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Abstract 
 
Home country effects on internationalization has been conventionally conceived as a 
contrast to the pull of host countries determinants. While scholarship acknowledges that home 
country support matters more to internationalizing emerging market multinational enterprises, 
the focus of extant literature has been underpinned by assumptions of stable macro-level and 
unidirectional institutional support for the internationalization of firms. This thesis contrasts 
with previous studies by repositioning the conversation to incorporate the temporal dimension, 
and investigate the multi-level relationships across institutions, industries and markets in the 
home country and the varied effects on internationalization.  
 
Chinese agrifood investment to advanced economies from 2008 to 2017 against the 
backdrop of rebalancing and consumption-led growth economy is the phenomenon and 
research context. The overarching research question is “How do home country effects shape 
the internationalization of Chinese firms?”. This is addressed in four contextual and case study 
chapters. Drawing on interdisciplinary literature and applying an abductive research process, I 
developed a dynamic home country relational model to study the internationalization process 
of Chinese firms that enriches existing process and institutional frameworks.   
 
There are four central findings presented in this thesis. First, home country support 
engenders different meanings constructed by heterogeneous dispensers and recipients who 
adopt discretionary selection in a competitive environment. Second, experienced agrifood 
firms have learned to deliberately avoid controversial farmland purchases and targeted 
downstream businesses in advanced economies to access resources and gain management skills. 
Third, wealthy non-agricultural Chinese groups lacking in specialized industry knowledge, 
face compounded challenges diversifying into agrifood sector and internationalizing 
simultaneously. Fourth, risk perception and risk mitigation have accentuated as 
internationalization of Chinese firms evolved, shifting from self-checking to tightening of 
regulatory controls and reinforced by businesses’ confirmation of support.   
   
This study has enhanced the understanding of evolving institutions, and the nuances 
and irregularity of internationalization processes through the explanation of complex 
interactions and responses from the perspective of home country actors.
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“IB research has become detached from new phenomena in the globalizing world.” 
– Delios (2017: 391) 
 
“How do institutional entrepreneurship and co-evolution affect the home country of 
the MNE?” – Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan (2010: 581) 
 
1.1   Overview 
 
This thesis begins with lingering puzzles and paradoxes surrounding what constitutes 
home country effects and how it works in the internationalization of Chinese firms. Despite an 
increase in media attention and studies in international business (IB) literature on the effects of 
home country institutional support or constraints (Voss, Buckley, & Cross, 2010), many 
questions on heterogeneity, micro-level foundations and multi-directional relationships of 
home country effects on internationalization have not been adequately addressed. Most studies 
focus on home country resources and the impact on motivations and performance relationship 
(Marano et al., 2016).   
 
China is an emerging market that is transitioning through multiple political and 
economic reforms. Evolving home country developments are changing the dynamics of 
interaction between different stakeholders that have implications for internationalization. 
Policy changes, different interpretations, implementation by different levels of governments 
and firms, responses of businesses, and burgeoning markets are happening concurrently. In this 
context, it is pertinent to conceptualize the real-world phenomena to develop our understanding 
on the roles of complex home country actors in the internationalization of Chinese firms.   
 
The quotes in the introductory vignette of this chapter are taken from renowned IB 
scholars. Delios (2017) underlines the concern that research has become distant from new 
phenomena and changes in the real world. Cantwell et al (2010) highlight the future direction 
for research into how home country institutions coevolve with internationalization. These calls 
are perceptive, and it is opportune for research to focus on China’s transitioning to provide new 
insights of home country effects on internationalization. Prior studies of home country 
determinants of internationalization emphasized on measurement of institutional factors. 
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However, most studies rarely address and explain momentous events, anomalous cases and 
changing circumstances. The sources, levels and scope of home country factors and actors are 
interesting topics which are hardly examined in depth. The research agenda of this thesis is to 
investigate and ascertain what constitute home country effects, how this influence 
internationalization and how the processes have evolved.  
 
China’s globalization has been studied extensively during a time of rapid growth but 
not in the context of recent home market rebalancing and a consumption driven economy. 
Interest in the study of internationalization of Chinese firms started prior to China’s formal 
promulgation of Go Global policy in 1999 and accession to WTO in 2001. Seminal works on 
MNEs based on the internalization model (Buckley & Casson, 1976) informed us of how 
motivations shape a country’s decisions on internationalization (Buckley et al., 2007). Another 
stream of literature paid attention to knowledge-based drivers of OFDI (Kogut & Zander, 1993) 
The focal and starting points of these works are the host country determinants of OFDI.  
 
Though studies of home country institutions are gaining prominence, empirical studies 
are preoccupied with formal and informal institutions or “rules of the game” (North, 1990). 
Extant literature is inclined to accept the assumption of direct linkage between institutional 
factors and internationalization (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). Causality is also applied 
to firm-specific advantages and country-specific advantages (Rugman & Li, 2007). The 
latecomer perspective of EMNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002a) has improved our 
understanding of how their internationalization experience deviated from the traditional path 
taken by MNEs of advanced economies. Special country-specific advantages (Buckley et al., 
2007; Rugman, Verbeke, & Quyen, 2011) enable EMNEs to internationalize without the 
typical firm ownership advantages (Ramamurti, 2012) and competitive advantages (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002a). From earlier resource-seeking (Wang, 
Carr, & Liu, 2016; Williamson & Raman, 2013) and technology-seeking motivations (Rui & 
Yip, 2008), Chinese overseas investment has expanded to agrifood ventures in advanced 
economies over the past decade. I argue for the integration of the process model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) with institutional frameworks to understand home country effects and the 
dynamics of internationalization.  
 
This thesis is situated in the context of China’s transition to rebalancing, consumption-
led growth and increasing protectionism. Taking a bottom-up approach would enable and 
facilitate the discovery nuances often missed in broad overviews. The well-established 
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approaches are safer but tend to reinforce longstanding assumptions and merely test existing 
frameworks, rather than generate new insights to enrich theoretical constructs. The view from 
outside considers the home country institutions as stable, smooth, and having a direct impact 
on internationalization. The home country context of emerging markets is often associated with 
the government policy impact on businesses and internationalization. The assumptions are 
usually top-down, static and aggregated abstraction and neat categorization of entities. 
However, capturing real world complexities is more challenging. It is unclear what goes on 
inside the proverbial black box. The search does not stop at the mere finding and opening of 
the black box but should uncover the meanings and the intricacies that make the system tick or 
falter. The behavior of the founders, entrepreneurs, managers and professionals in the firm 
influence their assessment and decision-making process. Besides fixed resources and 
capabilities (Barney, 1991), moderators and mechanisms could alter the course and results of 
internationalization.  
 
In this dissertation, I will be writing in the first person. The use of ‘I’ is intentional with 
an understanding that the research is my personal research journey. The first person also 
supports an abductive analysis grounded in Peircean pragmatism. As an interpreter, 
investigator, analyst and writer of this research involving people, I am present in the inquiry 
and my view will be represented in the development of the narratives as writers are not detached 
and disengaged in the real world. Writing in the first person has been well accepted in 
qualitative research as an expression of authenticity (Coghlan, 2008; Riad & Elmes, 2008) as 
a way to present emic creativity (Chilcott et al., 2016). 
 
I adopt a process rather than a variance approach (Van de Ven, 2007) as this would be 
appropriate for studying change in the Chinese context. The process framework encompasses 
interconnections and roles of actors at an intermediate and ground level of analysis (Langley, 
Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van De Ven, 2013). Though the Uppsala model emphasizes the role of 
the firm (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), it would be as important to understand the trees level and 
how this relates to the overall forest (Sayles, 1999).  There appears to be a mismatch between 
a static perception of the home country when the Chinese context is evolving at multiple levels, 
rather than unidirectional top down imposition of directives on local governments and firms. 
While internationalization presents opportunities, investors also face risks and uncertainties 
notwithstanding support from the home country. This study will go further to explore how 
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emerging market government and firms formulate and influence policies that support 
internationalization (Yan, Zhu, Fan, & Kalfadellis, 2018). 
 
Figure 1.1 represents the multilevel and temporal dimensions that are explored in this 
thesis. The conception of the home country is fragmented comprising broad central policies 
and flexible implementation by local government officials who forge relationships with 
industry and entrepreneurs-investors. The black box captures the micro-level interactions 
among actors of firms, industry, markets and government. I aim to track the effects of 
evolutionary home country factors on the dynamic internationalization process instead of 
taking a snapshot approach.    
 
Figure 1.1 Multilevel and temporal dimensions of the black box 
    
      Bottom up  
Static                          black box 
                                                                        Dynamic   
 
 
This chapter provides a synopsis of the journey undertaken in the study. After 
grounding the research context, I shall discuss the background, motivation, research strategy 
and theoretical framing of the research inquiry in IB knowledge. This is followed by the 
structure of the chapters on context, conceptualization, methodology and four case study 
chapters. The final section of this chapter summarizes the reconceptualization gleaned from the 
findings and theoretical contributions.    
 
1.1.1 Background 
 
Food security has long been a key and longstanding concern of China, as the 
government needs to ensure sufficient grain supplies at affordable prices to feed its 1.4 billion 
population. Food shortages have negative repercussions on the economic, social and political 
well-being of the Chinese. For the past three decades, the Chinese government managed to 
Macro-level: agregate and variance
Central Government
Local government Managers
Markets / Industry
Businesses types
Top down 
Internationalization 
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achieve self-sufficiency in grains. Since the late 2000s, China had to import more food 
especially soybeans and corn. Concurrently, food safety has emerged as a growing concern 
when the contamination of meat and dairy products came to light. Moreover, demand for better 
quality food by the burgeoning Chinese middle class has encouraged investment interest in a 
variety of premium products from different international sources. A McKinsey study estimated 
that by 2022, the upper middle class will account for 54 percent of urban households and 56 
percent of urban private consumption or 550 million people (Barton, Chen, & Jin, 2013).   
 
Agricultural investment accounted for one percent of Chinese total global investment 
in 2005 but increased to four percent in the last three years (Scissors, 2017). However, 
investment projects below $100 billion are not captured in this dataset. This means that 
cumulative small-scale projects by the same investor over time are not tracked by American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI). Traditionally Chinese investment and developmental aid were 
directed at developing economies such as Africa and mainland Southeast Asia and emerging 
markets in South America. Since the global financial crisis (GFC) and food crises 2007 – 2008 
and tainted food scandals, Chinese OFDI in agrifood sector has begun to move towards 
advanced economies. Being an emergent trend, Chinese OFDI in agrifood sector has scarcely 
been studied. Nonetheless, agrifood OFDI is an important research setting to inform 
scholarship of the dynamics of China’s globalization efforts. This study is conducted during 
China’s shift from a rapid growth in manufacturing and export economy to consumption-led 
rebalancing. Agrifood OFDI continues to receive encouragement and endorsement from the 
Chinese government, unlike some speculative sectors that have been discouraged in the current 
mood of deleveraging credit.  
 
China’s transition from a socialist command economy to mixed and capitalist market 
forms have resulted in unclear and overlapping demarcation of boundaries. China has 
implemented pro-market reforms since the 1980s, with the most extensive restructuring of 
SOEs effected from 1998 to 2003. The two SOE case companies studied in this thesis are 
majority state-owned and publicly listed. They are among the more important and better 
performing SOEs that have undergone restructuring under the pro-market reforms and most 
are considered hybrids (Fan & Hope, 2013; Putterman & Li, 2008). POEs that have capitalized 
on pro-market reforms and deregulation to prosper and prevail in the Chinese economy. Prior 
to the recognition of POEs as legal entities in 1999, POEs collaborated with government-linked 
bodies to gain legitimacy. Though most POEs started as family-owned small businesses, they 
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comprise a diversity of organizations of varying sizes, ambitions, management styles and 
political connections (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015a).  
 
Home country institutions are not limited to regulative forms, but include normative 
and cognitive elements and their relationships to organizational change (Scott, 2001). The 
Weberian model touted as the ideal bureaucracy for the growth of Western advanced 
economies is absent in China’s political economy, where individuals and relationships matter 
more (Ang, 2016; Scott, 2014). As change is the norm in Chinese political economy, this thesis 
embraces change and uncertainties to consider the multidimensional influences of different 
home country elements on internationalization. This study focuses on agrifood OFDI to 
advanced economies undertaken by Chinese firms from 2008 to 2017. During the period of 
study, China has undergone further reforms in the domestic economy and witnessed parallel 
leadership changes within the firms and growing nationalism and protectionism in the 
international environment.  
 
1.1.2 Motivation for the study 
 
This study is prompted by the lack of consistent explanation on the influence of 
transitional home country actors on internationalization process. My aim is to move beyond 
broad applications and get into the protagonists’ minds (Doz, 2011) to find how and why they 
influence decisions over time. The complexities of relationships and change are neglected areas 
in IB scholarship and has not caught up with theoretical developments in political economy 
literature. In view of the disparity between phenomenal development and theorizing, I am 
motivated to address three main dimensions in this thesis: temporal, multi-level and 
interdependencies.  
 
There is preponderant interest in IB scholarship on the direct connection between 
antecedents and outcomes. However, scant consideration is given to complexities in the 
development process. Process framework which has been utilized in the study of European 
firms, has largely been downplayed or simplified in studies on emerging economies. The 
cumulative progression posited in the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) does not fully 
explain observations of irregular growth spurts and patterns in Chinese internationalization. 
The institutional stream of IB knowledge has offered explanations of home country influence 
on internationalization at certain points of economic development. Heeding calls to incorporate 
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change and integrative institutional research (Peng, 2003), I strive to study continuity and 
interruptions of institutions in a holistic way.  
 
The Chinese home country context includes different levels of institutions as well as 
the weakness of institutions. The central and local authorities play respective roles in guiding 
and implementing policies related to internationalization (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014). Macro-level 
aggregate analysis has offered a broad and comprehensive overview of internationalization 
patterns and causation. Interaction among local stakeholders that lead to individual managerial 
and entrepreneurial decisions are not captured in most studies. The conventional assumption 
adheres to strict boundaries of firms and institutions. The conventional view of home 
institutional support tends to be restrictive and dualistic, focusing on state-supported ownership 
advantages (Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman et al., 2011) bestowed on SOEs to acquire overseas 
resources and strategic assets. In contrast, enterprises that are not politically connected are 
assumed to be constrained by market imperfections. However, this does not offer convincing 
explanation of the phenomenal rise of POEs in market-driven OFDI. Chinese firms are 
characterized by heterogeneity. Among the SOEs, there are varying degrees of government 
involvement, private shareholders, professional management, national and local level 
supervision.  
 
Existing home country structures cannot be assumed to be stable and enduring as actors 
and policies adapt or foster further changes. Following calls for new directions and agenda for 
IB scholarship, I hope to bring relevance by re-engaging with the real world to develop 
knowledge that incorporates novelty and complexity (Delios, 2017). Participants of 
internationalization are negotiators, collaborators and competitors in active, responsive and 
coevolving relationships (Child, Rodrigues, & Tse, 2012). Reductionism and high levels of 
abstraction overlook two sides of institutional change and the negative side effects of 
globalization (Meyer, 2017). Considering that changes are prevalent in emerging market 
institutions, a study that integrates the transition (Peng, 2003) and roles of multiple parties 
would provide greater insights than stable and unchanging institutions. Theorizing on a veneer 
of evenness belie the complexities of the political economy comprising various dimensions, 
layers, overlapping connections and paradoxes. The aim of this exercise is to produce 
  Chapter One: Introduction 
 
8 
 
interesting theories that engage with problems of the world (Kilduff, 2006), incorporating 
adaptive changes and using ends-in-view as guidance (Dewey, Boydston, & Hickman, 2003).1   
 
1.2   Research Strategy  
 
This thesis adopts a qualitative (Doz, 2011) multiple case study approach guided by 
abductive logic. Though less prevalent than quantitative studies in IB, a qualitative approach 
has potential to generate novel findings and enable a conceptual leap (Klag & Langley, 2013). 
In the article celebrating 40 years of the Uppsala model, the founders urge for more micro-
based qualitative research (Vahlne & Johanson, 2017). The research design of this thesis moves 
away from a macro-level perspective to focus on multilevel and multidimensional interactions 
and processes. This is a bottom-up and inclusive approach that considers the perspectives of 
central-local government, business owners/ managers and industry/market dynamics. The 
research strategy that I have chosen is conducive to shifting the conversation based on 
conventional assumptions at the country level to reflect nuances and relationships (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002), managerial behavior and decision-making (March & Shapira, 1987). The use of 
qualitative case study methods can be justified as an effective way to address the research 
problems on a recent phenomenon and transitions that have not been adequately studied.  
 
Studying China poses both methodological and practical challenges. Theoretical 
exploration is consistent with the Chinese context and history of experimentation and 
adaptation. I am inclined to apply abductive logic in analyzing case studies to search for 
answers to surprises in the phenomena. Instead of choosing either positivist or interpretivist 
ontology, I am persuaded toward Peircean pragmatist ontology (Peirce, 1955; Peirce, Fisch, 
Moore, & Klousel, 1982) that offers alternative explanations and articulate meanings of 
practice. Induction is data-driven reduction while deduction is hypotheses-driven data analysis 
(Brinkmann, 2014). Abduction is different from induction and deduction in that it does not 
require a statement of a priori determinants and fixed entities. Applying abductive logic allows 
flexibility in iterating empirical material with theories to expand and develop insights and novel 
theoretical constructs (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). 
 
                                                          
1 The Blackwell reference defines ends-in-view as a plan or a hypothesis that guides present activity and is to be 
evaluated by its consequences and revised throughout the activity guided by it. Its appraisal springs from the 
fact that there is something lacking or wanting in the existing situation. 
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I incorporate a temporal dimension by considering political, economic and historical 
developments (Buckley, 2016) in response to recent calls by eminent IB scholars. Drawing on 
biological sciences, evolution is the natural selection of organisms in the environment while 
coevolution encompasses more complex interplay of internal and external forces and adaption 
of organizational forms (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999). The evolution of institutions and 
human adaptability are uncertain (North, 2005) and should not be taken for granted. The 
acceptance of non-linear and uneven development in the study could be represented as 
systematic combining as events unfold and warrant reconsideration (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; 
Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). I argue that the international process model is a suitable initial 
framework to study the development towards the current state of play in the internationalization 
of Chinese firms. Apart from being a true blue IB framework built from empirical research and 
not borrowed from other disciplines, the internationalization process model (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977) accepts variations at the micro levels and change over time. Learning from 
experience is key to improvement and boosts the confidence of managers to expand 
international commitments (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). Internationalization process is neither 
regular nor linear but an evolutionary process which may include discontinuous dynamics 
(Santangelo & Meyer, 2017; Vahlne & Johanson, 2017).  
 
In line with the pragmatist epistemological inclination of this study, I have adopted a 
reflexive approach (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009; Finlay, 2016) to problematize conventional 
assumptions to generate interesting inquiry (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Golden-Biddle & 
Locke, 2007; Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011). Widely accepted and longstanding assumptions on 
internationalization based on dichotomous support versus constraint associated with ownership 
types, trade-off between domestic and international diversification, land-based agrifood 
investment and risk propensity of Chinese investors, need to be re-examined and explained.  
 
Knowledge gained from literature, field work, follow up research and reflexivity 
contribute to the development of this thesis. Following the lead of multiple puzzles, I 
investigate and uncover the mystery behind the surprises and inconsistencies (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2011; Brinkmann, 2014; Hoffmann, 2013) and build an interesting narrative that 
helps in advancing the theoretical frames. This process entails iteration and sense-making 
(Weick, 1995a) of the empirical and practical world, reviewing analyses to reach eureka 
moments, leading to discovery of novel insights.   
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1.2.1 Situating the study in IB knowledge 
 
Questions remain over the meaning of home country dynamic effect, the scope it 
encompasses and the manner it shapes internationalization. Policy changes from pro-market 
reforms, deregulations to recentralization and rebalancing are often seen as being paradoxical 
and a reversal of past reforms. Though multinationals are social constructions developed from 
institutional context that shape how they internationalize, institutions are diverse, shifting, 
contingent and across boundaries (Morgan, 2007). The strict categorization and adherence to 
entity boundaries of SOEs, POEs and government have impeded studies in change and 
collaboration. Moreover, most firms do not start at zero, but would have acquired some prior 
forms and levels of international experience such as import/export and cooperation with foreign 
companies. 
 
While country specific advantages (Rugman et al., 2011) facilitate selective enterprises 
to internationalize with enormous speed and scale, such firms may suffer from liabilities of 
country of origin (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) associated with 
state support. The country of origin liability is not limited to trade and perception of product 
quality. SOEs are typically viewed as less efficient and uncompetitive, and their links with the 
Chinese government undermine legitimacy, and may be viewed with suspicion by host 
countries (Cui & Jiang, 2009). The predominant statement of advantages accrued to SOEs from 
home country institutional support is not clear cut. The restructuring of central SOEs into 
"national champions" paradoxically exposes them to stronger institutional pressures from home 
and host country governments than local SOEs (Li et al., 2014). 
 
Mainstream IB scholarship has presented the tip of the iceberg of complex multi-
layered and multi-dimensional home country processes. The limitation of the institutional 
frame is the preoccupation with a unidirectional influence between home country state policy 
on firms. The tendency to focus on a country-level of analysis neglect critical details that may 
tilt the balance among different actors in the home country. It would be unrealistic in practice 
to hold constant either managers, industry, or market in internationalization. The institutional 
frame has been critiqued as static (Peng, 2003) but the challenge is to incorporate change in a 
study of home country effects on internationalization.  
 
The Uppsala model has been interpreted as a progressive path towards higher 
commitments as the firm overcomes liability of foreignness (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
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Network relationships and learning are posited as positive factors that would boost 
internationalization commitment levels (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). However, the assumption 
of a cumulative process may not work in practice as the model leaves open the prospect of 
reduction in commitments. Internationalization of firms could be irregular, with dormant, 
active, surge and decline periods. Home country effects have commonly been studied in 
isolation from process in international business. Integrating home country institutional with the 
internationalization process of firms would overcome the limitations of a static perspective, 
and enhance the explanatory power of existing models.  
 
Evolutionary and coevolutionary models are more appropriate to study the 
internationalization of Chinese firms and explain paradoxes not addressed in extant literature. 
Moreover, the interactions of actors and combined effects that are not captured in the 
institutional frame could be compensated by using a dynamic framework. An interdisciplinary 
approach that draws on strategy and political economic literature would enrich and expand the 
process framework. Eminent IB scholars have called for an multidisciplinary perspectives to 
create meaningful special theories (Buckley, Doh, & Benischke, 2017). Using the 
coevolutionary lens (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; Lewin & Volberda, 1999) can be justified as 
an appropriate way to study complexities and change in the context of Chinese 
internationalization.  The coevolution of MNEs with host country institutions have been studied 
recently (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010). Political economy literature has studied 
coevolution of business and levels of government within the home country context extensively 
(Ang, 2016; Chen & Naughton, 2017; Child et al., 2012; Krug & Hendrischke, 2015) but there 
is a missing link with internationalization. My aim is to tap the body of interdisciplinary 
knowledge on home country developments and the mechanisms that shape internationalization.  
 
 Following preliminary research and pilot project on the ground, I developed an initial 
conceptual framework and an overarching research question:  
 
    How do home country effects shape the internationalization of Chinese firms? 
 
Throughout the study, taking the cues from empirical material, I generated more related 
questions to address how and why inquiries that are relevant to the themes of the four content 
chapters. I searched for alternative framing for the data elicited from progressive rounds of 
fieldwork, analysis of archival published material and recent developments. By analyzing the 
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detailed processes and counterbalances, I aim to find out the reasons, opportunities and 
challenges of individual actors in the internationalization process. 
 
1.3   Outline of The Thesis 
 
Following the abductive approach, I present this thesis according to how my research 
has advanced and developed. The content chapters are documented according to the main 
themes of the narrative of home country dynamics in the discovery process. Relevant literature 
will be addressed in the conceptual and content chapters instead presenting as an entirety in a 
separate chapter. It would be clearer and more meaningful to discuss specific literature and 
concepts according to the themes of the relevant cases. The content chapters (5, 6, 7 and 8) are 
presented in article format as they have been improved and developed from earlier drafts that 
were published as conference papers.    
  
Chapter 2 shows the development of the initial conceptual framework towards 
integrating the coevolutionary perspective and learning process models. While mainstream 
literature focuses on government support and weak institutions (Voss et al., 2010), I integrate 
leveraging of institutions by business and institutional actors (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2015; Landau, 
Karna, Richter, & Uhlenbruck, 2016). The other framework to be employed is the Uppsala 
model to capture the temporal dimension. Time is a critical element in conceptualizing Chinese 
internationalization, owing to the rapid changes and complex relationships of the context. I 
conceive home country dynamics to comprise: (1) how officials interpret and implement 
regulations and policy directives; (2) industry standing and connections of business actors and 
(3) home market developments. Two of the contextual case study chapters (5 and 8) fit the 
coevolutionary framework while learning process was found to be the dominant framework 
and more suited to analyze the other two chapters (6 and 7) on value chain targets. 
 
 Chapter 3 provides the context and historical background of this study. Inclusion of the 
context would lend credence to generating multifaceted and profound meanings and in turn 
enhance theorizing. For a large country steeped in history and frequent policy changes, it is 
essential to understand the evolution of policies and responses that impact internationalization. 
The heterogeneity of Chinese firms such as hybrid SOEs and differences among POEs are 
clarified. SOEs are increasingly commercially oriented but also have national social 
responsibilities to fulfil. I identified at least five stages of pro-market reforms, some with 
intersecting and corrective objectives. In the review of how political economic developments 
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shape internationalization, it is common to find concurrent progress, adjustments and 
redirection of policies and practice by different parties in the state, non-state and official roles. 
I also provide the background on the agrifood sector, which is a focal area of this thesis. 
Agriculture value added as a percentage of China’s GDP was at 8.99 per cent in 2015 according 
to the World Bank data, showing a downward trend since 2004 (at 13.5 per cent). Deficiencies 
in China’s natural endowment and rapid industrialization forced Chinese firms to look to more 
diverse overseas destinations to make up for shortfalls and meet food security and food safety 
needs.  
 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the philosophical basis and paradigmatic underpinnings of 
abduction (Bertilsson, 2004; Brinkmann, 2014; Martela, 2015) and why this is the appropriate 
approach for the study of Chinese home country dynamics on the emergent internationalization 
of the agrifood sector. I adopt the holistic and processual casing research strategy for this study 
due to the changes and heterogeneity of actors involved. The methodological process involves 
the selection of cases, preparation of semi-structured questions and protocol, fieldwork process, 
analysis of empirical material and published sources and perspectives from industry experts. 
The study comprises a total of eight companies, two SOEs and six POEs. Four companies (two 
SOEs and two POEs) are full-fledged agricultural and agrifood core businesses. I justify the 
adoption of case-oriented instead of variable-oriented approach (Ragin, 1999), and utilize 
process rather than variant research (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Case study methods are 
useful for investigating contemporary phenomenon in depth with the real world (Yin, 2014). I 
conducted rigorous within-case analyses to find common and different patterns from cross-case 
analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The casing process involves finding out what the case is about 
and the causal mechanisms (Ragin, 2014) that shape the patterns of behavior. 
 
Chapter 5 is the first content chapter aimed at illuminating the meanings of home 
country support. Existing literature assumes duality of support for SOEs versus constraints on 
POEs that lack political connections (Voss et al., 2010). I question this assumption by 
examining the effects of ongoing pro-market reforms, deregulation and recentralization. 
Policies coevolve with the roles played by local officials and businesses. SOEs have come 
under increasing pressure to perform and need to justify state support for internationalization. 
On the other hand, the claim that POEs face constraints and escape overseas (Witt & Lewin, 
2007) needs finetuning as some may not require or yearn for state support. Some POEs may 
not trade off autonomy in global strategic decisions and divulge their plans to gain state support. 
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Using the experience of eight case companies that have received varying degrees of home 
country support for internationalization, I reconceptualized home country support from 
different perspectives and the evolving discretionary approach adopted by stakeholders.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the reasons why and how four leading Chinese agrifood 
corporations (two SOEs and two POEs) have invested in downstream agrifood businesses. The 
pre-emptive strategy to avoid land purchases suggests that the management has learned 
vicariously from negative experience in developing countries. They reasoned that access to 
global resources and value chain could be achieved by acquiring established processors and 
distributors instead of farmland purchases. Industry leaders also aim to gain management skills 
and avoid controversies from nationalist backlash over sensitive foreign land ownership issues. 
However, integrating acquired assets have been uneven, resulting in some level of divestment 
and de-commitment of international assets. Attempts to fulfil food safety and food security 
needs are complicated by difficulties of infiltrating the China market, even from the perspective 
of model Chinese firms. The objective to supply the China market may not always work out 
because of the uncompetitive prices of beef products from advanced economies like Australia. 
Chinese consumers are unmoved to wean off traditional food for unfamiliar foods. Moreover, 
increased home country governance has constrained expansion while recent import restrictions 
would undermine importing products from overseas assets to the China market.  
 
Chapter 7 showcases four selected case companies (all POEs) that target upstream land-
based farming in OFDI ventures targeting land-based OFDI. I label these firms as diversifier-
internationalizers owing to their wealth accumulated from non-agricultural core businesses and 
current expansion into the agrifood sector at home and overseas. There are elements of 
opportunism, but the investors claimed to be prepared to stake for the long haul. The main 
finding is the gap between intentions and actual achievement due to the lack of knowledge of 
specific host country environmental factors and specialized industry management skills. The 
realization of ‘mistakes’ was only evident from hindsight and sense-making by senior 
executives and managers of companies concerned. The aspiration to access agrifood resources 
directly from its source did not pan out because of shortages and high operating costs. Two of 
the companies were locked in upstream segment and detached from supplying to the hyped 
China market. Despite their status as POEs, one company failed in its bid due to host country 
regulatory changes and nationalist public campaigns. The interesting insight shows that OFDI 
could be derailed contrary to assumptions of stability in advanced countries as main drivers.    
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 In the final content Chapter 8, I examine the evolution of the concept of risk 
management in Chinese OFDI. Extant literature finds that earlier Chinese internationalization 
has been associated with destinations that are politically unstable developing countries 
(Buckley et al., 2007). Chinese are overpaying in part due to inexperience and willingness to 
pay higher prices for coveted brands (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). The notions of risk, viability 
and sustainability of internationalization have rarely been addressed relative to aggressive 
acquisitions supported by increasing pro-market reforms and deregulation. However, Chinese 
investors and government increasingly acknowledge the need to deal with different types of 
risks and has intervened against overleveraging more actively in the past year. The term “come 
back” emerged as an afterthought over a decade after launching China’s “go out” or 
globalization policy in 1999. Firms were initially entrusted to put in place risk mitigation 
control mechanisms to ensure commercial viability and long-term sustainability of their OFDI 
ventures. As official policy moved strongly against high risk internationalization, businesses 
explicitly showed support for the government’s risk management priorities.  
 
 Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by presenting a coherent overview of the major themes, 
findings and contributions of the study. I address the research questions pertaining to how 
Chinese invest in agrifood businesses in advanced economies in the past decade and from there 
explain why events took these courses. Using dynamic frameworks and drawing on multi- 
disciplinary literature I enriched the process and institutional frameworks in IB scholarship. 
The use of case studies is less common in empirical work but rewarding in terms of eliciting 
inside narratives and reasoning offered by participants on what really happens in the practical 
world. Internationalization is a non-linear process fraught with uncertainties and challenges 
that national level studies and may not uncover. I recapitulate the conceptual framework and 
findings in the case studies, and identify the contributions of this thesis to theories, methods, 
practice and policy. The limitations and agenda for future research are recognized.   
 
1.4   Summary 
 
I have introduced the overview, background, definitions, motivations, research strategy, 
positioning of the research, concepts, methodology, chapter outline and synopsis of the thesis. 
The above discussion prepares for the exploration of complex phenomena of Chinese OFDI to 
agrifood sector in advanced economies. The three key areas of the research focus are defining 
what constitutes home country factors and effects, the selection of the agrifood sector against 
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the backdrop of China’s move to consumption economy, and the timeframe covering a surge 
in agrifood OFDI to advanced economies. The aim of this thesis is to delve into the subtleties 
and nuances of relationships among actors to address puzzles of diverse and concurrent 
phenomena of China’s globalization. The case study selection of SOEs and POEs 
complemented by official and industry perspectives improve our understanding of the 
complexities of home country effects on internationalization.  
 
I will be revisiting the concepts, literature, definitions and methodology in the following 
chapters. Through the study of interactions of home country actors over time using abductive 
logic, I gradually discovered the missing links that illuminate the evolution of state support, 
diversification of non-agrifood firms, pre-emptive strategies of downstream investors, and 
development of risk control mechanisms. These themes are important but have rarely been 
addressed in extant IB literature. Reconceptualization of home country effects as dynamic 
connections contributes to the extension and enrichment of institutional and process frames in 
the study of international business.  
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2 Chapter Two: Conceptualization of Home Country Dynamics in 
Internationalization 
 
 “Interdependence is and ought to be as much the ideal of man as self-sufficiency.  
  Man is a social being.” -  Mahatma Gandhi 
 
 “The first step toward change is awareness. The second step is acceptance.”  
  - Nathaniel Branden (Canadian-American psychotherapist) 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
The home country has significant influence on the internationalization strategies and 
performance of emerging market MNEs (Luo & Wang, 2012; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; 
Tolentino, 2010; Xu & Meyer, 2013). Studies of home country IB literature has been dominated 
by institutional frame and linkage between country-specific advantages (CSA) and firm-
specific advantages (FSA). The main discourses are underpinned by shared assumptions of 
stability and support for favored firms. IB research has focused on the motivation of firms, 
their resources and capability, pitched at macro-level analysis and deterministic linkage to 
outcomes. While there is agreement on the importance of home country factors on 
internationalization, it is uncertain how the influence is operationalized among different actors. 
The main aim of this thesis is to find out what goes on in home country dynamics. I 
reconceptualize home country influence on internationalization as a multilevel, interactive, 
dynamic and non-linear process, and illuminate the mechanisms and contingencies that may 
moderate the outcomes and development. 
 
The institutional stream has gained prominence as the third pillar (Peng et al., 2009) by 
including context that is lacking in the conventional industry-based (Porter, 1980) and 
resource-based views (Barney, 1991). Institutions may provide firms with direct or indirect 
resources to enhance global expansion (Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2011; Wei, Clegg, & Ma, 2015). 
SOEs are seen as the primary beneficiaries of state support while small private firms are less 
likely to receive help from home institutions (Voss et al., 2010). However, close association 
with the home country government pose a liability and negative image for MNEs in the host 
countries (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). EMNEs could compensate for the 
weakness of formal institutions by cultivating informal networks (Child & Tsai, 2005). 
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Networks have helped SMEs in emerging markets to gain knowledge and resources, enabling 
them to expand to new markets (Chetty & Blankenburg Holm, 2000). Institutions in resource-
rich environments may foster competitive or collaborative internationalization strategies 
among firms in the industry (Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li, & Meyer, 2017). Just as coopetition 
exists in international markets (Luo, 2007), home country actors may collaborate or compete 
for resources and influence given the right opportunities. Besides conforming to institutional 
guidance, firms may proactively manage relationships with actors in the socio-political 
environment (Hadjikhani, Lee, & Ghauri, 2008). Business groups in China (Yiu, 2011) 
operating in conditions of market imperfections could generate OLI advantages (Dunning, 
2001). Contrary to Porter’s argument that a nation’s firms must be robust before they could 
compete globally (Porter, 1990). However, EMNEs may internationalize to overcome 
competitive disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005) as latecomers could use the springboard 
strategy (Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018) and compound the advantages gained from acquiring 
international assets and capabilities (Mathews, 2002a).  
 
The Uppsala model is the foundation of process research (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) in 
IB scholarship. The model subsequently incorporates networks (Forsgren, 2015; Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1988; Johanson & Mattsson, 2015) to explain emerging market firms’ entry to new 
foreign markets. The assumption inherent in the Uppsala process framework is positive 
progression. Learning from home country networks enhance firms’ ability to build capabilities 
for international operations (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). However, firms may learn from positive 
(Casillas & Moreno-Menéndez, 2014; Johanson & Vahlne, 2003) as well as negative 
experiences (Madsen & Desai, 2010) or vicariously (Huber, 1991; Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 
2014; Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016; Pellegrino & McNaughton, 2015; Posen & Chen, 2013; 
Yang, Li, & Delios, 2015) from earlier examples unrelated to the firms’ direct acquisition of 
knowledge.  
 
While existing studies provide a useful guide and overview of the composition of home 
country effects, the relative degrees and impact on internationalization remain ambivalent and 
inconclusive. Economic and social changes in emerging economies raise questions on the 
adequacy of applying specific frames in isolation. Institutions and process streams have been 
studied separately in extant literature. In the latest augmented version of the Uppsala model, 
the authors proposed to include evolution, from early internationalization to the global firm 
(Vahlne & Johanson, 2017).  
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China has transitioned from a full state command economy over the past four decades, 
increasing the proportion of market mechanisms (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008a; Wank, 1999) which consequently impact internationalization. Continuous pro-market 
reforms have narrowed the management gap between SOEs and POEs (Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, 
& Nielsen, 2016) and presumably the economic and institutional distance between home and 
host countries (Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). 
An increasing number of Chinese POEs investing in advanced economies draw attention to 
new areas of research interests, in contrast to previous preoccupation with government support 
for SOEs. Integrating internationalization process with institutional frameworks would deepen 
our understanding of home country effects on internationalization. As relationships often 
evolve in complex and interlocking ways, it is important to trace the dynamics of home country 
factors on internationalization. The continuous interactions of actors and stakeholders in 
government, business, industry, markets and networks. What these relationships mean to 
internationalization would be the focus of this study.  
 
This conceptual chapter initiates an overarching problematization of common 
assumptions of home country effects. IB research rarely address concurrent multilevel and 
concurrent multifaceted changes (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2015). Relevant frameworks that capture 
the actions and reactions among the diversity of actors with changes is scarce. Mainstream 
studies tend to treat home country effects as unidimensional, stable and linear, based on the 
premise of rationality, efficiency and causal impact guided by neo-classical economics. Yet, 
dynamic relationships matter because in the practical world, complex interactions coexist 
among of managers in firms, industry associations and agents of government. The pace and 
scale in which EMNEs internationalize (Luo & Tung, 2007) calls for integrating different 
perspectives, multilevel interactions and temporal dimensions. Alternatively, qualitative 
studies may generate novel theoretical constructs. The emergent analytical framework should 
portray interdependencies among economic and political actors, institutional changes, 
industries networks and markets. The construction of a dynamic home country framework is 
conducive to investigating and addressing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions of home country 
effects on internationalization. 
 
The research setting of this study is the internationalization of Chinese firms in the 
agrifood sector to advanced economies. The agrifood sector is chosen because of the 
importance of food security that has pervaded the Chinese history and political economy and 
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recent concerns over food safety issues. Another unique characteristic of the agrifood sector is 
that farmers and corporations receive subsidies and protection in the domestic market but 
support for internationalization varies widely. While resource-seeking motives have largely 
been shaped earlier agrifood OFDI to developing economies, investment targets in advanced 
economies in recent years are more diverse. OFDI in agrifood business is imperative to the 
current domestic context of growing middle class demands for food safety, rebalancing policy 
towards qualitative growth, consumer-oriented economy, fine-tuning market reforms and 
recentralization. Institutional and process frames can be enriched by adopting a dynamic home 
country framework developed from inter-disciplinary political economy and economic 
sociology literature discussed in this chapter.    
 
This conceptual chapter begins with a synopsis of the conceptual framing process. Instead 
of having a separate chapter on literature review, I provide an overview of relevant literature 
that conceptualize the main themes in this thesis. Specific literatures are discussed in greater 
detail in the relevant content chapters and case studies. I problematize extant literature by 
questioning conventional assumptions in mainstream literature, providing alternative 
groundings from interdisciplinary sources and analysis, in the lead up to generating research 
questions. Using abductive reasoning to analyze empirical material, I develop an outline of the 
emergent framework to provide guidance for the research agenda of this project. Finally, I 
discuss how continuous iteration with data would help in the construction of an integrated, 
bottom-up, multi-relational and coevolutionary conceptual frame to conduct in-depth study of 
home country dynamics and internationalization. This study aims to theorize through multi-
dimensional and temporal lenses to enrich institutional and process frames, and synergize 
nuanced conversations in IB research. 
 
2.2   Conceptual framing process  
 
This thesis has evolved organically, undergoing various phases of iterating theories with 
empirical material. The construction of an emergent framework runs in parallel to my personal 
research journey. The abductive process, graphically depicted in Figure 2.1, adopts a 
continuous iteration between theories and data. I have outlined seven stages to refine the 
conceptual construct over three years. The first step involves a broad approach to finding the 
main conversations in literature relevant to my research topic. Prior to fieldwork, I scanned the 
broad IB literature related to emerging markets to find a tentative working framework. The two 
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initial working models derived from scoping the expanse of IB literature are the eclectic model 
or OLI  (Dunning, 2001) and the latecomer perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002a, 
2002b). The OLI is well-established while the latecomer angle seems relevant to studying 
EMNEs. As part of my pilot project, I visited senior academics in IB, economics and 
management disciplines in various Chinese and Australian universities. However, both 
frameworks struggle to explain agrifood OFDI setting. Data generated from fieldwork shows 
certain discrepancies that are not explained by mainstream theories in extant IB literature.  
 
Following the first round of interviews in late 2015 and feedback given by senior 
academics attending the EIBA conference, I was persuaded that the process frame was more 
suitable to study the context chosen. To enrich the process frame and find an appropriate 
framework for the interview data, my supervisor and I discussed the institutional frame 
extensively to present home country perspectives informed by field knowledge. The second 
round of interviews with participants of four Chinese companies in mid-2016, concurrent 
discussions with business executives of Chinese firms and subsidiaries based in Australia as 
well as consultants and officials in Australia threw more light on some puzzles. After going 
through interview and secondary data, I included learning and feedback responses to highlight 
the interactive nature of relationships and the dynamic internationalization process. Figure 2.1 
shows the journey of developing a conceptual framework for this study taking a reflexive 
approach. It is not plausible to apply a single theoretical framework from extant literature for 
the study. In the process of iterating data with theories, I would draw on interdisciplinary 
literature to reflect the coevolution of home country actors on internationalization.   
 
The recent update of the Uppsala model (Vahlne & Johanson, 2017) was timely and 
welcomed as I was editing the thesis. The authors call for the inclusion of four features: firm-
level heterogeneity and milli-micro level bounded rationality; possibility of innovation; 
performance outcomes due to managerial intent and actions taken by others; and coevolution 
between behavior of actors at different levels of analysis (2017:1090). Firstly, to follow up 
requires deeper insights into managerial behavior and relationships to enrich the conventionally 
firm-centered analysis which the U-model is originally based. Secondly, the path is irregular 
rather than incremental and cumulative. Chinese investors may increase commitment, expand 
geographically, diversify into different sectors, sustain, hold back or de-internationalize. 
Thirdly, learning is not limited to experiential learning but may include vicarious learning and 
adjustment and recovery from setbacks. Fourthly, the main counterargument to the 2017 
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version of the Uppsala model  (Santangelo & Meyer, 2017) is that “path-breaking resource 
commitments” create novelty and deviate from a gradual path of growth, exposing firms to 
both opportunities and higher risks (2017: 1115). In a nutshell, this thesis will follow a non-
linear research, reflexive and iterative approach to investigating phenomena.  
 
Figure 2.1 Reflexivity in an abduction process: iteration of theories and empirical material 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to building an integrative and evolutionary framework, I incorporated 
interdependencies and changes in the home country. I draw on the wealth of multidisciplinary 
literature from strategy, political economy and economic sociology to make sense and explain 
the rich and diverse empirical material. The findings that encapsulate the coevolution of among 
actors of institutions, business and markets will contribute to developing an emergent 
framework. Mere incremental extension of extant IB theories would be inadequate to explain 
the complex and dynamic phenomenon (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006), and irregular patterns of 
internationalization. Following the guidance that good qualitative research involves abductive 
engagement of multi-theory debate (Doz, 2011), I aim to derive the most plausible explanation 
from the iteration of data with theory.  
 
I conceive home country effects on internationalization to comprise structured and 
informal interactions and responses involving key actors in institutions, firms, industry and 
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boundaries. While IB literature on emerging economies institutions has broadened prior firm-
centric view, questions remain over the composition and diverse effects of home country 
institutions (Peng, 2003). Firms may proactively leverage institutions to create conditions that 
are more favorable to achieving their objectives (Child & Tsai, 2005; Landau et al., 2016; 
Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). Using the institutional work lens firms provide 
feedback to the home country government to develop favorable OFDI regulations  (Yan et al., 
2018).  A coevolutionary lens used in this study is not limited to adaptation to the environment 
but mutual adaptation of the main actors in the home country.  
 
Owing to the inadequacies of stable institutions and progressive process in conventional 
frameworks, my proposed model will include interactions of businesses, officials, industry and 
markets. I incorporate industry and market factors in the home country dynamics because the 
complexities emanating from domestic environment need to be addressed. That firms interact 
in a community justify the adoption of various strategies specific to industries and situations. 
Markets are important in the context of the agrifood sector because of China’s huge population 
of 1.4 billion and a growing middle class that demand both quantity and quality. While central 
agrifood SOEs have traditionally fulfilled the responsibility of providing sufficient supplies of 
grains and basic ingredients at affordable prices, local and hybrid SOEs and POEs are 
capitalizing on the potential growth in demand for premium quality food resources from 
advanced economies.  
 
2.3  Problematization Steps 
 
To achieve a “conceptual leap” towards discovery entails arbitraging dialectical tensions 
and collaborative relations in the reasoning and research process (Klag & Langley, 2013). 
Instead of following and rehashing the well-trodden paths of finding research gaps, I have 
designed and developed a conceptual framework by problematizing and inquiring current 
assumptions of relatively controlled home country environment. As with most studies, I 
attempted gap spotting initially to identify interesting and emergent areas not covered in the 
body of knowledge or tested by existing theories. However, gap spotting was found to be 
constraining during the pilot project and fieldwork in designing the research questions. To 
move beyond incremental contribution to theorizing, I problematized assumptions in related 
extant literature in the hope of innovating theoretical construction supported by empirical 
material. Problematization entails a critical approach to deepen inquiry and extend existing 
research parameters. Constructing interesting theories involve denying some of the 
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assumptions of the domain and some taken-for-granted world in routinized living (Davis, 1971). 
How economic management and coordination is conceptualized and explained is underpinned 
by ontological and epistemological assumptions (Whitley, 1999).  
 
The first part of the conceptual development process follows steps suggested in 
problematization: identifying the assumptions in mainstream literature, generating alternatives, 
evaluating the alternatives, grounding new assumptions and constructing research questions 
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013). To instill clarity, rigor and reflexivity in the theorizing process, 
I follow developments in IB knowledge that challenge the dominant assumptions, before 
proceeding to the next stage of developing alternative assumptions in this thesis. My objective 
is to extend and integrate problematization to a deeper level of analysis to frame the domain 
and direction of the investigation. Questioning assumptions improves the conditions for 
interesting contribution and developing paradigmatic shift than testing, amending and 
extending existing conceptual frames. Figure 2.2 is adapted from Alvesson & Sandberg (2013).  
 
     Figure 2.2 Problematization: Steps towards research inquiry 
  
            
 
I begin by examining the main assumptions or conventional wisdoms applied in extant 
IB literature and the cause for reconsideration. (A summary of the literature covered is 
presented in Table 2.1). Problematization helps to develop the foundation for alternative 
approaches to address key issues. The next section will detail the process leading to the 
construction of pertinent research questions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013).  
 
2.3.1 Review of Literature: Equilibrium and Change 
 
Early IB literature has been strongly influenced by neo-classical economic assumptions 
based on the development experience and standards of advanced economies. Balance, stability 
and equilibrium in the economic system hinders exploration of change and continuity. It is 
often taken for granted that emerging market progress in regular and unidirectional course. The 
proposition of a cumulative, incremental and linear path by neo-classical economists (Casson 
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& Lundan, 1999) is underpinned by following an exemplary template of functioning markets 
in capitalist systems served by efficient Weberian institutions and stable regulatory framework 
(North, 1990). It is assumed that any changes to institutions would be incremental, as the past 
would impose constraints on transforming and constructing new institutions that are workable 
(North, 2005). The pursuit of economic objectives is underpinned by stable structures and 
rational organization seen in developed economies. It is assumed that the prerequisite of 
marketization involves strengthening of institutions to align with the ideal bureaucracy. Yet 
China accomplished rapid economic development and globalization through a combination of 
industrial governance policies and reconfiguration of markets and institutions. The latecomer 
perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002a) acknowledges the speed of successive 
acquisitions during a certain period of high growth. Nevertheless, relationships, institutional 
changes (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010) and evolution of innovative systems in physical and social 
technologies (Nelson, 2008) have not been given due attention in extant IB literature.  
 
2.3.2 Firms, Industry and Country 
 
  Early studies examine value generation by the firm at the micro-foundation level. The 
resource-based view (RBV) studied the process by which firms grow (Penrose, 1960) using 
multiple resources available. RBV has influenced the development of evolutionary theory 
(Nelson & Winter, 2002) and the Uppsala model (Steen & Liesch, 2007). This was extended 
to linking firm resources with sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and getting 
inside the black box to study the behavior of the firm (Cyert & March, 2011) 2 . The 
independence and pivotal control of firms in internationalization has been well-accepted in 
economics tradition. However, redirection to focus on opportunities and threats in keeping with 
industry capabilities (Vernon, 1997; Porter & Wayland, 1995) departed from the prevailing 
view of given and constant availability of resources.  
 
The linkage between macroeconomic national level home country factors to OFDI 
decisions (Buckley et al., 2007; Tolentino, 2010) has dominated IB scholarship. The OLI 
eclectic model links internationalization decisions with internalization of the firm’s 
competitive advantages (Dunning, 2001). Entities in the market are viewed as impersonal and 
homogeneous, driven by efficiency and rationality. Studies have sidestepped explanation of 
idiosyncratic and nuanced characteristics shaped by different actors in situational decision-
                                                          
2 First published in 1992. 
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making. Emerging markets tend to adopt multi-prong and seemingly conflicting policies to 
deal with a host of economic, political and social challenges (Whitley, 2003). In contrast to 
classical models predicated on Western MNE experience based on competitive advantages, 
Chinese OFDI has sought to redress latecomer disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Firms 
may gain competitive advantage by linking, learning and leveraging acquiring assets, skills and 
technology internationally to consolidate their gains (Mathews, 2002a). The notion of 
balancing competitive advantages (Dunning & Narula, 2004b) suggests that some 
disadvantages among the elements in OLI could be counterbalanced and compensated by other 
advantages (Buckley & Hashai, 2009). Access to credit and industrial support constitute 
ownership-specific advantages that enable less efficient firms to compete with rival foreign 
firms (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.3 Institutions 
 
Early institutional theories drawn from economics discipline, focused on the functional 
aspects of institutions. Formal rules and regulations (North, 1990) are ostensibly created for 
governance purpose, such as to reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency. North 
subsequently extended his analysis to include adaptive efficiency, suggesting that changes in 
the quality of institutional infrastructure that support markets, would also improve economic 
performance (North, 2005). Consistent with this line of argument, empirical findings show that 
high governance quality of home country regulatory institutions would facilitate the MNE’s 
strategic decision for international expansion (He & Cui, 2012). However, using the criteria of 
governance in institutional development instead of the level of economic development still 
does not explain the trajectory of emerging markets that have developed alternative channels 
and pathways to overcome the weakness of formal institutions.  
  
The definition of institutions varies across disciplines. Sociological conceptualization of 
institution is broader and includes normative and cognitive aspects (Scott, 2014). The 
institution-based view provides context to the study of IB strategy EMNEs. Institutions could 
be combined with the industry- and resource-based views to illuminate the trajectory of 
EMNEs (Peng et al., 2008). Home country resources and support would improve the ownership 
and competitive advantages of internationalizing firms (Ramamurti, 2012). However, literature 
has neglected consideration for moderating role of home country effects on internationalization 
performance (Marano et al., 2016).  
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2.3.4 CSA and FSA 
Embodied in the study of country specific advantages (CSA) are factors that would 
enhance firm specific advantage of (FSA), lifting competitiveness and reducing liability of 
foreignness (Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman et al., 2011). CSA in emerging markets, such as 
low cost of production, access to resources and scale economies, could arguably be transformed 
into firm-specific advantages. The firm-country linkage provides explanation that financial 
resources would make up for capability and competitive deficiencies. Emerging economies 
gain atypical ownership advantages (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2010) by tapping unique 
conditions of their home market. Comparative time series analyses of emerging economies, 
China and India, show that unique national characteristics and factors other than 
macroeconomic home country specific national determinants, offer more nuanced explanation 
of internationalization (Tolentino, 2010).     
 
FSAs of EMNEs are bolstered by home country CSAs for resource-seeking and 
strategic asset seeking objectives and may dilute the liability of foreignness (Rugman & Li, 
2007). However, positive effects may be attenuated by practical difficulties in implementation 
and overreliance on government protection. The Uppsala model suggests that firms initially 
enter geographically proximate countries that may have similar CSAs and could expand to 
distant markets when firms learn to overcome the liability of foreignness. However, latecomers 
are able to develop competitiveness in the home base and offset the distance with advanced 
host countries through springboard strategy (Luo & Wang, 2012).  The latest development of 
springboard (Luo & Tung, 2018) continues theorizing an upward spiral model, suggesting 
linear development path. Another view contends that EMNEs weak in FSA are constrained in 
developing absorptive capacity and knowledge management capabilities to learn from alliance 
partners and acquired companies in advanced economies (Li & Oh, 2016). Effective 
managerial planning and coordination would optimize the benefits attributed to CSA and FSA. 
MNEs require complementary assets for the development of requisite location-bound FSAs 
and effective asset bundling and recombining of CSA and FSA (Hillemann & Gestrin, 2016).    
 
2.3.5 Economic and Business systems 
 
The assumptions posited in neo-classical capitalist frameworks have been countered by 
empirical research in business systems, varieties of capitalism (VOC) and process frames. The 
growth of Asian Dragon or Tiger economies has been attributed to unique characteristics of 
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business systems in Asian countries and regions (Whitley, 1991, 1998). The debate between 
scholars is grounded on different epistemological assumptions, with traditional economics 
focusing on industry efficiency and equilibrium (Casson & Lundan, 1999). Shifting from 
previous preoccupation with economic rationality, economic sociologists find “choices are 
constructed according to varied cognitive norms and values entrenched in different societies at 
particular times” (Whitley, 1999: 115). A multi-dimensional frame includes managerial 
coordination and responses towards economic and social realities such as lobbies from labor 
unions, professional associations, regional or international organizations (Whitley, 1999). 
Nevertheless, Whitley qualified that qualitative changes in the business system would not 
happen at a rapid pace or displace the prevailing global business system (Whitley, 1998). While 
early business systems theories add to knowledge on economic development, studies have been 
ambivalent about transitioning, and the direction of change from societal structures steeped in 
culture and history. Though it has been argued that normative and cultural-cognitive systems 
are more stable (Scott, 2014), societal norms do evolve with varying impetus for internal and 
environmental changes. 
 
Expanding on Whitley’s seminal work, management strategy studies inform literature 
that mainland Chinese managers focus on personal connections. Businesses make deals in the 
absence of stable institutional procedures and independent intermediaries (Boisot & Child, 
1988, 1996). In contrast to earlier research that suggests stability, Boisot and Child (1996) 
embrace transition explicitly, tracing the shift from state command economy towards 
decentralization, that has given rise to a distinctive institutional form of “network capitalism”. 
The change allows for managerial discretion through the delegation of administrative power 
from central government to local officials (Boisot & Child, 1996). This narrative argues that 
spectacular growth is possible despite the weakness of conventional codification seen in 
Weberian bureaucracy. Hence, changes need not be costly and unsettling as emerging markets 
are able to improvise and adapt to existing conditions towards personalized institutional order 
(Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). Moreover, institutions in emerging markets evolve and shape 
dynamic internationalization strategies through changes in regulatory foundations (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005). While the concept of networks capitalism captures important milestones, it 
would be opportune to construct a framework to study continuity of changes.    
 
The varieties of capitalism (VOC) stream of literature explains varying competitive 
advantage of advanced economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) such as Germany and Japan. VOC 
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is inclined towards economic rationality similar with traditional economics. However, instead 
of examining unidimensional summary of indicators employed in traditional economies, VOC 
sought to compare institutional landscapes (Jackson & Deeg, 2008a) to better understand 
diversities and clusters in comparative capitalism. As research of VOC was originally based on 
mixed systems in Europe, capitalism remains the principal benchmark that unique nationalist 
traits are compared with. The main types of economic systems are capitalist liberal market 
economies, coordinated market economies and mixed market economies (Hall & Soskice, 
2001). However, Hall and Soskice have been reticent regarding the dynamic roles of actors. 
Given that actors follow institutional logics and continuity at the national level (Hall & Soskice, 
2001), change is presumed to be gradual. Macro-level observation adopted by VOC gives a 
semblance of stability and may neglect in detecting subtle political reconfigurations 
contributing to institutional change (Jackson & Deeg, 2008b; Langley et al., 2013). A main 
criticism of the VOC is its inadequacy in addressing complex institutional changes (Hay, 2005). 
Internal diversity, attributed to history, regulation, regional and sectoral dynamics, are 
addressed within specific national contexts as different degrees of commitment to capitalist 
features (Lane & Wood, 2009).  
 
In more recent business systems models, scholars argue that the VOC frame is not 
applicable to studying Asian economies (Witt & Redding, 2013). China would retain its unique 
configuration of capitalist business system that is workable, adaptable and sustainable 
(Redding & Witt, 2009). Expanding from Whitley’s research of embeddedness (1999), recent 
business systems theories highlight multi-level analysis of different types of firms, networks 
and societal environment (Witt & Redding, 2013). Nevertheless, the interaction between 
informal and formal institutions (Jackson & Deeg, 2008b) remains unclear in the field of 
business systems research. Comparative business systems theory (Morgan, 2007) also 
criticized VOC for its preoccupation with macro-level regulatory context at the expense of 
exploring multiple logics, rationale of actions and relations among organizations and variations 
in vested interests and affiliations (Redding, 2005).  
 
Limitations of incremental and sequential models fall short of explaining paradoxes and 
surprises in emerging market economies’ transition and globalization experience. Though 
clustering in VOC and business system frames delves into prevailing structures and conditions 
of special cases, political dimensions in complex relationships and continuous changes are not 
adequately addressed. We should be mindful that the end goal of reforms undertaken by the 
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Chinese leadership since the 1970s is not intended to achieve capitalism and liberal democracy 
but rather capitalize on marketization to achieve economic modernization and improved 
governance (Goodman, 2009). Historian Wang assessed that China’s pursuit of modernity did 
not envisage an end-point (Kwok, 2018). Adhering to stability suggested in VOC or business 
systems framework hinders exploration of changes taking place in emerging markets. The 
debate would not take off beyond labelling whether the macro-level observation is half empty 
or half full against economic or cultural benchmarks. Indeed, attention should not be on what 
the system is and the changes that have taken place, but rather how and why home country 
effects influence internationalization. Table 2.1 summarizes the preceding discussion of 
various streams of literature on home country effects. 
 
  Table 2.1 Composition of Home Country Effects in Extant Literature 
Industry, Firms, Country Institutions 
Resources of the firm (Penrose, 1960; Barney, 1991) 
 
Neo-classical market equilibrium 
Managerial behavior (Cyert & March, 1992) 
 
Weberian bureaucracy 
Firm Resources and Industry (Porter, 1990; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) 
 
Formal and Informal (North, 1990) 
Firm-specific and Country-specific Advantages 
(Rugman & Li, 2007) 
 
Cognitive and relationships (Scott, 2014) 
  
 
Integration of institutions and change (Peng, 
2003) 
 
Network capitalism and institutional change (Boisot & Child, 1988; 1996) 
Varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) 
Business systems (Whitley 1991; Morgan, 2007; Witt & Redding, 2013) 
 
 
Despite accepting the transitory nature of institutions, most scholars tend to avoid 
transition (Peng, 2003) and address the implications of institutional changes. The process 
approach questions the assumptions implicit in the status quo and enduring traits proposed in 
neo-classical and VOC frames. Yet, it has been shown that more developed home institutions 
tend to encourage emerging market firms to venture overseas (He & Cui, 2012; Huang, Xie, 
Li, & Reddy, 2017; Luo et al., 2010). The “Go Global” policy (Luo et al., 2010) and 
deregulation of approval procedures facilitated POEs to internationalize and forced firms to be 
more competitive in preparation for China’s accession to WTO in 2001. Concurrently, policies 
had been progressing to streamline large and inefficient firms (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, 
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& Kehan, 2015; Estrin et al., 2016). Home country reforms and deregulation gained momentum 
and augmented support for firms in general as they became more marketized (Luo et al., 2010). 
This underscores the importance of studying the effects institutional changes and specific 
economic transformation have on internationalization (Li et al., 2014). The temporal dimension 
warrants deeper analysis and limelight in IB scholarship. Documenting a point in time could 
not claim to represent a phenomenon as internationalization is fluid and involve multi-
dimensional interactions.  
 
2.3.6 Development paths 
 
Investment development path (IDP) literature examines macro-level internationalization 
stages (Dunning & Narula, 2003). IDP preconceives stages tied to the state of development and 
resources of countries. At the final stage of development, the country has high stocks of inward 
and outward FDI, and net OFDI is low. This scenario does not explain the complexities of 
contemporary emerging market phenomenon, or ascertain that transition economies have not 
reached the high level of development. It has been argued that idiosyncratic characteristics of 
Chinese companies and institutional factors may limit multi-nationalization; as progress to the 
next stage requires higher economic growth and investment (Marton & McCarthy, 2007). This 
scenario seems incongruent with rapid growth and internationalization of Chinese firms. 
Though empirical study on European emerging markets show OFDI to be positively associated 
with both GDP per capita and inward FDI, broad rather than specific institutional reforms are 
necessary to move up the development path (Stoian, 2013). Nevertheless, such prescriptive 
models are constrained in explaining irregular paths. In practice, investors are often challenged 
by uncertainties instead of smooth, predictable, linear internationalization experience. 
Continual adjustment to the environment is a necessary part of firms’ internationalization 
process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2006).   
 
2.3.7 Temporal dimension 
 
The process framework would help to explain adaptation to the dynamic nature of 
emerging market economic development and internationalization. The Nordic tradition of IB 
research (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) offers a dynamic perspective of internationalization that 
explicitly addresses transition. The process lens has contributed to the study of path dependent 
internationalization. Moving beyond variance-based research (Klag & Langley, 2013), process 
theories acknowledge that firms face uncertainties in international expansion. Experiential 
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learning increases knowledge and competencies and in turn increases the speed and scale of 
internationalization and reduce uncertainties (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006). Departing from the 
structure of production internalization theories and the eclectic model, the subsequent Uppsala 
models focused on business relations and the coordination of networks (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009). The learning process entails acquiring, dissemination, diffusion and accumulation of 
knowledge, and applying this to internationalization (Welch, Nummela, & Liesch, 2016).  
 
Process could be integrated into the home country context to study how managers learn 
to navigate and respond in unfamiliar host country institutions (Scott, Levitt, & Orr, 2011). 
Some firms may learn vicariously in anticipation of needs, and make adjustments (Langley et 
al., 2013). As new and small internationalizing firms have limited resources, capabilities and 
influence, opportunities are often discovered through networks to ensure the firm’s survival in 
the initial stages (Crick & Spence, 2005; Meyer & Skak, 2002). Investors may turn liability of 
newness or inexperience in internationalization (Zou & Ghauri, 2010) into advantages by 
learning from experienced incumbents and predecessors (Huber, 1991; Posen & Chen, 2013). 
Process frame is portrayed as an evolutionary model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006; Meyer & Skak, 
2002) that expands from the largely stable and firm-centric view to networks. Figure 2.3 
represents the integration of home country factors with process frames. 
 
 
           Figure 2.3 Adding Process to Home Country Context 
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2.4   Questioning Conventional Assumptions 
 
Four main areas of assumptions in extant literature will be problematized in this section. 
In contrast to gap spotting, the research strategy questions underlying assumptions and provide 
 Elements of Home Country Context 
- Institutions, officials, reforms, guidance 
- Corporate actors’ experience & industry network 
- Markets: demand for food safety  
 
 
 
Host Country   
Culture, Economy 
Politics, Institutions 
Learning 
Feedback 
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alternative framing emerging from empirical material to uncover original insights than 
theoretical extensions.  
 
2.4.1 Home Country Support Versus Constraints 
 
In chapter 5, I aim to develop multiple and nuanced explanation of the meanings behind 
home country support and how these may have changed. The research process begins by 
revisiting the basic assumptions on home country institutional role in internationalization of 
different types of Chinese firms. IB literature tends to portray high level of home country 
support for SOEs (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012) and constraints faced by POEs (Witt 
& Lewin, 2007). China has been identified as one of the unique cases for extending direct and 
substantial support (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003) to enhance international competitiveness 
of selective SOEs (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin, & Voss, 2008; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peng et al., 
2008; Ramamurti, 2012). Emerging economies gain atypical ownership advantages 
(Ramamurti, 2012; Sun et al., 2010) in low cost financing, industry information, local 
knowledge and selective waiver of approval process to engage in serial acquisitions (Luo & 
Tung, 2007).  
 
EMNEs globalize to alleviate domestic institutional constraints and voids in the domestic 
legal system and imperfect markets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Voss et al., 2010). Case studies show 
that Chinese SMEs are pushed out or forced to escape, relocate and venture overseas (Boisot 
& Meyer, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Voss et al., 2010; 
Witt & Lewin, 2007). SOEs that have received “conscious” support, are encouraged to embark 
on aggressive international expansion, while POEs would escape and adopt more cautious 
strategy (Wei et al., 2015). SMEs that did not receive direct support would internationalize 
through alternative channels encouraged by the government and business-initiated industry 
networks (Chetty & Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Child & Tsai, 2005). However, some firms are 
more adept at proactively managing relationships with industry and institutions in the socio-
political environment (Landau et al., 2016).  
 
The preoccupation with contrasting favored SOEs and deprived POEs has neglected the 
effects of pro-market reforms. The restructuring of SOEs have closed some gaps between firms 
of ownership types. Hybrid SOEs that result from pro-market reforms (Bruton et al., 2015) 
increasingly operate like POEs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Estrin et al., 2016). Large Chinese 
private corporate groups that are gaining prominence in domestic markets and OFDI. Most 
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studies tend to avoid the evolving political economy. An exception is the study on the 
coevolution of deregulation with the internationalization of Chinese firms (Luo et al., 2010). 
Local officials and businesses collaborate to advance common interests (Redding & Witt, 2009) 
and expedite approval. Institutions are not monolithic authority, but comprise multilevel actors 
engaging with businesses (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013) in view of the 
complex structures, relationship cultivation and overlapping goals. Moreover, home country 
support could have double-edged effects on internationalizing firms. Close association with 
home governments could work against firm’s image in the host country environment. SOEs 
operating in host countries that are vastly different from home country may face greater liability 
of origin (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) and distrust by foreigners 
(Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Though SOEs may enjoy initial ownership advantages, 
liability by association may constrain expansion (Wu & Chen, 2014), especially in sensitive 
sectors (Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015).   
 
I explore the coevolution of various actors interacting within the home country over time 
instead of following the support versus constraint dichotomy. Home country institutions affect 
internationalization of Chinese firms depending on the nature and level of their affiliations 
(Wang et al., 2012). Stakeholders may have common and diverse interests, contingent on the 
cost-benefit assessment at certain points in time. The relationships may move from 
collaboration, competition, or indifference across fuzzy entity boundaries. In a  
“moving theory”, entities are seen in their use, meaning, situations and embeddedness in the 
tasks (Weick, 1999).  
 
2.4.2 Sensitivity of Land-based Investment 
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I question conventional assumptions that agrifood sector 
investments are usually land-based and unfair to host countries. Chinese invested in Southeast 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. Notably, Chinese investors recently chose 
Western advanced economies as OFDI destinations to secure clean and green food resources. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that resource-seeking OFDI is often associated with land 
acquisitions (Kaag & Zoomers, 2014) to satisfy home food security needs. Media hype and 
NGO campaigns (Grain, 2016a) against Chinese ‘land grab’ has given investors a negative 
image and allusion of ‘neo-colonialism’. The sensitivity towards foreign land ownership have 
resulted in nationalist backlash and host government tightening investment regulations.  
Agrifood OFDI is motivated by strategic asset-seeking and resource-seeking objectives 
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(Dunning, 1992) to achieve food security and safety needs in the home country (Lam, Remais, 
Fung, Xu, & Sun, 2013; Zhou, 2010). 
 
The assumptions of land acquisition as a necessity for the agrifood sector is incongruent 
with multiple ways of achieving access to resources. Agricultural economics literature found 
flexible models adopted by Chinese investors in resource-rich developing economies: 
developmental aid (Bräutigam & Zhang, 2013) outsourcing (Hofman & Ho, 2012), contracting 
(Co, 2014), forming partnerships (Alden, 2008), experimenting with demonstration farms and 
special economic zones (Smaller, Qiu, & Liu, 2012). Moreover, Chinese investors have 
committed to developing infrastructure and logistical support (Myers & Guo, 2015) for 
agrifood supply chain. Chinese investors’ contribution to agricultural output and employment 
are obscured by reports of competition with host country farmers and neglect of social 
responsibility (Chen & Guo, 2017). Chinese MNEs have more opportunities to acquire food 
processing businesses in advanced economies that have been downsizing since the 1990s 
(Anastassopoulos & Rama, 2004) and divesting after the GFC. IB research should not be 
confined to studying entry modes but to examine value chain targets in cases of agrifood sector.  
  
Preliminary research in this project showed that SOEs and POEs with abundant resources 
and specialized agrifood sector knowledge (Liang, Lu, & Wang, 2012) are inclined towards 
downstream value chain targets in advanced economies. Investing in downstream agrifood 
business requires more financial resources and industry knowledge and management 
capabilities than land-based and upstream OFDI. IB research could gain more by studying the 
rationale for internationalization decisions. Managerial decisions are often made with 
consideration of the past and current conditions (Levitt & March, 1988). Actors are flexible 
and adaptable to the environment. Learning extends to gaining insights from others’ experience 
or vicarious learning (Jiang et al., 2014; Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016). Investors could turn 
liability of newness (Zou & Ghauri, 2010) to an advantage by learning from incumbents and 
predecessors (Posen & Chen, 2013) within and outside their organizations.    
 
2.4.3 Diversification 
 
Successful private corporate groups in China whose core businesses are in non-
agricultural sectors are diversifying into agrifood sectors and investing in farmland and 
upstream businesses overseas. Chapter 6 shows that diversifying firms face a multitude of 
challenges (Gaur & Kumar, 2009; Knecht, 2014; Wan & Hoskisson, 2017a) despite being 
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backed by discretionary funding from parent companies in China and performing due diligence. 
Well-designed strategies of resource-rich firms may not always work according to plans and 
expectations. High risk ventures undertaken by non-agricultural firms diversifying into non-
core agrifood sector and internationalizing concurrently defy findings in extant literature on 
trade-off in domestic and international diversification  (Kumar, Gaur, & Pattnaik, 2012) and 
profit motivated strategy (Ansoff, 1958). The anomalous calculations warrant further 
investigation. 
 
2.4.4 Home and Host Context 
 
The notion of distance has dominated extant IB literature in terms of how differences 
between home and host country affects the incidence, entry mode ownership choice and 
successful completion of cross-border M&A transactions (Xie, Reddy, & Liang, 2017). 
Distance is viewed negatively as a cause of increased costs (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart 
& Larimo, 1998) and uncertainties from liability of foreignness (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 
2009). Distance can be broadly categorized into physical geographical and psychic distance 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009). The notion of cultural distance (Kogut & Singh, 1988) and 
Hofstede's measurement 3  focus on country level differences (Hofstede, 2001). Cultural 
distance has been critiqued on conceptual and methodological grounds, in terms of unrealistic 
assumptions of asymmetry, stability and linearity (Shenkar, 2001). Instead of a positivist 
treatment of culture (Shenkar, Luo, & Yeheskel, 2008) critics suggest that research should 
develop a more dynamic distance construct (Shenkar, 2012). Empirical findings on distance 
have been inconclusive (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). It is 
possible for knowledge understanding to be higher across linguistically distant locations 
(Schomaker & Zaheer, 2014).    
 
China is an emerging market undergoing multiple reforms within a short time and using 
a fixed distance may not fully account for complex and changing relationships. Cultural 
distance could be bridged through foreign experience, acculturation, cultural attractiveness and 
staffing (Shenkar, 2001). Moreover, cultural distance is a double-edged sword that may lead to 
positive learning and negative burden on the acquirers’ integration capabilities (Reus & 
Lamont, 2009). Home and host country differences could be addressed by unpacking, 
expanding and disaggregating and recombining the broad categorical measures of distance. 
                                                          
3 First published in 1980 
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The impact of distance varies with sectors, with primary industries being more vulnerable and 
sensitive to cultural and administrative distance (Ghemawat, 2001). Shifting the conversation 
to cultural friction would sidestep problems encountered in allocating  distance measure (Luo 
& Shenkar, 2011). Besides cultural intersection (Shenkar, 2012) it is crucial to examine 
business interests, attitudes and values (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). Research should be sensitive 
to the both the home and host country contexts (Child & Marinova, 2014) as the home country 
perspective comprises perceptions and responses to host countries and could not be artificially 
separated.  
 
The institutional distance lens (Kostova, 1999) is another approach to studying home 
and host country differences. When dealing with exceptions, IB research tends to look at host 
country’s resources and developed institutions to explain moderation of distance from less 
developed home countries (Xie et al., 2017). It is accepted that EMNEs operating in developing 
economies could turn prior home country disadvantage into advantage when they face familiar 
and similar environmental constraints of host countries that are at the same level of 
development (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Others find that the quality of institutional 
development in the home country of the MNE is more important in facilitating international 
expansion than the level of economic development (He & Cui, 2012; Wu & Chen, 2014). 
Chinese MNEs are attracted to advanced economies with strong investment fundamentals, 
lower levels of domestic competition and property rights protection to capitalize on 
institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2015). However, moderating and disrupting influence 
may change the internationalization process.  
 
SOEs are less welcomed than POEs by host country due to distrust of foreign 
government ownership (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Li et al., 2014). SOEs could leverage the home 
government depending on the bilateral political relations and economic dependency with host 
countries (Duanmu, 2014). Host governments may show preferential treatment to ﬁrms from 
certain home countries that have friendly historical relationships or signed trade and investment 
agreements with (Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2011) but are prejudicial towards others. Wider institutional 
distance would increase risks and prompt firms to tend towards minority stake acquisitions 
except in deals involving industry affinity (Contractor et al., 2014). Institutional distance  
increases the likelihood of failed acquisitions and the time taken for the completion of deals 
(Reis, Ferreira, Santos, & 2013). 
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The shortcoming of the conventional focus on distance is the avoidance of discussing 
change. Scholars have called for a shift from the longstanding preoccupation with the 
negativity of distance and differences to common interests and advantages (Stahl, Tung, 
Kostova, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2016). Drawing insights from firms’ resources, institutional, and 
political perspectives, firm-level learning and adaptation would enhance understanding of the 
permutations of Chinese and host country characteristics (Child & Marinova, 2014). The home-
host perspective can be expanded by incorporating explicit depiction of continuous interactions 
and feedback. Distance and liability of foreignness could possibly be reduced through corporate 
social responsibility activities, and confer social legitimacy benefits to foreign firms in host 
countries (Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012). The concept of relational proximity is highlighted 
in a study on co-location and low cultural distance, where proximity are outcomes of sourcing 
strategy, rather than predictors for sourcing in the supply chain decisions (Schmitt & 
Biesebroeck, 2013). More critical to managerial decisions are perhaps the constant 
communications and adaptation of responses to political developments and new situations 
(Welch & Wilkinson, 2004). Feedback and lessons from previous dealings may modify 
strategies for subsequent entries. In a dynamic market environment (Jan Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977), changes are not limited to economic cycles and may include tactical policy shifts at 
different levels of bilateral relations. Feedback from the host country relations should be part 
of the calculations in home country effects on internationalization (Figure 2.3).    
 
2.4.5 High Risks 
 
In Chapter 8, I address the emergent risk awareness and management mechanisms in 
the internationalization of Chinese firms., Chinese firms were investing in politically unstable 
host countries in the early phases of globalization (Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu, 2014) and in 
the recent Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese investors have paid high premium to acquire 
resources, energy, learn high technology or gain management skills (Phillips, 2012). Risk 
avoidance are also linked to financial viability and sustainability of OFDI. While risk is 
regarded as inevitable for entrepreneurs to exploit higher returns (Knight, 1921), the amount 
of risk absorbed by Chinese investors appeared extremely high from purely commercial 
calculations. Businesses operating in uncertainties have to confront unavoidable risks (Vahlne, 
Hamberg, & Schweizer, 2017). Individual managers may not always perceive or handle risk in 
the conventional conception of rational decision-making (McDougall, Shane, & Oviatt, 1994) 
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but would look for alternatives to improve the odds for expected values of return (March & 
Shapira, 1987).  
 
Inexperienced Chinese firms with limited relevant knowledge may be oblivious and try 
to accommodate risk (Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011). Risk tolerance has been attributed to 
low cost of capital for internationalizing SOEs (Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu, 2014; 
Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman et al., 2011). SOEs especially the national champions (Landau et 
al., 2016; Li et al., 2014; Thun, 2004a) have greater flexibility in meeting returns to investment 
and repayment (Kornai et al., 2003).  In the early part of internationalization, such losses are 
probably seen as affordable (Vahlne et al., 2017) as entrepreneurs ‘make do’ with given 
knowledge and available resources, and accept affordable loss in effectuation strategy 
(Sarasvathy, 2001). However, overpaying by inexperienced Chinese acquirers for coveted 
brands (Child & Rodrigues, 2005) may not be sustainable in the long run. Though advanced 
economies with strong institutions (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Henisz & Delios, 2004) may lower risk, 
Chinese investors have encountered liability of country of origin (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). Nationalism and regulatory changes could affect international 
commitments and future managerial decisions (Kobrin, 1979).   
 
The rapid pace and scale of internationalizing from the latecomer perspective seem at 
odds with the process stream of IB literature of moderating risk through gradual commitment 
(Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson, & Vahlne, 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Nevertheless, the 
springboard narrative admits to the knowledge gap for expansion to different sectors (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Williamson & Raman, 2013), distant locations, industries and markets (Petersen, 
Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008; Shenkar, 2012). Against the backdrop of economic rebalancing and 
deleveraging, firms are urged to be more mindful of different types of risks and how to mitigate 
risks (Liesch et al., 2011).  
 
I proceed to track how policy priorities coevolve with risk perception and mitigation 
over time. That Chinese subjects in the study show concern over the viability of OFDI and 
conscientiously conduct due diligence show that existing theoretical frames may not fully 
explain the changes on the ground. The study would consider disparities in the awareness, 
aspirations and realizable goals in risk mitigation among actors and their evolving strategies.  
 
2.5   Alternative Grounds 
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In the third stage towards conceptualizing the initial framework, I develop alternative 
grounds by exploring different multiple relationships and changes. There are alternative 
assumptions to the conventional dichotomy between support versus constraint, land-based 
agrifood investment, trade-off between product and market diversification, and high risk 
aggressive serial acquisitions. This thesis follows an inclusive coevolutionary model that maps 
interconnections of businesses, institutions and markets. As discussed in the earlier section of 
this chapter, actors in pluralistic and multi-level organizations respond to external environment 
as well as proactively engage in negotiation and bargaining. The view that pro-market reforms 
reduce institutional imperfections, increase domestic competition and encourage international 
expansion has been well accepted. Alternative narratives examine effects on private firms 
responding to institutional changes and limited opportunities (Dau, 2012). Political dynamics 
that is often neglected in VOC perspective (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008b; 
Pontusson, 2005; Whitley, 1998) could be addressed using a coevolutionary frame.  
 
Distinguished IB scholars have called for the study of coevolution across individual 
MNEs and institutions. This is a worthy but challenging task. A more innovative approach 
entails studying how micro-processes of decentralized experimentation and variety generation 
in MNEs and international corporate networks coevolve with the institutional environment 
(Cantwell et al., 2010). Others have similarly called for greater emphasis on temporal 
observations (Welch et al., 2016) by taking a historical approach (Buckley, 2016; Jones & 
Khanna, 2006). Concurrent interaction and changes in personalities, organizations, policies and 
market forces and mutual relations would inevitably result in different configurations and 
combination of effects. Managerial decision-making is a continuous process. As history 
unfolds, past decisions will impact on present and future decisions (Buckley, 2016). De-
institutionalization is a possibility (Scott, 2014) along with change, balancing the new and 
residual elements. When prevalent factors gain currency, they create momentum for changes 
and subsequent trajectory to reinforce common objectives.   
 
Coevolution at macro and micro levels could happen at different pace and would have 
implications for the firm’s competitive advantage (Madhok & Liu, 2006). A power relational 
evolution framework between the organization and government institutions shows how 
interdependencies could gain legitimacy for the firm and support for the sector (Child et al., 
2012). The same has been witnessed in gradual convergence of corporate interest with the 
political regime (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). Beyond the conventional notion of top down pro-
 Chapter Two: Conceptualization of Home Country Dynamics in Internationalization 
41 
 
market reforms that spur learning and spillover, bottom-up lobbying by MNEs (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2015) is thriving in the context of economic reforms in emerging markets. 
Coevolution entails selective adaptation that strengthens different parties’ ability to survive, 
deal with crises and improve their positions. “Such a hybridized system is characterized by the 
embodiment and integration of multiple institutional logics reﬂecting the mixing of old and 
new modes of coordination which engender coevolution and increasing plurality in the 
institutional environment” (Li, Cui & Lu, 2015: 983).   
 
The home country dynamics model that I aim to construct would overcome 
preoccupation with a snapshot of general economic equilibrium. Concurrent multi-dimensional 
actions may generate varieties of outcomes and subsequent responses. Original preferences 
may change with practical, tactical and situational requirements, and shape long-term strategic 
relationships. An in-depth analysis necessitates the identification of the original, continuity and 
future points of reference. Problematization of development paths can redirect attention to 
internationalization decision processes of evolving institutions, managerial resources, different 
experience and networks for the research agenda. The research inquiry generated from the 
discussion of transition domain would hopefully shift the conversations to embrace 
complexities such as paradoxical policies, competitive-collaborative dynamic relationships, 
imitation across boundaries, proactive-reactive actions, outcomes from designed, chance or 
concurrence in the internationalization process. Empirical material from fieldwork suggests 
that home country effects are temporal and multi-dimensional. An emergent integrative 
coevolutionary approach to study multi-level (central and local) government with industry, 
firms, markets, internationalization will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.  
 
2.6   Research Questions  
 
Having discussed the main premises in extant IB literature, and recent attempts that 
question their underlying assumptions, I move on to generate research questions for this project. 
In contrast to research gap spotting that center on addressing what, I aim to address how and 
why. The research setting is Chinese OFDI in agrifood business to advanced economies from 
2008 to 2017. The home country factors and actors comprise institutions, industry and markets. 
From the alternative assumption grounding, I develop a main overarching research question: 
 
    * How do home country effects shape internationalization of Chinese firms? 
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The main question can be further subdivided into four areas of inquiry which will be 
addressed in the content and contextual chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis.  
 
- What is the meaning of home country support to key players and how this has 
shaped internationalization in the light of evolving pro-market reforms, 
deregulation and recentralization? (Chapter 5)  
 
- Why and how do established Chinese agrifood investors select downstream targets 
in advanced economies? (Chapter 6) 
 
- Why and how do some Chinese firms choose to diversify and internationalize 
concurrently?  (Chapter 7) 
 
- How do home country actors perceive and manage risks? (Chapter 8)  
 
 
In the preceding section, I discussed alternatives to four domains in extant literature by 
questioning conventional assumptions on stability, duality of support, risks of rapid and 
incessant internationalization and managing host sensitivities. The alternative grounding 
questions underlying assumptions in conventional models that define the boundary of 
institutions and firms as largely monolithic, homogenous and stable entities rather than 
dynamic subsystems.  
 
A summary of the four steps in problematization of different perspectives, finding 
alternative grounds and generation of research questions is shown in Table 2.2. The alternative 
assumptions embrace time, change, irregularity, complexities, uncertainties, challenges, and 
different ways to achieve objectives. Case studies are useful for building knowledge of how 
the home country factors and actors shape the internationalization process. Progressive 
theoretical construction is consistent with abductive analysis and theorizing through increasing 
awareness, clarification and explanation. The following section draws on interdisciplinary 
knowledge to develop an emergent evolutionary framework that would enrich institutional and 
process theories in IB research. 
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Table 2.2 Alternative Positions Leading to Research Inquiry 
Common Assumptions 
 
Different Streams Problematization / 
Alternatives 
Research Inquiry  
Stability of systems and 
paths 
 
- homogenous entities 
- market or state 
influences 
 
- unidirectional progress 
 
- Varieties of 
capitalism 
- Business systems 
- Networks 
- Process learning  
 Temporal dimension 
 
 Irregular paths 
 
 Interactions of multiple 
actors, loose boundaries, 
responses 
 
How and why do 
home country actors 
interact and 
influence 
internationalization 
of Chinese firms? 
 
Institutional support 
versus constraint 
 
- Defined ownership 
boundaries 
 
- Support for selected 
SOEs 
 
- Disadvantaged escape 
 
 
- SOEs face liabilities 
in host country 
diminish advantages 
 
- Firms can leverage 
institutions 
 
- Hybrids / reformed 
SOEs similar with 
POEs 
 
 Complex alternatives to 
duality 
 
 Different types and levels of 
support 
 
 Small firms lack means to 
escape overseas 
 
 Collaboration and 
competition  
 
 
What is the meaning 
of home country 
support? 
 
How does home 
country support 
impact key actors 
and shape 
internationalization? 
 
Host Country Context 
 
- Resource-seeking 
motivations 
 
- Distance 
 
- Land grab discourse 
Negative responses 
 
 
- Management and 
Competency seeking 
 
- Cultural friction 
 
- Institutional distance 
 
- Political changes 
 
- Process: experiential, 
cumulative learning 
and commitments 
 
 
 
 Different types of learning 
for different situations   
 
 Different ways of achieving 
resource seeking objectives 
 
 Uneven development path 
of internationalization and 
responsiveness 
 
 
Why and how do 
established agrifood 
investors select 
downstream targets?  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diversification  
- Competitive advantage 
and profit motives 
 
- Related products and 
markets 
 
 
- Process and 
implementation 
 
- Diversification of 
home inversely related 
to international markets    
 
 Anomaly of concurrent 
diversification and 
internationalization 
 
 Low margins and long-term 
gestation  
 
 
Why and how do 
non-agricultural 
firms choose to 
diversify and 
internationalize into 
upstream agrifood 
targets?   
 
 
Risk and Rapid 
internationalization 
 
- High risk destinations 
 
- Latecomer perspective   
 
 
- Risk awareness   
- Control mechanisms 
 
 
 Challenges to relentless 
expansion 
 
 Adaptation of policy, firms, 
industry and environment 
 
 
How do home 
country actors 
perceive and manage 
risk? 
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2.7   Integration of Interdisciplinary Knowledge 
 
The above discussion justifies the integration of context into process and institutional 
frames. This study would avoid simplifying matters, imposes restrictions, averaging the 
interaction parameters within an equilibrium state and mechanical representation of changes 
(Allen, 2001). Reflexivity and avoidance of pre-judgement would be more conducive to 
developing theoretical constructs that reflect the realities on the ground. From multiple 
interviews with executives and managers and discussions with industry experts, I realized that 
an interdisciplinary approach would be useful to enhance our understanding of the 
internationalization process. Using the co-evolutionary lens would elucidate the interplay of 
different actors, multilevel, responses and changes over time. Buckley et al (2017) proposed a 
redirection of IB research towards ‘‘grand challenges’’ in global business by adopting 
interdisciplinary research methods, multilevel approaches and phenomena-driven perspectives 
to address research questions (Buckley et al., 2017) 
 
Though emerging economies are not new frontiers of research, what is known is probably 
only the tip of an iceberg viewed through prisms, and puzzles remain unsolved. To 
accommodate non-conventional paradigmatic assumptions necessitates discovery of relevant 
frameworks beyond IB in other social science disciplines. Three domains are repositioned:  
 
(1) Multi-level interdependencies and conditional boundaries across time and space;  
(2) Coevolution of business managers, institutions, networks, markets and environment;  
(3) Responses, learning, feedback and adaptation to home and host country contexts 
 
I reflect on alternative assumption grounds through systematic combining (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002) of divergent interests and change in courses. A dynamic model maps the 
synthesizing process, allows for comparative analysis and is better equipped to cope with 
complexities (Cohen & Axelrod, 1984). Studying complexity which is increasingly appealing 
to scientific fields, entails shifting from reductionist and stable state to systemic and dynamic 
approach (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006). The proposed framework should be flexible, and 
develop with multifaceted emerging empirical material, rather than to fit data into a set 
framework. Research findings should embrace negative cases and idiosyncrasies so as not to 
be caught by surprises that nullify propositions and previous findings.   
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Just as it is unrealistic to expect pure economic rationality, pure serendipity in business 
deals would not be possible without incorporating the inclinations, preferences and objectives 
of influential actors adapting to procedural, situational and external factors (Simon, 1985). 
Studies of sophisticated decision-making and problem-solving demands continuous 
painstaking empirical investigation (Simon, 1985). Though the specific interim results are 
uncertain, intentions drive processes in preferred directions. In line with my epistemological 
approach of pragmatism, inquiry and reflexive routines are oriented towards an ends-in-view 
(Dewey et al., 2003). Accordingly, experience is not a one-off knowledge acquisition, but 
adaptation continues from the past to the current moment and the future. There is a practical 
result regardless of whether actors are conscious as they have deliberately selected and paid 
attention to certain experiments in their pursuits. If the results turned out to be different from 
original intended or expected, what are the reasons and possible responses? Institutional 
changes in emerging economies in turn shape the dynamics of subsystems in the home country 
and the overall picture over time. Even within the same country, a central policy may have 
diverse effects on different players and industries depending on their readiness to accept 
changes. To map the complexities and create home country dynamics construct, I draw on 
literature in economic sociology and political economy to extend IB theories. It is conceivable 
that business actors take initiatives to negotiate for more favorable terms and sustainability.  
 
IB literature has incorporated valuable insights from political science and sociology 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008b; Witt & Redding, 2013). Strategic management studies recognized 
the interplay among different institutions and within similar establishments would collectively 
deliver change (Zenger, Lazzarini, & Poppo, 2000). Understanding institutions could be 
enhanced through holistic comparative studies to reflect heterogeneity as institutions. This 
avoids presenting institutions as separate monolithic entities independent of the environmental 
forces at work.  Social norms prevail when institutions are weak or undeveloped. An inclusive 
depiction should embody not just visible symbols of institutions, but informal and underground 
operations in transition economies that circumvent formal structures as well. Low levels of 
institutional trust encourage higher levels of family ownership because relationships are more 
effective in enforcing contracts when formal legal and regulatory institutions are weak (Nolan, 
Rowley, & Warner, 2016).  
 
The dichotomous discourse of support versus constraint in IB literature could be 
challenged by studies on the fuzzy boundaries of firm ownership structures and institutions. 
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SOEs can be placed on a spectrum of controls relative to their economic, social and national 
objectives. The decade from late 1990s emphasizing economies of scale was geared towards 
grooming identified national champions (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013) in ‘pillar’ and ‘strategic’ 
industries into powerful business groups modelled after the Korean chaebol and Japanese 
keiretsu  (Thun, 2004a). Despite rapid growth, industrial policy has fallen short of building 
competitive and innovative MNEs (Nolan, 2014). Though the agrifood sector has not been 
identified as a ‘strategic’ industry, food security has historically been a key national objective, 
and firms continue to receive domestic subsidies and encouragement to internationalize. 
Economic reforms have resulted in various shades of ownership and economic management. 
The growth of the non-state sector needs to be reconciled and elaborated (Fligstein & Zhang, 
2015) in the context of home country effects on internationalization.  
 
Despite reservations regarding recent recentralization, the Chinese government 
continues to play a significant role in managing OFDI as enabler and protector of globalization 
(Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014). The government tries to balance the demands of managing SOEs 
and encouraging entrepreneurship in the private sector.  An example of efficiently run 
government-owned company is the Singapore Airlines which is a majority government-owned 
public listed company that has performed well in a competitive industry. Norwegian companies 
with government co-ownership show better performance on the stock market than similar 
companies in Europe because the government differentiates between its role as owner and 
regulating authority, follows good management, and treats all shareholders as equals (Claes, 
2002; Post, 2016). Reforms undertaken by South Korea and Sweden in the 1980s have led to 
improvement in the performance and value of the companies concerned (Hahm, 2013). 
 
More weight should be given to research on POE perspective. The coexistence of shared 
goals and incompatible vested interests or priorities requires a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up analyses in the implementation process (Thomann, Lieberherr, & Ingold, 2016). 
Nee and Opper (2012) noted that “bottom- up institutional innovations in the private sector 
initially enabled the development of a dynamic capitalist economy, and then the political elite 
followed up with institutional change legitimizing what already had taken place on the ground 
to enable the gains in productivity to be channeled into taxable revenue” (202). The non-state 
sector in China has grown faster and sometimes independently, now accounts for more than 
half of the total economic activity and shows greater efficiency in output terms (Lardy, 2014a). 
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In 1999, the private sector was recognized in the Chinese constitution and government declared 
support for private firms to globalize in 2003.  
 
While pro-market reforms have resulted in the ascendancy of the non-state sector, the 
Chinese government professed that the goal of pro-market reforms is to achieve socialism 
(Goodman, 2009; Wong & Bo, 2010) with Chinese characteristics and not pure capitalism. 
Expecting a ‘big bang’ implementation of reforms is impractical due to the destabilizing effects. 
A decline in small businesses epitomized by TVEs at the early stage of liberalization (Huang, 
2008) does not imply the shrinking non-state sector, but the reconfiguration of market 
dynamics. A growing number of overseas educated are inheriting family businesses. Some 
have held professional positions in foreign consultancies and MNEs would help to modernize 
the management of POEs and adopt increasingly global outlook, yet retaining some traditional 
ways of managing businesses.  
 
The importance of contextual subsystems and identities of players and interactions at the 
individual levels should not be obscured. Individuals organize collectively in different 
structures such as unions, profession, ownership and social position (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Walder, 2011)  with a range of vested interests. Their priorities and concerns may vary, 
with possibilities of conflict or overlap in different situations and projects. I focus on business 
networks and relational capital building and systemic changes rather than culture per se.  The 
economic landscape of emerging economies exhibits a complex mixture and overlapping stakes 
across conventional sectoral categorization. Walder (2011) identified more categories than the 
simple state and non-state sectors in the Chinese economy as: SOEs, privatized SOE, 
transactional enterprises and entrepreneurial enterprises.4 Phenomenon-based research is not 
limited to collaboration among firms, but include the industry, institutions and markets. 
Reformed SOEs and hybrids may follow successful POEs under intense competitive pressure 
to become more efficient to keep up with globalization. Other than strategic SOEs, majority of 
SOEs have been reformed and largely privatized or merged with larger and more efficient 
holding groups in the sector.  
  
Overlapping interests between SOEs and POEs (Xie & Li, 2017) could lead to situational 
collaboration or formalized public-private ownership promoted by the current Chinese 
                                                          
4 Transactional firms were headed former government officials or individuals with close relationships with 
government offices; entrepreneurial enterprises grew from exploiting exploited new products and 
technologies after the onset of reform.   
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leadership. Reformed hybrids SOEs undergoing isomorphism would imitate ‘successful’ 
examples and structure internal changes accordingly (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jiang et al., 
2014) to legitimize their position in the industry. Opportunities to cogenerate, adjust and 
negotiate could result in circumvention of conventionally accepted processes that distinguish 
clearly the public and private domains. With the burgeoning of collaborative and public-private 
partnership (PPP) arrangements, merger of public goals and private standards could erode the 
weight accorded to institutions. The government engages with private actors to deliver projects 
to ensure economic viability and public good although these may be peripheral objectives of 
the partners. Firms that could overcome differences and envisage long term benefits (Etienne 
& Schnyder, 2014) would be induced into tactical collaboration.  
 
POEs that are strong in entrepreneurship initiate alternative institutions that the state 
comes to accept and implement subsequently (Nee & Opper, 2012). But these alternative 
channels created out of frustration with limitations of under developed institutions have been 
synchronized and harmonized with the larger ecosystem. POEs proactively leverage and 
legitimize favorable policies to enhance the competitiveness of the firm and industry (Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Yeh, 2008). Through commercial and industry associations, entrepreneurs share best 
practices and strengthen relations with state actors (Nee & Opper, 2012). Recent literature on 
international political economy examines three-dimensional interactions among the state, 
market and society (Wong & Bo, 2010). This perspective extends the current global strategy 
literature on institutional competitive advantage (Martin, 2014) that focuses on POEs reacting 
to opportunities and leveraging existing institutions for survival and improving their 
competitiveness (Dau, 2013; Landau et al., 2016). 
 
2.8   Conceptualizing Home Country Effects 
 
 This study incorporates coevolution, multi-dimension, multi-level and reflexive 
approach. The political economy is focused on domestic coevolution of local authorities and 
entrepreneurship and attraction of inbound foreign investment (Ang, 2016) but did not explore 
the impact on outbound investment. Political economy incorporates market and cultural factors, 
and highlight authority patterns and legitimation strategies that best explain organizational 
structure (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). One stream focused on interaction between political and 
economic strategy over three successive generations of China model (Chen & Naughton, 2017) 
by strengthening modern economic management without a concurrent move towards rule of 
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law (Naughton, 2016). However, a nuanced view of changes in emerging markets allow for 
firms and government to bargain, negotiate, adjust relationships to achieve common goals and 
consequent strengthening of weak institutions to protect their gains (Ang, 2016). The aim of 
this exercise is to extend the political economy perspective to establish the connection between 
home country dynamics with internationalization. On the other side of the equation, global 
strategy literature informs us of learning and adaption as a strategic logic (Koza, Tallman, & 
Ataay, 2011). Faced with additional institutional pressures in host countries, SOEs actively 
build legitimacy to gain acceptance (Meyer, Ding, Li & Zhang, 2014). The feedback process 
would nudge change in home country institutions, as suggested by Jackson and Deeg (2008).  
 
2.8.1 The meanings of home country support  
  
I shift the attention from stringent institutional support versus constraint to nuanced and 
diverse interactions of organizational actors. The long-held support versus constraint paradigm 
can be critiqued on intentional, relational and temporal grounds. The notion of support evokes 
different connotations for managers, firms and institutional agents and the meaning may change 
over time. The calculation of what investors wish for the state to support internationalization 
and the trade-offs involve, are pertinent questions that have not been addressed directly but are 
nonetheless important to IB research. As reforms deepen, SOEs come under increasing 
pressure to operate more like private enterprises in the marketplace. On balance, deregulation 
and opportunities encourage and facilitate POEs to internationalize. The assumption that POEs 
are disadvantaged could be challenged by research of POEs’ preferences for the types and 
levels of government support. Some POEs may not yearn for direct government financial 
support and prefer autonomy in their internationalization plans even though some had benefited 
from government assistance in the home country. Other types of non-financial assistance may 
be more relevant for firms. Prior understanding of direct financial support to SOEs would need 
to be modified to suit changing circumstances.   
 
Institutional mechanisms and effects, contrary to common perceptions, do not merely 
flow from the state. Nor is institutional support a binary construct of support versus constraint. 
Indeed, complexities and change show causal ambivalence (Ang, 2016; Chen & Naughton, 
2017). To redress the dominance of institutional formalities and top-down directives in 
previous research on institutional effects, multiple influences during economic transition 
should be discussed. State capitalism or developmental state (Haley & Haley, 2013; Knight, 
2014; Li et al., 2014; Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015b) should be viewed in conjunction with the 
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historical developments, relationship cultivation and evolution of political relations. 
Delegation of authority from central to local Chinese officials have encouraged business 
initiatives while conforming with general national and central level directives (Thun, 2004a). 
Firms beholden to higher authorities would be seen as compliant implementers who meet the 
targets spelt out by state sponsors, but they have some flexibility to pursue parallel strategic 
agenda that may not be fully aligned with the sponsors’ (Lange, 2009).   
 
Conceptualization of the role of the state (Knight, 2014; Thun, 2004a) could be enhanced 
by analyzing increasing political co-optation (Walder, 2011) of businesses and professionals, 
such as party recruitment, and involvement in policy recommendations through the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Former SOE managers or party cadres 
who become entrepreneurs could benefit from their connections to the local and/or central 
government and former collectives. POEs also build political capital by offering company 
stakes to local cadres in exchange for protection and favors, and collectively lobby for policies 
beneficial to the industry and community (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). 
 
The proactive behavior and accomplishments of POEs should be highlighted in 
contemporary research. Purposive action by individuals initiate change in organizations 
(McGaughey, Kumaraswamy, & Liesch, 2016). The process encompasses actors’ responsive, 
reflexive monitoring and reciprocal actions, integrating social relations with strategies and vice 
versa. That POEs which do not enjoy a level playing field in the protected domestic market 
would escape overseas (Witt & Lewin, 2007) tells only part of the story behind POEs’ overseas 
expansion. A bottom-up view challenges the assumption that advantages are afforded only to 
those having political capital. Actors find niche and complementarity to leverage heterogeneity 
among institutions and businesses and overcome obstacles (Ang, 2016). While entrepreneurs 
could choose from different sources of financing, Chinese state-owned banks have come under 
market pressure to operate as commercial entities (Garnaut, Song, Yao, & Wang, 2012). 
Nevertheless, business to government (B2G) connections at the local levels are still important 
for POEs to access financial resources (Zhao & Morgan, 2016).  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, POEs are increasingly connected with the national 
government (as with some western democracies) to serve as additional and steadfast protection 
against governance intervention and anti-corruption investigation, though membership does 
not result in immediate benefits for the business (Wang, 2016). Interactions between managers 
and government officials have become routine exercise to expedite approval or bypass red tape. 
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A further step of cultivation may be undertaken over the long term for support of major 
commercial projects in the future, or to gain approval and insurance protection for businesses 
(Nee & Opper, 2012). However, not all POEs partake in cultivating officials (Nee & Opper, 
2012) as they prefer to keep a low profile. While political connections, financial donations and 
party position could be exchanged for access in regulated sectors, it does not always offer clear 
advantages in improving private firms’ financial performance and obliges businesses to return 
favors, and subject enterprises to closer government scrutiny (Nee & Opper, 2012).  
 
2.8.2 Irregular internationalization paths 
 
 The second domain in the emergent conceptual framework addresses the uneven 
development paths of emerging economies. Internationalization process is like a moving 
picture rather than a snapshot of a glimpse at a point in time. Changes do not happen suddenly 
but evolve over time with the participation of different actors and the environments. Location 
advantages could be multiple fold in the case of China, which is a global factory as well as a 
huge market for international goods and services. Chinese management and 
internationalization is closer to the business systems of East Asian economies than varieties of 
capitalism in Europe. Nevertheless, labels are less important than studying how things work, 
the rationale for decisions and whether it served the actors’ objectives.  
 
This study departs from the assumption of stability, replicability and predictability of 
home country factors. Although industry-specific learning in different cultures could have 
varied implications on firm strategies and responses (Xu & Meyer, 2013), managers may not 
have full knowledge when making decisions. Most actors may not have the capabilities or full 
understanding of the environment to optimize business strategies (Cohen & Axelrod, 1984; 
Nelson & Winter, 2002). Managers and entrepreneurs often make decisions under time 
pressure, lack business information and may be oblivious to risks that could contribute to 
miscalculations. Strategies are ideally planned with available knowledge and skills but 
managers must deal with the unplanned and unintended results (Crick & Spence, 2005).  
 
 Process is not necessarily smooth, and could proceed in irregular pace and pattern, 
experiencing growth spurts, slowdown, reversal and de-commitment. From the impetus of 
change, implementation may encounter difficulties, and the end-point may not be in accordance 
with the original plan. Organizations may retain, adapt and discard templates to exercise 
incremental or radical shifts of value commitments (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). The main 
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protagonists undergo trial and error, responding to policy changes and feedback from 
consumers and host countries, and try to adapt, modify and refine strategies over time. 
 
 A coevolutionary model is appropriate for studying how changes in the home country 
impact on internationalization. Adapting from political science literature would enhance 
analysis of multi-level and concurrent relationships. Decentralization in China opened 
opportunities for regional governments. Having the advantage of local knowledge, officials are 
empowered with economic authority that may result in some unintended and incongruous 
outcomes from centralized plans (Caulfield, 2006). Despite this, the targets and general 
direction of policy directives would have to be met, in meandering ways. In the absence of 
institutional trust, firms in less developed regions rely more on informal financial institutions 
and their business partners to solve financial problems (Zhao & Morgan, 2016).  
 
The  Chinese political economy has been described as a thriving entrepreneurial bureau-
franchising, where stakeholders supported the institutionalization of good governance to 
preserve markets that have emerged in the process (Ang, 2016). Relationships operate in 
multidimensional and multilevel dimensions. Intangible resources could be turned into social 
capital but the boundaries between positive relationships and corruption are not clearly 
identifiable (Robison & Ritchie, 2010). Social capital derived from networks not only builds 
trust (Witt & Redding, 2013) but help to sustain institutions (Robison & Ritchie, 2010). In 
organizational theory literature, coevolution is the preferred choice to study interactions 
between multi-level organizations and the larger population of organizations in the 
environment (Volberda & Lewin, 2003). Dynamic relationships enable research to transcend 
the ongoing debate over whether the capitalism-socialism configuration is half empty or half 
full. Relationships hinge on relative bargaining strength, and the roles of the provider and the 
recipient may be switched in another situation. The symbiotic relationships seen in Korean and 
Japanese business and political interests that wield immense influence on policy matters are 
cases in point. Even in advanced economies, revolving doors are a common feature in 
American pharmaceutical industry, with managers moving into official appointments, and the 
influence of business lobbies on policy matters.  
 
Unlike a unidirectional development path model, political connections do not fade away 
with institutionalization. Relationships and institutions are not trade-offs that would displace 
each other in the development process. A coevolutionary model accommodates concurrent 
existence of relationships and an evolving regulatory system. Marketization does not spell the 
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end of patron-client relationships, but may reinforce some forms of mutual dependency 
between officials and entrepreneurs connected through interpersonal networks (Wank, 1999).  
Relationships and political connections among businesses, local officials and central 
governments that endure market reforms in transition economies are not addressed in the 
Weberian model (Ang & Jia, 2014). Though networks would not be the focus of this thesis, it 
is acknowledged as an integral part of the context.  
 
2.8.3 Response, Learning, Adaptation 
 
 The third domain in conceptual building is the multidirectional interactive feedback 
loops (Weick, 1979) between home and host contexts. Instead of calculating the distance 
between home and host countries in the political, cultural, economic, institutional arenas, it 
would be more pertinent to examine how home country institutions, managers, officials and 
industries respond to evolving host country developments towards OFDI. This is presented as 
a continuity of relations, not limited to calculations of fixed distance or proximity, nor is this a 
one-off condition.  
 
During the period under study (2008 – 2017), many twists and turns have occurred, and 
the process is still unfolding. The case studies show that home country actors have to manage 
the fluidity of the home and international environment. Apart from structural changes, cyclical 
factors in home and host countries, international markets and regulatory changes could 
influence internationalization in the short-term. Resource sectors, such as mining and 
agriculture, are especially vulnerable to volatile prices in the commodity markets. Agrifood 
business is susceptible to weather conditions and fluctuation in demand and output. Home 
country economic and political conditions such as volatility and risks influence decision 
process and the levels of OFDI (Tallman, 1988). While market factors may explain the rational 
behavioral aspect, I would venture further to examine how and why businesses could react 
agilely or deliberately under pressure by switching among different sets of logics to justify their 
decisions. The following Figure 2.4 shows how the main elements in the home country 
influence each other in different directions. The three main factors are institutions, markets and 
industry/firms where the actors interact across overlapping boundaries in contingent 
collaborative-competitive relations and adopt proactive and responsive approaches to advance 
their interests. 
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Figure 2.4 A Dynamic Home Country Model 
  
  
  
 
2.9    Summary 
 
This chapter traced the conceptualizing process of home country dynamics on 
internationalization through problematization consistent with abductive logic. The research 
subject of study is Chinese agrifood outbound investment to advanced economies between 
2008 and 2017. Though OLI model and latecomer perspective were not a perfect fit to match 
empirical material and the phenomenon, they were considered in the initial construction of an 
integrated institutional and process model. IB scholars have problematized in varying degrees 
the notion of institutional support and different business and capitalist systems. I will go further 
by establishing alternative assumption grounding to create opportunities for generating new 
findings. Rather than continuing preoccupation with longstanding categorization of 
conventional assumptions, I iterate theory with data and vice versa.  
 
I have reconstructed an alternative dynamic home country model comprising 
institutions, markets and businesses, operating in changing environments. I have 
reconceptualized the research approach to offer different ways of looking at home country 
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support, unique characteristics of individual transitioning experience and adaptation to home 
and host country changes. This is aimed at providing alternative explanations that are more 
convincing and closer to the experiences of business and official actors. Highlighting key actors 
in a coevolutionary model would illuminate momentous events when personalities capitalize 
on prevailing socio-economic and political conditions that culminate in a phenomenon. 
Acknowledging that internationalization is not a smooth, predictable and regular process, my 
conceptual model envisages and embraces complexities. This necessitates a shift in the notions 
of conventional resources and capabilities in political, economic and institutional frames to 
examine multi-level relationships, multiple logics of action and irregular development paths. 
An emergent model would try to capture the interactions among heterogenous actors in 
collaborative-competitive and proactive-responsive ways. I also explore the adaptation, 
learning, experience and interdependencies of multi-faceted relationships using a combination 
of lenses within the nexus of path dependent internationalization.  
 
 A coevolutionary model would enhance our understanding of seemingly incongruent 
policies and concerns of regression. Recent recentralization and deepening of pro-market 
reforms may not be incompatible as multi-prong strategies shape different businesses and 
levels of authorities on internationalization. Chinese globalization experience provides lessons 
and feedback on the home country and the process continues.  Weak institutions can coexist 
with functional markets as it is in the interest of the actors to find ways to make things work. I 
embrace outliers, deviant cases, challenges and alternatives as this will strengthen explanations 
of practical experience. While macro empirical studies address “why” questions in longitudinal 
studies, there are limits to exploring complexities at the individual level and systems in a 
holistic fashion. Addressing the “how” questions are important as this would help us to 
understand “why” things happened the way they did.  
 
The purpose of this study is not to find statistical significance but to provide insights to 
a phenomenon of Chinese agrifood OFDI to advanced economies which coincide with the 
move to consumption-driven economic growth. While responses to host countries are 
considered, the focus of this framework is based on home country effects on 
internationalization. The aim is to shed light on the process of negotiating discretionary 
arrangements and cultivation of relationships that provide alternatives and nuanced explanation 
to exemplars, outliers and idiosyncrasies.   
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3 Chapter Three: Context of the Chinese Political Economy 
 
"History cannot give us a program for the future, but it can give us a fuller 
understanding of ourselves, and of our common humanity, so that we can better face 
the future."  -- Robert Penn Warren (American poet, novelist and literary critic) 
 
3.1  Overview 
 
Current developments are invariably shaped by earlier decisions and experience of 
organizations and the environment. In the context China and the agrifood sector, developments 
in the political economy influence firm behavior, internationalization strategies and responses. 
Extant literature tends to relegate context to the background. However, scholars increasingly 
recognize the importance of interactions within the home country context (Landau et al., 2016; 
Peng & Luo, 2000; Rugman et al., 2011). This chapter aims to provide the historical 
background and context for the study of home country effects on internationalization.  
 
3.1.1 An Inclusive Approach 
 
 A holistic approach that incorporates multilevel and multidimensional relationships 
among home country actors would deepen our understanding of home country context. In 
emerging economies such as China, policy changes in the home country have significant effects 
on internationalization of firms. I draw on literature from political economy, history and 
sociology to inform an emerging area of interest in IB. Though leadership transition in China 
has been stable, economic policies are largely experimental. Operating in uncertain 
environment, it was ambiguous how policy implementation would pan out. Deng Xiaoping, 
credited for modernizing and opening China, has notably been cited for his analogy of "crossing 
the river by feeling the stones". This suggests that despite guidance and general directives from 
the central government, the Chinese bureaucracy and industry must be cautious and steadfast 
and be prepared to acclimatize and alter directions. Rather than unleashing comprehensive 
reforms all at once, the Chinese leadership took small steps and confined experimental pilot 
projects in special economic zones to buffer risks of major failure that may affect political 
instability.   
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 I argue for process to be incorporated in the study of Chinese internationalization. 
Rather than focusing on what is relevant to a point in time, a coevolutionary approach 
incorporates complex interactions of different actors over time. A snapshot approach would 
freeze what is relevant at a juncture in history but discounts continual transformation, whether 
initiated or adjusted. With reference to Heraclitus’ analogy “no one could ever step into the 
same river twice”, we should be mindful of the temporal dimension. Contextualization is 
crucial to the understanding of transition economies. Commonly applied reductionist models 
would be predisposed to a static and deterministic perspective. Such a portrayal is problematic 
because business systems are contingent on various social, organizational, institutional and 
environmental influences (Zhao & Morgan, 2016).   
 
 This chapter will be structured according to historical developments, focusing on pro-
market reforms. Reforms cover both the state and non-state sectors. As reforms deepen, 
boundaries of entities, sectors and institutions may overlap. Next, I will address the importance 
of agrifood sector in the Chinese economy and aims of internationalization. The final section 
shows the connection between progressive deregulation to facilitate globalization of agrifood 
business.   
 
3.1.2 Evolution of Pro-Market Reforms   
 
Since China embarked on pro-market reforms and an open-door policy in 1979, the 
government adopted multi-prong strategies with different emphases at different stages of 
development. A key priority has been the massive restructuring of SOEs that pervaded the 
Chinese economy since new China was established. Varieties of capitalism model (Coates & 
Palgrave, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008b; Lange, 2009; Whitley, 1998; 
Witt & Redding, 2013) adapted from western capitalist systems are useful for comparative 
studies but do not fit the Chinese developmental process. Scholars debate the pace and degree 
of privatization. Industrial policy has been a part of developing state capitalism. Debates over 
how capitalist or socialist, or whether economic transformation must necessarily be 
accompanied by political reforms, have not led to fruitful understanding of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics”. It is more important to recognize that the goals is socialism and not 
capitalism (Goodman, 2009). The Chinese leadership does not have a clear vision of the 
endpoint in history (Kwok, 2018).  The definitions of private and public have been debated due 
to the lack of clear divisions in the informal networks and the criteria for determining the 
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categories (Scissors, 2016). Different shades of SOEs have emerged - some are more 
competitive, organized like private enterprises, while strategic SOEs fulfil key social goals and 
are more important than peripheral SOEs. There are limitations of relying on China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Commerce statistics due to incomplete reporting by firms 
and difficulty of verifying publicized data. A diversity of sources would overcome information 
gaps and provide a holistic overview. 
 
It would be more meaningful to focus on the temporal dimension of Chinese political 
and economic reforms. Within each phase, the roles of different sectors will be discussed in 
greater detail. There are broadly five phases of Chinese multi-faceted pro-market reforms:  
 
(1) initial experimentation with socialist modernization;  
(2) top down restructuring of SOEs through guided capitalism;  
(3) transformation to make SOEs more competitive;  
(4) further pro-market reforms and encouragement of POEs; and  
(5) deregulation, recentralization and collaboration of state and private. 
 
Initial experimentation with limited market-oriented reforms were focused on rural 
markets and contractual arrangements. Though farm income increased, ineffective 
coordination resulted in imbalances, rural-urban divide and distribution inefficiencies. From 
1989 to 1991, reforms were brought to a temporary halt due to the crisis of state capacity. There 
was a pressing need to search for future policy direction. With reformers gaining the upper 
hand, reforms were revitalized. In 1992, the Chinese leadership pushed ahead with 
implementing a socialist market economy. The first goal was to reduce the number of SOEs 
through a policy of ‘grasping the big, releasing the small’. In the late 1990s as China was 
preparing for entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese government stepped 
up support for SOEs to become more competitive internationally. Concurrently, the 
government encouraged entrepreneurship and private firms to compete with SOEs to improve 
their performance. While pro-market reforms imposed higher standards on SOE management, 
the post-GFC stimulus favored SOE’s continued dominant role in the domestic economy. 
Under Xi’s leadership, recentralization and anti-corruption campaigns took off ostensibly to 
improve governance over state-managed assets. Overseas deals by Chinese companies hit a 
record US$170bn (£132bn) in 2016, prompting the Chinese government to tighten controls of 
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overleveraged credit in foreign investment. Table 3.2 shows the evolution of China policy 
priorities over the years.  
 
3.2   State Sector 
 
Since the formation of new China, SOEs undertook the important responsibility of 
national reconstruction, providing not just employment, but also a range of social services, such 
as education, medical care and healthcare and retirement protection for their  employees (Fan 
& Hope, 2013). SOEs continue to dominate mining, steel, telecommunications and energy. 
SOEs may be supervised by central or local (provincial or municipal) governments. Each SOE 
has been assigned certain areas of priority and specialization to fulfil, whether in strategic, 
pillar or other less essential portfolios. Central SOEs receive direct government funding and 
their performance is slightly below those of regional SOEs. Despite decades of pro-market 
reforms, China’s state sector continues to account for more than 30 per cent of total GDP (down 
from 70 per cent in the late 1990s) and 20 per cent of total employment (down from 60 per cent 
in the 1990s).    
 
The first significant milestone of SOE reforms was the ‘grasp the big, release the small’ 
policy from 1992 to 1997. After SOEs were corporatized in 1994, their numbers were reduced. 
Large SOEs came directly under central government control but smaller SOEs relinquished 
their management to local governments which restructured, privatized or closed. In the 1990s 
the Chinese leadership looked to the Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol for inspiration to 
achieve economies of scale and develop into global competitive conglomerates quickly 
(Kroeber, 2016).  
 
The next wave of change to SOEs could be considered the most massive transformation 
of SOEs in Chinese history. From 1998 to 2003 Premier Zhu Rongji launched a huge 
transformation of SOEs to boost their competitiveness in preparation for accession to the WTO. 
The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) was set up to hold state assets on behalf of the state and evaluate managerial 
appointments. Pillar industries that have been identified (equipment manufacturing, 
automobile, information technology, construction, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, 
and surveying and design) must have significant government ownership but the government 
need not be a majority stakeholder. According to SASAC, strategic industries are those that the 
state must maintain at least a fifty percent ownership stake of existing firms (defense, electric 
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power and grid, petroleum and petrochemical, coal, telecommunications, civil aviation, and 
shipping). State‐owned financial institutions are owned by Central Huijin. However, SASAC 
and Central Huijin are not involved in day-to-day operations of individual SOEs.  
 
The policy of promoting national champions continued well into the late 2000s. China 
adopted the “guojin mintui” policy, meaning that “the state advances as the private sector 
retreats” in order to promote national champions. SOEs’ share of market capitalization 
increased from 70 percent in the 1990s to 83 percent in 2007 (OECD/CSMAR, 2009). The 
target was to promote 30 to 50 SOEs as national champions to become multinationals in the 
league of Samsung and General Motors. SOEs were again given preference in domestic 
stimulus projects after the GFC. Some profitable subsidiaries of SOEs have been listed on the 
stock exchange. Nevertheless, national champions are not strictly limited to SOEs. One such 
private company is Huawei. Additionally, innovative and successful POEs, identified as award-
winning domestic “dragonheads” have received government encouragement and tax incentives 
to internationalize.  
 
Within a decade since SASAC was set up in 2003, the profits of its assets quadrupled 
but the share of profits of state-owned non-financial corporations underperformed (Lardy, 
2014b). This did not necessarily mean that national champions were more successful. Despite 
the “release the small” policy in the 1990s, SOEs have multi-layered structures with uneven 
performance, where some efficient companies may subsidize loss-making subsidiaries. The 
return on assets (ROA) of SOEs in three highly state monopolized sectors (tobacco, oil 
extraction, and electricity) have performed very well during the last decade but those in sectors 
where POEs are competitive have been lagging behind by 4 percentage points on average (Xu, 
2010). Competition has intensified among firms of various ownership structures in the mixed 
market economy (Wu, 2006). As a result of institutional reforms, Chinese firms regardless of 
state-owned, hybrid or private ownership, are subject to increasing market pressure, and strive 
for efficiency and delivery of performance targets (Zhou, Cai, & Li, 2006). However, SOEs 
have additional responsibilities which include social objectives on top of profit maximization. 
SOEs have been more aggressive in adjusting prices and marketing new products that would 
benefit Chinese consumers (Wu, 2006). 
 
The period 2004 to 2012 witnessed mixed policies to manage globalization and the 
global financial and food crises. As more central SOEs are corporatized, a third of central SOEs 
recruited external professionals as directors (Fan & Hope, 2013). Previous management teams 
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were principally filled with bureaucrats and political appointees who would be promoted or 
moved to other ministries and SOEs after a few years’ stint. The number of central government-
owned enterprises has been reduced over the years while smaller SOEs continue to be owned 
and managed by local governments. Most studies showed that pro-market reforms led to 
productivity growth, with the performance gap and formal ownership distinction between 
SOEs and non-SOEs gradually being reduced since the late 1990s (Putterman & Li, 2008). 
 
Table 3.1 Decline in the number of Central SOEs 
Time Number of Central SOEs 
1998 127 
2003 196 
2013 115 
2016 106 
December 2017 98 
 
Source: China Daily; Xinhua; China Statistical Yearbook; OECD; Fan & Hope (2013) 
 
 
Chinese SOEs have been favored over POEs to undertake key domestic infrastructural 
projects. China expanded rail, highway, telecommunications and water management systems 
in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, enabling connections of previously separate 
domestic markets in a huge country (Lieberthal & Lieberthal, 2003). The move to the interior 
provinces to take advantage of low cost labor in manufacturing and attracted joint ventures 
with private and foreign businesses. Similarly, SOEs undertook investments of overseas 
projects to capitalize on the post-GFC stimulus funding.  
 
China’s pro-market reforms capitalized on its decentralized organization owing to the 
size of the country. Local SOEs have displayed greater flexibility and are outperforming central 
SOEs. In the first three quarters of 2017, centrally-administered SOEs made about 1.09 trillion 
yuan in profit, up 17.3 percent year-on-year, while locally-administered SOEs made over 575 
billion yuan, up 35.8 percent year-on-year (Zhong, 2017b). In this respect, improved 
performance of SOEs bode well for Chinese banks as half of the credit are made to SOEs.  
 
3.2.1 Strengthening SOEs 
 
The recent shift towards rebalancing the economy and recentralization of political 
monitoring may seem paradoxical, but it is a continuation and deepening of the reform process. 
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Some observers wonder if changes amount to reversal of pro-market reforms. Strong SOEs 
may seem incompatible with pro-market reforms and consumption-based economic growth. 
However, policy adjustments are consistent with improving the efficiency of SOEs. The current 
leadership is concerned with improving the governance and competitiveness of SOEs. An 
estimated 345 “zombie companies” with weak core businesses and excessive bureaucracy 
subsidized by central SOEs would be reorganized and streamlined. Central SOEs are required 
to shrink the number of management levels from the existing five to nine to lower than three 
or four, while stripping off 20 percent of their subsidiary legal entities within three years. The 
decision was unveiled during the State Council’s executive meeting on May 2016 chaired by 
Premier Li Keqiang (State-Council, 2016). 
 
“Central SOEs have played an indispensable role for China’s social and economic development, and 
we should give them full credit in that regard…Yet crucial problems exist with them as well, and 
now we must tackle them step by step, which is in fact deepening the SOE reform” - - Premier Li. 
 
The ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy is aimed at helping Chinese SOEs to excel globally 
and increase the value of exports. To create competitive global MNEs out of SOEs, the 
government sought to deepen supply-side structural reforms. The number of SOEs have been 
reduced through consolidation, mergers and disposal of non-core SOE assets. Majority of the 
central SOEs focus on strategic industries and natural monopolies. Other industries are open to 
competition between SOEs, hybrids and POEs.  
 
The government’s encouragement of private-public partnership (PPP) since 2013 was a 
way to improve the performance of SOEs. At the beginning, PPP was supported in major 
infrastructural projects, but gradually expanded to other sectors. In October 2017, the first batch 
of 19 central SOEs have undergone mixed-ownership reforms in areas of power generation, oil 
and gas, railway and telecommunications (Zhong, 2017b). Local SOEs in high growth regions 
such as Shenzhen, are taking initiatives to promote ownership diversification. SOEs would 
continue to feature as key players in both the domestic economy and international markets, 
fulfilling social goals in addition to commercial targets.  
 
3.3   Non-State Sector  
 
The non-state and subsequently the private sector emerged from the policy shift of 
allowing diverse forms of ownership to operate side by side in the post-Mao era (Wu, 2005). 
The development of the non-state and private sector has come a long way. Marketization of 
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firms has been guided by central government directors, implemented by local officials and 
leveraged by entrepreneurs. The notable milestones are: (1) household contract system; (2) 
corporatization; (3) recognition and legitimization; (4) government support for innovation and 
internationalization; and (5) collaboration. A summary of the evolution of China’s non-state 
sector policies and the political and economic environment is shown in Table 3.2.  
 
POEs have grown in numbers and are the engine of rapid growth of China’s domestic 
economy. The rising prominence of POEs is evident in their contribution to two-thirds of 
China’s GDP and three-quarters of Chinese industries (Lardy, 2014a). The private sector’s 
share in GDP was already 33 per cent in 1998 (Garnaut et al., 2012; Tsui, Bian, & Cheng, 2006) 
prior to China’s accession to the WTO. By 2006, the number of POEs were five times more 
than SOEs. Though the majority of POEs lack scale in comparison with SOEs, they are the 
leaders in the manufacturing sector. POEs have even moved into pillar industries such as 
airlines services and automobile manufacturing, through partnerships and encouragement of 
the central government (Thun, 2004a).  
 
3.3.1 Legitimization process  
 
Township-village enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s were experimentation models of 
entrepreneurship and the free enterprise system. TVEs were more efficient than SOEs despite 
inherent disadvantages in technology and modern management skills and limited access to 
bank loans and government support (Perotti, Sun, & Zou, 1999). Some private entrepreneurs 
even surpassed the performance of SOEs in urban areas (Thun, 2004b). While the non-state 
sector spearheaded economic growth, SOEs continued to play important social functions. 
Huang argued that the 1980s to 1990s were the height of entrepreneurial growth and lamented 
the demise of spontaneous and vibrant small POEs in favor of ubiquitous state control which 
stifled entrepreneurship (Huang, 2008). However, history has shown that imbalances in the 
economy led to discontent, necessitating further reforms and adaptation toward a new 
equilibrium. The non-state sector played an important role of absorbing surplus labor and laid 
off workers from restructured SOEs (Garnaut et al., 2012).   
 
A significant milestone was limited liability afforded to registered private firms when 
the Company Law was enacted in 1994. Prior to private enterprises gaining recognition or 
legitimacy, firms put on a “red hat” to masquerade as a collective firm or local government 
branch  (Garnaut et al., 2012). Hence, many private firms formerly disguised as collectives 
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formally took on the POE label. Many previously unknown enterprises also registered as 
companies. In 1999, private firms were recognized by the Constitution and were allowed to 
apply for foreign trade licenses. Domestic market protection was lifted to encourage 
competition among firms, in preparation for China’s accession to the WTO. Foreign investors 
in China also pushed for adherence to international benchmarks which POEs were more 
capable of meeting in a short time (Thun, 2004a). Further liberalization of state controls, 
deregulation and institutional changes were conducive to the growth of POEs.  
 
Economic sociologists have studied the context of policy changes in depth. 
Decentralization gave rise to ‘network capitalism’ that facilitated industrial governance in the 
absence of strong institutions (Boisot & Child, 1996). Though incremental, the bottom-up 
evolution of economic institutions helped to legitimize private enterprise as an organizational 
entity (Nee & Opper, 2012). The lack of enforceable ‘institutionalized trust’ has been 
compensated by informal and social trust (Witt & Redding, 2013). Firms that proactively 
leverage political connections (Landau et al., 2016) are likely to benefit than “takers” of policy 
changes. The pace of private firms gaining legitimacy through organic environmental change 
would be slower than firms that proactively build legitimacy for their business and industry 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Initial reforms may trigger local governments and businesses to 
respond or initiate change because of their complementary interests (Krug & Hendrischke, 
2015). Chinese actors coevolve by harnessing weak institutions to build markets, stimulate 
strong institutions and preserve markets (Ang, 2016). Contrary to conventional assumption that 
Weberian rule of law and formal property rights are prerequisites to achieve growth, Chinese 
enterprises and local governments collaborate and coevolve to develop new markets and norms 
(Ang, 2016). POEs worked more closely with local officials on specific business deals than 
with the central government that primarily set general directives. Regulations helped POEs to 
secure rights and gain legal, social, economic and political legitimacy (Nee & Opper, 2012).  
 
At the same time, some POEs have been co-opted by the central government for mutual 
benefits. From 2001, owners of private business could join the Chinese Communist Party. The 
profile of the Chinese elite has been changing from the previous bureaucrat and party model to 
a more heterogeneous base. Business leaders, professionals and academics are welcomed to 
join the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and provide inputs for 
policies. It was estimated there were 185,000 members with postgraduate engineering degrees 
(Yearbook, 2014). However, other scholars argue that the Chinese government exerts 
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considerable influence over large POEs. Like SOEs, POEs that enjoy market access, state 
subsidies and are close to political power, arguably carried out the national policy objectives, 
similar to the functions of SOEs (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015a). These narratives suggest 
overlapping objectives across entity boundaries.  
 
3.3.2 Financing POEs 
 
The People’s Bank of China functions as the central bank. The Agricultural 
Development Bank of China, China Development Bank (supervised by the State Council) and 
EXIM Bank of China were set up in the 1994 to serve as policy banks. Of the 10 Central 
government-owned commercial banks, five are among the top international banks (Agricultural 
Bank of China, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, People’s Bank of 
China and China Construction Bank Corporation). The "Big Four" state-owned banks represent 
60 to 70 percent of the domestic banking business.  
 
The liberalization of the Chinese financial sector has opened opportunities for non-state 
funding sources. The China Merchants Bank, founded in 1987, was the first share-holding 
commercial bank wholly owned by corporate legal entities in China. Large publicly-listed 
joint-stock private commercial banks include Minsheng Bank (the first to be set up in 1996), 
China Zheshang Bank and Ping An Bank. Privately-owned banks include the Bank of Shanghai, 
Taizhou and Taian. In 2014, five new trial private banks have been approved, and Sanxiang 
Bank in Hunan started operations in 2016. MYbank of Alibaba Group Holding and WeBank 
of Tencent Holdings make microloans to individual clients and small enterprises.   
 
Officially, commercial banks are not supposed to discriminate against private firms. In 
1998 the central bank lifted the credit cap on commercial banks and let each to be responsible 
for profit and losses. Though the Chinese central bank forbids differential rate, banks mitigate 
higher credit risk and charges higher interest on POEs that are less transparent on ownership 
structures and accounting records (Garnaut et al., 2012). However, wealthy POEs could 
“borrow the shell for the egg” through back door listing (Garnaut et al., 2012). There are cases 
where larger unlisted POEs purchased a smaller listed company to improve their credit rating 
and access to diverse funding sources. 
 
While SOEs have direct access to the state banking system, private entrepreneurs with 
connections to local government (Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2015)could facilitate loan processing 
 Chapter Three: Context of the Chinese Political Economy 
66 
 
time and request for a higher loan amount if these clients meet the basic loan criteria (Zhao & 
Morgan, 2016). The success rate of POEs getting loans from four state-owned commercial 
banks was 83 per cent but the bureaucratic processes and expenses of making a formal loan 
application was time consuming and financially costly (Garnaut et al, 2012). Informal 
connections are important for POEs seeking capital. According to the data released by the 
People’s Bank of China, private firms received 52 per cent of all credit flowing to firms from 
2010–2012, while the share of state firms was only 32 per cent. This should not be surprising 
considering the higher return on assets generated by private industrial firms, and their interest 
coverage ratio, which are common measures of credit worthiness (Lardy, 2014). 
 
POEs may find it worthwhile to get long term and substantial loans from established 
formal banking institutions. However, it would be more convenient to obtain short-term 
working capital, one-off bridging and operational liquidity financing from their own resources, 
informal connections (family and friends) and semi-formal avenues (credit associations) that 
charge higher interest rates but overlook documentary and collateral backing and allow flexible 
repayment terms (Garnaut et al., 2012). 
   
3.4   Overlapping Boundaries  
 
Debate over the definitions of entities and inconclusive findings of Chinese economic 
development could be attributed to the lack of clear divisions of sectors and responsibilities. It 
is difficult to provide strict definition and categorization of what constitutes state and private. 
Dominant literature tends to take a dualistic state “ownership bias” view of state capitalism 
rather than a blurred boundary conceptualization (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015a). POEs have 
acquired non-performing SOEs, and recruited former SOEs managers, or have close 
connections to the local and/or central government officials. POEs are heterogeneous 
businesses, former collectives, start-up or experienced entrepreneurs. Huawei is considered a 
private company despite the founder’s military background and political connections cultivated 
as the company expanded. In China where most entrepreneurs or a family member would have 
worked for a state organization, it would be difficult to completely dissociate connections to 
the government. Marketization may not spell the end of relationships as mutual dependency 
between officials and entrepreneurs are conducted through interpersonal networks (Wank, 
1999).     
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Table 3.2 Evolution of Chinese policy priorities 
       
Economic Context Summary State sector Reforms Non-state sector policies Political Context 
1978 – 1980s 
First stage of 
economic reforms   
 
Experimented with 
“socialist 
modernization” 
 
Bottom-up growth 
SOEs given greater autonomy and responsibilities 
for profits/loss. Performance-based incentives.  
 
Contract-based collaboration of all levels of SOEs.  
Licenses to selected SOE to export.  
Farm household contract responsibility 
Township-village enterprises (TVE) modernize 
farms & industrialize rural.   
1983: two tier pricing and distribution 
1980 – 84: Special economic zones 
Post Cultural Revolution Party 
rejuvenation under Hu-Zhao 
leadership. 
 
1989-1991: reforms halt; crisis 
of state capacity 
1992 – 1997 
Market 
liberalization 
 
 
“Socialist market 
economy” declared 
 
Top down institutional 
reforms 
 
Large corporations 
 
1994: SOEs registered as companies. 
Reduce SOE numbers (500): “grasp the big, release 
the small” (lease or sell). 
 
SOE as vehicles of guided capitalism.  
Study Japan & Korea models to develop identified 
national / provincial champions.  
1994: Company Law - limited liability  
 
Decentralization favor urban firms.  
 
Incentives for private and foreign joint venture 
in technology sectors. 
 
1992: Deng’s southern tour 
 
Local officials given more 
powers (e.g. real estate) 
 
Cadre reforms: emphasis on 
professionalism 
 
1998 – 2003 
Develop global 
competitiveness 
   
Accelerated reforms 
 
1999: Go Out Policy 
announced 
 
2001: Accession to 
WTO 
Premier Zhu Rongji: huge transformation of loss- 
making large & medium SOEs in three years.  
 
Industrial ministries were abolished.  
2003: SASAC set up to evaluate SOE managerial 
appointment process, invest and hold assets on 
behalf of the state.  
1999 Constitution recognized private firms. 
Allowed to be issued foreign trade licenses. 
 
Deepening of local entrepreneurship. 
 
1998: foreign investors allowed to buy state 
assets. 
Jiang Zemin’s three represents 
to re-establish inclusiveness. 
 
Long term plans for economic 
and social development. 
2004 – 2012 
Dealing with global 
crises and 
sustainable growth 
 
Top down revamp of 
bureaucracy  
 
Sustain reforms but at 
slower place 
  
Post-GFC stimulus 
2005: external directors to fill half of SOE boards – 
introduced individual accountability. 
 
2006: state continues to dominate seven strategic & 
five pillar industries.  
 
2010: “state advance, private retreat”.  
SOEs favored in domestic projects. 
2004: private asset and capital ownership were 
recognized by the Constitution.  
 
2006: Limited personal liability company law.  
Support innovation through domestic R&D. 
Intellectual property protection laws.   
 
MOFCOM supports POE globalization.  
Hu Jintao: harmonious society.  
 
Policy consultation and co-
optation of businesses. 
 
2013 – 2016 
Rebalancing 
Mixed policies 
 
 
Centralization  
Deepen reforms  
 
Restrict capital outflow 
Improve management of capital through “mixed 
ownership” reform.  
 
SASAC to reform selected SOEs to promote 
efficiency and governance. Tightened monitoring 
and forex controls.  
 
Deregulation of approval requirements for 
internationalization but increased firm 
responsibility and checks.  
 
Encourage PPP (public-private partnership). 
Xi Jinping: China Dream 
Quality & sustainability 
Anti-corruption  
Direct supervision 
“Belt and Road initiative” 
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3.5   Agrifood Sector 
 
China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of food. Between the 1990s and 
mid-2000s, China was able to produce sufficient food for its domestic consumption and was a 
net exporter of agricultural products (Ghose, 2014). However, the Chinese government 
struggles to feed its 1.4 billion population with only one-fifteenth of the world's arable land. 
Since agro-economist Lester Brown published the popular and controversial book “Who Will 
Feed China?” in 1994, global attention and concern has turned to China’s food consumption 
needs. Though agriculture accounts for only nine percent of China’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), a third of the national workforce engaged in farming activities (Kroeber, 2016).      
 
3.5.1 Food Security  
 
Agriculture commands an important place in the Chinese economy. That the 
Communist Party Central Number One Document is dedicated to the agricultural policies 
shows the importance of this sector. Food security has been a key concern of policy makers, 
having suffered three years of natural disasters and the great famine in 1958 to 1961 following 
the Great Leap Forward. Despite its huge land mass, only seven percent of China’s land is 
cultivable land. For three decades China managed to achieve self-sufficiency in grains but the 
ratio has been revised to 90 per cent excluding soy bean since 2011. The current 166 million 
hectares under active agricultural usage (though above the 120 million hectares “red line”) falls 
short of consumption needs by 30 percent (Cheng & Zhang, 2014). The rise in demand for 
meat has also put pressure on grain supply for both human consumption and animal feed. The 
cropping structure has been changing, with farmers diversifying from grains into higher-valued 
crops, aquaculture and off-farm employment. Since 2011, China has become the largest 
importer of food, surpassing the US (Cheng & Zhang, 2014).  
 
Though agriculture was not identified as a strategic or pillar industry, sustaining food 
security in terms of sufficient supplies and stable pricing have always been important goals. 
Since 2003 the government has encouraged grain growing by offering subsidies or higher 
prices to farmers. However, grain production has only increased marginally by less than five 
percent in the past decade. Land and water shortages and soil degradation are serious resource 
limitations. The effects of growing urbanization, rural-urban migration, aging population and 
climate change have put strains on farm productivity. Rapid urbanization and industrialization 
have depleted natural resources and reduced the availability of surplus cheap rural labor.  
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The government responded to the global food crises of 2007 – 2008 by intervening in 
consumer pricing protection, applying trade measures and encouraging domestic production 
(Yu & Jensen, 2014). Food prices soared in the international and domestic markets from late 
2006, negatively impacting low-income households in China. Increase in food prices 
previously maintained below three percent a year, registered more than 12 per cent price rise 
in 2007. The price of pork and poultry rose by 30 percent (Foodsecurityportal, 2014). The 
government increased the minimum support prices for different varieties of rice and pays 
higher than market prices. In 2008, China increased export duties on major crops, such as wheat, 
barley and rice, to ensure sufficient supplies for the domestic market. Domestic investment in 
rural areas increased by 21 percent from 2007 to 2008, 27 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 20 
percent from 2009 to 2010 (China Statistical Yearbook). The Chinese government supported 
producers by tripling subsidies for fertilizer between 2004 and 2007 (Maetz et al., 2011). 
During the food security crisis in 2008, China ensured adequate supply of fertilizer to domestic 
farmers by discouraging exports through tariffs (Maetz et al., 2011). 
 
As agrifood prices eased in recent years, Chinese food security policy turned to long- 
term plans to capitalize on global markets rather than direct ad hoc intervention in times of 
crises. Chinese chief agricultural economic policy adviser urged Chinese investors to become 
global traders rather than farmers (Cheng & Zhang, 2014). Agriculture Minister Han Changfu 
said that China’s agriculture sector needs to undertake supply-side reform in view of the 
bumper harvests and surplus corn stockpiles which put a financial burden on the government 
to pay artificially high prices to support farm incomes (Stanway, 2016). As Chinese agricultural 
management academic Wei noted, prices of imported agricultural products have remained low 
and domestic prices are falling.  Chinese policy makers are persuaded to address China’s food 
security needs through internationalization. China could coordinate global resources by 
increasing imports from diversified suppliers and forging long-term partnerships and overseas 
investment to ensure China's food security (Wei & Chen, 2016).  
 
The shift to higher protein diet has driven the diversification of the agrifood sector. 
Increasing meat consumption has partially displaced grains as the staple food of the rising 
Chinese middle class. Between 1985 and 2005 meat consumption in China quadrupled, 
reaching 59.5 kilos per person a year, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO, 2012). Meat consumption is likely to continue to increase in coming years 
as more Chinese become affluent and exposed to consumption patterns of advanced economies. 
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By 2020, meat consumption is expected to grow by 35 percent from current levels. There is 
also a growing market for wine, olive oil and exotic fruit such as cherries and berries (Z. Zhou, 
2017). The decline in meat consumption in the US (Figure 3.1) opens investment opportunities 
for Chinese firms seeking to import a variety of food sources to the home country.  
 
Figure 3.1 Meat Consumption in China and the USA 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Food Safety  
  
Food safety issues have become a major concern in China in recent years. Following 
the global food crises of 2007 – 2008, Chinese consumers were hit by a spate of food 
contamination scandals over tainted milk, chemical additives in pork and supply chain lapse 
(Lam, Remais, Fung, Xu, & Sun, 2013).  It was not until 2015 that the government explicitly 
enunciated the importance of food safety in public statements. This has prompted the search 
for “clean and green” food sources from global markets.  
 
In the past, agricultural firms diversified into non-agricultural sectors mainly to increase 
profits (Wei, Fang, & Wu, 2017). However, successful non-agricultural corporate groups have 
diversified into agricultural business to tap the growing middle-class consumers, and to secure 
long-term stream of stable income. EverGrande, a real estate company in Guangzhou expanded 
into tourism and agriculture in 2011. Its agrifood subsidiaries sell  organic rice, oil, dairy and 
animal husbandry sectors to Chinese consumers (Qiu, 2014). Alibaba founder Jack Ma set up 
Yunfeng Capital with Citic Private Equity and spent US$360 million to acquire a majority 
stake in Chinese dairy group Yili. Internet game company NetEase invested in an 80-hectare 
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pig farm in Zhejiang province. Computer maker Lenovo invested in a blueberry and kiwi 
distributor through its agricultural subsidiary, Joyvio. (Murray, 2014). Leading technology 
firms Alibaba and JD.com have started selling imported farm products on e-commerce 
platforms to Chinese consumers. 
 
3.6   Internationalization 
 
China’s open-door policy evolved from import substitution in 1972-1978 and export 
orientation in 1978-2001 (Wu, 2005). In transitioning to global trade, China adopted a gradual 
policy with special economic zones at the forefront for expansion. In 1990, China led the world 
in the production of cotton textiles and televisions. After China joined WTO, it became a key 
manufacturing center of Asia and a major exporter of white goods and electronics, bicycles, 
motorbikes, and subsequently cell phones and computers.   
 
When China opened its economy to inbound foreign investment in the 1980s, tight 
restrictions were imposed on the locations, sectors, and types of participation available to 
inbound foreign investment. However, regulations were gradually relaxed. By 2006, foreign 
financial service firms were permitted to provide a full array of banking services (Garnaut et 
al., 2012). Foreign MNEs have been leveraging mainland Chinese workers for international 
competitive advantage and the growing China market. Since 2000, Japanese firms have 
increasingly committed to high-end investments in China (Lieberthal & Lieberthal, 2003).  
 
China’s agricultural sector is fast losing its comparative advantage in land intensive 
agriculture. Nevertheless, niche labor intensive agrifood production such as aquaculture, 
horticulture and processing in China may still enjoy cost advantages in the short-term. Chinese 
firms have been known for specializing in producing food inputs for developed countries. SOE 
COFCO Tunhe manufactures tomato paste destined for international brands such as Heinz, 
Nestle, Unilever and McDonalds (Lin, 2007). China’s cost advantage is gradually eroded due 
to rising cost of production for cash crops such as sugar and fruit.  
 
Prior to post-Mao modernization, Chinese outbound investment was mainly in the form 
of developmental aid to developing countries. In the 1990s, Chinese firms invested on large 
scale projects or formed joint ventures with Southeast Asian, African and Latin American 
countries (Table 3.3). The common perception is that Chinese funded projects in developing 
economies were motivated by resource-seeking and market seeking objectives. The Chinese 
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government was also keen to transfer of Chinese farming technology, self-sufficiency model 
and infrastructure development. The strategic thinking behind enabling populous developing 
countries in large continents to feed themselves would to alleviate global food scarcity and 
competition for resources in the world markets. Recent projects in developing regions are 
geared towards diverse, smaller scale and profitable entrepreneurial ventures (Cook, Lu, 
Tugendhat, & Alemu, 2016).  
 
China’s food security policy has evolved towards sophistication, encompassing multi-
prong strategy of domestic self-sufficiency by increasing productivity (through seed research, 
mechanization and chemicals), subsidies for domestic producers, storage and cost controls, 
moderate import dependency and encourage Chinese investment in different agrifood resources 
and supply chain (Wei & Chen, 2016). Home country food strategy has shown changing 
priorities, from concerns over food security to incorporating food safety needs. Following the 
GFC and global food crises of 2007 - 2008, the government encouraged large agrifood firms 
to invest overseas to have better control over supplies and global prices. Inductive observations 
of smaller scale investments in developing countries claimed that food security has not been 
achieved as produce was not shipped to China (Chen & Guo, 2017). This discourse neglects to 
give due recognition to the indirect achievement of food security as a long-term strategy. In the 
broader context, POEs and regional SOEs complement overseas investment by larger SOEs 
that acquire global trading and logistic firms.  
 
In 2007, Beijing issued the Central party number one document, calling for the rapid 
implementation of “go global” policy for the agricultural sector. As global agricultural prices 
fell in the past decade, attention shifted to the high cost of subsidizing domestic production to 
compete with cheaper imports. Historically, China’s agrifood investment have been focused 
on developing and emerging market economies. Official data showed 589 of the 1356 
enterprises in agriculture related enterprises (including forestry and fisheries) are in Asia. 
Increasingly, Chinese OFDI destinations have diversified to advanced economies as it sought 
premium quality resources, management skills and technology. The balance between state and 
private players has even out gradually. The value of China’s outbound M&A for POEs grew 
from US$5 billion in 2010 to US$35 billion in 2015 compared to US$53 billion and US$39 
billion for SOEs during the same period (Barber, 2016).  
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Table 3.3 Evolution of Chinese Involvement in Overseas Agrifood Projects 
Timeline Significant Events 
1950s – 1960s  Development aid to newly independent and third world countries driven by diplomacy 
1978 – 1980s Shift to business-oriented model, commercial medium sized farming and demonstration projects 
in developing countries  
1980s – 1990s Joint venture with foreign partners and revival of defunct projects of other investors and 
sponsors  
1990s Government level and state / provincial involvement: 
• African countries (Zambia, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania, Tanzania, Tongo, Gabon, 
South Africa)  
• Latin American countries (Cuba, Mexico) 
1992  Deng Xiaoping encouraged regional authorities to engage in international business under 
supervision and regulation 
 
Mid 1990s Chinese government provided host countries and Chinese investors with machinery and credit   
2000 – 2008 • Investment in land and infrastructure in Africa (Mozambique and Ethiopia)  
• Mekong river basin infrastructure and rice (Laos and Cambodia) 
• Demonstration farms and transfer of technology to developing countries   
• Investment in raw materials from Indonesia (palm oil, rubber, timber)  
• Large scale farming in Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia (soy, corn, vegetables) 
 
2001 Encouragement of “Go Out” globalization policy formalized by a directive to relax controls on 
ODI.   
 
2001 China’s accession to WTO opened domestic economy to global competition 
2006 Agriculture was listed as one of the priority sectors of the Chinese economy 
2006  China African Summit cemented and deepened ties of the two regions 
 
2007 Central No. 1 Document of the Chinese Communist Party on Agriculture called for the rapid 
implementation of agricultural “Go Out” policy  
 
2008 Food security strategy was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture 
2009 Food safety law was implemented.  
Chinese agricultural firms began to explore investment opportunities in advanced economies. 
  
2010 Document No. 1 urged development of trade, supervision of quality imports and cooperation in 
agricultural technology.  
 
Surge in food imports to meet growing demand not be met by domestic production. Minister of 
Agriculture Han Changfu said time was ripe for Chinese agrifood companies to invest overseas.  
 
2012 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
2017 
NDRC policy guideline identified agriculture as a priority sector for financial support. 
 
Document No. 1 called for green development in domestic grain output. Production structure 
must meet diverse consumption demand. Enterprises encouraged to "go overseas" to balance 
exports and imports. 
 
Document No. 1 offered favorable taxation policies for business startups in China’s rural areas; 
encourage college graduates, entrepreneurs and returned students from overseas to start 
businesses and bring technological and managerial expertise to rural areas. 
 
SASAC adopted a negative list to crack down on overleveraging in overseas investment. 
Agriculture was encouraged and excluded from the list.  
 
 
Sources: China Daily; Ministry of Agriculture (http://english.agri.gov.cn); Financial Review; Reuters; Bräutigam & 
Tang (2009); Hofman & Ho (2012) 
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The turning point arose from negative reports on food contamination which motivated 
more Chinese firms to invest in advanced economies. The focus of this thesis is on advanced 
economies as the host destinations as a recent phenomenon. The food security strategy and 
food safety law were passed consecutively in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, the need to ensure 
‘food safety’ besides domestic regulation (2009) was not officially and publicly acknowledged 
until 2016. Prior to public admission of problems with safe food production in China, the 
justification for internationalization was for food security needs. In 2010, Chinese Minister for 
Agriculture Han Changfu said, “The time is ripe for the country’s agricultural companies to 
embark on a go outward strategy.” Ensuring the quantity and quality of agrifood products for 
Chinese consumers involved coordination of domestic and foreign policies.  
 
Following years of encouraging agrifood OFDI and careful management of imports, 
policies shifted back to balancing sustainable domestic agrifood development and 
internationalization since 2016. Internationalization was not mentioned in the Document 
number one issued in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2018, focusing instead on domestic 
rural development. The extent and ways in which home country support and market drivers 
play in internationalization warrant further investigation.  
 
Apart from central SOEs, Chinese provincial SOEs, POEs and migrants have invested 
in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America (Horta, 2014). There have been allegations of land 
grab by Chinese investors in developing countries (Grain, 2016b) though some transactions 
were done through leasing and contracts with farmers (Hofman & Ho, 2012). Foreign land 
ownership is a sensitive issue that touches on basic human instincts of ownership and belonging. 
While there were complaints that Chinese investors were not sympathetic and caring towards 
locals in Mozambique and Angola, locals acknowledged that Chinese have invested in research 
centers to increase crop yields and alleviate food shortage (Horta, 2014). Chinese investors also 
invested in costly transportation and major infrastructural projects to support agrifood 
investments (Bräutigam & Zhang, 2013; Myers & Guo, 2015).     
 
The largest of the Chinese agrifood companies are mainly state-owned such as COFCO, 
Chongqing Grain, Heilongjiang Beidahuang and privately-owned WH Goup (Shuanghui). 
High profile and high value agrifood acquisition and integration are seen in ChemChina’s bid 
for Syngenta, WH Group’s acquisition of Smithfield and COFCO’s acquisition of Noble and 
Nidera. A diversity of players whose core business is non-agricultural, have emerged to 
capitalize on growing demand for safe and premium quality food. Legend Holdings’ 
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acquisition of Pizza Express and joint venture with Australia’s Kailis Seafood supplier are 
prominent examples of this trend. The AEI China Global Tracker collates deals above US$100 
million while Rhodium monitors Chinese investment in the US by states, sectors and time. 
However, majority agricultural transactions that are smaller than resources and energy 
acquisitions, and some private deals are either not captured or publicized. Table 3.4 shows a 
selection of high profile Chinese agrifood OFDI. 
 
Table 3.4 Selection of recent high profile Chinese OFDI in Agrifood Sector 
Year Country  Chinese Company Name Amount (US$ million) Target Project  
2011 Brazil  Chongqing Grain 1,410 Food processing and Port 
2011 Argentina Heilongjiang Beidahuang 
Nongken 
1,510 Soy and corn cultivation, 
irrigation and port 
development 
 
2011 Argentina  Chongqing Grain 2,400 Soy processing and animal 
feed 
 
2012 UK Bright Foods 1,940 Weetabix (60%) 
2013 US Shuanghui (WH Group) 4,700 Smithfield Meat 
2014 - 
2015 
Netherlands COFCO 1,500 + 750 Nidera traders 
2015 UK Hony and Legend  1,540 Pizza Express (80%) 
2016 Switzerland ChemChina 43,000 Syngenta 
 
Sources: AEI China Global Tracker; Financial Times; Bloomberg 
 
Internationalization offers both opportunities and risks for Chinese companies 
intending to invest in agrifood business. In November 2010, Premier Li Keqiang urged 
businesses to fully utilize “two resources, two markets” strategy. Government support for 
priority projects may facilitate Chinese companies to acquire overseas assets. However, 
internationalization is fraught with uncertainties. The Chinese government indicated that the 
scorecard of agrifood OFDI has been neither satisfactory nor optimistic (Jiang, 2017). In a joint 
study by the Ministry of Agriculture International Cooperation and Outbound Economic 
Cooperation Centre issued in 2015, the stock of agriculture related investment comprises less 
than one per cent of total OFDI.  According to a senior authority who is research director on 
agricultural policy for the State Council, China’s increasing dependence on imports of food is 
a passive response to rising demand (Ye, 2016). Agriculture sector (including forestry)  
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4 Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
“There is no logical path leading to new ideas. They can only be reached by intuition 
based upon something like an intellectual love of the objects of experience” – Albert 
Einstein  
 
“How to make our ideas clear -  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.” – Charles Sanders Peirce (1878) 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explain how qualitative reflexive techniques are applied to achieve a 
holistic and processual research strategy in this thesis. This research design uses abduction 
underpinned by pragmatism which complements the coevolutionary theoretical framing of 
home country dynamics in this study. As discussed in Chapter 2, the initial framework of my 
research explored the latecomer perspective, eclectic model, Uppsala model and the role of 
institutions in emerging market outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI). I problematized 
three main assumptions that prevail in extant literature: institutional support and constraint, 
stable systems, entry mode determinants and high risk undertaken by Chinese investors. I 
develop an emerging theoretical framework by examining tensions between conceptual frames 
and empirical data (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Van Maanen, Sørensen, & Mitchell, 2007). 
I argue that my use of abductive logic encourages creativity, innovation and enriches IB 
scholarship.  
 
This chapter is organized into three main sections. I begin by discussing the philosophical 
basis and paradigmatic underpinnings of abduction (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). I then explain 
why this is an appropriate approach for studying home country dynamic effects on the emergent 
internationalization of Chinese firms in the agrifood sector. Firms have different core 
competencies and learn continuous learning from the environment. I then explain the necessity 
and appropriateness of adopting a holistic and processual casing research strategy. Next, I detail 
the methodological process in this undertaking and justify the selection of cases, fieldwork 
process, various sources of data with interviews forming the core, and the analysis of empirical 
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material. I then discuss the broader criteria for good qualitative research. This chapter 
concludes by bridging methodology and theoretical development.     
 
4.2   Pragmatist epistemology and Abductive logic 
 
In view of competing perspectives of the world presented in social sciences, positioning 
and reflecting of ontological commitments about the nature of reality (Tsoukas & Chia, 2011) 
are important before embarking on the research project. Philosophical assumptions would 
influence decisions on the boundaries of the study, interpretations and representation of data 
(Creswell, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). While positivism involves clearly defined and 
widely accepted criteria for research methods, it is imperative to clarify the philosophical 
foundations for non-positivist research. A pragmatist epistemology breaks away from the 
conventional choices between positivist or interpretivist approaches and offers an alternative 
to explaining a phenomenon and construct innovative theories through inference, meaning, and 
action (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). The different philosophical underpinnings and 
methodological positions are shown in following Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Framing Ontological and Epistemological Positions 
Positions Positivism  Pragmatism  Interpretivism    
Ontology  
– view of reality 
 
External objective truth, 
independent of social actors 
Experientialism, 
Instrumentalism, Fallibilistic 
 
Subjectivism  
 
Epistemology  
–  study of knowledge 
 
Acontextual 
Correspondence 
Contextual  
Practical consequences 
Constructed meanings of the 
social world.   
Logic  
 
Deductive 
Inductive 
Abductive 
 
Interpretive 
Methodology 
 
Quantitative and/or 
Qualitative 
Qualitative and/or 
Quantitative 
Mostly qualitative in-depth 
and focused study. 
 
Role of the 
Researcher 
Detached and value-free. 
Focus on causation, 
reductionism and 
generalizability. 
 
Prompted by surprise or 
puzzle. Understanding 
different perspectives to find 
the best explanation. 
Value laden; researcher is 
part of the research, 
observing and interacting 
with the subjects.   
 
Adapted from: Timmermans & Tavory 2012; http://research-methodology.net/research-philosophy/ontology/ 
 
 
This dissertation is underpinned by Peircean pragmatist ontology and aims at articulating 
meaning through inquiry. Philosopher Charles Peirce (1905) who coined the term 
pragmaticism and articulated retroduction or abduction (Peirce, 1955; Peirce et al., 1982), with 
ideas originating from Kant, Hegel and Darwin . Peirce took the natural sciences as his model, 
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the basic logical model of abduction has a wider application. Scholars in organizational theory 
link pragmatism to the construction of disciplined imagination and sensemaking (Weick, 1989, 
2015). While the researcher may come with some theoretical frames, pragmatism does not 
require a priori determinants and fixed entities, but focuses on the creation of meaning from 
the interplay of various influences relative to a situation and the bigger picture. The 
epistemology of pragmatism is fallibilistic, asserting claims of absolute certainty about 
knowledge is not achievable. Following pragmatism, I aim to find practical ways of explaining 
human conduct, meaning-making and consequences in its dynamic and social complexity 
(Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). 
 
Compared to various intellectual and philosophical persuasions, pragmatism is not bound 
by the absolute objectivity characteristic of positivism. This provides room to explain 
paradoxes, ironies and hidden meanings in real life. Unlike interpretivism, pragmatism 
approximates the unification of external and internal coherence (Tohmé & Crespo, 2013). An 
eclectic combination of experimental, instrumental and anticipatory aspects of pragmatism as 
living philosophy bodes well for finding inspirational research themes (Elkjaer & Simpson, 
2011). In my context-rich and historically path-dependent study of internationalization of 
Chinese firms addressing food safety and food security concerns, a creative rather than 
reductionist approach would extend the boundaries for discovery.  
 
Abductive epistemology is the underlying logic of pragmatism. Situating abduction, 
Peirce argued that "deduction proves that something must be; induction shows that something 
actually is operative; abduction merely suggests that something may be" (5:171). As an 
alternative approach, abduction is neither induction nor deduction but driven by mystery and 
seeks understanding (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011; Brinkmann, 2014). Departing from 
prevailing rationalism, pragmatists thought abduction was the method of inquiry that would be 
empirically grounded to gain fresh insights into real problems and offer potential for theorizing 
(Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). Unlike strict adherence to ‘logic’-following procedures, Peirce’s 
idea of abduction is a process of critical reasoning. New knowledge could be constructed 
without imposing certainty demanded of deductive exploration in detached, controlled and 
variable-guided experiments. In contrast to induction, abduction is not constrained by 
exploratory and experimental paths, but is mainly interested in introducing creative models. To 
study my research topic that is complex and filled with uncertainties and paradoxes, applying 
abductive logic was appropriate to find the best explanation for change and deviant cases. 
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Abductive logic would avoid vulnerability of inductive method that could be challenged by 
surprise and negative observations (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012).  
 
Abduction is a process of reasoning from evidence to offer the best explanation to a 
puzzling or surprising observation (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2). While abduction is commonly 
understood as inference by best available explanation (IBE), abductive logic incorporates 
multiple perspectives of the factual, empirical, observable and unobservable (Schurz, 2008; 
Tohmé & Crespo, 2013). Driven by an inquiry of doubts to our beliefs generated by surprise, 
abduction has the potential for daily imaginative work and theorizing (Locke, Golden-Biddle, 
& Feldman, 2008). Abduction does not preclude causal mechanisms, but aims to unify the 
interconnections in more complex settings with conditional and functional dispositions 
(Schurz, 2008). Abduction entails coherent explanation, justification, discovery and 
predictability (Aliseda, 2006; Bertilsson, 2004; Schurz, 2008). While inductive logic builds 
greater certainty with more cases, it has less explanatory power than abduction that starts with 
consequences and then constructs reasons. Abduction requires familiarity with existing 
theories in literature throughout the research process and continuously ask new questions 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). 
             
Figure 4.1 Comparisons of Expansive thinking in abductive reasoning 
 
Source: http://www.pivotdesigngroup.com/2013/02/design-as-a-strategic-driver-of-business-5-part-series/ 
 
 
I argue that abduction is appropriate for investigative research to unveil multiple layers, 
overlaps and concurrent developments. Shifting from the types of qualitative positivism 
prevalent in IB research (Piekkari, Marschan-Piekkari, & Welch, 2011), my approach embraces 
complex non-linear evolutionary paths of home country effects on internationalization. New 
knowledge is more likely to be generated through non-positivist methods. Moreover, inductive 
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case studies that dominate IB literature runs the risk of falsification by subsequent negative 
cases (Aharoni, 2011; Popper, 2002). Acknowledging that flexibility and explanatory power of 
abduction (Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, & Martin, 1993) is appropriate to track evolving processes, 
I seek to untangle complex issues that shape the actions of Chinese investors. I try to make 
sense of dynamic engagements and problem-solving (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2015) by applying 
abductive logic to analyze multilevel, heterogeneous actors and circumstances, and 
continuously develop and reconstruct concepts during the investigative and reﬂexive processes.  
To address the dilemma of treating coding data as either data-driven (induction) nor 
hypothesis driven (deduction), I followed the abductive approach driven by surprise 
(Brinkmann, 2014) and reiterative process to construct theories. Table 4.2 shows the 
dimensions and outcomes of the three main types of logics – abduction, deduction and 
induction. Each type of logic displays different strengths and weaknesses and should be chosen 
depending on the research objectives.  
 
    Table 4.2 Dimensions and outcomes of different logics 
 Traits Abduction  Deduction Induction 
Certainty Situational and conditional High, always true Medium, may be true  
Innovativeness High Low Medium 
Epistemology Pragmatist; Critical realist Positivist Positivist or Interpretivist 
Objectives   Perception and Explanation  Formalization   Confirmation  
 
Reasoning  Best explanation through logical 
inference, instinct and insight 
 
Solid theoretical finding 
 
Generalize existing ideas 
Context Context is important Context is peripheral Context sensitive 
Stages Practical results, inquiry, explore 
multiple theories, data analysis, refine 
constructs, continuous iteration of data 
& conceptualizations 
 
From general to specific:  
theory, hypothesis, testing, 
observation, operationalize  
From specific to general: 
observations of patterns, 
hypothesis, theory 
 
  
Author’s adaptation from Timmermans & Tavory 2012     
 
 
This study of multiple cases using abductive logic entails critical reasoning to elucidate 
the impact of coevolving Chinese home country effects on internationalization. Theoretical 
narrative is best constructed through comparisons between cases (Eisenhardt, 1989b). I 
maintain that integrating multiple case studies with abductive logic and a coevolutionary frame 
(Ang, 2016; Cantwell et al., 2010; Krug & Hendrischke, 2015) would strengthen the conceptual 
constructs. Redirecting research, and matching theory and reality enabled the discovery of 
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alternative dimensions of addressing research problems, and sculpt and reframe the case with 
evolving theoretical insights (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Ragin & Becker, 1992). This was not a 
smooth path of discovery, and entailed the application of the logics of generation and 
evaluation (Aliseda, 2006).  
 
This study started by observing the phenomenon of the surge in Chinese OFDI to 
agrifood business in advanced economies. My initial attempts at theorizing was to match 
observations with the latecomer perspective and OLI eclectic model, but it did not offer 
adequate explanation for variations. After pursuing fieldwork, consulting academics and 
engaging with multiple sources of information, I became more confident to take theorizing to 
unchartered areas. I appreciate that good qualitative research involves abductive engagement 
of multi-theory debate (Doz, 2011). Analysis can be enriched through careful methodological 
process of revisiting, de-familiarization, and alternative casing towards conceptual innovation 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Despite the efficiency and reward of borrowing well accepted 
partial theories to address research questions, the contribution to theorizing would be limited 
(Doz, 2011). Theory building is a slow process. Using active and reflexive theorizing, I drew 
on interdisciplinary literature from IB, global strategy, political economy and economic 
sociology to enhance my understanding of the subject. This enabled me to reconstruct the 
conceptual frameworks.5 
 
4.3   Research Strategy 
 
The research design of this study is aimed at producing good and interesting theories that 
engage with problems of the world (Kilduff, 2006). This is a qualitative case study guided by 
abductive logic, taking into consideration holistic and temporal dimensions. Driven by missing 
explanation in existing static models, I aim to be adaptive to changes, guided by ends-in-view 
(Dewey et al., 2003), to assess the present as consequences, and revise the analysis towards 
more convincing explanations. As theory and method are interrelated, capturing the interplay 
requires sensitive iteration between evidence-based theorizing to intuition from experience, 
habits of mind and research context (Van Maanen et al., 2007). Diverse forms of qualitative 
research are legitimate ways of theorizing beyond conventional exploratory undertakings 
(Welch, Plakoyiannaki, Piekkari, & Paavilainen‐Mäntymäki, 2013). Qualitative research is 
uniquely suited to “opening the black box” of organizational processes (instead of entities) to 
                                                          
5 Details of the conceptualization process are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions over time (Doz, 2011). Deep research inquiry into 
complexities cannot be easily addressed by conventional means that impose boundaries on 
entities (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). Embarking on a qualitative research is a learning journey 
that entails understanding interdisciplinary literature, having discussions with managers, 
uncovering contradictions, building stories from rich empirical data and documentary 
evidence, and presenting the write up clearly (Doz, 2011). Detailed and colorful narratives 
(Katz, 2001, 2002)including surprises (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011) would be useful to inform 
and construct theories.  
 
4.3.1 Holistic design 
 
I adopted a holistic approach to be better equipped to address and capture the 
complexities and changes (Cohen & Axelrod, 1984; Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; Ragin, 1987) 
in Chinese home country context and the effects on internationalization of firms. Empirical 
data from the social world is unstructured and contains ‘irregular, disorderly and unpredictable 
“clouds”’ and ‘regular, orderly and predictable “clocks”’ according to the metaphor used by 
Popper in 1972 (Almond & Genco, 1977; Popper, 1972). My role was to organize and create 
value from the data. Stability and conventional wisdom should not be taken for granted. Instead 
of applying orderly standard criteria and theorizing based on internal logic (Van Maanen et al., 
2007), I sought to explore multiple perspectives and provide interesting insights to emerging 
trends in the consumption-led growth of Chinese internationalization and expand opportunities 
for theory building. Using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003) enhances the 
understanding of complex and context sensitive phenomena (Ragin, 1999; Yin, 1994). This 
method is inclusive, encompassing factual, theoretical, empirical laws, analogical, micro level, 
intuition, hidden, evolution, interconnections and externalities (Schurz, 2008). 
 
Contextualization and a multi-disciplinary approach to theoretical construction in this 
thesis would transcend the vicious cycle of self-reinforced and perpetuated theorizing within 
the same framework. Contextualization of the research problem is essential to develop a 
convincing thesis. Moreover, presenting multiple perspectives resists pure speculation (Schurz, 
2008). Reflexivity would enable the research to moderate biases and explore different 
explanations. Systematic combining  which entails an evolving framework of the empirical and 
model worlds, redirection of the case study using abductive reasoning, could potentially 
illuminate the dynamic and complex interdependencies among activities (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). Due to the heterogeneity of participants and complex empirical material, this study is 
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less suited to reductionist solutions that reject negative results, as evidence may unfold to reveal 
unique and outlier cases. Instead of setting a priori assumptions, procedural and bounded 
rationality, understanding the perceptions and preferences of actors with the context could 
uncover intentions and expectations of outcomes (Simon, 1985).  
 
4.3.2 Process of the Study 
 
I adopted a processual approach to explore the nature and sequences of events (Langley, 
1999). A process-based study captures changes, in contrast to variance-oriented linkages. Time 
sensitivity helps to explain how and why changes occurred (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). 
Abduction as inference to the best explanation (IBE) is conceived as a complex process with 
stages of reasoning and selection to improve explanatory power (Cresto, 2006).  The concept 
of “becoming” is significant to highlight the temporal dimension (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) of 
policies, activities and interactions. The philosopher Hercalitus views a river not as an object 
but as an everchanging flow, since it is not possible to step into the same river twice. This 
resonates with the research process in this study. The strategy of ’temporal bracketing’ 
(Langley, 1999) was employed to map the sequence of events in domestic and external 
environments as coevolutionary, rather than a cumulative or independent metamorphic 
progress. I sought to elicit information of times and places to understand a phenomenon and 
interpersonal context. Just as the same event may not be replicated exactly, the research of the 
same topic carried out by another person later may elicit a changed understanding of stories 
and nuanced findings (Finlay, 2006). This research process is appropriate for studying non-
linear developments seen in the uneven developments of internationalization. Tracking the 
progress of research boosts confidence in the theory building (Vennesson, 2008). Empirical 
material that seems irrational and contradictory initially could be explained with alternative 
lenses (Aharoni, 2011). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, I began by problematizing assumptions in extant theory 
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013) to form an initial working framework. The route to good theory 
is through engagement with problems in the world that we find interesting rather than gap 
spotting (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013). In line with pragmatism, the research starts with a 
mystery or puzzle (Kuhn, 1996), motivating the search for a preliminary and tentative 
framework, using empirical material to refine theory, going back to data and empirical work, 
reflecting and engaging in reflexivity and reiteration, and constantly challenging existing 
knowledge (Popper, 2002). My research strategy and process have been summarized in Figure 
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4.2. In the past three years, I have been revisiting the empirical material, returning to sources 
and reading literature. The iterative process has helped to strengthen the analysis and construct 
theoretical frames to deliver more convincing explanations the phenomenon.  
 
Figure 4.2 Components of Research Strategy 
 
4.4   Case Studies 
 
While there are various definitions of case study, the choice of what to be studied is 
perhaps an accurate depiction of researchers’ goals (Stake, 2006). I follow casing (Ragin & 
Becker, 1992), a process by which the outcomes reveal what the research is a case of (Ragin, 
2009). Casing involves sifting through empirical material including surprises and puzzles to 
find explanations. The use of the first-person voice where appropriate has been accepted in 
qualitative writing to reflect the active scholar’s responsibility for the interpretations (Given, 
2008). I would present the voices of participants by adopting a reflexive apparoch. Researchers 
are prompted to inquire, critique and interpret different sources of data, and develop conceptual 
understandings inspired by empirical material (Alvesson, 2011). Theorizing entails acceptance 
of intuition and conjecture, where products that claim to be theory are approximations towards 
the final goals (Weick, 1995b). In the absence of a blueprint, cases need to be found and applied 
to refine or refute the initial theory (Ragin & Becker, 1992).  
 
In line with abduction, I developed cases using a continuous process of theorization 
(Byrne & Ragin, 2009) to reflect change. Incorporating a coevolutionary perspective is 
consistent with a process-oriented research design to throw light on empirical conundrums and 
offer plausible explanations among alternatives (Locke et al., 2008). Causal mechanisms are 
Research Strategy
Holistic
Multiple 
perspectives, 
levels and 
interactions  
Sensitive to 
Context and 
Complexities
Multi and 
inter-
disciplinary 
Process
Temporal and 
dynamic (non-
variance)
Theorising stages: 
problematise, 
reflexive, recursive, 
reconstructive
Casing: develop 
and redefine 
constructs from 
multiple data
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studied rather than extricated as distinct correlations and causal effects (Ragin, 2009). In 
‘systematic combining’ an evolving case (Ragin & Becker, 1992) could be a tool as well as a 
product (Dubois & Gadde 2002). Cases could offer both explanatory and instrumental powers 
through an interplay of proposals and counter-proposals in the abductive process (Tohmé & 
Crespo, 2013). As there are no predetermined template, criteria or patterns for qualitative 
methodology, I match theories and evidence and concede to redirection to build a case (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002). Reflexivity is applied during the research process, considering contingent, 
emergent, tentative, open-ended, intersubjective, and socially situated influences (Finlay, 
2016).  
 
Casing enables me to manage the challenges of capturing inherent complexity, 
specificity, uniqueness and contextuality of social phenomena (Ragin, 2009). Case study 
methods to investigate contemporary phenomenon in depth with the real world (Yin, 2014) are 
suitable for studying complex issues. How and why things emerge, develop, grow or terminate 
are shaped by the interaction of multiple forces. However, dynamic activities may be 
camouflaged by a semblance of stability and some actors may learn and adapt better than others 
(Langley et al., 2013). Chinese outbound agrifood investments in advanced economies have 
seeds in a range of domestic historical and economic self-sufficiency policies, to more recent 
resource-seeking, strategic assets and efficient management enhancing motivations. Investors 
define ‘strategic’ differently, with some perceiving it as long-term national interests, while 
others are preoccupied with diversification and long-term profitability. The characteristics, 
scope and scale of home country elements and influence on internationalization may shift over 
time.  
 
4.4.1 Case selection 
 
I employed a multiple case design (Piekkari et al., 2011; Robison & Ritchie, 2010). The 
focus is not on the number of cases but in-depth study of the causal mechanisms and processes. 
Unlike random selection in quantitative studies, purposive case selection and shortlisting from 
a larger pool is justified in terms of relevance to the topic of study (Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 
2011). Following initial background data gathering and application of extant theories over 20 
months, I identified key players involved in Chinese OFDI in agrifood sectors in advanced 
economies. Evidence emerging from purposive selection of individual and cross-case 
comparisons would strengthen theoretical constructs (Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton Nicholls, 
& Ormston, 2014).   
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Departing from the conventional preference for exploratory case studies with large N and 
using aggregate macro data, I analyzed empirical material in depth. Sampling cases for 
qualitative case study differs from statistical sampling in quantitative research, as the goal is 
not to represent a large population but to shed empirical light on theoretical concepts (Yin, 
2014). There is a trade-off between seeking rich data and complying with the recommended 
number of cases and prescriptive procedures of four to eight (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Having a 
small number of cases does not constrain theorizing since multiple units of analyses could be 
drawn from each case (Piekkari et al., 2011). Qualitative research would enhance our 
understanding of diverse capabilities and idiosyncratic behavior of Chinese managers 
responding to rapidly changing environments. The boundaries of cases and the eventual 
number of cases could shift in accordance with abductive analysis. Hence, the same events 
could be ‘cased’ in different ways. In this study, the construction of relevant cases is more 
useful than adhering to fixed large population, randomly or expediently selected (Ragin, 2009).  
 
Purposive sampling and selection are guided by criteria and denominators to enable 
comparisons. Firstly, case companies invested in agrifood businesses of developed countries 
regardless of their domestic home business. The subsectors covered include raw materials, 
staples, dairy, meat, ready to consume meals and beverages. The business activities span the 
entire value chain from farming, processing, distribution, to services.  
Secondly, participants come from large publicly-listed companies or conglomerates 
based in first and second tier cities in the Yangzi delta regions, western region and the north-
eastern capital region. Companies C, D and E originate from Zhejiang province that is well-
known for entrepreneurship. Each corporate group has assets and capitalization well above 
US$1 billion. This eliminates small-sized transient migrant investors and hobby farmers from 
the sample. Also excluded are equity investment funds that are fluid and reap quick returns 
from a choice of mixed assets in the portfolio. Not only have case companies achieved some 
degree of domestic and global integration, all are well recognized industry leaders, having 
previously received national business awards for their core businesses (though not necessarily 
in agrifood sector). Temporal markers are established among firms with varying industry and 
internationalization experience.  
 
Thirdly, for cross-case comparisons, I have chosen companies of different ownership 
types, two SOEs and six POEs. Some cases and participants had been dropped from this study 
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as they were not suitable for casing but served as valuable expert opinions. The final selection 
was filtered to focus on subjects who were articulate and had insights to offer. Case selection 
is a dynamic process as cases evolved from initial purposive sampling to eventual theoretical 
sampling of exemplars or outliers shaped by emerging concepts (Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 
2011). A summary of the case companies is shown on Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. 
 
Fourthly, I included perspectives of officials and industry experts to gather deeper and 
more comprehensive information and assessments. The Chinese officials interviewed were 
based in first tier coastal cities and municipalities (Table 4.4). Other sources included business 
and industry experts, consultants, agricultural economic researchers, senior academics and 
government officials.  They were based in Australia, China, the UK, Singapore and Hongkong 
(Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.3 Participants from Chinese Firms (2015 - 2016) 
Monikers  Position   HQ / Bases Core Businesses OFDI Host Countries   
A1 
A2 
General Manager 
Vice President 
Shanghai 
and regional 
Agrifood production; Retail  
Distribution; Trading; Brands 
Australia, New Zealand, 
Europe 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
President of Company 
Vice President of Group 
Deputy to CEO   
Manager, Overseas Investment * 
Shanghai 
and regional 
Real estate; construction; 
Agrifood (pastoral and dairy); 
Retail distribution   
Australia, New Zealand, 
South America 
C1 
C2 
C3 
Founder of Company (HQ) 
Senior Manager (HQ) * 
Managing Director (HQ)  
Zhejiang 
province 
Heavy industry; Retail 
distribution 
Australia  
D1 
D2 
D3 
D4 
Vice President (HQ) * 
Director, Strategy (HQ) 
Chairman (overseas subsidiary)  
General Manager (overseas) * 
Zhejiang 
province 
Heavy industry; Real estate; 
Services; Agrifood 
production; retail distribution  
Australia, North America 
E1 
E2 
General Manager   
Senior Manager * 
Zhejiang 
province 
Heavy industry; 
Manufacturing; Services; 
Agrifood production    
Australia, North & South 
America, Europe, Asia 
  
F1 
F2 
Vice Chairman 
CEO (overseas subsidiary) 
Western and 
Northern 
regions 
Agricultural production and 
manufacturing; Services    
Australia, Southeast Asia, 
North America 
 
G1 
G2 
G3 
Vice President 
Manager (HQ) 
Manager (overseas subsidiary) * 
Northern 
region and 
provinces 
Agricultural production; 
Global distribution; Trading 
South America, Europe, 
Oceania, Central Asia, 
Southeast Asia 
H1 
H2  
Founder and Chairman  
CEO of Australian subsidiaries 
Northern 
regions 
Pastoral and meat processing; 
Seafood trading 
Australia and South 
America 
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Table 4.4 Interviews with Government Officials 
Moniker  Position Portfolios Geographical Region 
Q1* 
Q2 
Principal Consultant 
Director 
Foreign, Economic 
Foreign, Economic 
Guangzhou 
Guangzhou 
 
Q3 
Q4 * 
Deputy Director 
Supervisory Manager 
Economic, Business, Foreign, Agricultural 
Investment Promotion 
Shanghai  
Zhejiang 
Q5 
Q6 
Director 
Deputy Director 
Productivity, Investment 
Economic, Business, Foreign 
Zhejiang 
Zhejiang 
      
Table 4.5 Subject and Industry Experts 
Moniker Expertise Country / Region 
X1 Senior scholar, East Asian economies Canberra  
X2 
X3 
X4 
Owner of a Chinese multinational corporate group 
Senior analyst from research institute 
Business broker and consultant 
Australia 
Beijing 
Sydney 
X5 
X6 
X7 
X8 
X9 
X10 
X11 
Manager, private commercial bank 
Senior academic in business management and economics  
Academic in rural development economics  
Academic in agricultural economics 
Senior researcher on political economy  
Chinese investor in beef processing 
Marketing manager for beef products 
Beijing  
Zhejiang  
Zhejiang 
Guangzhou 
Singapore 
Asia Pacific region 
Australia 
 
X12 
X13 
Senior trade and investment official 
Supply chain expert 
 
Australia 
Australia  
 
 
The process of getting willing participants for this project was fraught with trials and 
challenges. Access was achieved through careful deliberation, diligent networking and 
navigating officious and political hurdles. The initial advice to approach Australian subsidiaries 
seemed logical and practical. However, the assumed convenience was not to be, as corporate 
administrative gatekeepers among scores of companies invariably turned down cold calls by 
telephone, email and formal written requests. Only Australia-based business consultants and 
brokers agreed to share their views without identifying their clients or details of the projects. I 
managed to speak to prominent Chinese investors in Australia by sheer goodwill cultivated 
from friends’ network, but they asked to be excluded from the case studies. Personal 
introduction by company insiders and close associates is crucial for a junior academic to meet 
business top management and gather a glimpse of their views.  
 
I rejected the questionnaire approach from the start in favor of case studies both for 
practical and judicious calculations despite the supposed convenience of conducting surveys 
(Aharoni, 2011; Buck, 2011). Foremost, surveys are more relevant for quantitative and mixed 
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methods. As there were less than 30 Chinese companies invested in agrifood business in 
Australia and New Zealand in 2015, it would not yield significant results and offer depth of 
coverage even if I was able to obtain responses from the entire population. The choice to use 
case studies over surveys was backed by two academic advisers on my dissertation proposal 
defense committee. I was convinced that doing a small number of case studies would make a 
meaningful contribution. Moreover, during my fieldwork, a senior executive of Company B 
frankly confided that he was glad that I requested for face-to-face discussions. Had researchers 
sent him a survey form and questionnaire, he claimed that he would have let his assistant clerk 
tick the boxes. Having multiple insiders and informed observers enables me to compare field 
material with the macro phenomenal developments, create new data points, strengthen the 
analysis and provide alternative perspectives.    
 
The challenge was finding suitable companies willing to be interviewed. Two senior 
academics from whom I sought advice elucidated the channels to launch fieldwork. An avid 
case study researcher based in the UK advised that cooperation with another researcher based 
in China working on a similar research is the most feasible course, or else it would be time-
consuming and tricky to network the web of contacts to reach companies. Another professor in 
Canberra said that his peers who conducted case studies started with gaining access to parent 
companies in China which wielded authority and confidence to share business information that 
overseas subsidiaries lacked.  
 
The timing of conducting interviews could affect the ability to gather information. It was 
difficult to get interviewees in Australia during the run-up to the 2016 Australian federal 
elections given the sensitivity of right-wing nationalist backlash on land sales to foreign 
companies. Not only were businesses reluctant to engage, requests for information and 
discussions with relevant government departments were turned down. The agrifood sector is 
one of those topics deemed too delicate to divulge or share, in view of the watchful media, 
intense business competition and negative public reactions. Nevertheless, I collected 
information and assessments by attending seminars where Australian bankers, agrifood 
managers and The Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) officials gave 
presentations and information updates. Australian officials covering trade, foreign affairs and 
agriculture portfolios and local government agencies I met at business council events were 
approachable and interested to share their views on those occasions.  
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The breakthrough came in the second year of my PhD candidature. A Chinese visiting 
scholar offered to put me in touch with an alumnus presently based in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The researcher was working on project funded by a western ABCD agricultural 
commodity trading corporation to study the progress and prospects of Chinese OFDI to 
Australia and New Zealand in the agricultural sector. Although my Chinese colleagues were 
inclined towards quantitative research, we agreed that exchanging resources and assessments 
would improve our respective research outcomes. Collaboration with Chinese official and 
academic networks had certainly opened doors and expedited the data collection process. My 
academic contacts are based in top ranking Chinese universities that are highly regarded by the 
business community. Moreover, companies are usually cooperative with government-
sanctioned research, so as not to give reason for the state to be suspicious. Research is held in 
high regard in China, with government and industry trying their best to support, but like 
everywhere else, the key to accessing companies is introduction. While the research 
environment in China is increasingly conducive, conducting fieldwork in an emerging 
economy, steeped in history and cultural heritage, presents both opportunities and challenges 
(Scoggins, 2014; Tan & Nojonen, 2011). Having contacts in the government and academia 
enabled me to navigate internal regulations and access high level sources (Tan & Nojonen, 
2011).  
 
4.5   Data Collection Process 
 
4.5.1 Interviewing 
 
In my qualitative study, empirical materials elicited chiefly from face-to-face interviews 
formed the core building blocks of the thesis. The prelude leading up to fieldwork required a 
year of preparation: questions, scheduling and background readings. Interviews were 
conducted in October 2015 and June 2016 with senior executives and managers of parent 
companies in China and followed up with subsidiaries in Australian cities through to 2017. In 
total, I conducted 30 formal interviews of companies and officials. These involved 41 
individuals: 22 were from businesses and six were local government officials, and another 13 
industry and subject experts. Each contributed substantive knowledge and insights for this 
study but some were more articulate and willing to share. I interviewed eight participants twice 
or more, and maintained written communications with them. Each formal interview lasted 
between one and two hours. Discussions with industry experts, officials and scholars 
contributed different perspectives and enriched the research findings. Prior to conducting 
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interviews, groundwork preparation included scoping the research, familiarization with the 
facts of the topic, preparation of paperwork, ethics approval procedures, discussions with senior 
academics, liaising and coordinating with networks (Table 4.7).   
 
In the first round of fieldwork (late 2015) where the bulk of interviewing was done, I was 
part of a Chinese Ministry of Agriculture researchers-led delegation that called on seven 
companies. The second round of interviews scheduled eight months later, narrowed down to 
companies that were amenable to continue the dialogue as they saw benefits in receiving 
feedback from researchers. Some declined the second round of interviews due to organizational 
changes such as rotation and promotion in SOEs and appointment of new management to 
satisfy shareholders. Some parent companies even introduced me to managers of overseas 
subsidiaries. Meanwhile, my request to interview another agrifood business was granted and I 
had to opportunity to meet the owner and the CEO of the overseas subsidiaries in Australia. 
Through deepening of knowledge and tracking new developments, I found that some 
participants toned down their sanguine assessment as they learned more about the host country 
context and challenges in managing overseas investments (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003).  
 
In follow-up telephone conversations, email correspondence and messaging, I sought to 
clarify questions upon reflecting on the initial interview and recent developments with 
participants whom I have built a good rapport. Subsequent meetings with the same managers 
and officials often drew interesting insights on the latest developments. Meanwhile, I found 
more opportunities to talk to business investors, business consultants and industry experts at 
business events held in Australia. However, I could not follow up with participants from SOEs 
due to their stringent adherence to officious procedures. My primary contact and collaborator’s 
project was completed by then and was not involved in subsequent rounds of interviews. Some 
senior managers had left their previous posts. In those cases, I tracked developments and 
counterchecked with secondary sources, other former employees and industry experts.  
 
 My role as a researcher was to be perceptive, keen to learn, and build relationships and 
trust (Coplan & Goldie, 2011) depending on the attitude and responses of different participants. 
I acquired knowledge through a bottom-up approach by eliciting divergent insider perspectives 
in the contextual dynamics and selected the criteria to present the narratives (Gertsen & 
Søderberg, 2011). Though my role was not dominant and deeply involved initially, I was 
empathic and  engaged (Adler & Adler, 1987). However, it was difficult to be an active and 
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participatory member given the officious nature of our dealings with larger companies 
especially the SOEs. When opportunities arose, I followed up with relevant questions and 
showed sensitivity and understanding to participants’ concerns. For instance, two participants 
lamented there was a lack of industry information. I took the initiative to send them extracts 
from books on farm management and internet links to professional associations. To provide a 
spectrum of perspectives for the study and generate potential for rich data and insights I 
categorized participants according to companies, government officials and experts (in research, 
industry, business consultancy). I adopted an open attitude towards forming overlapping rather 
than precise categories and challenged my interpretation and discourse with interdisciplinary 
theories (Alvesson, 2011). 
 
Table 4.6 Stages of data collection and construction 
Milestones Activities 
First 12 months 
July 2013 - 2014 
Preliminary Scoping 
 
- Read literature, and followed media and industry reports for updates 
- Attended Nanjing university summer school symposium and international students 
exchange 
- Prepared trial questions with assistance from a Chinese academic 
- Visited academics in Hangzhou and Guangzhou and their contacts 
- Met with associates in banking sector in Shanghai and Fuzhou 
 
Second year  
2015 
Authorization to 
proceed 
 
- Academic defense and confirmation of PhD candidature   
- Call on academics in Canberra 
- Ethics application and approval 
- Network with Australian business community and attend industry events   
- Interviews with consultants and industry experts 
 
Third year 
Late 2015 
Fieldwork 
 
-  First round of formal interviews in China 
 Visits to business investors’ headquarters in Shanghai and Hangzhou 
 Discussions with academics in Shanghai and Hangzhou 
 Visit officials and industry researchers in Beijing 
-  Industry sources in Australia  
 Call on executives and managers in overseas subsidiaries 
 Attend industry events and cross-checking industry publications 
 
Mid 2016 
Fieldwork and 
Exchange 
 
-  Second round of formal interviews in China 
 Coordination with academics and officials in China 
 Visits to business investors’ headquarters in Hangzhou  
 Discussions with academics in Hangzhou 
- Visiting scholar at East Asia Institute, Singapore  
2017 
Fieldwork,  
Fact checking  
and Thesis drafting 
 
-  Discussions with overseas subsidiaries and agrifood industry in Australia and Asia 
-  Follow up communications with sources by email, telephone calls and messaging 
- Attendance of China studies forums and business events 
 
 
 
Semi-structured questions were used for the first batch of interviews to lay a strong 
foundation. These were refined from an earlier set of preliminary trial questions drafted with 
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the help of a Chinese academic who then asked a business contact to respond and offer feedback 
(but he did not become a participant of this study). Separately, another Chinese academic 
arranged for me and his doctoral students to speak to the international manager of a well-known 
dairy company that had been importing and planned to invest overseas. Based on the feedback 
from the pilot project, I modified the interview questions to achieve exploratory objectives, and 
allow for depth of inquiry, rather than to seek affirmative or negative answers. The language 
used in the questions was targeted towards business practitioner, and toned down on academic 
terminology. I shared 28 semi-structured questions comprising factual, overview and general 
business assessment inquiry with my Chinese colleagues.  
 
Table 4.7 Protocol of Topics Covered in semi-Structured Interviews 
Basic facts beyond public domain of the company 
 Core businesses, diversification and consolidation of corporate group.    
 OFDI values, sectors and destinations  
 National recognition and awards (e.g. dragon heads, industry leadership, efficiency)  
 How does parent company develop core competencies in agrifood business to invest overseas 
Timelines of the company 
 Milestones and turning points of company’s diversification, integration and internationalization. 
 The process of finding investment targets and what factors shape decision making. 
Home Country Factors 
 Types and scale of support received in home country (e.g. financing, subsidies, tax benefits) 
 Regulatory host environment and support given by governments and business partners  
 Views on support for OFDI and rationale or justification 
 Areas that are positive and satisfactory and any suggestions for changes 
Market Analysis and Strategies 
 Firms’ competitive advantages in internationalization and compared to others in the industry 
 Is land purchase in host country necessary? Horizontal and vertical integration of GVC.  
 Pros and cons of value chain target, integration and pace of OFDI. 
 Main challenges faced when investing overseas and issues of concern 
 Why certain targets are chosen (country, type, sub-sector, value chain segments).  
 Valuation of a good investment and pre-OFDI preparations 
 Additional investment (e.g. infrastructure and community)  
Review and Prospects 
 Personal and company experience and lessons learned from globalization.     
 Post entry business operations and experience. Transfer of knowledge between parent and subsidiaries. 
 Coordination between parent and overseas subsidiaries, localization and integration of staff   
 Short term plans on internationalization and assessment of the future 
 Views on effects of signing of China-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
 Long term projections of the company’s investment destinations and sectoral weightage 
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An English version of semi-structured questions is shown on Table 4.7. Chinese 
counterparts who organized the interviews added five more questions to my list during the 
interviews. My principal Chinese contact who organized the first round of interviews sent the 
list of questions to business participants a few days before the scheduled meetings. She 
reasoned that giving participants a preview of our research would be reassuring, and they would 
have more time to ponder and assemble relevant experts to address the answers.  
 
After introductions to various participants, individuals were asked more specific 
questions that pertained to their area of specialization. Interviews with government officials 
followed formal procedures as well as informal settings over dinner. Proceedings began with 
factual briefings and commentaries by the interviewees addressing the broad questions asked. 
Interviewers followed up with free flow discussions and clarification and elaboration of 
specific issues. To encourage participants to speak candidly, the conversations were neither 
video- nor audio-recorded. I took detailed notes which were corroborated with officials and 
academics after the sessions. I went through my written records to note finer points in verbal 
and body language of the interviewees and add comments for reference when revisiting the 
data for analysis later.  
 
As some companies were concerned with disclosure, I anonymized all the interviewees 
and companies and refrained from using explicit and distinctive descriptions that may reveal 
their identities. Being a bilingual third generation overseas-born ethnic Chinese was 
advantageous, as I did not require an interpreter and could respond to opportunities 
spontaneously and elicited more information. Being situated at a confluence of cross cultures 
could be double-edged but I managed to overcome obstacles and learned from these exchanges. 
Time-scarce business executives were unenthusiastic if interviewers were unable to 
communicate well. Initial meetings involved larger numbers of interviewers and interviewees. 
Subsequent exchanges with individual managers were less formal. I was personally more 
involved in the organization of the second round of fieldwork with the help of an academic and 
an official in the background. Some participants who were more interested in my research 
project, were more articulate and receptive to informal exchanges.  
 
Following Alvesson and Skoldberg’s reflexive (2009) approach to interviews, I allowed 
interviewees to complete their narrative and speak freely about the issues at heart before 
following up on interesting ideas (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). I am persuaded that 
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interviewers should not expect or encourage coherence (Pfeffer, 1982) or show reassurance as 
these cues from the interviewer may divert attention and steer the conversation to different 
directions (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). During formal and informal meetings, I was given 
ample time for questioning. Moreover, in Asian culture, interrupting the interviewee who is the 
host, could be misconstrued as lack of respect. I raised specific events to understand a 
phenomenon and interpersonal context, and let them convey their lived experience and self-
reflection (Finlay, 2006). While I was aware of the strengths of active interviewing (Holstein 
& Gubrium, 1995), I joined and followed a resultant comment instead of guiding the 
interviewee.   
 
I was mindful of the need to strike a delicate balance between making the best of 
interview opportunities and keeping participants at ease. I was fortunate that interviewees were 
cooperative once they agreed to participate. What constitutes sensitive information is 
subjective and varies across individuals and organizations. I treaded carefully and showed 
respect to interviewees who obviously had leverage in the power relationship, but 
simultaneously assessed if there was room to inquire further. Asking safe, preconceived, well-
known, self-confirmative and politically correct questions would not have advanced my search 
for novel findings. I found that company directors with strong professional credentials were 
more confident to share the challenges they faced. With business owners and political 
appointees of SOEs, I took a softer approach to test the waters and boundaries to sense the cues 
on the extent they were willing to share insights. Though some middle managers adhered to 
the party line, senior manager participants were more confident to add their personal views. 
Self-made owners were candid in sharing industry developments and comparisons with their 
associates and rivals. Managers based in overseas subsidiaries and former employees involved 
in key investment projects were more willing to share their experience after establishing that I 
had spoken to senior executives of the parent company. As the interviewer, I had to be flexible 
and play by ear to reap optimal benefits from rare and precious opportunities. 
 
Reflexivity in interviewing entails awareness of the object of study in the research 
process, without a priori favoritism towards a single focus, to consciously and consistently 
view different angles of the detailed text to find the most interesting interpretation among 
alternatives (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). I used generic terms in the introductory questions 
and moved on to empathize with language and metaphors (Alvesson, 2011) used by 
interviewees to learn more and interpret the meanings. Phrasal verbs emerging from the 
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participants paved the way for deeper analysis of risk mitigation in Chinese internationalization 
that has largely been neglected in extant literature. The value of interview data lies in the 
meanings and how meanings are constructed and should not be an exercise to fulfil certain 
theories. Reflexivity is an interplay between 3Ds (deconstruction, defensiveness and 
destabilization) and 3Rs (reconstruction re-presentation and rethinking) to interpret the 
plurality of meanings and find the best explanation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).   
 
4.5.2 Secondary Sources 
 
Documentary and archival data was useful for acquiring background knowledge before 
fieldwork and continuous learning after fieldwork. Aware of some limitations of interview 
data, I relied on other sources to bridge the information that were not discussed or reflect on 
different dimensions. I consulted company statements, websites, financial reports, policy 
research papers in Chinese language, press reports and industry news and commentaries. I also 
found parliamentary research and policy directives useful as these were authoritative sources 
of information that SOEs must at least show support and compliance. Between completion of 
fieldwork and the final writeup, I engaged the expertise of a Master of Accounting graduate to 
analyze and summarize the financial performance of the business groups studied. Details of 
references from various types of secondary resources are shown in Table 4.8.  
 
Alternating checks between field and archival sources was part of a successive theory 
building process. Documentaries and news of prominent publicly-listed companies that are 
featured in the media could be used as reference. Though public statements are more carefully 
crafted than interviews, they served as useful reference points for comparisons. I conducted 
searches in public domains, including newspapers from different countries, the internet, photos, 
videos of interviews with business leaders, country and international industry sources and 
government statistics. As for business leaders whom I did not have a chance to meet, interviews 
covered in the print media and television were useful sources of information on their thinking 
and personalities. Though China is far from the American ‘interview society’ typified by Oprah 
and Dr Phil, TV hostess Jin Xing asks prominent celebrities some tough questions that provides 
a window to their thoughts. Nevertheless, I was aware of the hagiographical nature of 
interviews published in the mass media and utilized this information with care. In contrast, my 
fieldwork interviews are more candid and holistic. Without any vested interests in the 
participants’ organizations, I did not have an agenda to portray the companies or officials in a 
certain light.    
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Table 4.8 Sources of archival data 
Evidence Types Description  
Corporate 
Documents    
 
• Company annual reports (all the case companies are publicly listed)  
• Media releases and announcements of companies examined 
• Company websites and advertisements 
• Speeches and interviews of business owners and senior managers   
• Attached documents to emails and messages from interviewees and academics 
 
News Reports • Australian media coverage: Australian Financial Review, The Australian, Age 
• New Zealand media coverage; New Zealand Business Review, NZ Stuff.  
• Chinese media coverage: SCMP, China Daily and Chinese language media 
• International media: Financial Times, Forbes, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg 
• WeChat links to subscription on management training and host countries  
 
Databases • American Enterprise Institute China Investment Tracker (formerly Heritage)  
• Rhodium Group - China Investment Monitor (US) 
• UNCTAD, FAO, Thomson Reuters 
• CSMAR, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Industry sources  • Industry: Rabobank, Beef Central, Stock & Land, Agrimoney, Wine Australia 
• Business associations: Dairy Australia, Meat and Livestock Australia 
 
Government 
sources 
• China: Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture 
• Parliamentary research on industry and policy directives announcement 
• Australian government reports: ABARES, DAFF, Austrade, DFAT, FIRB 
• New Zealand government investment statistics 
 
Consultant reports • Ernst & Young, PwC, KPMG reports 
Photos and Videos • Interviews of business leaders, government advisers, academics on YouTube 
• TV programs featuring company activities 
 
 
 
Databases from public and paid resources complement empirical material and provide a 
basic overview but are insufficient to be used for meaningful statistical analysis. The Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) statistics rely on self-reports by businesses willing to share 
information. Chinese officials and consuls acknowledge that the data is not comprehensive and 
there are gaps in information of firms that transit or make round trips to leverage financial 
advantages. The US-based American Enterprise Institute (previously sponsored by the 
Heritage Foundation) managing China Investment Tracker (CIT) has a decade of OFDI 
records. Its shortcoming is omitting smaller scale yet significant investments below the US$100 
million threshold. It is also lacking in details of projects and company affiliations. Hence, 
incremental and cumulative investments which could amount to substantial levels over time 
are often not captured. The criteria CIT uses for categorizing agriculture and related 
infrastructural investment are unclear. Nonetheless, this is useful for collation and tracking 
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purposes. Rhodium China Monitor, also based in the US, provides aggregate data with sectoral 
breakdown, number of projects, mode of entry and location by American states. However, the 
details of investors, target companies and value of individual projects are not published. 
Occasional topical data could be gleaned from Thomson Reuters, Agrimoney, The Australian 
and AFR, but these reports are brief and need to be complemented by other sources.   
 
4.6   Analytical Process  
 
In this section, I discuss the guidance and technicalities followed by this research. As 
discussed in the research strategy of this chapter, the study will adopt holistic and processual 
approaches to investigate the puzzles using mainly interview material as evidence and guidance. 
Reflexivity is part of the research process of open-minded, creative interaction between 
theoretical frameworks and empirical research (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009) to interprete 
interviews. The researcher is involved in explicit theory construction (Weick, 1989). Cases are 
not ‘out there’, clearly defined, waiting to be researched and harvested. While boundaries need 
to be identified by the researcher, it should be approached without prior deterministic guidance 
towards regularities or direction of casing process. I analysed the data during and following the 
interviews. Being reflexive is to be receptive to a spectrum of positions, acknowledging 
uncertainty of empirical knowledge and exploring alternative interpretations (Alvesson, 2011; 
Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). In the theoretical construction process (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2011; Brinkmann, 2014), relevant material is selected for critical analysis (Alvesson, 2010). 
Reflexivity requires critically self-aware evaluation (Finlay, 2002a, 2006; Finlay, Gough, & 
Wiley, 2003) from the preparation for case studies to analysis of empirical material (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009). This research experience shows reflexivity to be a potentially powerful 
tool in promoting rich insights through examining personal responses and interpersonal 
dynamics that could unlock unconscious motivations and implicit biases in the researcher’s 
approach.  
 
4.6.1 Intensive Coding 
 
Coding of data using software serve as popular modern conveniences for inductive 
research. I commenced with open coding and did not impose restrictions and prerequisites on 
categorization. Computerized coding programs may be efficient at mechanical sorting of 
occurrences and connections (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) from transcripts but tend to 
generate themes that are separate from the context and holistic experience. My initial 
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experimentation with NVivo proved to be unsuited for abductive research. I resolved to 
manually sorted out the subjects of importance and critically examine empirical and published 
materials from micro and comparative perspectives. Initially, cases were constructed on broad 
emergent themes, as following the context of the phenomenon and terminology and metaphors 
of the participants could generate profound interpretations (Alvesson, 2011). The transient files 
created are subject to changes when more data is analyzed over time. Recognizing the 
limitations of arbitrary coding, I explored alternatives such as time, hierarchy (Ragin 1992) and 
multiple sites (Barton 2006). This provided space for changes, sequencing, constructing 
linkages and relate to the context at the expense of theorizing.  
 
I engaged in recursive iteration of data and theories by charting the patterns, underlying 
assumptions and implied meanings. I analyzed and attached interpretation to quotes by 
referring to relevant theoretical concepts (Finlay 2006). I argue that themes can be integrated 
with processes and actions in the research strategy, and need not be independently coded 
according to categories (Charmaz, 2014). New and different themes may emerge from initial 
broad umbrella themes observed (Lincoln & Guba, 2013). The cases were analyzed according 
to relational patterns and temporal dimensions. Textual analysis requires transcending the 
obvious statements to offer the most probable explanation. At every stage, it was crucial for 
me to conduct sensibility checks and watch for blind spots. I inquired about the meanings and 
the context when casing exemplars and outliers. Advice and feedback to conference papers 
were also useful in shaping the cases.   
 
4.6.2 Units of analysis 
 
Cases may contain multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009) constructed from corporate 
stakeholders and relationships with institutional and market actors even though a small number 
of cases are studied. In qualitative studies, analysis of levels and the system as a whole are 
more important than having a large number of observations of different entities (Aharoni, 2011). 
When constructing stakeholders’ roles, cases are more suitably viewed as enactments rather 
than entities (Tsoukas & Chia, 2011). Moreover, there are several cases embedded in each 
entity where overlapping social, temporal, locational categories could be examined (Fletcher 
& Plakoyiannaki, 2011). Instead of branding cases nominally based on entities, this study 
continually inquires what is the case(s). The unit of a firm is not the basis of the puzzle but the 
subject matter to be addressed. Clusters of companies were reconfigured according to 
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commonalities and contrasting themes. The rationale for pursuing internationalization 
strategies may overlap across managerial and official boundaries. Tracking the casing process 
(Ragin & Becker, 1992) and progression from ideas to a case would deepen our understanding 
of the cases and linkages. Moreover, the same participants and managers within the same firms 
and locality may change their perception and assessment over time.  I refrained from uncritical 
and repetitive attempts to seek a harmonious ensemble that would neglect to explain paradoxes 
and reject deviant results.  
 
4.6.3 Knowledge building process 
 
Discovery of exceptional cases transcend the standard classification of categories. The 
role of the researcher in casing is pivotal to theory building from problematization and 
reflexivity. Passive data is factual and there is not much scope for variations in interpretation 
but active data is associated with discovery (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Consistent with abductive 
logic, I allowed for flexible conceptual categorization (Doz, 2011), evolving provisional 
concepts concurrently and collectively with data and emerging concepts. Besides exemplary 
cases, I embraced outliers to shed light on undercurrents and nuances of unnoticed tendencies 
(Aharoni, 2011). This is consistent with the abductive process to examine the surrounding 
including those causes and effects that are not obvious (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Among 
the cases studied, commonalities and divergence cut across apparent structural demarcation. In 
these cases, I would explain how and why certain cases exhibit idiosyncrasies and their 
stakeholders took certain courses of action. 
 
Casing incorporates the temporal dimension and necessitates construction of the 
sequence of events and coevolution of business actors, institutions and markets. In Chapter 3, 
contextualization lays the foundation of historical perspective and this is elaborated in the 
content chapters. Temporal bracketing (Langley, 1999) enables tracing the sequence of 
concurrent developments in the home country that impacts internationalization.  Unlike variant 
oriented study, in the process view, performance measures are ephemeral transition points 
(Langley et al., 2013). Process tracing research designs for within-case and cross-case 
comparisons could uncover diversity and causal mechanisms (Vennesson, 2008). Metaphors 
cited by interviewees were useful guidance for analysis because these were time-bound, 
representing certain periods, or may inspire new interpretations over time (Alvesson, 2011).  
Social engagements linking the past and future with the current state, would be continuously 
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constructed and reconstructed through experimental and reflexive processes (Elkjaer & 
Simpson, 2011).  
 
4.7   Broadening the validity criteria  
 
The meaning of rigor for qualitative studies is not clearly defined and is often measured 
in terms of the quality of social sciences research rather than procedural precision and 
strictness. Qualitative researchers are urged to move beyond criteria focusing on established 
forms of rigor that confirms the status quo rather than generate creativity (Finlay, 2006). To 
address the lack of consensus on the evaluation criteria of heterogeneous qualitative research, 
I discuss various steps undertaken in this study. Conventional standards of appraising 
qualitative research that hails from deductive and inductive traditions continue to dominate IB 
scholarship even though there exist diverse approaches to qualitative case studies (Bluhm, 
Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011; Piekkari et al., 2011; Welch et al., 2013). Qualitative scholars 
have called for assessing the value and integrity of qualitative research using different criteria 
instead of producing mediocre and pseudo-scientific qualitative research aimed at seeking 
credibility and legitimacy (Finlay, 2006).  
 
I question the preoccupation with specified methods and theories, and argue that research 
methods should be appropriately cast as practical philosophy of reasoning (Schwandt, 1996) in 
keeping with pragmatist ontology and abductive logic. In this section, I will discuss the position 
of this thesis in assessment of rigor in the continuum of research, in comparison with the 
quantitative research paradigm and positivist criteria of reliability, validity and generalizability 
(Ballinger, 2004; Finlay, 2006). Consistent with my ontology and epistemology stated at the 
start of this chapter, there are alternative criteria to assess the value of research. Diverse forms 
qualitative research are legitimate ways of theorizing beyond conventional exploratory 
undertakings (Welch et al., 2013). Linear paths and generalization that neglect complexities 
and contexts are deemed untrustworthy (Stiles, 1993). The common understanding of the 
criteria to assess various paradigmatic positions are shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Validity in the positivist persuasion of qualitative research guided by testability and 
generalizability required of quantitative methods may seem at odds with my research 
objectives. On the other hand, naturalist research paradigms use a different set of criteria. A 
recent term that has emerged is “criteriology” which suggests that evaluation can reflexively 
focus on managing research and choosing methodologies that suit the philosophical 
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assumptions (Johnson, Buehring, Cassell, & Symon, 2006; Schwandt, 1996). The appraisal of 
qualitative research entails a balance between well-accepted guidelines with appropriateness 
to ontological basis, epistemological assumptions and methods of study (Dixon-Woods, Shaw, 
Agarwal, & Smith, 2004; Finlay, 2006). Evidence in qualitative method does not equate to 
adhering to stringent rule-based and systematic methodological procedures but allows space 
for creativity. Central to qualitative approach is the quality of analytical inference (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002, 2014). Metaphors cannot be translated into more precise, objective language and 
thus elude rigorous measurement and testing (Alvesson, 2011). It is possible to move beyond 
the ambit of common impression of rigor, and reflect on clarity, credibility, contribution, 
communicative and caring qualities (Finlay, 2006).   
 
Table 4.9 Criteria for rigor across four research paradigms 
Positivist term Naturalist term Alternatives   Means to check 
Internal Validity  
Repeatability 
Credibility 
Accuracy 
Confirmability 
Meaning 
Rationale  
Resonance (quotes) 
Relevance 
 
Prolonged involvement, persistent 
observation, data triangulation, 
members check, feedback 
 
External Validity 
Generalizability 
Transferability Interdisciplinary 
theorizing 
Multiple perspectives 
 
 
Robustness checks 
Thick description of setting and /or 
participants 
Reflexivity 
Deviant cases 
 
Reliability Dependability 
Trustworthiness 
Transparency, clarity, 
documentation trail   
 
Audit: researcher’s documentation 
of data, methods and decisions; 
researcher triangulation 
Objectivity Confirmability Contextualization 
Conditions 
Situations 
Statistical or analytical rigor   
Reflexivity  
Fresh eyes and peer review 
 
 
      Author’s adaptation from Alvesson 2009; Ballinger 2006; Finlay 2006; Lincoln & Guba 2013; Madill et al 2000  
 
I also considered sensemaking as a relevant analytical tool for studying processes. 
Sensemaking calls for a move away from preoccupation with validation that may exclude 
discovery and broaden the notions of methodology to incorporate flexible processes of 
discovery and theorizing (Locke et al., 2008; Van Maanen et al., 2007; Weick, 1989). An 
abductive sensemaking process (Kolko, 2010) involves filtering, grouping relationships, 
combining patterns and coherent structures leading to a synthesis of complex relationships. 
Validated knowledge does not necessarily translate into theorizing. I was inclined to find 
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plausible connections and relationships that have not been considered or found in extant 
frameworks (Van Maanen et al., 2007). Active construction from interesting and complex data 
with representations such as metaphors (Alvesson, 2003) demonstrate reflexivity in the 
evolution of theorizing (Weick, 1989).  
 
4.7.1 Relevance and rationale 
 
I sought relevant meanings rather than internal and external validity in positivism and 
credibility in naturalism. Starting with a puzzle suggests that an earlier assumption has been 
falsified and needs investigation using different frames (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013; Davis, 
1971; Weick, 1989). Constructionists argue that internal coherence and transferability are 
unrealistic as research is inherently subjective and researchers should study deviant cases and 
include interdisciplinary perspectives (Madill, Jordan, & Shirley, 2000). Rather than applying 
pure economic rationality, abductive logic is synchronized within an iterative methodology for 
theory development. I focus on the rationale provided by actors of their actions and responses. 
The interview experience showed that participants from the same organizations may not speak 
with one voice and some were willing to share their personal assessments. Instead of 
generalizability, plausibility is a more suitable criteria because theorizing from qualitative data 
cannot be simple, accurate and general at the same time (Weick, 1999). Reflexive practices can 
function as both creative interpretation and evidence for rigor to develop coherence between 
the aims and methods of research (Ballinger, 2004). Providing verbatim quotes resonate with 
readers (Finlay, 2006) and generate more persuasive arguments. The primary purpose of 
research is to address relevant (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011; Kilduff, 2006) and current 
phenomenal issues than to produce rigorous works that is academic and esoteric, sacrificing on 
practical and actionable issues.  
 
It would be more important that the researcher declares biases rather than attempt to be 
perfectly objective. Having an agenda of engagement, processing, interpretation, and self-
critique would clarify and communicate ideas well (Stige, Malterud, & Midtgarden, 2009). A 
frequent question regarding repeatability stems from positivist expectations. Firstly, transcripts 
would not be understood at the same level as those involved. Among interviewers, each may 
have different preferences for theoretical frames and nuanced interpretations. My collaborators 
view the same data from a domestic economic policy lens rather than the IB perspective. 
Secondly, it would be impractical to replicate the same research due to heavy commitment of 
time and resources. The “romantics” (Alvesson, 2003) suggest replicability and sharing of 
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transcripts, but it is difficult to imagine how anyone could beg, borrow or steal raw qualitative 
data from the original interviewers and their co-authors and the ability to inject objectivity in 
different contexts.   
 
4.7.2 Theorizing from interdisciplinary and multiple perspectives 
 
Utilizing a fine-grained dataset optimally was a skill developed in the research journey. 
The traditional view of qualitative research considers ‘less is more’, rendering over 
descriptiveness as not getting to the point and ending up with a weak theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). I tried to strike a delicate balance of providing participants’ quotes that resonate with 
readers. I searched for individuals’ perceptions and relationships that stand out and drive 
decisions. I cross-checked field data with their actions and documentary sources (Vaughan, 
1996) and industry sources to gain better understand their meanings, relationships and 
justification for certain actions and decisions. Multiple perspectives could be a way to cross-
check and ‘triangulate’ field data (Woodside & Wilson, 2003). Unlike most previous case 
studies of MNEs, I present multiple perspectives of government officials, academics, business 
consultants and industry experts. Company documents, industry commentaries, business 
analyses, public statements and news reports are referenced for reliability and plausibility 
checks. While this could be considered a form of validation, analyzing social behavior requires 
more complex tools to bounce, weigh and deliberate on ideas to understand the rationale and 
reasoning behind these interactions and decisions.  
 
Continuing communications with participants who were amenable to provide updates 
and clarification helped in the construction and reconstruction of theories. By following up on 
some interviewees, I found that their views were not static as they learned lessons from 
previous actions before making the next moves. Reflexivity and iteration of field data with 
theories overcome dependency on participant’s transient mood, retrospective meaning making 
and knee-jerk reaction of interviewers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Reflexivity raises the 
researcher’s involvement and subjectivity to the level of consciousness to produce more 
conscientious scholarship (Prasad, 2014). I did not take the statements at face value but 
explored deeper into the thinking behind the articulation of the participants’ position. Adopting 
an interdisciplinary approach to analysis and theorizing, interview data is seen through complex 
social situations that bear imprints of a multitude of social logics, mechanisms or social forces 
that are addressed (Alvesson, 2011).     
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Theorizing with a robust and emerging framework (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, 2014)  would 
improve the explanatory power of case studies dealing with non-linear (a mathematical term) 
causality and chaotic systems of human behavior and experience (Stiles, 1993). The merit of 
iterative process of moving “back and forth” is the ability to check theories with empirical 
evidence and returning to the field for confirmation for further theorizing. Abduction could 
rely on extant theories and similar studies and develop new concepts concurrently with data. 
Instead of starting on a blank slate and rely solely on matching field data with a single 
framework, familiarity with multidisciplinary theories would strengthen the process of 
conceptual construction. Using within-case and cross-case comparisons, this study deepens our 
understanding of different types of trees but does not claim to represent the forests in the world. 
Replication and generalizable objectives are not in line with the study of human behavior and 
social sciences (Dubois & Gadde, 2014). Ultimately, evaluation should include discovery since 
this study uses abductive analysis aimed at generating novel theoretical insights (Weick, 1995b) 
that reframe empirical findings in contrast to existing theories (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). 
My attempts to explore outlier cases that may challenge existing theories are motivated by 
developing more persuasive arguments and constructs (Aharoni, 2011). Falsification in the 
scientific research has generated new discoveries and theories (Popper, 2002).     
 
4.7.3 Clarity  
 
Transparency in information gathering and analysis are ways to instill rigor (Bluhm et 
al., 2011) and discipline in the absence of clearly defined steps. I demonstrate that in a 
qualitative approach, detailing the research journey and justifying the approaches taken would 
help to build up the cases. In qualitative scholarship, realist tales have given way to 
confessional tales that offer transparent account of research (Finlay, 2002a). Trustworthiness 
is the criteria used in interpretivist paradigm, implemented by member checking, triangulation 
and negative cases (Lincoln & Guba, 2013). The intention is to uphold reliability (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) rather than replicability across different cases over time. A theoretical frame 
could be applied to other cases with similar characteristics and conditions, and offer guidance 
for future research.  
 
Abduction requires exercising discipline, conscientious documentation and continuous 
reflexivity. I started with a mystery consistent with pragmatist Dewey’s ‘ends-in-view’ and the 
objective was to solve the puzzle through investigation (Hoffmann, 2013). Though ‘rich’ rigor 
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demands carefully considered research questions and approach, appropriate process, detailed 
and accurate data to support theoretical constructs, it is insufficient to guarantee qualitative 
quality (Tracy, 2010). Hence, quality research does not preclude telling a good story (Dyer, 
Wilkins, & Eisenhardt, 1991; Gubrium & Holstein, 2009) and conveying vividly the lived 
experience (Finlay 2006). The process of reflexivity from preliminary theoretical frames, 
interviews, analysis, casing and conclusion are detailed in this thesis.  
 
4.7.4 Contextualization   
 
Contextualization is a strength of qualitative case study. Sometimes an obvious and 
compelling finding may not be relevant to the historical, political and macro-economic context. 
Yet certain findings that defy conventional wisdom may be meaningful if viewed in a larger 
context. Reflexivity involves not only self-awareness, but continuous self-reflection (Finlay 
2002, 2006) throughout the learning process from interviews, memo reviews and analysis. 
Inferring from multiple clues, distributed cognition and mediated activity with the environment 
would enhance abductive processing (Paavola & Hakkarainen, 2005). Qualitative research 
demands stamina and willingness to take risks (Doz, 2011) but is compensated by the rewards 
of holistic and novel findings. 
 
4.8   Summary 
  
In this chapter on methodology, I have outlined the paradigmatic basis for abduction and 
justified the advantages of the approach undertaken to strengthen findings towards theorizing. 
I provided an overview of the research strategy, which is holistic and processual, incorporating 
the contextual and temporal dimensions. Evolving casing of multiple levels of analysis that 
examine dynamic interactions rather than fixed entities at a point in time is an appropriate 
approach to studying the deeper meanings behind a phenomenon. Chinese agrifood OFDI in 
advanced economies grew in tandem with the transition to balancing and consumption-driven 
economy. Reflexivity is adopted in problematization of the research question, purposive 
selection, interviewing and data collection process, analysis of various sources of information 
and theorizing. I tried to make sense and meanings (Weick, 1989, 2006, 2015) from the 
research and conceptual development which are presented in subsequent four content chapters 
of this thesis. In the long run, these case studies could potentially provide a good basis for 
future longitudinal investigations of related topics. Ultimately, methodology serves as tools to 
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construct better narratives for theorizing rather than as an end in itself. Finally, I explained that 
this study meets the criteria of quality in qualitative case study using abductive reasoning.    
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5 Chapter Five: Coevolution of economic reforms and agrifood 
industry development in support of internationalizing firms 
 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, nor the most intelligent, but the one 
most responsive to change.” — Charles Darwin 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Home country support for internationalization is commonly conceived as state 
institutions and policies such as tax and subsidies that facilitate firms’ overseas investment. 
Home country support may encompass formal, informal, direct, indirect, persuasive, organic 
and spontaneous growth with enterprises over time. Convention focuses on unidirectional 
causal link with institutions as the centrality of study. This chapter seeks to address the neglect 
of the dynamic and mutual effects of policies and industry towards internationalization. In this 
context, home country policies that impact on internationalization include pro-market reforms, 
deregulation of approval processes for OFDI and recentralization. Policies are response to 
requirements on the one hand, and in turn elicit responses and feedback for further reforms. 
The research setting is Chinese agrifood OFDI to advanced economies in the past decade 
against the backdrop of consumption-driven growth and post-GFC acquisition opportunities. I 
aim to clarify the meanings of home country support from different perspectives, extending to 
relationships among actors, and assessing the relative needs of businesses.  
 
Home country support for emerging market firms is often seen in a positive light, 
promoting competitive advantages and coveted by firms. Departing from the typical and 
predictable division between support for selective firms and constraints on disadvantaged firms 
that escape overseas, I reconceptualize a dynamic framework to capture the complexities and 
changes of multiple level interactions among actors. Moving beyond institutions to interaction 
among business actors using a coevolutionary lens, I offer alternative insights and explanations 
of dynamic home country effects. The findings show home country support is not limited to 
unilateral financial backing or unconditional uplift, but might require negotiation, adjustment 
and compromises among actors.   
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the context of Chinese agrifood OFDI to 
advanced economies from 2008 to 2016. Guided by inquiry of home country support, I try to 
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find out the different meanings conveyed by giver and diverse recipients over time. Home 
country support should not be limited to direct financial support for internationalization. In the 
initial conceptual framing and research investigation process, I problematized long-held 
assumptions in extant IB literature on the duality of support versus constraint which suggests 
SOEs typically receive preferential support while less prominent POEs fend for themselves.  
 
The eight Chinese corporations examined here comprise different ownership structures 
(two SOEs and six POEs) and their core businesses vary from agrifood, real estate, metals 
manufacturing to services sectors. I gained different perspectives from the local officials, 
central government researchers and industry experts and referred to secondary published 
reports. The study will question and explore further how home country reforms conducive to 
internationalization coevolve with business actors’ selective needs. 
 
The main finding from the research is that resources for institutional support should not 
be taken for granted. Even state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face increasing pressure on to 
deliver and perform. Across a spectrum of business perspectives on useful and relevant home 
country support, confident privately-owned enterprises (POEs) would not trade off autonomy 
in internationalization decisions for state support but appreciate past support for domestic 
industry development and regulations on imports from Chinese overseas assets. This multiple 
case study enables the development of nuanced insights towards a “discretionary adaptation 
model” that contributes to the enrichment and explanatory power of process and institutional 
frames.  
 
5.2   Contextualization 
 
Chinese economic reforms have been exploratory and experimental to overcome 
institutional inadequacies. In the process of transitioning to market economy, adjustments were 
made to create an environment conducive to domestic, inward and outbound foreign 
investments. Subsequent economic reforms intensified marketization, changed priorities and 
consolidated previous policies (Refer to Chapter 2). SOE reforms which began in the 1990s 
entailed the restructuring and privatization of most SOEs, and identified national champions 
(Fan & Hope, 2013) to prepare large Chinese enterprises for globalization. When China 
acceded to the World Trade Organization, OFDI was geared towards accessing resources, 
energy, technology and strategic assets (Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011; Meyer, 2015b) were 
encouraged to supply home country manufacturing and infrastructural development and 
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improve competitive advantages (Williamson & Raman, 2013). The combination of pro-
market reforms and deregulation (Fligstein & Zhang, 2015; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008b; Li et al., 2014; Whitley, 1998; Witt & Redding, 2013), enabled POEs to capitalize 
on streamlined administrative procedures and adopted a less stringent list of prohibited 
destinations to expand overseas at a shorter time (Luo et al., 2010). In the absence of strong 
coordinating mechanisms, local governments were free to adopt flexible interpretation of 
central policies and improvised ad hoc channels to support investment (Ang, 2016).   
 
 China has instituted multiple overlapping regimes to regulate OFDI under a basic 
official structure of reporting governing internationalizing firms (Figure 5.1). SOEs are 
governed by the Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC). SOEs could invest overseas in areas that are within their primary business sector by 
merely reporting to SASAC with the investment plan and financing sources. SOEs would only 
require approval from SASAC in special circumstances or if OFDI falls outside their non-core 
business (Lumsden & Knight, 2012). Such flexibility and freedom provide advantages for 
SOEs over POEs. Meanwhile, local SOEs, subject to less stringent supervision than central 
SOEs, may compete against each other or with private firms (OECD, 2016). 
 
POEs need to seek approval from the National Development Research Council (NDRC). 
The NDRC’s main role is to ensure that POEs align their OFDI with China’s domestic 
economic development. The NDRC may allow multiple businesses to bid for overseas assets 
that are below the $US300 million threshold and are not supposed to favor certain companies 
over others. Technically, potential investors must satisfy the requirements set by State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) on the amount of foreign currency and bank 
procedures for OFDI. Chinese enterprises can use either their own foreign currency holdings 
or government foreign exchange reserve loans for OFDI. In 2009, SAFE relaxed qualification 
requirements for offshore lending, expanded sources of funding and simplified verification and 
remittance procedures, facilitating more POEs to invest overseas.  
 
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) formulates regulations on OFDI and 
coordinates the activities of the commercial counsellors in China’s embassies. The primary 
objective is to protect and advance the interests of Chinese companies overseas. More recently, 
the regulation of OFDI thresholds and sectors has been delegated to provincial-level 
MOFCOM for assessment. In principle, local MOFCOM officials used the ‘economic and 
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technical feasibility’ criteria to approve OFDI applications (Ma, 2014). After 2014, MOFCOM 
further relaxed approval review requirements to let Chinese firms conduct their own economic 
and technical feasibility of an overseas investment project. 
 
                 
   Figure 5.1 Regulatory Authorities of Chinese OFDI 
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Deregulation of internationalization procedures have benefited POEs considerably as 
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sectors (Zhong, 2017a). OFDIs undertaken by SOEs are scrutinized more closely while POEs 
are restrained from overleveraging through financial institutions.  
 
5.3   Assumptions in Extant Literature 
 
I problematize commonly accepted assumptions in literature and offer alternative 
assumption bases to construct research questions that will more likely generate interesting and 
influential theories (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011). The 
conventional approach that seeks to find research gaps, creates narrow spaces and contributes 
primarily to theoretical testing, confirmation and extension. While static efficiency concepts 
are advantageous in studying constant causal links, complexities and interconnections are 
downplayed. There is a wealth of scholarship on institutional support, but untapped knowledge 
on what happens in home country support has yet to be clarified and discovered. Flexibility in 
theorizing would enable expansion of research parameters to capture the realities in the 
empirical world. Inquiries that embrace diversity and paradoxes are more likely to stimulate 
creative insights (Hayes, Hopkinson, & Taylor, 2016).  
 
This study of agrifood OFDI commenced in late 2013, when Chinese investment in 
Australian mining resources peaked and agrifood investment interests increased in tandem with 
higher consumption of better quality food in Chinese domestic markets (Stacey, 2015). Relying 
on extant literature on early waves of SOE led OFDI in resource-seeking ventures, I expected 
to inquire along the lines of institutional support. The empirical material, however, raised 
questions on the suitability of existing frameworks and opened the way for insights into the 
composites of multifaceted actors interacting concurrently in a transitional institutional 
environment. Systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) is appropriate for studying 
dynamic systems as actors and organizations inevitably have to revise their strategies when 
requirements and relationships change over time. That theories and practice operate in ever-
shifting contexts needs to be addressed at the fore. A formula that is relevant to a case and point 
in time may not be applicable as societies coevolve.  
 
Complex regulatory regimes facilitate the internationalization process (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2015; Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; Lewin et al., 1999; Redding & Witt, 2009) and while players 
may learn (Cuervo-Cazurra, Luo, Ramamurti, & Ang, 2018), respond or create further changes 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Child & Tsai, 2005; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Oliver, 1991). 
Ramamurti and Hillemann (2018) argue that the government bolstered the international 
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competitiveness of Chinese firms in many ways through “government-created advantages.” 
While this has been prevalent in the early part of internationalization, home country effects 
may not lead to clear cut advantages but could be ‘double-edged’. Domestic inefficiencies, 
restrictions, lack of protection for property rights and corruption may drive disadvantaged firms 
to invest overseas to escape constraints imposed on smaller private businesses in the domestic 
economy (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Emerging market governments create policies shaped by 
domestic companies that facilitate foreign direct investment (Yan et al., 2018). 
 
5.3.1 Change: incorporating the temporal dimension 
 
Research on factors for rapid internationalization of EMNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2002a) contributed to our understanding of a phenomenon. It has been well 
recognized that home country government support for higher value production and skilled 
services are key drivers of early internationalization (Aggarwal & Agmon, 1990; Ramamurti, 
2012). Research on institutions augment and complement existing resource-based and 
organizational theories, but transition and temporal adaptation (Peng, 2003) have been 
relegated to the background. The snapshot approach of studying internationalization of Chinese 
firms tends to neglect changes of the stakeholders in the home country environment over time.  
 
The focus on direct causal links also downplays the role of moderating mechanisms and 
the temporal dimension within unique national characteristics (Tolentino, 2010). Multiple 
institutional reform processes, such as decentralization, industrial restructuring and market 
liberalization, contributed to variations in SOEs’ strategies (Li et al., 2014). Similarly, POEs 
adapted to different regulatory and political economic environments since pro-market reforms 
and subsequent globalization policies gathered momentum. Luo et al (2010) provide insights 
to the gradual transformation of Chinese institutions, tracing the simplification of monitoring 
mechanisms and broadening support for OFDI up to 2007. These measures included tax and 
financial policies, insurance subsidies for expatriates in overseas subsidiaries, information 
services, and preferences to MNEs that meet the direction guidance catalogue. The narrative 
of an influential government progressively transforming undeveloped institutions to 
complement promotion of OFDI policies continues to dominate IB literature.  
 
Alternative perspectives challenge longstanding assumptions of entity boundaries and 
stability of the home country environment. Incorporating political economy and strategic 
management help to enrich the framing of home country effects. China accomplished rapid 
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economic development through a combination of industrial governance, network capitalism 
(Boisot & Child, 1996)  and bureau-franchising (Ang, 2016) rather than the ideal Weberian 
model. SOEs seem anomalous from the perspective of non-interventionist and free enterprise 
system. Yet, in comparison, there are over 200 SOEs across capitalist economies in Europe and 
Asia involved in a range of sectors such as transportation, power generation, energy, financial 
institutions and partly privatized telecommunications companies (Jackson & Deeg, 2008a). 
Chinese pro-market reforms do not necessarily follow the conventional path and projection of 
depersonalization of institutions and firms. It is assumed that marketization requires the 
strengthening of institutional authorities towards the Western codified Weberian conception of 
bureaucracy (Boisot & Child, 1996). However, ongoing personal relationships and political 
connections have endured during transition from exploratory to the deepening pro-market 
reforms (Ang & Jia, 2014). While most Chinese firms would have connections with local 
governments, publicly-traded Chinese SOEs and POEs are increasingly connected with the 
national/central government (Wang, 2016). Additional political connections to central 
authorities serve as additional insurance and contingent protection against centralization and 
the government’s anti-corruption drive (Wang, 2016). The mainstream IB literature has been 
relatively reticent regarding dynamic advantages afforded to internationalizing SOEs and POEs 
operating in an environment prone to policy shifts.   
 
After decades of reforming SOEs, hybrid Chinese firms  are behaving increasingly like 
POEs but retain key SOEs objectives (Bruton et al., 2015). While SOEs benefit from 
government support in the foundation years, the restructuring of strategic and pillar central 
SOEs into ‘national champions’ has exposed these selected beneficiaries to increased pressure 
to improve their performance in the home (Redding & Witt, 2010) and host countries (Li et al., 
2014). The internationalization strategies of listed SOEs have become more similar to private 
companies when home country institutions assert effective corporate controls (Estrin et al., 
2016).  
 
SOEs have dominated the economic history of post-war nation building. SOEs provided 
employment, social services, education, medical care, healthcare and retirement protection for 
Chinese citizens (Fan & Hope, 2013). While retaining control over certain strategic industries, 
most SOEs have been merged, streamlined and engaged in partial private shareholding (Wang 
et al, 2015; Leutert, 2016) ostensibly to improve governance (Ho & Young, 2013). The number 
of central-level SOEs has fallen from 196 in 2003 to 115 in March 2013, and fallen further to 
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98 by December 2017 (Mengjie, 2017). Some publicly-listed SOEs holding companies may 
own many unlisted and less efficient subsidiary companies that receive support if they serve 
important social functions. The SASAC (as mentioned earlier) is responsible for managing 
SOEs, including appointment of top executives and approving mergers or sales of stock or 
assets, and drafting laws related to SOEs. However, once appointed, individual SOE managers 
are accountable to the shareholders. The performance of appointees in business management 
affects their future promotion in the bureaucracy and SOEs.  
 
I argue that business actors are heterogeneous community and the distinction of the 
business management between SOEs and POEs is gradually narrowing. Large POEs in China 
share many similarities with SOEs in aspects such as market dominance, receiving state 
subsidies for key domestic sectors, forging proximity to state power and supporting 
government policy objectives (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015b). There are variations among 
strategic SOEs, transformed hybrid SOE, and POEs with varying resources, their experience 
and connections. Most POEs that started as small family or partnership businesses in the 1980 
- 1990s, are the main drivers in the non-state sector but continue to navigate discreetly with the 
bureaucracy. POEs are increasingly recognized for China’s globalization as more opportunities 
have emerged post-GFC. SOEs have been the front runners of OFDI, accounting for 60 per 
cent of the total value of outbound M&A deals in 2014, but the share is down from 90 per cent 
in 2010 (Barber, 2016). While SOEs continue to dominate higher value global deals, OFDI by 
the POEs are gaining prominence since the past decade.    
 
Chinese MNEs grew in a rapidly changing home environment over three decades. 
Regardless of the level of direct support, developed home institutions would be more conducive 
for firms to internationalize (Huang et al., 2017). Deregulation has reduced tedious approval 
procedures and facilitated POEs to commit to overseas investment without much delay. Pro-
market reforms also improved SOE efficiency, corporate governance and market competition. 
In the 1990s, SOEs were tasked with internationalization to seek resources, technology and 
brand names (Rui & Yip, 2008), as POEs were not well-established then. As China has higher 
savings and foreign reserves, SOE borrowers had more resources than predecessors of the 
Asian tiger economies (Gallagher & Irwin, 2014). At the same time, decentralization and 
deregulation have unlocked and extended opportunities to successful POEs.  
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5.3.2 Support versus Constraint Duality 
 
The mainstream literature has been informative on competition for resources by 
Chinese firms (Buckley et al, 2008; 2014 Luo, et al; 2010; Wei et al, 2015). Seminal studies 
have been based largely on macro-level analysis during high economic growth (Buckley et al, 
2007; Tolentino, 2010). Owing to China’s experimentation with capitalist practices (Boisot & 
Child, 1996; Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016; Nee & Opper, 2012; Redding & Witt, 
2009), the scale and pace of emerging market internationalization have been attributed largely 
to the role of direct government support (Ramamurti, 2012). Country-specific advantages 
(CSA) in turn boost firms’ specific advantages (Rugman & Li, 2007) and reduce the liability 
of foreignness (Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman et al., 2011). However, questions remain over 
the diverse effects of home country institutions on internationalization (Peng, 2003) of SOEs 
and non-SOEs. 
 
Institutions may determine the playing field for companies with an incentive system 
that either fortuitously or intentionally creates market imperfections (North, 1990; Voss et al., 
2010). Direct institutional support manifested in low cost financing, industry information, local 
knowledge and selective waiver of the approval process, enabled latecomers to engage in serial 
acquisitions (Luo & Tung, 2007). The ability of firms to harness resources and leverage global 
assets reinforced ownership advantages (Mathews, 2002a). EMNEs gain atypical ownership 
advantages (Sun et al., 2010) by tapping unique conditions of their home market. The 
institutional frame extends the “ownership” element in the eclectic model (Buckley, Forsans, 
& Munjal, 2012) to reconcile how firms that do not possess competitive advantages could be 
enabled to internationalize.  
 
Institutional support and domestic capital market imperfections (Voss et al., 2010) 
allow investors to broaden their strategic options (Luo & Wang, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012) to 
overcome latecomer disadvantages. Home government support for firms entering a host 
country with well-developed institutions reduces the importance of having prior entry 
experience and increases the likelihood of commitment (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). 
Strategic asset-seeking and market-seeking overseas investment were encouraged by the home 
government (Lu et al., 2011). Besides direct support provided by the state, firms are 
incentivized to pursue speciﬁc global strategies that meet national objectives (Cuervo‐Cazurra, 
2011).  
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State financial support has helped firms to compensate for competitive disadvantages and 
mitigate risks of investing in politically unstable host destinations (Buckley et al., 2007). Home 
country support may facilitate internationalization by promoting market efficiency through 
transparency enhancing and uncertainty reduction mechanisms (Hobdari et al., 2017). Though 
institutions remain weak in emerging markets, policies geared towards internationalization 
could help inexperienced EMNEs to overcome challenges of internationalization. More 
recently, scholars try to unpack the contingency factors of home country advantages. It was 
found that only SOEs with requisite internal technology and marketing resources in specific 
industries that are prioritized by the state would benefit from institutional support for 
internationalization (Hong et al., 2015).    
 
On the other hand, POEs that lack political connections face difficulties accessing capital 
for international expansion. Constrained by restrictive domestic regulations and institutional 
voids, POEs are pushed out or forced to “escape”, relocate and venture overseas (Boisot & 
Meyer, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Voss et al., 2010; Witt 
& Lewin, 2007). POEs that operate on a small scale, and are uncompetitive in the domestic 
market, would be deemed as non-strategic. Firms that are not politically connected would not 
receive institutional support to internationalize, and would have to find their own means to 
venture overseas (Witt & Lewin, 2007). Smaller firms may internationalize as a way of 
attracting overseas venture capitalists (Voss et al., 2010). Emerging market MNEs globalize to 
alleviate domestic institutional constraints and voids in the legal system and imperfect markets 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). Discriminatory support depends largely on affiliation and confidence of 
relationships with different levels of the home government (Dau, 2012). SOEs receive what is 
termed as “conscious” support that encourages aggressive international expansion while 
“unconscious” support forces POEs to adopt a more cautious approach (Wei et al., 2015).   
 
The binary conceptualization portrays SOEs as beneficiaries of the institutional 
perspective in contrast to constraints faced by POEs. A longstanding assumption is that home 
state-centered intervention has discriminatory effects based on ownership types, favoring SOEs 
and hindering POEs. However, in practice, political connections could be double-edged. 
Protection in the domestic market could entrench firms into dependency and managers would 
not be incentivized to venture overseas (Huang et al., 2017). It is even argued that intense 
market competition in the home country, rather than encouraging conditions, may have been 
the main driver behind firms’ internationalization (Huang et al., 2017).  
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While institutional support has been widely accepted as a positive asset that enhances 
the firm’s capabilities in the home environment and international competitiveness (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001), it has given unfair advantage to favored recipients at the others’ expense. The 
conventional perception supposes that well-connected SOEs enjoy privileges and preferential 
policies, such as quotas, subsidies, tax incentives and soft budget constraints (Kornai et al., 
2003). Buckley et al (2007; 2008) and Ramamurti (2012) have also suggested that SOEs 
received preferential government to facilitate access to low cost capital and improve their 
comparative advantages.  
 
Granted that support conferred initial advantages to firms entering host countries, linkage 
to the home country government may work against firms targeting host countries that are vastly 
different. Firms’ close association with home governments seen as authoritarian by liberal 
democratic countries, could constrain SOE’s subsequent market expansion and higher 
ownership of host country assets (Gao, Liu, & Lioliou, 2015). SOEs tend to face greater 
liability of country of origin and distrust by foreigners who are wary of their close relations 
with the home government (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Meyer et al., 2014; Ramachandran & 
Pant, 2010). A high degree of government ownership may backfire and weaken the positive 
institutional effects for EMNEs expanding to advanced economies (Wu & Chen, 2014).  
  
Challenging the notion of beneficiaries based mainly on ownership criteria, alternative 
streams in state capitalism argue that home country institutions may have more influence over 
POEs through their close political connections (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015b). Some proactive 
POEs may circumvent disadvantages in the home country, utilizing substitutes, or improvising 
new channels to fill the gaps of weak institutions (Ang, 2016). Influential firms negotiate and 
exert “institutional leverage capability” on institutions to their advantage (Landau et al., 2016).  
 
Business systems scholarship acknowledges that complexities shape the course of weak 
firms (Morgan, 2007). Institutions are not monolithic, homogenous or static entities. Local 
officials and entrepreneurs have been drivers of adaptation while adhering to broad central 
directives. National champions are not limited to SOEs. Model POEs with proven track record 
also receive subsidies, incentives and rewards. Home institutional support is not confined to 
allowing direct access to resources and could extend to collaboration with firms that share 
government objectives on specific investment targets (Wang et al., 2012). Private businesses 
in developing countries could grow into entrepreneurial crony institutions of the regime 
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(Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). POEs navigate and capitalize on weak institutions by creatively 
tapping informal channels to improve their access to various forms of home country support. 
 
In more munificent home country environments such as developed economies, abundant 
resources and institutional means permit multiple firms to compete and share benefits, add 
value and improve efficiency (Castrogiovanni, 1991; Wang et al., 2012). Though China is an 
emerging market, it is unique in that SOEs have access to abundant state resources. POEs that 
are well-connected to provincial and municipal level authorities could leverage influence to 
support policies that promote the expansion of their businesses. Local officials have also 
coopted supporters from businesses to reap mutual benefits from economic growth (Redding 
& Witt, 2009). Where the interests converge between central and local governments, managers 
and industry associates, there are incentives to reduce institutional constraints and expedite the 
approval process for Chinese firms to invest overseas (Luo et al., 2010).  
 
5.4   Alternative Positioning  
 
Having considered and consolidated the main conversations of change in home country 
effects on internationalization, I proceed to outline alternative positions for the research inquiry. 
Exploring complex relationships and alternative perspectives would stimulate debate on the 
power play of divergent interests across entity divisions. To address the multifaceted realities 
of internationalization, the sources, level and types of institutional support need clarification 
and refinement. Table 5.1 shows the conventional assumptions in mainstream literature and 
alternative positions for this study, addressing the dynamism and relevance of support.  
 
First, my alternative assumption is a dynamic home country environment. Instead of 
economic equilibrium, continuous adaptation is the norm in emerging economies. Chinese 
economic and social policies have been experimental and formulated to achieve multiple goals 
and shifting priorities. Central directives are interpreted and adjusted by local level officials 
and interactions with business actors. The extant IB literature assumes stability using resource-
based and institutional lenses. Studies attribute rapid internationalization during the late 1990s 
and 2000s to macro-level home country support for selected firms. The alternative assumption 
incorporates policy changes, firms’ idiosyncrasies and responses to institutions, industry and 
markets. By highlighting the temporal nature of home country developments and 
internationalization, I could explore deeper explanations for multi-dimensional and irregular 
trajectory of home country support. 
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Second, I revise the conventional notion of dichotomous support and constraints. EMNEs 
are not mere recipients of policies of an all-powerful state but are active players in the home 
country and internationalization process. The distinction of internationalization strategies 
pursued by listed firms of different ownership types may not be clear cut (Estrin et al., 2016). 
Chinese firms overcome ambiguity in hierarchically-nested systems and manage indefinite 
boundaries by exploiting new market opportunities to gain strategic advantage (Meyer & Lu, 
2005). Questioning the assumption of unconditional home country support, I explore the 
conditions, expectations, levels and types of support.  
 
In subsequent process of theorizing, I substantiate that firms may internationalize with 
substantial, moderate or limited support from diverse home country conditions. Moreover, 
support does not engender definite benefits and may even result in trade-offs and negative 
perceptions by foreigners. The majority of POEs rely primarily on self-financed initial capital 
but established firms with a good track record and business credentials may collaborate with 
industrial, local government and financial networks (Garnaut et al., 2012). In the portrayal of 
a “quiet revolution”, Garnaut et al (2012) noted that POEs have found various avenues of 
raising capital and are not dependent on state support for expansion.   
 
Deviating from the narrative of disadvantaged POEs that escape overseas, I focus on how 
POEs navigate and leverage institutional connections and market mechanisms. Business 
stakeholders and state agents function in interdependent relationships (Wang et al., 2012).  
POEs may select appropriate channels and the timing to engage home country institutions for 
support, just as SOEs would contingently capitalize on internal resources to leverage 
institutional support for internationalization (Hong et al., 2015). Firms continually adjust to the 
external environment as a necessary part of their internationalization process (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). This calls for greater attention to map the continuous interactions involving 
official and business actors. Addressing the proposition of disadvantaged firms being forced to 
escape overseas, I argue that small firms with limited means have difficulty escaping and 
succeeding overseas. Large, asset-rich corporations may not be in dire need for state support, 
but SMEs seeking unofficial industry and entrepreneurial funding channels need to pay a higher 
cost on capital.  
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the problematization steps to position this study. The two 
alternative positions include exploration of change and complexities in home country support 
 Chapter Five: Coevolution of home country relationships on support 
121 
 
for Chinese firms to internationalize. I also consider different perspectives to assess how firms’ 
needs are met by relevant support for internationalization. 
 
      Table 5.1 Problematization of Existing Assumptions to Explore Alternative Assumption Positions 
 
Assumptions in Mainstream Literature Alternative Positioning 
Resource-based and institutional lenses.  
 
Phenomenal OFDI during high domestic economic 
growth and strong support for internationalization 
of selected firms, mainly SOEs.  
 
Dynamic, holistic, complex relationships exist 
among home country actors.  
 
Continuous change in emerging economies is the 
norm.  
  
Dichotomy between support and constraints. 
Disadvantaged firms constrained by weak 
institutions and lack of support escape overseas. 
 
It is more important to focus on firms’ needs and 
the relevance of support. 
 
Firms that possess resource capabilities may 
leverage institutions, industries and markets. The 
question remains how they undertake this.  
 
 
 
5.5   Conceptual Framework 
 
This study would encompass multilevel and temporal perspectives to theorize and 
extend boundaries. Despite pro-market reforms and deregulation, studies continue to highlight 
SOEs as the main beneficiaries of Chinese government support while POEs contend with 
multiple domestic constraints and are disadvantaged. Integrating institutional and evolutionary 
dimensions, this study aims to finetune the meaning of home country support to different 
business actors, and incorporate the mixed effects of overlapping reforms on internationalizing 
firms. I incorporate context and political behavior as an integral part of economic production 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Though the Chinese government continues to play a significant 
role as enabler and protector (Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014), there are various types and levels of 
support for different target beneficiaries with the growth of hybrid SOEs and POEs. The notion 
of home country support has evolved and should be constructed as a contingency based on the 
needs of individual actors and their responses to the evolving environment. 
 
Chinese SOEs have long benefited from direct government support in domestic 
business, international trade and investment. Privileges included subsidies, preferential finance, 
advantages in major projects. SOEs may still enjoy priority for domestic projects and receive 
special treatment to achieve political in addition to commercial goals  (Du & Boateng, 2014). 
However, SOE managers have come under increasing pressure to focus on returns on capital 
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for overseas investment (Gao et al., 2015). The bar has been raised with the recent 
recentralization policy and anti-corruption campaigns in the domestic political economy.  
 
It would be arbitrary to define POEs as these are heterogeneous and diverse players in 
the non-state sector that could transverse boundaries. Large POEs may gain institutional 
advantages while smaller firms internationalize under constraints (Voss et al., 2010). POEs that 
have technology-based advantages and export experience are more likely to benefit from 
Chinese government support (Luo et al., 2010). POEs may leverage domestic policies to their 
advantage through adaptation, negotiation, informal channels and avoidance (Landau et al., 
2016; Li et al., 2014) Disadvantageous firms may find ways to capitalize on institutional 
arbitrage of transaction costs to plan their strategic entry and exit decisions (Boisot & Meyer, 
2008).   
 
5.5.1 A Coevolutionary Perspective   
 
The term “coevolution” is borrowed from science where wo or more interdependent 
species (e.g., predators and prey or hosts and parasites) interact symbiotically and mutually 
adapt and drive change, diversification in communities and organization of life (Thompson, 
1999). March (1999) studied firm-level exploration with exploitation and adaptations to 
environmental changes. Multiple interactions produce new forms and different directions that 
actors may operate (Lewin et al., 1999)  with the industry and larger market environment. In 
this study, the species of coevolution comprises multi-level government policies and Chinese 
firms of different structures and competencies. The communities operate respond to the market 
environment and industry developments.  
  
There is strong justification for developing a coevolutionary model involving multiple 
stakeholders in the home country that have an interest in obtaining institutional support for 
internationalization. Emerging markets are diverse and regulatory regimes are changing at 
different pace, depth and coverage. Internationalization ought to be conceived as multi-
dimensional and temporal. Extant literature on home country focus on the institutional 
perspective neglect the combined effects of pro-market reforms and deregulation and recent 
recentralization on different levels of government, industry and markets. The perspectives of 
SOEs and POEs would be considered together with the implementation of central policies by 
local officials. POEs are gaining prominence in both the domestic and international markets 
with deregulation and streamlining of approval guidelines. 
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Though SOEs continue to receive government support for OFDI in priority sectors and 
strategic assets, the same level and types of support for SOE internationalization cannot be 
taken for granted. Due to EMNEs’ varying degrees of affiliation with the home country 
government, individual firms may experience different levels of institutional pressure and 
capitalize on their ability to internationalize according to preferred locations and resource 
seeking or market seeking motivations (Wang et al., 2012). Incorporating the temporal 
dimension, pro-market reforms put SOE managers under evaluation based on profitability and 
adherence to government policy directions (Du & Boateng, 2014). Moreover, the government 
has raised expectations of the financial performance and accountability of SOE’s overseas 
investment (Gao et al., 2015) exacerbated by the domestic debt pressure in recent years. The 
flexibility afforded by years of decentralization that spurred local entrepreneurship has been 
restrained with recentralization and deleveraging.     
 
I aim to enrich IB scholarship using multi-disciplinary perspectives. Drawing 
inspiration from political economy literature, I learn that Chinese firms and local level officials 
negotiate and develop business networks (Ang, 2016). Coordinating mechanisms are 
developed at macro and micro levels in the absence of clear and specific guidelines from the 
central government (Krug & Hendrischke, 2008; 2012). The boundaries demarcating 
institutions, SOEs and POEs are less distinct in practice as the latter is known to cultivate close 
relations with officials (Milhaupt & Zheng, 2015b). A coevolutionary model is an appropriate 
tool to analyze complexities and change (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006). Distinguished scholars 
have encouraged the adoption of a coevolutionary perspective to improve our understanding of 
interrelationships between MNEs and public policy (Cantwell et al., 2010). While addressing 
changes within firms, it is equally important to study coevolution among firms (Volberda & 
Lewin, 2003). A coevolutionary approach incorporates the sequence of decisions (Buckley, 
2016) that prevail in emerging markets and how they impact on internationalization. 
 
An initial conceptual framework presented in Figure 5.2 explores how dynamic 
institutional impetus broadly defined as pro-market reforms, deregulation and supervision. 
Concurrent home country policies may have mixed influence on the internationalization 
different Chinese business actors. The aim of this exercise is to open the black box of how 
interactions take place and investigate evolving relationships in the internationalization process.  
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      Figure 5.2 Coevolutionary model of dynamic home country effects on internationalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Coevolution 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Research Inquiry 
 
The main research question in this chapter aims to find out how home country reform 
policies and various actors in industry and markets coevolve, and impact internationalization. 
What is the meaning of home country support to key players and how this has shaped 
internationalization in the light of evolving pro-market reforms, deregulation and 
recentralization? I argue that home country factors are complex, changing and continuous. 
While previous studies on ownership-defined dichotomous support have been informative of 
early Chinese globalization, theorizing has not caught up with the effects of pro-market reforms, 
deregulation and recentralization. A coevolutionary lens may help to unearth the interplay of 
various stakeholders capitalizing on the home country developments to internationalize. 
Integrating multiple perspectives and temporal dimensions would enrich conventional IB 
theoretical frameworks on home country institutions.  
 
5.6   Data Generation 
 
The primary sources of information are from face-to-face interviews of 22 company 
owners/managers/executives and six local officials. I also included conversations with 
researchers and industry experts, company reports, archival material, videos of interviews with 
business executives and commentaries. The cases are purposively selected from those involved 
in high profile deals in advanced economies as they could be tracked and validated with 
multiple sources. Each company may reveal multiple companies relevant to the theme (Ragin, 
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1992) to develop existing theoretical constructs. I adopt multiple cross-case analyses of two 
SOEs and six POEs and perspectives of officials and industry to substantiate the changing 
relationships and responses among institutions, managers, industry and market.  
 
The decision to use semi-structured questions was to generate deeper meanings from 
the participants’ experiences. A survey was ruled out after the trial pilot project because some 
participants would not commit to addressing a range and complexity of questions in writing 
even though provisions were made in the questionnaire. For this component of a larger research 
project, Table 5.2 lists four main questions that are relevant to addressing specific questions in 
this chapter.   
 
 
Table 5.2 Protocol of semi-structured questions on home country support 
 
- What are the types of and degree of government support that you have received? Are these in the 
form of capital financing, subsidies and tax benefits for overseas investment? Or are there other forms 
of support?  
 
- What types of support and encouragement would be helpful for your OFDI plans?  
 
- Why do you need home country support? What are the processes involved?  
 
- In which areas would you like to see improvement that would facilitate your company to Go Global?  
 
 
 
 
Following a pragmatist ontology and applying abductive logic, I iterated theories with 
the data generated from two rounds of formal interviews, follow-up communications and 
informal conversations with individual managers, officials and industry experts. There are three 
main abductive points (Aliseda, 2006; Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Klag & Langley, 2013; 
Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) in the research learning and discovery process that are worth 
noting. Prior to field study, I relied on frameworks for studying internationalization of 
emerging economies from extant IB literature such as the latecomer perspectives (Luo & Tung, 
2007; Matthew 2002) and institutional theories (North, 1990; Scott, 2008; Peng et al, 2008). I 
was encouraged to investigate further after consulting two senior Australian economics 
professors who noted that SOEs only had a slim advantage over POEs in accessing low interest 
credit. During the pilot project trip, local officials appeared supportive of businesses, regardless 
of ownership type, to invest overseas. Significant discoveries after the first stage of fieldwork 
steered the research towards examining evolving multi-dimensional interactions. Further 
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conversations with businesses and industry experts uncovered complementary factors and 
comments of pro-market reforms, recentralization, new industry standards and adjustment in 
the post-GFC environment. The initial conceptual position that changes in the political 
economy would have significant bearing on internationalization is developed further. More 
interesting discoveries unfolded with the inclusion of multiple perspectives and the evolving 
manifestation of varieties of home country support for the internationalization of Chinese firms.   
 
5.7   Analytical Process: Multiple voices and overlaps 
 
The coevolution of economic reforms, stakeholders’ responses and internationalization 
captures complexities and changes in the Chinese home context. In the early days of 
internationalization when SOEs dominate the Chinese economy, central SOEs were identified 
as the primary beneficiaries of institutional support. More than two decades after POEs 
established themselves in the domestic markets, connections have been forged with local and 
central governments, and industry associates. The Chinese government’s stimulus policy in the 
post-GFC period witnessed a return of benefits to SOEs in domestic markets, giving them 
priorities to secure licenses and contracts for infrastructural projects. The popularity of 
President Xi Jinping’s leadership has helped to build some semblance of legitimacy and 
mandate to carry out further reforms. Nevertheless, current deepening of pro-market reforms 
could not match the scale of massive shakeup of SOEs undertaken in the late 1990s by Premier 
Zhu Rongji. Recent measures to tighten governance and curb local authorities have tempered 
OFDI and would have some impact on agrifood investments which surged from 2011 to 2015.    
 
I characterize home country support institutional effects from different perspectives.  
Home country support can be wide-ranging and may include direct financial support, domestic 
subsidies, loans, technical support, encouragement, conscious/unconscious (Wei et al., 2015) 
reward for performance, directives to fulfil priorities and preferences, and other indirect forms 
of support. Individual firms may not benefit from various forms of support in the same way 
and degree. How each type of support or a combination of support impact on 
internationalization would be of research interest. From the business perspective, certain types 
or level of government support are welcomed but others may not be necessary or advantageous.  
Chinese local officials offered flexible interpretations and appeared willing to adapt and 
respond to business needs for internationalization. 
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Table 5.3 Steps in Coding 
 Initial Categorization from fieldwork Explanation Subsequent Coding 
Local officials claim abundant funding 
Capitalist practices and reduce dependency   
Fairness regardless of forms and links 
Deregulation facilitate POEs to globalize 
Willing to listen and respond to needs 
Effective use of resources 
Promote competition  
Compatible with Go Global 
Encourage disclosure 
Defining evolving criteria  
 
Discretionary support for 
deserving firms. 
 
Definition of fairness by 
giver and receivers (A, B) 
 
SOEs prove savvy, efficiency and diligence   
Do not receive direct support for OFDI 
Commercial loans at best rates    
Envy over POEs receiving support 
Justification for support 
Leverage for support  
 
Freer banking practices: 
flexible funding choices 
 
Question assumption of 
CSA-FSA   
 
Pressure to be competitive 
 
Reward and entitlement 
 
Anti-corruption scrutiny 
 
POEs engagement with officials, portraying 
a positive image. Not demanding or pushy. 
 
Varied requests (tax delay, cheap loans, deep 
research on host country, training in non-core 
areas, diplomatic, overseas support) 
 
Open to potential networks 
 
Carefully crafted modest 
requests.  
 
Access to various funding 
sources and networks 
 
Selective, specific and 
contingent. 
 
Reward and entitlement 
 
Only support that is 
relevant to needs 
Preferred not to receive direct support   
 
Extreme case: POE (F) declined state support  
 
But appreciated domestic subsidies and post-
acquisition support 
 
Autonomy, self confidence 
Differentiate from SOEs 
Support comes with state 
involvement and less 
independence 
Counter-intuitive to 
positivity and desirability 
of support.  
 
 
Home Country support for domestic agrifood 
businesses in the form of subsidies enabled 
agrifood firms to grow.  
Benefited established SOEs 
and POEs. 
 
 
Giver and potential 
recipients pick and choose. 
 
  
 
Following abductive process used in sociology (Katz, 2001, 2002) as most IB studies 
applied the inductive approach. Manual coding and analysis is the preferred approach to 
mechanical categorization through software as the author is personally involved. First order 
coding involves sorting from dense data and description. Giving structure to the datasets would 
enhance explanations progressing from addressing how to why (Katz, 2001, 2002). Table 5.3 
tracks the steps involved in deriving deeper analysis from rich field data, manual coding and 
theorizing on the coevolution of pro-market regulation and deregulation of processes with 
industry developments of SOEs and POEs. The emergent ‘discretionary’ framework enables 
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givers and recipients would cautiously ‘pick and choose’ the types and levels of support that 
match their needs for internationalization. Subsequent coding is complemented by references 
to secondary sources, publications, literature and industry experts. The next section of this 
chapter will detail the deconstruction and gradual revelation of discretionary selection and 
adaptation by official and business actors in a competitive and leveraged environment. Multiple 
perspectives of home country perspectives are explored to present the “multivocality” of 
empirical material (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007).  
 
5.7.1 Emerging Official Criteria of Home Country Support           
 
The dispensers of support are entrusted to evaluate who gets what and how much. Local 
officials in commerce, foreign trade and investment, industry related portfolios have wide 
discretionary powers to interpret and allocate various forms of support if their decisions could 
be justified. With a strong historical precedent of favoring strategic and pillar industries led by 
SOEs, the Chinese central authorities increasingly displayed even-handed support for both 
SOEs and POEs. While encouraging state-owned commercial banks to extend more credit to 
POEs, Chinese commercial banks are progressing slowly to broaden the base of extending 
credit to POEs (Leutert, 2016). The officials in this study applied a broad definition of support 
for firms to internationalize, putting a positive spin on the government’s role. They tried to 
impress that government support for OFDI was exercised carefully and prudently. Only 
enterprises that satisfied stringent government criteria would receive approval, encouragement 
and financial support. It was not for the lack of state funding considering China’s huge reserves, 
but the difficulty of identifying which firms deserved support and preferential treatment.    
 
Specific to agricultural sector context, Chinese firms received subsidies for domestic 
investment in agricultural activities that meet national food security needs. However, support 
for OFDI in the agrifood sector is not guaranteed. This view is shared by participants from 
SOEs and POEs. China’s State Council research policy center put forward recommendations 
to support agrifood OFDI, including for smaller firms. The government acknowledged that 
commercial entities tend to focus on short-term corporate performance, but this evaluation 
method is not appropriate for agricultural investment.  Agricultural investments typically 
require long gestation for returns on capital should not expect profits in the first 10 years. While 
agricultural more medium-sized firms are becoming important players in OFDI projects in 
foreign countries, they lack funds and have limited access to financial support. Considering 
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that financing through bond and share offering is not well-developed, and smaller companies 
have limited securities to obtain loan approval, they are unable to raise sufficient capital. The 
central government is aware of the predicament, and is keen to provide funds and improve tax 
and trade tariffs to support its agricultural “Going Global” policy to meet China’s food security 
needs (Cheng & Zhang, 2014). 
 
According to a provincial deputy director Q3 based in a Yangzi delta region, though 
funds were available, it was difficult to determine who were the needy and deserving recipients. 
Q3 denied that the government favored SOEs. He claimed that selective MNEs that presented 
a convincing proposal would be successful in applying for government support.  
 
“The government has money but faces a dilemma. Enterprises must apply for government assistance. 
How does the government assess that firms would use the money for OFDI carefully? We strongly support 
M&A but this requires much capital. We should support those promising companies with good strategy 
and innovation.” - - Q3 (2015) 
 
All the officials interviewed assured that POEs that met the “benchmark” would be 
recognized and rewarded. Some officials specifically identified “efficiency” as the criteria and 
that allocation decisions were based on merit. Q1 from another municipal economic authority 
in south China said that inefficient firms should not expect government subsidies to keep them 
afloat. This view was also shared by provincial officers tasked with promoting investments. 
Q2 and Q4 likened support for uncompetitive Chinese firms as “protectionism” and argued that 
this was incompatible with the government’s policy of “free and fair markets”.  
 
Chinese officials portrayed changes as positive and progressive, from earlier restrictive 
policies to more enabling and facilitating roles of the government. Prior to the 1990s, only 
SOEs such as Companies A and G were issued licenses for international trading. Q4 argued 
that deregulation itself was a form of support for internationalization. Q4 explained that 
reduced supervision and faster approval process were down to the bare minimum. He did not 
think that complaints of insufficient government support for internationalization were valid.  
 
A senior municipal official in charge of international and economic portfolios Q2 
justified the stringent approval process for financial support to internationalizing firms. 
Funding resources would be made available to aspiring Chinese MNEs in terms of attractive 
interest rates and initial capital outlay. However, it was up to these firms to convince 
government officials to support their application for initial bridging expenses to start up 
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overseas ventures. Q2 has processed many applications from POEs but only a selected few 
were awarded assistance to get cheaper loans and cover expenses but there is an absence of tax 
incentives and subsidies that directly support firms’ internationalization.   
 
“How could the government help businesses? There are three ways: firstly, assistance in the form of 
favorable interest rates; secondly, pre-investment and initial expenses; and thirdly, transportation 
expenses.  
 
Currently, the Chinese government is not doing much or enough in terms of tangible support to 
encourage businesses to invest overseas, e.g., in the form of tax incentives and subsidies. Most 
enterprises that “Go Out” did not receive government financial support. If there is more assistance, 
OFDI would likely be higher than current levels.  
 
We do have lots of national reserves to invest overseas but there is a gap between intention of these 
enterprises and actual amount available for them to invest.”  - Q2 (2014) 
 
 
  The private narrative by local officials that most Chinese enterprises did not receive 
sufficient support to internationalize was subsequently confirmed publicly by a higher level 
official. In 2017, Ye Xingqing (the current Director-General of the Research Department of 
Rural Economy of the Development Research Center of the State Council), said that majority 
of POEs were not receiving as much support for agrifood OFDI compared to SOEs (Jiang, 
2017).  
 
Nonetheless, some local officials had disagreed with businesses purporting insufficient 
government attention and support to “deserving” internationalizing firms. Two officials 
attributed their rejection of applications to businesses’ reluctance to share detailed business 
plans. Provincial bureau manager Q4 said that businesses, regardless of size and experience, 
were obliged and encouraged to keep the government informed. Officials were concerned that 
opportunities for making money would likely to be risky. Q4 defended that if certain OFDI 
projects were unsuccessful, the government was absolved of the blame because firms wanted 
to pursue their ambitions independently rather than consulting the government. Q2 (2014) 
disclosed that more than half of Chinese businesses that invested overseas did not file reports 
of OFDI activities and utilized illicit channels of funding. Officials were keen to find out what 
businesses needed and tried to oblige. Q4 (2016) cited the example of a “private personalized 
business pilot project” set up to help MNEs in his provincial jurisdiction. However, the project 
was abandoned within a year due to the lack of interest from enterprises.  
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5.7.2 SOE’s Perspective of Financial Support 
 
Challenging the common belief that SOEs continue to receive generous credit terms 
from state banks, the two SOEs studied, Companies A and G, clarified that they had to meet 
stringent conditions. Government support in the past had helped SOEs to establish financial 
resources and credit worthy credentials to access bank loans. The government’s rationale for 
supporting MNEs whose goals were in line with national policy was understandable as SOEs 
have been at the forefront of China’s globalization (Voss et al., 2010). This provided SOEs 
with a head start over newer and emergent POEs in the early phases of going global. According 
to officials Q1 and Q2, SOEs were in an advantageous position as all the required documents 
were in place before seeking approval to invest overseas. SASAC provided a fast track to 
internationalizing SOEs, in contrast to higher requirements and procedures that POEs had to 
satisfy prior to 2010.  
 
 Some SOE managers asserted their entitlement to more government support than they 
currently received and cautioned against even distribution of support that may benefit more 
POEs. Manager A1 tried to convince the team of researchers and three officials present at the 
interview that the government could do more to help SOEs acquire higher value foreign assets. 
SOEs were not complacent and did not take government support for granted. There were hints 
of envy expressed by SOEs over competition with POEs. Vice President A2 expressed concern 
with the Chinese government’s eagerness to help some POEs in accessing low interest loans, 
but it was uncertain whether these companies would be profitable. Manager A1 was more direct 
when highlighting the disadvantages and uncertainties of providing financial support for POEs.  
 
“Personally, I feel that the policy [of financial support] can be improved, to utilize government finance 
for new overseas investments [by SOEs], mainly in M&A and greenfield projects. Greenfield is very 
costly, especially those involving mechanization. Most private companies cannot afford it. If our 
government assists POEs, they can’t exert much influence on POEs; they are not governed by stringent 
regulations [unlike SOEs].” - A1 (2015) 
 
 
While SOEs have indeed built up its current level of resources with longstanding 
government support, they are under increasing pressure to become more accountable for OFDI 
funding. A1 claimed that the company had “discretionary funds” but the Chinese government’s 
support for internationalization was “insufficient”. Though Chinese SOEs traditionally have 
easier access to state-owned banks, they are increasingly seeking alternative sources of funding 
from the markets. The gradual liberalization of the financial sector has unlocked opportunities 
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for cheaper financing from smaller financial institutions. A third or more of Company A’s 
financing for OFDI were from its own funds or sourced from the free market that offered the 
best rates. The amount involved was significant as Company A acquired an average of two 
projects a year over eight years totaling over US$5 billion. In the same vein, A1 justified more 
support for SOEs to invest in higher value overseas projects to reduce the burden of loan 
repayments.   
 
“OFDI is growing rapidly and traditional ways of support cannot cope. Government support is only 
helpful in the short term. Different from early days of Going Out, nowadays branding and technology 
are more important uses of capital … We go to the free market for credit to finance overseas investment. 
Initially the ratio was 3:7 but much more now. Our company has both soft and hard loans; some private 
commercial banks even offer lower interest than state-owned banks.”  - A1 (2015) 
 
 
Pro-market reforms have mixed effects on SOEs. Foremost, it moderated some 
privileges previously reserved for SOEs that spearheaded early internationalization. While 
SOEs benefited from government support in terms of access to resources and early 
internationalization, marketization entailed that SOEs deliver on financial performance. A 
senior executive of Company G impressed that they looked out for quality investments and 
patiently waited for opportunities and business downturn to acquire overseas assets at a good 
price. Senior executive G1 emphasized that they were cautious with expenses. They ensured 
due diligence was conducted prior to acquiring assets overseas. Industry contacts confirmed 
that Company A and G hired Big Four accounting firm for preparatory investment work and 
managing ongoing business financial reports. In its more recent overseas acquisitions, 
Company G followed the example of large private conglomerates and sought multinational 
consortium funding to mitigate risks and share management expertise.  
 
Unlike SOEs in the early phases of internationalization that were saddled with huge 
repayment for costly assets, current SOEs need to constantly prove their competencies. 
Company A examined potential projects carefully and had been known to walk away from 
negotiations of unsuitable or unfavorable deals. A1 claimed that the company did not seek the 
cheapest overseas assets but targeted those that offered good value and potential for growth. 
Companies A and G tried to create more value in its overseas subsidiaries and aimed for public 
listing to earn higher returns to capital. According to an overseas subsidiary manager G3, 
investors hoped to get good returns on capital from IPO in international financial hubs and 
reinvest in coveted higher value international assets.  
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Pro-market reforms opened more opportunities for SOEs to tap free market loans. Well-
resourced firms such as Company A drew on discretionary funds for OFDI and was not 
dependent on state-owned banks. As the loan rate between state-owned and private commercial 
bank narrows, the benefit of state bank credit is marginalized, unless the sum borrowed is 
substantial. Local official Q3 confirmed that Company A did not really need preferential capital 
support because it already possessed many avenues of getting funds. An industry source X10 
believed that Company A “did not face shortage of funds” as it had a wealth of assets backing. 
Company A had 50 years of experience as a well-integrated and dominant industry player in 
the domestic market and was involved in international trading long before China opened its 
doors.   
 
Another form of pressure ironically stems from the state’s lingering supervision and the 
recent tightening of monitoring systems over mixed and hybrid SOEs. While some observers 
view recentralization as a reversal of pro-market reforms, closer scrutiny could induce SOEs 
to improve their efficiency and move closer to the privatized model. The central government 
intervenes intermittently through legal and industrial mechanisms despite increasing private 
equity in SOEs. X10 disclosed that some managers in Company A who were negotiating a 
potential deal had been called up for “interview”, a euphemism for investigation into 
irregularities. According to X10, central authorities wanted to determine whether the 
transaction price in the most recent deal was excessive. A former senior executive of Company 
A investigated for embezzlement was forced to resign and sentenced to long jail term. While 
Company A has been delegated much autonomy and influence in its municipality and 
provincial bases, it has halted and curbed overseas expansion with the onset of recentralization 
and lackluster performance of some overseas assets. Indeed, over the past year, Company A 
has slowed down its pursuit of planned serial acquisitions. The complex interaction of pro-
market reforms and state supervision to strengthen governance and accountability further 
moderated strong support for internationalization previously accorded to prominent SOEs.  
 
5.7.3 Pressure on Lenders 
 
To further unpack the notion of dualistic preferential support for privileged SOEs and 
disadvantaged POEs, I examine the perspective of creditors. Interview data from SOE and POE 
perspectives on government financial support for OFDI has been cross-checked with officials, 
industry experts and scholars. According to a banker based in Beijing (X5), state-owned banks 
have come under increasing pressure to justify good governance and grant credit to feasible 
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and profitable projects. The exceptions are strategic and pillar industries which receive 
preferential treatment. The “big four” state-owned banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China and Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of 
China) hold large assets but face slower growth in profits and bad loans (Cendrowski, 2015; 
EIU, 2016). Like SOEs, state-owned financiers have also undergone pro-market reforms. 
Managers of a state banking school in southern China informed that state-owned banks are 
geared towards professionalism. In the initial years, cadre schools conducted basic training for 
political appointees who had little formal education. Since the 1990s, training was tailored to 
improve technical and operational skills. More recently, positions have become more 
competitive, and having an overseas post-graduate degree would improve the chances of 
promotion to managerial positions in state banks.  
 
While individual bankers may accelerate approval procedures for favored customers, 
borrowers must meet the banks’ commercial requirements. The size and performance of the 
borrowers’ business influence the credit risk assessment. By the same token, poor performing 
SOEs are poised to face more obstacles and require strong political intervention to smoothen 
the process. Though backroom political bargaining remains, it would be too simplistic to 
assume that politicians could blatantly impose directives on commercial banks to follow. 
Attempts to circumvent due procedures are less common in recent years, and face greater 
resistance from professional bankers (Elliott & Yan, 2013). Following my discussion with a 
senior academic X1, I asked a financial manager based in Beijing (X5) what advantages SOEs 
had over POEs in accessing financing for internationalization. X5 confirmed that the main 
advantage SOEs had was their higher credit rating and ability to repay debts, given their larger 
assets base and assumed government support. Smaller POEs and start-ups have greater 
difficulties in securing substantial loans due to their lower credit rating and inability to furnish 
long-term strategic plans to financiers. On balance, Chinese formal financial institutions face 
pressures from  interest rate liberalization and the rise in non-performing loans, prompting bank 
managers to adopt greater transparency and efficiency measures (Chan, 2015).  
 
5.8   POEs’ perspective of support 
 
The belief that POEs have been overlooked for state support requires reconsideration 
to reflect practice. I found that large POEs have adequate resources and capabilities and 
therefore need not depend on government support to internationalize. POEs with good 
connections may seek advantages from institutions, but this is not limited to funding. POEs 
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demonstrated ease of engaging with local officials in frank exchanges. Researchers and local 
officials were keen find out what the POEs needed for internationalization. As the POEs studied 
here are large and publicly listed, with a good track record, it would not be difficult for them 
to obtain credit approval and raise capital.  
 
To impress central government researchers and local officials, interviewees from POEs 
presented their OFDI portfolio as the result of well-thought strategies, having conducted due 
diligence by reputable consultants. However, most POEs are not interested in receiving direct 
and substantial state support to internationalize. Moreover, Companies D and F have financial 
services in the corporate groups’ portfolio that could help them to expand overseas. As an 
award-winning enterprise in heavy machinery China, Company E secured favorable domestic 
loans for initial OFDI in agrifood business in Australia and planned to increasingly leverage 
its overseas assets to secure favorable credit terms and loans from overseas financiers to expand 
and consolidate its portfolio.  
 
“Currently our projects are financed by Chinese banks such as EXIM which offers preferential interests. 
Funding sources are diversified to include host countries such as the National Australian Bank. After 
M&A, the company has to pay wages, interest repayment and forex. Australian banks mainly service 
cash flow.” - E1 (2015) 
 
Most POEs participants were not enthusiastic about direct government support (except 
Company B executives who were keen on support for soft credit for OFDI). However, they 
kept an open mind to various other forms of government support. Implicit in their hesitation 
was possible conditions attached that would interfere with their business plans. This narrative 
is consistent with local officials’ observations that some POEs guarded their plans closely and 
were not keen to seek home institutional support prior to internationalization.  
 
Company F was content for the Chinese government to continue adopting a hands-off 
policy. F1 preferred autonomy of investment decisions and did not think that efficient and 
competitive POEs would need any home country institutional support for OFDI. He implied 
that SOEs needed support because they were less efficient and not mindful of risks. 
 
“It is enough if the government could educate the young well, improve the country's image and foreign 
relations. Deep thinking is the responsibility of enterprises, not the government. The government does 
not own the business, so entrepreneurs don't expect much help.” - F1 (2015) 
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While Company F’s founder publicly acknowledged that the business benefited from 
subsidies for its domestic agribusiness, its foray to developing countries since the 1990s was 
funded by soft credit through international organizations. Nevertheless, the management was 
appreciative of previous government support to help the company grow into one of the largest 
integrated agrifood company in China. As Company F expanded, OFDI to advanced economies 
targeting high value M&A ventures was funded by its own financial resources and international 
consortia. Company F had been accustomed to being independent and self-sufficient in 
investment capital and was therefore not interested in government support for its OFDI. More 
recently, the owners of Company F realized and expressed the need for government support to 
allow high value meat imports from its overseas assets to the China market.  
 
Company B stood out among the other companies, in its open request for government 
financial support for its OFDI. Company B was the only POE that was critical of the 
longstanding unfair treatment and favoritism towards SOEs. The President of its agricultural 
business, B1, impressed upon local officials that his company deserved stronger support. 
Company B executives joined the chorus to nudge the state for more financial support and level 
the playing field for POEs. B1 said that POEs needed both “material and moral support” to 
internationalize. He emphasized that the government’s role at the pre-investment stage would 
be crucial. B1 said that since the government already gave unfair advantage to SOEs in the 
domestic market, controlling quotas and supplies, it should offer more help to POEs to 
internationalize. The Deputy to the CEO (B3) claimed that financial support from the 
government would make a big difference to improving POEs’ performance, citing MNEs in 
Japan and EU countries. Vice President B2 specifically suggested that the government could 
help by raising the proportion of soft loans available for internationalization.  
 
“Most of the capital for our outbound investment are self-sourced, 50% of own capital and 50% bank 
loan. The government can help POEs to increase the loan ratio to 60% by providing better interest rates. 
In our investment research, we focus on three areas: loan, insurance and subsidy.” - B2 (2015)  
 
 
POEs were interested in other forms of non-financial government support. Company 
B was willing to pay for micro-level research reports covering industry analysis, country 
specific market research and competitive intelligence data. Company B hoped that 
government research institutes could provide in-depth research to support internationalizing 
firms. 
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“Macro & mid-range government reports should be given free to businesses. We are willing to pay for 
micro analysis. Government researchers could tailor their research to our needs. Information is crucial for 
investment in high risk developing countries.” - B1 (2015) 
 
“For smooth investment to proceed, we need information that is not available in the public domain. 
Though our company is a POE, it is a Chinese company representing Chinese internationally [and deserve 
to receive support]. Soil and water resources data in host country would be important to us.” - B3 (2015)   
 
 
Company C wished that the Chinese government would foster better relations with 
host countries and expedite the approval process for OFDI. The owner C1 was satisfied that 
the government had tried to facilitate internationalization process in recent years. C1 hinted 
that subsidies and low interest loans would be helpful but he did not push strongly.  
 
“It is already quite convenient for businesses. I will personally research for business information. In the 
initial stage, government subsidies would be helpful. Easier credit will lighten the investor’s load 
especially in terms of repayment.  
 
Chinese state-to-state relations with host countries are very important and will impact on our investment. 
Improving state relations will benefit China. Government could help businesses to establish contacts.  
 
Application for investment approval that takes one to two years compared to two weeks makes a lot of 
difference to enterprises’ pace of going out ... Some approvals could be removed or simplified. 
Provincial level approval would be sufficient. The processes of replying and resubmitting documents 
can be time consuming and tedious. Faster approval times would be appreciated.” - C1 (2015)  
 
 
The Vice President D1 was modest in its request for government assistance, suggesting 
that it would suffice to delay tax on profits. Overseas subsidiary manager D4 was satisfied 
that their agrifood OFDI was approved quickly by the home government. Given the 
company’s healthy financials and vast resources, Company D executives and managers did 
not expect or request for direct financial support to POEs.  
  
“If the Chinese government allows six months delay in taxation, businesses will have more flexible cash 
flow during the turnaround time. For a company registered in Australia, a surcharge applies. China’s pre-
tax regime impose added pressure on MNEs.” – D1 (2015) 
 
 Company E received guidance from a provincial SOE to launch its first sheep breeding 
venture in northern China. As it did not have prior experience in agricultural business, 
assistance from a local SOE was important for its diversification from non-agricultural core 
business in China. Technical advice, local knowledge and manpower resources from the local 
SOE helped Company E to familiarize with pastoral farming, develop domestic production 
bases and local markets prior to internationalization. Home country support enabled Company 
E to gain confidence to invest in similar projects in Central Asia, Australia and South America. 
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Like Company B, Company E also wished for better market data. E1 said the Chinese 
government databases were not comprehensive or up-to-date and did not serve the Company 
well. 
 
The conventional narrative of POEs escaping from weak institutions to strike out on 
their own overseas may be applicable to some disadvantaged SMEs. POEs that failed to meet 
the government’s benchmark and credit rating by formal banking channels would have to resort 
to underground funding. Almost 60 per cent of SMEs in a survey used the informal credit 
market and many paid annual interest rates as high as 20 per cent (Yang & Mitchell, 2016). 
However, another study found that interest rates charged by credit unions and even state-owned 
commercial banks are surprisingly moving closer to the informal market, deviating from the 
central bank regulation of uniform rate (Garnaut et al., 2012). Nevertheless, none of the 
participants needed informal banking because they had internal resources and good credit 
rating to access loans. Table 5.4 shows a diverse range of home country support that POEs are 
currently receiving and hope to receive for internationalization. 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison of current support for POEs and 'wish list' for more support 
Companies B C D E F H 
Existing 
support 
received 
 
Basic 
information  
Convenience to 
internationalize 
Expedite 
approval for 
OFDI 
SOE helped to 
start up farms 
in China 
 
Subsidies for 
domestic 
businesses 
Contingency  
Ideal: 
additional 
support 
Low interest 
loans; 
 
Business 
research at 
the micro 
level 
Subsidies  
Cheaper credit  
Expedite approval 
Improve relations 
with host countries 
 
Delay tax by 
six months    
 
Better database 
that is detailed 
and current 
Financial help 
is not required. 
 
Education and 
diplomacy.  
Facilitate 
imports. 
Chinese 
officials 
based in host 
countries 
should 
engage with 
businesses 
 
 
The owners of Companies C and H and the director of Company F believed that the 
Chinese government could do more to improve diplomatic relations with host countries. 
Improving the country’s image would be conducive to Chinese investors making inroads to 
unfamiliar destinations. The owner of Company H felt that Chinese consulate officials based 
in Australia did not show much interest bonding with Chinese investors and try to understand 
the challenges they faced.    
 
The narrative of diverse and independent POEs that are apprehensive about institutional 
support is consistent with the Chinese government’s concerns. Provincial officials tried to 
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entice businesses to approach government agencies, share their business plans and receive 
advice and facilitation for funding. Officials Q2 and Q4 spoke candidly about thriving illicit 
channels, implying difficulty in breaking the impasse of shadow financing and leveraging. 
Reforms to relax foreign exchange since 2003 and proposals to waive letters from financiers 
point to implicit acknowledgement of the limitations of foreign exchange controls. Doing away 
with approval process which requires the presentation of supporting bank documents may 
encourage more POEs to report their OFDI activities. According to Q2 and Q4, OFDI 
undertaken by legal entities are tracked by MOFCOM but underground financing “based on 
relationship and trust, leave no trail” and would not be captured in the statistics. Q2 estimated 
that over half of the money invested overseas from his province were facilitated by 
underground channels. Some firms reinvest back to China through round-tripping and 
exploitation of OFDI approval formalities. As a matter of performing their duty, Chinese 
government officials maintained that smaller investors in need of capital, would gain by 
reporting to the government to seek advice and avoid costly mistakes. However, smaller POEs 
that are most in need of financial support struggled to prove potential profitability.   
 
5.8.1 Leveraging Institutions 
 
I investigated and analyzed further the extent well-connected Chinese firms have 
benefited from institutional support and how they leverage and extract benefits to support 
internationalization. While deregulation facilitated POE internationalization, some firms have 
been more proactive or adept at exploiting the power play to their advantage. However, this 
study did not find direct linkage between political connections and support for 
internationalization. Even some POEs with party connections preferred not to receive financial 
support from the government for internationalization. Contingent factors may influence the 
extent and timing of realizing the benefits from formal and informal connections with 
institutions. Businessmen could become party members, serve in local administration, industry 
associations and social initiatives. In recent years, academics, private entrepreneurs, celebrities 
have been coopted by the Chinese government to serve as advisers in the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) committees. The multi-party conference 
comprising members from related industries, could raise questions and provide information 
before submitting their policy recommendations. In 2016, MOFCOM requested the public and 
businesses to comment on proposed amendments to OFDI measures.    
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Field and archival sources suggest that political connections are initiated by businesses 
as a form of insurance. Businesses cultivate personal relations with local officials for advice 
and business collaboration. Being party members may not lead to direct and immediate benefits, 
but could be a useful long-term investment to protect their business interests when the need 
arises in the future. Approximately half of SOE management are political appointees who serve 
for a short term before being promoted in the political hierarchy.  
 
Most publicly-listed POEs have strong industry as well as political connections. Large 
POEs that are industry leaders and model firms have greater leverage in requesting for 
government support. While some POE owners, such as Companies C and D, have party 
connections, they did not receive direct financial support for internationalization. C1 defended 
the government owning a small stake in his company as purely driven by the markets. 
 
“SOE has bought 10% of our company stocks but this is something we the owners can’t control. The 
stock market is fluid and things could change.”  - C1 (2015)  
 
 
The founder of Company F is a member of the CPPCC, but he is not a party member. He 
once told the press that he was fortunate to have thrived for decades, unlike some of his business 
associates who had either failed in their business or were put in jail for flouting state regulations. 
Political connections may buffer and safeguard against effects of policy changes and 
uncertainties.  
 
Company H is backed by a reputable Chinese private equity investment fund for its 
domestic operations. The political connections of Company H owner evidently helped him to 
gain market intelligence. He was au fait with political and economic developments in China. 
Companies D and H are prominent in philanthropy and social responsibility activities. This has 
helped to portray a positive image for their businesses. The Chinese government and public 
hold favorable views of businesses that give back to society. Though Company E did not have 
clear political ties with the party, its managers gained the support of a regional SOE to jointly 
start up sheep farming in northern China before its foray into international markets.  
 
The majority of Chinese POEs are family-owned businesses but some have recruited 
professionals to top management positions in recent years. Though the owner of Company B 
has no known political connections, he recruited former SOE managers to join his board of 
directors and senior management. This ensured that the company was familiar with domestic 
economic objectives and regulations. As former insiders of the system, the senior management 
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of Company B, pushed for more financial support for the firm to expand internationally. The 
younger generation who are poised to succeed the family business, have received overseas 
tertiary education. The POEs I interviewed maintained close interpersonal relations with local 
officials and were cooperative in providing information. However, they were also candid and 
persuasive in pointing out the types of institutional support that are relevant and useful. Table 
5.4 summarizes the connections of POE owners and ways firms leverage institutions.  
 
 
Table 5.5 POE Owners' Political Connections 
Firms CCP * CPPCC * Local  Diverse Connections 
B No known connection  
 
-  Municipal 
Provincial 
Recruited former SOE managers and 
overseas Chinese to the board.   
C Founder is a Party 
member 
-  Provincial Critical of red tape. 
Government investors bought 10% stakes 
D Founder is Party 
member 
-  Provincial Metal processing industry awards.  
Management team of overseas Chinese. 
Philanthropy and CSR in China.  
 
E No known formal 
political membership 
-  Multiple 
provinces 
Recipient of multiple industrial awards.  
Sought local SOE help to start farms in 
remote regions. 
 
F No known formal 
political connection  
Founder is a 
member  
 
Multiple 
provinces 
Benefited from government subsidies for 
years to set up domestic operations.  
 
Preferred autonomy from government 
support for OFDI 
 
H Owner is a Party 
member 
 
-  Provincial  Industry association leader.  
Philanthropy and support for education. 
Overseas ethnic Chinese networks. 
 
 
  * Chinese Communist Party (CCP); Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
- Author’s collation from Chinese media, industry news and company reports 
 
5.9   Sectoral Priorities 
 
The Chinese agrifood sector has long received government support to achieve self-
sufficiency and food security objectives. Though the agrifood sector was not formally named 
as a strategic or pillar industry for internationalization, there is tacit government support for 
firms who invest in food resources and distribution networks. The agrifood sector is unique in 
that food security and food safety concerns affect the well-being of the population and has 
ramifications for political, economic and social stability. Due to China’s shortcomings in 
natural endowment, shrinking pool of arable land and worsening pollution, overseas resources 
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are needed to maintain domestic self-sufficiency in food production and control over the supply 
chain. This has benefited both agrifood POEs and SOEs. Firms justified the necessity for 
subsidies because China lacked the competitive advantage for land-based agricultural 
production. Company A has been receiving more than US$100 million a year to support its 
domestic operations. A1 justified that without government subsidies, its domestic agrifood 
businesses could not survive because of high costs of production in China. Due shortages in 
land, water, rural labor, and depletion of soil quality, agrifood businesses have to invest in 
irrigation facilities and chemical fertilizers to sustain agricultural output.  
 
“Every year, our company receives 800 million CNY (US 123.5 million) of government subsidies to 
assist domestic agriculture business. Because agricultural sector is highly risky and less profitable, 
government assistance is necessary.” - A2 (2015) 
 
Though not a SOE, Company F had gained support from government subsidies, tax 
incentives and monetary support in the 1990s to grow its domestic business. Despite varying 
degrees of home government financial support for SOEs to invest overseas, domestic subsidies 
had helped agrifood firms to develop competitiveness and free up resources for 
internationalization. However, Companies B, C, D, E and F did not benefit government 
financial support for more recent OFDI in agrifood resources. The managers, except Company 
B’s, are reluctant to request for direct financial support for its OFDI projects. This is because 
their core businesses were in non-agrifood areas and their OFDI focused on high-end Chinese 
market to meet food safety needs. In comparison, support for investment that satisfy food 
security requirements are easy to justify. Figure 5.4 shows previous direct support in the form 
of subsidies that helped to boost domestic agrifood industry has indirectly strengthened the 
resources and capabilities of firms for internationalization.    
 
 
  Figure 5.3 Firms' Funding and Institutional support for Internationalization 
 
Home Institutional support:  subsidies for domestic agrifood sector 
             financial help for internationalization  
          (Non-Agrifood Firms) 
Firm’s accumulated assets 
Strengthened the credit worthiness      
Competitive advantage 
                    Self-sourced resources for OFDI 
 
     
                                              Accumulated resources for internationalization 
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5.10    Discussion 
 
 This study reexamines the concept of home country support by tracking the 
coevolution of policies and interactions with agrifood industry development that impact on 
internationalization. In the process, I have uncovered multiple and nuanced meanings of home 
country support for internationalization from the perspectives of the giver and recipients. 
Support is not limited to direct financial support and included collaboration, facilitation of 
procedures, micro-level industry information and conducive investment environment. This 
study offers deeper analysis by considering the perspectives of multilevel government agencies, 
heterogeneous enterprises and industry views. An emergent framework that transpired from 
the study is a ‘discretionary’ model where actors from official and enterprises involved in 
internationalization would negotiate and navigate relationships to ‘pick and choose’ suitable 
types of aid that suit their needs and decline support that would undermine independent 
investment decisions. Firms that are keen on government support for internationalization view 
this as a reward for previous good performance and view this as an entitlement if Chinese firms 
were to be more competitive.  
 
The coevolutionary model developed in this chapter is appropriate for studying 
dynamic home country support for internationalization that involves transitioning, deepening 
and overlapping central government policies, local government interpretation and 
implementation of policies, and interaction between enterprises and government officials. 
Instead of focusing on institutions imposing policies on businesses, or recipients proactively 
leveraging officials (Child & Tsai, 2005; Landau et al., 2016) or respond to policies, multiple 
actors are involved in shaping the types, level and direction of internationalization. The 
confluence and succession of pro-market reforms, deregulation of internationalization 
procedures has helped to accelerate OFDI but recentralization may have slowed expansion. 
Despite quicker response of centralized decision-making authority (Scheffer, Westley, & 
Brock, 2003), delays in activities and implementation, time lag between recognition and 
responses could be significant (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Connecting the narratives with 
references to the historical developments of the firms, industry and policies enhance our 
understanding of the context of home country support. Table 5.5 shows the changing priorities 
and intersecting policies and responses by integrating policies and processes that impact 
stakeholders.   
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Table 5.6 Coevolution model of home country support for internationalization 
Pro-market reforms   Non-state sector   Alternative mechanisms 
Early 1990s:  
Support for large SOEs and identified 
national champions to become MNEs. 
 
Decentralization 
Local governments given discretionary 
powers. 
Agrifood Domestic Subsidies 
support for domestic policies to 
ensure food security. 
 
1998 – 2003 
Removal of inefficient SOEs 
Encourage global competitiveness 
 
1999:  Recognition of POEs by the 
Constitution. Allowed to get trade 
licenses. 
Growing emphasis on 
professionalism and 
accountability 
 
2005: external directors appointed to 
SOE boards. 
 
Hybrid SOEs under increasing pressure 
as reforms deepen 
 
Deregulation on OFDI 
2003, 2006, 2009 
Relax foreign exchange controls 
 
2006: MOFCOM encouraged POEs to 
invest overseas 
 
2004: Government encourages 
businesses to join party, coopt 
professionals to provide inputs.  
 
State-owned commercial banks adhered 
to commercial practices, assessed credit 
worthiness and debt repayment ability 
of borrowers. 
 
2008: relaxation of financing sources 
POEs and SOEs have more avenues to 
get funding. 
 
Small enterprises seek industry 
funds or illicit channels. 
 
Officials are aware but could not 
do much. 
 
 
2015: Local officials claim to follow 
fair criteria of support for eligible firms 
with good business plan.  
2014 Simplification and faster approval 
of OFDI application. Low level of 
investment needs only to file reports 
and are not required to obtain approval.  
 
Recentralization   
2014: increased supervision.  
Anti-corruption campaigns.  
Investigation of irregularities and 
excessive commitments. 
 
 
Fairness: SOEs express concern and 
envy over increasing government 
support for POE internationalization. 
 
2016: Request for all parties to 
comment on proposed amendments to 
OFDI measures.  
 
Local governments and SOEs 
tread carefully and put 
investments on hold. Some 
executives were jailed.  
 
POEs are reluctant to divulge plans. 
POEs need data but not financial 
support. Prefer autonomy in OFDI 
decisions.  
 
POE owners establish political 
connections for long term assurance 
and contingencies. 
 
2016: Restriction of capital 
outflow and overleveraging. 
 
 
   + Key: Official policies and implementation are presented in dark font.              
               Effects and responses to enterprises are presented in violet font.      
 
The findings of this study are four-fold. First, home country support is not limited to 
direct funding but extends to information, process facilitation, non-material collaboration and 
conducive investment environment. Support for internationalization of firms can be gained 
through indirect means. Agrifood firms including some POEs that have received subsidies for 
domestic industry over the years, have developed assets, capabilities and resources, credit 
worthiness to access commercial loans, rather than to depend on direct government funding for 
OFDI. Non-agrifood firms new to the industry such as Company E was able to seek guidance 
to enter unfamiliar area of pastoral enterprises before seeking investment opportunities 
overseas.  
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Second, home country institutional support for SOEs should not be taken for granted. 
With progressive pro-market reforms and scrutiny of recentralization, SOEs face mounting 
pressure to demonstrate greater commercially viability, financial accountability, good 
governance and sustainability similar to POEs (Estrin et al., 2016). Some SOE managers 
complain they need to compete share resources with POEs that are eligible for state support. 
Years of SOE reforms have moderated expectations of soft budget constraints (Kornai et al., 
2003) and unconditional financial backing for SOEs to expand internationally at a rapid pace. 
Preferential support towards SOEs is gradually being eroded, sufficient to cause envy, concern 
and apprehension. More recently, SOEs comes under closer supervision by the government, as 
seen in investigations of irregularities and high cost of acquisitions. Reforms and supervision 
may coexist through rationalization and consolidation to improve efficiency and governance 
objectives.  
 
The findings underscore the dynamism of home country support which encompasses 
adaptation and facilitation to meet policy goals and the needs of internationalizing businesses.  
By addressing the simultaneous and combined effects of encouraging OFDI and imposing 
exacting standards on who “deserves” support, this study shows mixed responses to home 
country support. The definition of fairness varies from the perspectives of officials, SOEs and 
individual POEs. Officials at local levels and related portfolios responsible for dispensing 
support for firms’ internationalization claim to adopt stringent criteria of assessment based on 
merit. Marketization standards flowed to banking and financing for overseas investments, 
reinforcing criteria and creating opportunities for firms to seek varied funding sources. More 
experienced POEs and SOEs are increasingly inclined to finance OFDI with a combination of 
private credit and consortium funding. Poorly resourced firms are most in need of government 
support but face greater challenges in obtaining capital for internationalization.  
 
Third, home country support is not necessarily positive, beneficial and desirable 
(Rugman & Li, 2007) for business actors in general. Support is very much contingent on 
specific needs and preferences. The usefulness and relevance of support relative to firms’ needs 
are not uniform and may change over time. While deregulation has benefited a broader base of 
enterprises, home country support has not kept up with much needed knowledge on industry 
and host countries. Despite the Chinese government’s established policy of offering 
preferential financial support to SOEs in the early days of internationalization, the increasing 
prominence and important role of POEs require a suite of different support items to meet the 
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needs of heterogeneous firms. As heterogeneous POEs have various means of financing OFDI, 
they welcome conducive policies that facilitate processing but value autonomy of business 
decisions over conditional financial support. Company B is the outlier in openly requesting for 
assistance with low interest loans. Most POEs studied prefer autonomous decision-making and 
self-sufficiency in funding international ventures. The findings challenge the conventional 
dichotomous assumption between positive home country institutional support versus escapism 
from constraints. Consistent with the processual insights provided by the study’s 
coevolutionary approach, some firms that have declined direct support are nevertheless 
appreciative of past government support for domestic businesses and requested for continuous 
support after overseas acquisition to tap the home country markets. This study offers an 
alternative frames of viewing support. The usefulness and types of state support are valued 
differently across firms. Home country support would be beneficial for firms targeting friendly 
host destinations, but it may constrain expansion post-acquisition (Gao et al., 2015) due to the 
liability of country of origin (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). For this 
reason, some Chinese firms downplayed their association with the home country government 
and institutions.  
  
5.11   Contributions 
 
This study enriches the institutional and process frames by providing a nuanced insights 
and changes in the political economy on the internationalization of Chinese firms. A 
coevolutionary model captures the non-linear, uneven and changing nature of home country 
support. A dynamic lens helps to elucidate the paradoxical and concurrent effects of the 
multiple levels and dimensions of changes in the home country support for internationalization. 
The emergent ‘discretionary’ model developed in this research illuminates the in the current 
state of play in the gradual maturing of Chinese globalization efforts. This model is applicable 
to the studying the relationships between official and business players in the 
internationalization of emerging market firms. 
 
An alternative lens overcomes the binary confines of conceptualizing positive support 
and negative constraints and challenge assumptions in extant IB literature. Assumptions of 
unconditional support for state-associated firms to pursue relentless overseas acquisitions (Luo 
& Tung, 2007) should not be taken for granted in the current environment. Under increasing 
pressures from pro-market reforms and recentralization, SOEs have to compete for funding and 
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convince officials of their excellent performance. IB literature addressed the effects of pro-
market reforms and deregulation in specific episodes but not as a continuous trajectory.  
 
The value POEs placed on ‘autonomy’ and preference for ‘selective’ support that are 
specific and relevant to their needs has not been covered in extant literature. Alternative 
insights of support contribute to conceptualizing beyond the conventional dualistic conception 
of institutional support and constraints. POEs have many options, preferences and 
heterogenous requirements for internationalization, some of which are not met by home 
country institutions. While certain firms with a clear business plan proactively seek 
collaboration to receive industry and management guidance, most POEs prefer limited 
government involvement. Their requests are specific to the needs of individual companies and 
contingent on new requirements to expand their distribution in the China market.      
 
The main contribution to management practice is a reassessment of the stark distinction 
between SOEs and POEs. The primacy of commercial interests has been articulated by SOEs 
and local officials. Financial support for SOEs could not be taken for granted as they are 
increasingly pressured to be more accountable and efficient for their investment decisions. The 
policy implication is to reconsider ownership bias of home country blanket support for SOEs. 
More firms could potentially benefit from deregulation and broader support options if they 
meet the official criteria. 
 
Though this is not a macro-level study that promises abstraction and broad application, 
the findings and theoretical contributions are generalizable to more recent developments as the 
home country transitions and consolidates pro-market reforms and recentralization. Future 
research agenda could followup with longitudinal studies. Another proposal is to focus on a 
single case study to deepen the analysis of each internationalization experience. Following the 
exploratory and theoretical construction in this chapter, future research could expand the 
sample size and conduct empirical studies to test home country effects on internationalization. 
Incorporating host government perspectives would help to understand the challenges faced by 
MNEs when expanding international commitments and integrating overseas assets post-
acquisition. This would provide feedback for the home country and consequently alter the 
nature of support for the internationalization of firms.   
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6 Chapter Six: The Role of Learning in Chinese Agrifood Firms’ 
Downstream Targeting Strategy  
 
“Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil and you're a thousand miles 
from the corn field.” - - Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics.”  - - Sun Tzu 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
The recent phenomenon of Chinese OFDI in higher value downstream agrifood 
business of advanced economies has prompted interest to investigate and understand agrifood 
investors’ business strategy. Western food processing sector has been downsizing since the 
1990s, divesting and consolidating previously acquired assets to concentrate on core food 
businesses (Anastassopoulos & Rama, 2004). This has opened more opportunities for Chinese 
MNEs to seek potential deals in advanced economies. However, with the growing demand for 
better quality food in emerging markets, western agrifood MNEs are investing again and this 
intensified competition among investors. This study examines four Chinese firms: two SOEs, 
a well-integrated agrifood private business conglomerate and a decade-old POE. Regardless of 
ownership type, actors are learning to be sensitive to the home and host contexts despite their 
varying degrees of internationalization experience. This study supports a growing narrative of 
Chinese agrifood leaders shifting to invest across industry and global value chains to gain better 
control of supply and pricing rather than commit to land investment (Myers & Guo, 2015). 
Chinese investors are enticed to seek second tier well-managed brand names to access 
resources indirectly instead of gaining land ownership. 
 
In this chapter, I aim to develop the learning aspect of the process frame (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977, 2006). Empirical material is analyzed through the lens of prior learning, 
considering firm resources, home country reforms and markets. I address the seemingly 
counterintuitive behavior of Chinese OFDI motivated by food security and food safety needs 
but refrained from pursuing land ownership. First, the aim is to uncover the reasons behind 
investment decisions by identifying the rationale provided by the main players in business and 
government. Through individual case study, I present how the process was undertaken. This 
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would further elucidate why the internationalization of Chinese firms took distinctive courses 
and shared experience. 
 
This study offers fresh perspectives and enrich existing conversations on land purchases 
associated with Chinese agrifood investment overseas. Questions are raised on established 
preoccupations with entry modes, land-based resource seeking, firm ownership differences, 
rapid acquisitions by emerging markets and achieving ideals of global value chain integration. 
I explicate a less explored area of seeking higher reputational value as part of strategic assets 
seeking to improve competitive advantage and sustainability. A process approach would 
uncover disparity between motivations and implementation, aspirations and realization, 
perceptions and knowledge, form and substance. Though SOEs and POEs have different 
resources and priorities, their strategies overlap in terms of ensuring commercial viability, risk 
mitigation and responsiveness to markets (Estrin et al., 2016). Despite their wealth of resources 
and due diligence, managing acquired international assets and integration could be fraught with 
difficulties and impede further expansion.   
 
The chapter begins by discussing mainstream IB literature on Chinese 
internationalization and questioning the assumptions on conventional resource-seeking 
motivations and institutional support. An initial conceptual framework will be utilized to 
analyze actors’ rationale for pursuing downstream targets. This is followed by case studies 
generated from field interviews and archival sources. In the concluding section, I discuss the 
findings on economic and political drivers towards avoidance of land purchases. I then explain 
the theoretical contribution to the process and institutional frames by drawing on 
interdisciplinary literature.  
 
6.2   The Context  
 
Chinese agrifood OFDI is a recent phenomenon at a time of domestic economic 
rebalancing and consumption led growth. Early waves of Chinese OFDI were mainly motivated 
by strategic assets seeking targeting branded manufacturing, technology and new markets (Luo 
& Tung, 2007) to address the lack of competitive advantage (Deng, 2009) when China joined  
the WTO. Acquirers used intangible overseas assets such as technology to improve their 
businesses in China, before trying to win market share abroad, and looked for ways to leverage 
new competitive advantages in global markets (Williamson & Raman, 2013). Concurrently, 
resource-seeking OFDI (Alon, Fetscherin, & Gugler, 2011) was driven by demand for energy 
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and raw materials to support rapid infrastructure construction and economic growth. Early 
internationalization mainly spearheaded by SOEs received strong institutional support. 
Country specific advantages (Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman et al., 2011) boosted firms’ 
knowledge and capabilities for internationalization. Institutional support help firms to develop 
ownership advantages that enabled them to broaden strategic choices and develop comparative 
advantages (Ramamurti, 2012).   
 
Chinese OFDI in agrifood business of advanced economies calls for a different lens 
from earlier phases of internationalization. Downstream agrifood businesses include 
processing of farm produce and distribution chains. This segment is more costly than upstream 
farmland purchases, though less costly than energy and technology acquisitions. That Chinese 
OFDI actors have grown more diverse, necessitate a more nuanced presentation of previous 
applications of soft budget constraints (Kornai et al., 2003) and support for strategic assets 
seeking. The 1990s saw radical elimination of small and inefficient SOEs, streamlining to 
hybrid SOEs (Thun, 2004b) and the growth of POEs in numbers and scale (Lardy, 2014a). Pro-
market reforms and restructuring of government-owned assets increased pressure on SOEs to 
demonstrate greater financial responsibility, though not necessarily delivering high profits. 
Generally, divisions between ownership structures of SOEs and POEs have narrowed (Estrin, 
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016). This is a significant consideration in the context of Chinese pro-
market reforms.   
 
Potential investors would have noted from previous failures attributable to inadequate 
industry experience in managing agrifood business with complex value chains and inadequate 
support systems. A Chinese POE Longyuan acquired a dairy farm in Victoria in 2008 but had 
to sell off in 2014, alluding to complex operations and huge losses. A state-owned investment 
corporation CITIC gave up Metro Meat Australia in 1999, five years after acquiring the 
processing business, citing poor financial performance. These lessons served as reminders to 
subsequent Chinese investors to be well prepared, conduct due diligence and ensure that a 
capable management team could continue to maintain and create value after the takeover.  
 
6.3   Problematization of assumptions in mainstream literature 
 
Two dominant premises from extant IB literature will be addressed. Firstly, 
conventional wisdom suggests that resource-seeking agrifood OFDI is often associated with 
land acquisitions (Kaag & Zoomers, 2014) to satisfy home food security needs. Secondly, 
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institutions and firms of the home country have been treated as stable and homogeneous entities. 
Problematization opens the doors to conceptualize beyond a single theoretical framework.   
 
The popular view regards agricultural investment by foreign companies as government-
endorsed and orchestrated “land grab” in developing countries (Grain, 2016a; Kaag & Zoomers, 
2014). Populist perception of undeserving ownership by an emerging market investor has given 
rise to saliency bias against Chinese investors. However, narratives in political economy and 
agricultural economics illustrate flexible and diverse resource seeking modes. Since the 1960s, 
Chinese have sent developmental aid (Bräutigam & Zhang, 2013) to developing countries in 
Africa. Chinese firms have been outsourcing (Hofman & Ho, 2012), contracting (Co, 2014), 
forming partnerships (Alden, 2008), experimenting with demonstration farms and special 
economic zones (Smaller et al., 2012) in resource-rich developing countries. When Brazil and 
Argentina passed new legislation and guidelines to restrict foreign ownership of rural land in 
2010 and 2011 respectively, Chinese investors (ranging from Chinese migrants, provincial 
SOEs and small businesses) resorted to contracting with local farmers and leasing land 
(Chatelard, 2014).  
 
Bottom up studies show relationships being forged between investors and host country 
officials, managers and staff (Taylor & Xiao, 2009). Development economics literature depicts 
informal and decentralized relationships of Chinese agrifood ventures to developing countries 
(Gu et al., 2016). Chinese state-owned and private farm operators work independently to supply 
mainly local markets (Cook et al., 2016). Moreover, Chinese investors have committed to 
developing infrastructure and logistical support (Myers & Guo, 2015) for agrifood supply chain. 
In non-agricultural sectors, firms engaged in sectoral specialization, with upstream firms in 
extractive business seeking natural resources, whereas downstream firms targeted strategic 
assets (Lai, O'Hara, & Wysoczanska, 2015). Whether the same adaptive behavior could be 
applied to host countries in advanced economies needs further investigation.       
  
Secondly, I examine the alternative to stability and try to capture the dynamic nature of 
internationalization through learning. Institutions are evolving and may impact the choices of 
entry modes and commitment decisions (Peng, 2003; Luo et al, 2010). Deregulation and pro-
market reforms address shortcomings in previous regulatory regimes and could promote or 
moderate China’s global strategy. Concurrently, Chinese investors develop depth and 
sophistication in assessing potential deals, gain knowledge and awareness, and recognize what 
to select and commit, as well as when to withdraw and move on (Williamson & Raman, 2011). 
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Despite accepting some risk taking in earlier OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007), a more recent study 
shows that only half of the Chinese firms are more inclined towards experimental learning and 
risk taking (Lyles, Li, & Yan, 2014). Actors across firms, institutions and industries did not 
start on a blank slate even in their first OFDI entries, but would have gained varying degrees 
of experience from trading, franchising and licensing (Vahlne et al., 2013). Mature MNEs 
emerging at later stages of the country’s internationalization would be better equipped to take 
precautionary measures. Managerial decisions are often history dependent and not made in 
isolation based exclusively on current conditions (Levitt & March, 1988). The firm’s 
international experience shapes its selection of markets, entry modes and pace of 
internationalization (Casillas, Moreno, Acedo, Gallego, & Ramos, 2009). Besides practical 
experience (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, & Forsans, 2016; Liu & Woywode, 2013), firms 
could gain insights from others’ experience or vicarious learning (Jiang et al., 2014; Jiménez 
& de la Fuente, 2016). Investors could turn liability of newness (Zou & Ghauri, 2010) to 
advantage by learning from incumbents and predecessors (Posen & Chen, 2013) who have 
relevant international experience within and outside their organizations.  
 
Firms may also learn effectively from major failures (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Yang et 
al., 2015), prompting reflection, critique, search and adoption of divergent ideas to find 
solutions to previously undetected problems. Aspiring EMNEs tap personal and industry 
networks (Crick & Spence, 2005; Johanson & Vahlne, 2003) to reduce the formal and informal 
gaps in the host environment (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Though firms may attempt to 
emulate successful industry examples (Jiang et al., 2014), in reality it would be difficult to 
replicate the circumstances as changes occur over time. Some risks and failures may be difficult 
to avoid if evaluation processes lacked professionalism and independent analysis of issues 
clouded by management’s priorities (Ghauri & Hassan, 2014). Learning is continuous, iterative, 
coevolving as organizations’ learning modes and knowledge usage shift irregularly during 
different stages of internationalization (Pellegrino & McNaughton, 2015).  
 
Agrifood OFDI is ostensibly motivated by strategic asset-seeking and resource-seeking 
objectives (Dunning, 1992). Home institutions that favor designated industries would support 
their internationalization (Deng, 2009). Concerns over food security beyond staples and grains 
(Lam et al., 2013; Zhou, 2010) gained traction following the global food crises in 2007 and 
2008. Though agriculture is neither classified as pillar nor strategic industries, food security 
has continually dominated the Chinese leadership’s agenda. Food security is a priority in the 
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political economy because of China’s huge population. Historically, food shortages in China 
had led to social unrest. Demand for safe food increased following a spate of high profile 
scandals involving tainted infant milk and chemical additives to meat in 2008. Rising 
expectations of the growing middle class portend huge potential markets in China and regional 
emerging economies.  
 
Alternative conversations on value chain targets would add new perspectives to the 
current focus on determinants of location and entry strategies (Canabal & White, 2008) which 
dominate IB publications. Literature on global value chain (GVC) integration of MNEs tends 
to focus on the attractiveness of supply chain capabilities (Alam & Bagchi, 2011) in host 
location and good governance criteria (Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). The intentions 
and effects of OFDI decision making and implementation process are rarely addressed. It is 
crucial to study the temporal dimension and understand why and how certain firms choose to 
direct its resources to certain destinations, value chain targets and strategic directions. MNEs 
typically work towards vertical and horizontal integration (Buckley & Ghauri 2004). Firms 
presumably learn from internationalization and integrate with subsidiaries to improve 
competitive advantage (Luo & Peng, 1999; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2013). 
 
Advanced economy host destinations for Chinese agrifood OFDI is under-researched 
in IB largely because the phenomenon took off after the global financial and food crises. It is 
conceivable that in modern agriculture, Chinese investors do not have to acquire farmland, 
given the connectivity of global supply chain. The fastest way to learn management skills is to 
target higher value-added industries to capitalize on advantages of the latecomer (Luo & Tung, 
2007). This enables investors to skip incremental progression and avoid certain mistakes made 
by predecessors. EMNEs could leverage learning from overseas acquisitions (Mathews, 2002a) 
to synergize and consolidate capabilities to catch up with advanced technologies and 
management systems of established firms. Studies of EMNEs in the past two decades support 
the finding that latecomer Chinese firms engaged in repetitive, serial and rapid acquisitions 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). However, the development process is not necessarily incremental as 
posited by the Uppsala model as the internationalization of Chinese firms face ups and downs. 
 
I focus on the dynamic learning process and reconfiguration of value chain (Sun et al., 
2010) of the case companies studied. Besides acquiring knowledge of the industry, markets 
and host countries, firms need to be flexible and innovative to deliver optimal performance 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Downstream investors are familiar with opposition to Chinese 
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resource-seeking ventures encountered in developing and emerging economies which has 
dominated popular media, and this could be repeated in advanced host countries as well. 
Foreign acquirers face lower rate of success if the target industry is sensitive to national security 
and if the investor is an SOE from a country of lesser institutional quality (Zhang, Zhou, & 
Ebbers, 2011). As agrifood sector may evoke controversy and nationalist backlash in host 
countries, experienced Chinese investors are learning to approach such projects delicately. 
 
I also depart from conventional focus on EMNEs’ relentless international expansion 
and integration (Luo & Tung, 2007). Investors who target advanced economies as host 
destinations often have preconceived notions of strong institutions and stability afforded by 
their overseas assets. However, smooth transitioning should not be taken for granted as investor 
objectives may not pan out. Given the complexities of agrifood sector, successive acquisitions 
and integrations may not be as easy as investors had hoped for. Apart from commercial factors, 
political developments beyond the control of investors pose challenges during and after 
acquisition. Success stories of integrating niche technology firms in Europe through light touch 
integration (Liu & Woywode, 2013) remains to be seen in Chinese agrifood OFDI. Table 6.1 
shows a summary of the above discussion that problematize extant literature to create space for 
constructing alternative perspectives for this research.  
 
Table 6.1 Questioning Assumptions in Mainstream Literature and Addressing Why and How 
Conventional Assumptions Alternative Perspectives  
 
Organized resource-seeking and land 
investment overseas to achieve food 
security in China.  
Access and end results are more important than the means. 
Investors need not acquire land to obtain quantity and quality.   
Actors are receptive to various modes and global targets 
(turning to advanced economies). 
 
 
Stability of advanced economies host 
countries  
 
Uncertainty of negative views towards investors’ home country. 
 
Learning from earlier examples to redirect strategy by 
circumventing land ownership to ensure better outcomes in 
future.  
 
Stable progression and rapid 
internationalization and integration 
seen in the past two decades.  
 
 
Challenges to relentless international expansion and integration.  
 
 
 
6.3.1 Research Inquiry and Conceptual Development 
The research question addressed in this chapter is: Why and how do established Chinese 
agrifood investors select downstream targets in advanced economies? The process approach 
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that emphasizes learning is appropriate for mapping changes. The basic inquiry starts with 
matching the attributes and motivations of investors. Relationships among actors turned out to 
be more complex after conducting preliminary background research and interviews. Using an 
abductive approach necessitates initializing with the observation of an anomaly and ends with 
a coherent resolution (Van de Ven, 2007). I present alternative explanations (Table 6.1) that 
differ from existing assumptions to unlock disparities and puzzles. Firstly, I examine why 
certain firms pursue downstream targets and avoid land purchases from the reasons given by 
the participants, industry and publications. To unpack and make sense of rich data, I went on 
to identify the characteristics, requisites and rationale of certain businesses that exploit 
opportunities for downstream agrifood business in advanced economies. I then proceeded to 
investigate how the internationalization processes were implemented and the challenges faced 
by different companies. I compared SOEs and POEs to find changes over time rather than 
assume and predetermine their differences. I will be guided by the analysis of empirical 
material to reflect on the meanings and relationships with theoretical frameworks.  
 
Figure 6.1 Initial Conceptualization of Alternative Positions on Home Country Support for Agrifood 
OFDI 
         Motivations: resource, strategic asset seeking  
   
  
    
    
       
                                                               
Internationalization process    - - - - - >        
                      
<- - - - - - - - - - - -        Feedback 
 
 
An initial conceptual framework is constructed from selective adaptations from the 
body of IB knowledge. Antecedents, prior learning (through direct experience or vicariously), 
home country policies and firms’ perception of assessment of potential business objectives 
would influence firms’ initial foray to new destinations. Figure 7.1 shows that 
internationalization is a continuous process of learning and feedback from experience.  
 
Prior Learning
  
 
Home support 
  
  
  
 
Food security   
Market demand 
Food safety 
 
 
  
  
 
Prerequisites: 
Firm resources 
Industry knowledge 
  
  
  
 
New Opportunities in 
Advanced Economies 
 
 Chapter Six: The Role of Learning in Downstream Target Strategy 
156 
 
6.4 Case Selection 
 
This study examines four corporate groups. Two SOEs (Companies A and G) and two 
POEs (Companies F and H) are identified as experienced home country industry agrifood 
leaders that have invested in downstream agrifood business in advanced economies from 2008 
to 2017. These downstream investors have been purposively selected from a larger list to 
represent different types of ownership structures and international experience. Semi-structured 
questions were prepared to address general questions on the motivations of these firms. Initially, 
all the participants in this research were not asked specific questions on downstream business 
though background research has indicated their preference. During the interviews, it became 
evident that only certain firms carefully chose to invest in downstream agrifood business in 
advanced economies. Interviewees justified their decisions and explained why they did not 
invest in land-based investments in advanced economies. Industry experience, knowledge and 
lessons from previous internationalization shape OFDI decisions. When analyzing the data 
generated by interviews, I will discuss how and to what extent home country factors overlap 
with firms’ perceptions. Finally, I will show how opportunities and significant political and 
economic developments shape the scale, level and directions of OFDI commitments. Table 6.3 
shows the background and 6.4 details the case companies’ levels and types of commitments. 
 
Table 6.2 Background of Agrifood Downstream Investors 
 Firms Domestic Business Internationalization Experience 
A (SOE) Established domestic production, 
processing and distribution 
ingredients, dairy, packaged 
convenient food.  
More than 50 years of international trading. OFDI in late 1990s.  
Invested in dairy, wine, cereal, confectionery, fruit and sauces, 
gourmet and well-known brands, processing and distribution in 
advanced economies (Europe, Australia, New Zealand). 
G (SOE) 
 
Grains, cooking ingredients, wine, 
processed food.  
Well integrated production and 
distribution. 
Produces high quality inputs for western MNE processing. 
Previous land concession and contracts in developing economies. 
 
Minority shares in US meat processing.  
Subsequent OFDI in processing in Australia and Europe.  
Global trading and distribution in Europe and Asia.  
Concurrent expansion of supply chain in South America.    
F Breeding and white meat 
production and processing, 
chemicals, animal feed.  
Finance, Real Estate, Infrastructure  
Early OFDI to Southeast Asia. Benefited from world bank 
financing and advice. More than 30 factories worldwide. 
Subsequent investment in Australia and North America meat 
processing, research and distribution.  
H  Pastoral farming, meat processing 
plants and distribution in northern 
and central China.  Cropping, 
seafood and trading 
Owner had international trading experience as manager of large 
agrifood companies. 
Meat processing in Australia and South America. 
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6.5   Addressing the ‘Why’ Question 
 
During the pilot research project and subsequent fieldwork, I gained background 
knowledge and updates from in-depth conversations with Chinese researchers. The Chinese 
government had long been concerned with achieving food security through combined strategies 
to increase domestic productivity and diversify import sources (Wei & Chen, 2016). My 
contacts based in premier Chinese institutions are well-informed on agrifood policy and 
developments. They included senior academics of the Zhejiang University and Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) and South China Agricultural University, as well 
as researchers in the Ministry of Agriculture. Before embarking on the study of Chinese OFDI 
to advanced economies, it is pertinent to understand the motivations of previous investment in 
developing economies and the lessons learned.  
 
Investing in developing economies such as African and Southeast Asia had been closely 
aligned with increasing world supplies and fostering diplomatic relations. Commercially driven 
projects are gaining prominence with the internationalization of Chinese firms since the 1990s. 
Chinese state-owned investors first ventured to Southeast Asia and Africa, and subsequently 
invested in South America and Central Asia. Reality is more complex than the conventional 
‘land grab’ narrative of exporting increased agrifood output from host countries back to China. 
Chinese food security strategy includes enabling Africans and Southeast Asians to feed 
themselves. This would in turn pose less competition with China for global food resources. 
Moreover, owing to the distance between Africa and China, it made sense for Chinese investors 
sell to host countries and third countries and save on transportation costs. In selecting advanced 
host destinations for exporting food to China, Australia and New Zealand are geographically 
more convenient and shared the same time zone.  
 
Despite the contributions to host countries development, frictions that emerged include 
structural issues, communication barriers and negotiations between locals and investors 
(Buckley, 2013a, 2013b). Chinese investment, management skills and technology have helped 
Africans and Asian economies to reduce dependency on food imports and do not have to 
compete with the Chinese for grains in the international markets, indirectly ensuring China’s 
food security needs. However, these policies come at some financial and relational costs. China 
continues to import soy and corn but strives to attain continuous self-sufficiency in staple grains 
that had meet met over three decades.  
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As consumption of rice declines as the population becomes more affluent, food security 
entails greater diversity and higher protein diets. Food safety has become increasingly 
important following a spate of serious food contamination incidents in 2008. The explicit 
reason given by interviewees for targeting downstream business was to meet Chinese consumer 
demand for better quality food. Additionally, owing to its size and importance, a 
central/national level SOE like Company G, has been tasked to achieve national food security 
needs as well.   
 
A foundation is understanding China’s food security and food safety and further 
readings helped me to gain confidence when preparing for fieldwork to conduct further 
investigations. Analysis of the companies’ history, resources and industry position provide 
useful insights of their objectives and responsiveness to changing circumstances. Why do 
certain business actors gravitate towards downstream targets? There are perceived advantages 
of acquiring downstream business and reasons for avoiding land purchases. Home country 
policies and markets may shape and reinforce their decisions. Managerial reasoning goes 
deeper than conventional firm and country level of analysis. Subsequently, I address the ‘how’ 
questions using process framework and individual case studies in the next sections.  
 
6.5.1 Requisite Competitive Advantages and Core competencies  
 
Large successful Chinese agrifood firms aspire to integrate with the downstream 
segment of the global value chain. Having discretionary funding, industry knowledge and 
experience in domestic supply chains enable these firms to undertake the scale and complexity 
of similar or more sophisticated downstream agrifood businesses in advanced economies. 
OFDI in downstream agrifood business requires more financial resources, industry knowledge 
and management capabilities (Liang, Lu, & Wang, 2012). The media tends to portray Chinese 
investors, especially SOEs, targeting farmland investment based on previous projects in 
developing countries. I argue that sufficient funding and sectoral knowledge influence the 
choice of higher value downstream targets.   
 
Companies A, F and G distinguished themselves as experienced agricultural leaders in 
China (Companies F and H were POEs while A and G are SOEs). Though A, F and G have 
branched out to non-agricultural sectors such as real estate and finance, its subsidiaries have 
been designed to complement and support their core business of integrated agricultural systems 
in China. Several well-known agricultural units of Companies A, F and G have frequently been 
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named as model companies or “dragonheads” in China and are publicly listed. Company G is 
a reputable producer for leading western multinational food processors. Companies A, F and 
G each have assets above US$1 billion with G being the largest. Though less than a decade old 
and smaller, Company H has seen rapid growth in the China market. All four have established 
production, processing and distribution networks in domestic operations before their foray into 
advanced economies. These companies already had land-based investments in China and 
benefited from government subsidies for key domestic agrifood businesses. However, 
subsidies were not linked to support for internationalization. Table 7.3 shows an estimate of 
the strength of funding resources, sectoral knowledge and international experience based on 
the narratives of managers and company reports.  
 
Companies F and G have extensive internationalization experience, mainly in 
developing countries. F established processing plants in Southeast Asia for two decades while 
G had long-term contracts for grain resources, and leased and owned land holdings in Africa, 
South America and Central Asia. This enabled F and G to invest in a wide range of reputable 
brands and trading companies in advanced economies and different regions. Owing to its 
responsibility for food security, Company G was the first to enter advanced economies a decade 
ago, when it first acquired minority stakes in an American meat processor. Company A had 
engaged in international trading but not OFDI. Company H focused on meat supply chain. All 
four did not consider direct access and ownership of resources in advanced economies as a 
priority. SOEs and POEs are motivated by profits, though the former has added responsibilities 
to fulfil national social objectives as well. Table 6.3 summarizes the relative strengths of 
individual companies.  
 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of Requisite Core Competencies of Case Companies 
 Advantages and Core Competencies  High Moderate 
Funding (Discretionary funds, Soft Credit, Equity) A, G, F H 
Sectoral Knowledge & Integration (Domestic) A, G, F, H - 
Internationalization Experience F, G (investment) A, H (trading) 
 
 
6.5.2 Acquire Management Skills Rapidly 
 
A primary motivation of companies targeting downstream segments was to gain 
management skills quickly. The managers set ambitious goals and affirmed that learning 
management skills from acquired assets in advanced economies was important and could be 
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achieved more easily by moving up the value-added ladder in the supply chain than managing 
farms. According to Company A, potential targets must have “a good management team in 
place”. Company A considered its strategy of pursuing well-managed businesses and 
improvement on its performance as achievable than managing farms. Its manager in charge of 
internationalization hoped to hone the company’s management skills and global 
competitiveness by learning from acquired downstream targets.   
 
 “We hope to complete the global value chain integration, not by purchasing land but to find distributors 
that are well-known, those that will facilitate learning and help to achieve our objectives.”  - A1 (2015) 
 
Midstream to downstream value chains are typically more expensive, running into 
several hundreds of millions of US dollars, more than 10 to 20 times the capital required for 
investing in large-scale farming. However, cost was no barrier to well-resourced firms. Chinese 
investors have selected second-tier strategic assets that were available because top commodities 
traders in the league of ABCD and global brand names would be reluctant to sell their premium 
assets. This view has been supported by government officials whom I spoke to during the field 
trips. A municipal official who headed a commerce portfolio believed that:  
 
“buying land would be too slow compared to acquiring an agrifood business” - Q3 (2015) 
 
6.5.3 Commercial Viability and Potential Gains 
 
Returns from downstream agrifood businesses are generally perceived to be higher and 
more stable despite higher initial capital outlay. According to industry sources that have 
invested in both upstream and downstream businesses, the higher transaction price of acquiring 
downstream business is worthwhile. In comparison, land acquisition was deemed less attractive 
unless they could generate scale economies and count on long-term capital appreciation. 
Participants showed preference for acquiring a few good selective investments in advanced 
economies rather than amass real estate. From my collation and study of industry reports, 
several prominent Japanese MNEs had been investing in Australian downstream agrifood 
businesses since the 1970s. 
 
Chinese agrifood firms have accelerated the process of gaining MNE status and 
expanded their global presence by acquiring downstream businesses. The strategy of ensuring 
commercial viability and resource seeking objectives could be met without purchasing land 
was clearly articulated and echoed by POEs. The founder of Company H shunned “highly 
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speculative” real estate investment. H1 advised small players to invest in “equity funds” instead 
of land. Companies F and H indicated that from a purely business perspective, there was no 
necessity to acquire land. It was more important to ensure an excellent supply chain and access 
to agrifood resources. A business consultant affirmed that the key to success was finding a 
well-managed business with competent staff. F1 who was the Director providing financial 
advice to the company said that he would not consider farmland as premium quality 
investments compared to more profitable downstream targets.  
 
“Why do Chinese investors think that they can manage better than previous local farm owners? Buying 
farmland is a passive reaction. If others don’t want to invest, why should we? There are more farm 
sellers than buyers. Chinese investors’ knowledge is limited, always thinking about scarcity of land and 
capital appreciation based on their experience in China. This is not relevant for overseas investment ... 
Global players ABCD manage supply chains and do not own land.” - F1, HQ (2015) 
 
 
SOEs expressed tacit acknowledgement of preference for downstream targets in 
advanced economies. Of all four companies, only Company G had the resources and scale to 
invest concurrently in upstream and downstream agrifood businesses globally. G was able to 
complement with land-based cropping investments in emerging economies in South America 
and developing economies in Central Asia. Driven by high cost and falling productivity of 
cropping due to natural endowment deficiencies in China, Company sought resources from 
international markets. The Vice President of a commodities unit G1 said that it was more cost 
effective to access overseas resources and process farm produce in the host countries to obtain 
adequate supplies at reasonable prices.  
 
“The cost of production in China is high for [certain essential food crops] and we are concerned with the 
quality of products. In China, plants take three years to grow. It is labor intensive to grow and harvest [these 
crops]. In contrast, the suppliers to our Australian operations have adopted mechanized methods, and it 
only cost a quarter of the price to harvest (compared to China) … Food prices in China are set by 
government, but we cannot keep up with global price fluctuations” - G1 (2015) 
 
The senior manager of another SOE (A1) dismissed greenfield land-based investment 
as too costly and did not think that SOEs should consider undertaking such projects. A1 
stressed that SOEs could not afford to develop farms from scratch as this would incur 
“additional costs of mechanization”. However, A1 presumed that some POEs might calculate 
that it would be worthwhile for long-term investment. Vice President A2 also viewed land-
based investment as unattractive as it would lead to more capital expenses.   
 
 “Investing in land would entail “payback” to host countries. They (host countries) expect additional 
investment to improve infrastructure such as transportation and irrigation facilities.” - A2, HQ (2015)  
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Firms with extensive experience in agrifood business and regional markets such as 
Company F claims to be adept at valuing targeted assets as it had built up a huge database on 
trading prices. Investors in downstream assets are able to take over from existing business 
operations, capitalize and expand on established global channels. In their initial calculations, 
downstream investments would yield quick returns and offer higher potential for growth. 
Company A sought brand names with potential for growth as it had planned for public listing 
in the future to improve the parent company’s ability to raise finances for expansion and reduce 
credit exposure. In its public statements, Company A executives acknowledged that 
internationalization would help to “securitize assets for further expansion”. 
 
Participants justified that downstream investments were safer options because farming 
was characteristically vulnerable to weather and volatile markets. Agricultural production 
typically assumes greater uncertainties than processing. Downstream businesses closer to the 
consumer end of the value chain are deemed less risky than upstream segments. Two Chinese 
investors in Australian farmland acknowledged that downstream businesses would command 
stronger bargaining position than producers in the supply chain. Though the phenomenon was 
prompted by a food security and food safety needs in China, participants recognized that the 
acquired downstream assets would continue to serve primarily the global and affluent markets.  
 
6.5.4 Pre-empt negative responses from prior learning 
 
Negativity associated with previous land purchases by foreigners have discouraged 
large Chinese corporations to refrain from following the precarious path. Earlier OFDI 
undertaken mainly by some SOEs were largely exploratory and experimental involving land 
purchases that resulted in nationalist backlash and host government restrictions on foreign land 
ownership. Prior to Company G’s acquisition of two global agricultural processing, trading and 
supply chain companies, it had tried to invest in farmland to produce soy beans in South 
America. However, according to financial commentaries, Company G’s plan to set up grains 
production bases was hindered by some global agricultural suppliers who had dissuaded the 
host governments in South America from approving the mega farm projects. Subsequently, 
another Chinese provincial SOE also encountered roadblocks in getting their land purchases 
and certification approved by the Brazilian government despite their commitment of millions 
of dollars in initial crop cultivation. Even though Argentina has recently revoked policies 
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restricting foreign land ownership, large integrated Chinese agrifood corporations are cautious 
about investing in land overseas.  
 
Companies that did not directly encounter negative responses in host countries such as 
Companies A, F and H, have learned vicariously (Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016; Posen & Chen, 
2013; Yang et al., 2015) to stay clear of land-based investment and the production stage. 
Chinese investors in downstream agrifood businesses demonstrated sensitivity to host country 
responses by refraining from committing to land purchases for production activities. Despite 
their lack of experience investing in agrifood sector in advanced economies, examples of 
rejection and incomplete investment in strategic resources (Zhang & He, 2014) served as 
warning to Chinese investors to be more sensitive and cautious.   
 
The founder and owner of a pastoral/meat processing/distribution business H1 was 
critical of some Chinese investors purchasing more land than they required, causing alarm in 
host countries. Inexperienced investors wanting to own land for the sake of possessing tangible 
assets could be seen as greedy and cause misunderstanding in the host countries.   
 
“It would not make sense to overextend. Why purchase more land than is required? Then lease surplus land 
to other farmers?” - H1 (2016) 
 
Company F, another POE, also shared similar sentiments. Reflecting on the negative 
responses to Chinese investment in farmland in developing countries, the company director felt 
that future investment strategy must be mindful of sensitivity of host country government and 
citizens and try to preserve the reputation of Chinese investors in general.  
 
" Two SOEs that had invested in agricultural resources in South America were unsuccessful. Instead of 
benefiting, they earned a bad name.” - F1, HQ (2015) 
 
In its public relations, Company F also demonstrated keen understanding of adapting 
to the strengths and needs of host countries. In early June, Chinese media reported that 
Company F Director of Strategy Development stating that the company positioned itself to 
develop infrastructural agrifood projects in developing countries. However, for advanced host 
countries, Company F would be interested in their management, brand, talent and resources. 
 
Chinese investors strived to build a positive image overseas. According to H1, Chinese 
investors should focus on businesses that were considered “beneficial and productive” by host 
countries. H1 added that downstream industries would provide more employment to rural 
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communities compared to farming which only required a manager, two assistants and seasonal 
workers. Companies A and H did not partake in earlier phase of OFDI in developing countries, 
hence they were free from historical baggage and the land grab label linked to some early 
investors. Company A adopted a preemptive strategy to avoid farmland purchases overseas. 
Unlike larger SOE Company G which has a mission to achieve self-sufficiency in grains and 
land intensive activities, Company A held a diverse portfolio of investments in cropping, 
processing and marketing, and an extensive product range. According to A1, “we deliberately 
avoided land purchases overseas”. This position is matched by public statements by senior 
executives. Moreover, A2 corroborated and affirmed that it was preferable to obtain supplies 
by controlling the supply chain. 
 
“accessing essential resources need not entail tangible possession as long as there are legal safeguards 
to ensure supply and reduce risk … It is more important to secure the processing, storage, supply chain 
and logistics system” - A2 (2015)  
 
As agrifood investment tended to attract public attention, most Chinese agrifood 
companies preferred to maintain a low profile and avoided public attention in host countries. 
The exception was Company F which did not hesitate to publicize its contribution to 
employment creation and revitalizing the host country’s agrifood businesses. SOEs A and G 
were cagey and avoided unnecessary exposure. Its public faces fronting the media were 
managers who stayed on from previous local ownership or locals of host countries. Though a 
publicly-listed company, Company A did not announce the monetary values and details of 
some of their smaller private acquisitions made through foreign subsidiaries. Company H also 
tried to stave off public attention, preferring to limit press statements to essential information 
just to avoid speculation. The CEO of Company H’s Australian subsidiaries alleged that the 
mainstream media and industry news were not familiar with Chinese investors and often 
misreported business news.  
 
“The limelight and high profile could be detrimental for Chinese investors. The media has too much 
freedom but not all that is reported is believable.” - H2 (2016) 
 
 
6.5.5 Home Country Support and Advisory 
 
Central government policies provide general guidelines that have persuasive influence 
and are interpreted loosely and implemented by local officials and enterprise to suit their 
respective objectives. Chinese local officials said that policies governing agricultural and OFDI 
were constantly adapting to the needs of MNEs. Official directives, guidance, 
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recommendations and encouragement are informal forms of support (Scott, 2001) that would 
impact SOEs than POE investors. Deregulation overlaps with pro-market reforms and have 
been revised to support internationalization strategies and suit the changing needs of businesses 
in the changing global environment. 
 
“Government policy is not inflexible because we still don’t have a clear picture or understanding. 
Enterprises must think of the long-term returns to investment in agriculture, not just monetary gains. 
From the national perspective, agriculture is the foundation.” - Q3 (2015) 
 
The government encouraged OFDI in downstream agrifood business to meet 
commercial objectives, national food security needs and build a positive image of Chinese 
investors for sustainability. Senior parliamentary researcher and policy advisor Cheng 
Guoqiang is an influential adviser for agricultural policies, holding concurrent positions as 
Secretary-General of Academic Committee and Director-General of Department of 
International Cooperation of Development Research Center of the State Council. He urged 
Chinese investors to aspire to become leading global commodity traders like Cargill instead of 
farmers in another country (Cheng & Zhang, 2014). Cheng noted that instances of land 
purchases had led some host countries to view Chinese investors as “neo-colonialists”. Cheng 
advocated government support for global agricultural production, processing, logistics, 
marketing and trade to achieve stable, safe and sustainable supplies (Cheng, 2013).  
 
Upgrading the scale and variety of China’s global supply management would enhance 
China’s pricing power to compete more effectively with agricultural multinationals (Myers & 
Guo, 2015). Unable to acquire companies in the league of global traders ABCD, which are 
either too expensive or unwilling to sell, Chinese SOEs targeted second-tier reputable global 
distributors. To reap benefits of the global value chain, it would be easier to firstly integrate 
from within existing MNEs than to build an entirely new system from scratch or fragmented 
parts (OECD, 2013). In the past, Chinese firms tried to ride on global brand names to build 
manufacturing capabilities in the home country (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Liang 
et al., 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007). More recently, Chinese agrifood firms appreciate the higher 
value of acquiring reputable global processors and distributors.  
 
Though China managed to achieve almost self-sufficiency in grain staples in the past 
three decades, imports of grains and legumes have increased since 2012 and the composition 
of the Chinese diet has a higher proportion of protein than carbohydrate. Longstanding 
concerns over food security in grains have been broadened to encompass a range of food 
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products and food safety concerns. It was only in 2015 that China officially acknowledged the 
priority on food safety in its annual Number One Central Document6, pressing suppliers to 
improve traceability (Lu, 2015). This policy was reinforced by Premier Li Keqiang’s speech to 
the National People’s Congress on food safety. Previously, China expressed concerns under 
the food security theme to evade the embarrassment associated with tainted food scandals. The 
public admission of food safety issues consequently led to the passage of the Food Safety Law 
in October 2015. Improved coordination of China Food and Drug Administration, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, the National Health and Planning Commission, and the General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, raised the bar for local producers and 
importers of food into China. 
 
Building competitive advantage of Chinese agrifood is another goal endorsed and 
encouraged by the government. Central government urged market-driven innovation to solve 
food safety issues and improve agricultural competitiveness (Zhong, 2015). A Chinese 
provincial official based in a region known for private entrepreneurship believed that SOEs 
should take the lead in facilitating POEs to internationalize by avoiding controversies related 
to foreign land ownership.   
 
 “Most companies from our province that have ventured overseas are private enterprises. Impressed by the 
fertile land and potential for cropping, they started buying land, invested in infrastructure projects, and 
employed consultants and local workers. However, when they purchased more land, the host government 
responded to local opposition and imposed restrictions.  
 
Should SOEs compete with POEs to support [Premier Li’s] ‘two resources, two markets’ policy? Land 
purchases by SOEs will cause public backlash; people in the host countries will be afraid of Chinese 
investors. This may hinder other Chinese businesses from operating overseas in future.”  - Q3 (2015) 
 
 
SOEs would be expected to adhere closely to government recommendations so as to 
gain continued support. Official guidance would have greater impact on SOEs and persuasive 
effect on some POEs. Company G received substantial formal institutional support such as 
preferential credit from state-owned banks to achieve food security and food safety goals. As a 
national level SOE, Company G has the responsibility of ensuring adequate food supplies at 
reasonable prices for the Chinese population, unlike mainly market-driven provincial SOEs and 
POEs.    
 
                                                          
6 China’s Number One Central Document is published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council). Since 2004, China has emphasized that reforms of the domestic agricultural sector 
would be a key goal. Proposals include farmland and water resource management, mechanization, training and 
improving the livelihood of farmers. 
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Despite claims by POE participants of adopting autonomous strategy of targeting 
downstream agrifood business driven mainly by market dynamics, their justification was 
spontaneously aligned with national policy, but underpinned by market assessments. This 
narrative echoes the independence of POEs and provincial SOEs that have invested in Africa 
earlier (Cook et al., 2016). They gave similar arguments for acquiring downstream business in 
advanced economies for commercial reasons and the need to avoid political controversies 
arising from land purchases. Some executives of POEs such as F1 continued to be critical of 
SOEs buying land even though some SOEs have become more cautious and avoided farmland 
acquisitions. 
 
6.6   Casing: Addressing the How Questions?  
 
A deeper level of analysis entails constructing the cases from the meanings that emerge 
from the research (Ragin, 1999). Casing considers exemplars and outliers that represent the 
dynamics and complexities of practical management (Cohen & Axelrod, 1984).  While OFDI 
levels (Table 6.4) and investment destinations (Table 6.2) provide an overview of the scale and 
geographical scope of the companies’ internationalization commitments, these do not address 
the how question.  
 
Table 6.4 Level of Commitments and Integration in Advanced Economies (2008 - 2017) 
 
Companies 
Total OFDI   No. of 
Projects   
Characteristics of Recent Investment 
A (SOE) US$5 billion +  
   
> 10 in five 
countries 
Aggressive serial acquisitions owning range of processors 
and distributors of farm products. 
Range between ½ to ¾ majority stakes.  
G (SOE) US$6 billion + > 6  Acquired branded processors to global trading companies 
incrementally through subsidiaries and consortium funding.    
F (POE) US$1 billion +  4 Controlling stakes in Australian beef processing.  
Joint venture in dairy processing 
 
Minority stakes in US in feed mills and meat processor.                
Consortium funding for selective agrifood projects in dairy, 
meat and health food. 
 
H (POE) US$20 million + 
(US$10 million 
invested in 
Australia) 
2 Processing of premium grade Australian beef for the China 
market.  
 
 
 
The effects of antecedents, concurrent developments, mechanisms and feedback could 
be presented using a process approach. Non-linear developments, combinative strategies and 
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adaptation by managers and officials to home and host country conditions will be considered 
as well. The initial aims set out by managers may not pan out as projected when unexpected 
developments thwart original plans. Firms’ confident advances and tactical de-commitments 
would shed more light on the reasons behind these moves.   
 
6.6.1 Company A: Relentless acquisitions abated by home market and policy shift 
 
Company A’s initial track record showed it was an exemplar of springboard (Luo & 
Tung, 2007) until it changed tack in 2017. Financial resources enabled Company A to embark 
on aggressive acquisitions despite lack of experience in OFDI. The total amount invested 
exceeded US$5 billion in eight years, spread over more than five countries, involving projects 
in branded confectionery, fruit, dairy, sauces, meals and wine. Company A appeared to have 
taken all the right moves following closely the clear guidelines its management stipulated. The 
“core principles” for OFDI are to achieve “food safety objectives”, “target profitable businesses” 
with “good management team”, “avoidance of risk” and invest only in “friendly countries”. 
Company A is known to have hired international consultants including one of the top five 
accounting firms, legal and financial advisers to conduct due diligence prior to commitments. 
 
Manager A1 professed that the company sought “reasonable purchase price, though not 
the cheapest” to acquire good quality businesses. It held the majority controlling stake from 51 
to 80 percent share in a number of global distributors. True to the Vice President’s expressed 
misgivings about the US, Company A showed preference by investing first in Australia and 
New Zealand before expanding to Europe, as these were seen as friendlier host countries. 
Company A’s initial focus on dairy was an extension of their core competencies in the home 
country. Another early acquisition was in wine distribution and trading in view of the growing 
demand for imported wines in China. To compensate for the lack of expertise, Company A 
recruited directors from among overseas Chinese and international professionals to form its 
OFDI negotiating team. While meeting the number of targeted projects, the negotiators were 
also cautious and ensured favorable terms, or else walked away from potential deals. However, 
there were instances of paying high premiums for reputable distributors which subsequently 
impeded future expansion plans.  
 
Bolstered by its initial smooth acquisition trail, Company A made higher commitments, 
of over US$1 billion deals to acquire higher value brand names in the UK and South Europe. 
By investing rapidly into global agrifood distributors, Company A gained access to producers 
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and quality resources as well as skills in managing supplies in a wide range of agrifood products: 
dairy, wine, oil, sauces, cereals, gourmet meals. The parent company entrusted overseas 
subsidiaries to purchase more assets and expand its influence on the supply chain. However, 
the momentum of incessant global expansion could not be sustained as seen in the short-lived 
acquisition spree over eight years. The main factors that had hindered its further expansion 
were lackluster financial performance of some of its acquisitions, slow development of home 
markets for certain products and home country political developments which constrained 
persistent overseas acquisitions. In the past decade, Company A’s European and Australian 
subsidiaries showed relatively flat revenue growth.  Though revenue from foreign subsidiaries 
made up more than 20 percent of revenue, this was not translated into increase in profits.  
 
Despite the oft touted narrative of a huge home market supported by a growing middle 
class, venturing into products beyond the habits and comfort zone of Chinese consumers was 
highly risky. The Chinese market’s response to cereal in cold milk, cheeses and expensive 
western culinary ingredients had been lukewarm. Success for Company A was confined to 
fruits, wine and olive oil that Chinese consumers embraced readily. A1 said that currently the 
company imported only “some popular sauces” from distributors in advanced economies to 
retail in China. Even though Company A has a developed and sophisticated production system, 
processing, logistics, wholesale and retail distribution networks for its domestic operations, 
infiltrating the huge China market with new and unfamiliar products proved challenging. 
 
Continual delays in the planned timeframe of offering shares through public listing of 
acquired foreign subsidiaries suggests that their performance did not meet original expectations. 
Despite earlier announcements of another 10 projects in the pipeline over five years, Company 
A recently slowed down its acquisition spree and delayed acquiring majority stakes in overseas 
assets in the past year. Instead, it chose to scale back certain international commitments. Just 
as Company A had walked away from unfavorable deals, it was prepared to divest assets (Berry, 
Guillén, & Zhou, 2010) that performed under expectations, regroup and move on (Williamson 
& Raman, 2011). A significant development was the divestment of a trophy European asset 
held for barely five years at a loss of almost US$20 million. The acquisition performed 
mediocrely in both the host country and international markets. In another host country, the 
media disclosed that disagreements ensued among board members over the falling value of 
assets and earnings post-acquisition. It was ironic that Vice President A2 who had earlier 
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cautioned other firms against undertaking relentless OFDI, but did not recognize that his 
company was a serial global acquirer. 
 
 “Large POEs are representatives of the country’s industry if they meet the criteria and benchmark. ODI 
should not be undertaken like fairies scattering flowers. When it is too abundant and easily available, it 
is taken for granted.” - A2 (2015) 
 
Incorporating the home country political economy lens would help to explain the 
slowdown of Company A’s international acquisitions. Ambitious expansion plans were 
deterred or put on hold following closer government scrutiny and anti-corruption investigations 
of SOEs since 2014. Though a hybrid and publicly-listed SOE, domestic political pressure 
forced Company A to be more circumspect and avoid overleveraging. The unceremonious 
removal, arrest and jail term sentence meted to Company A’s former senior executive 
symbolized a crisis of confidence and spurred reflection and moderation of the pace and scale 
of OFDI. An industry expert X10 who owned agrifood businesses in several countries and well-
informed about domestic developments, disclosed that the Chinese government questioned 
Company A’s recent OFDI projects. X10 said that a handful of senior managers involved in 
negotiating a recent deal had been queried for offering a high price for a marginal controlling 
stake of the potential target. Company documents discreetly erased from the Board of Directors 
chart the profile of a former financial adviser involved with negotiating many acquisition deals.  
 
In his parting statement, A2 highlighted the need to improve domestic horticulture by 
learning from Netherlands’ success story. He envisioned more relaxed atmosphere when 
Chinese farmers could supply fresh vegetables to the local markets every day. This shows that 
improving domestic production and productivity by employing advanced technology and 
mechanization was still foremost on the minds of SOE senior executives as internationalization 
would only address part of the food security and safety concerns. Unlike POEs, management 
of SOEs expressed strong commitment to holistic agricultural reforms to ensure home country 
stability.  
 
6.6.2 Company F: Steady expansion and integration through alliances 
 
This large and well-integrated Chinese private corporate group has established meat 
production, processing, chemicals, finance and real estate in the China market (Table 6.2). 
Company F is a “dragonhead” in China’s agricultural sector and has won many awards for its 
past achievements. From earlier investments in developing economies, Company F made 
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inroads to premium agrifood business in advanced economies only seven years ago, but it has 
already established strong presence in established meat and dairy businesses and R&D in 
advanced economies. Company F has achieved vertical and horizontal integration across 
agrifood sectors in four continents. Its success could be attributed to its management’s flexible 
attitude towards business alliances. Company F appreciated that acquiring majority controlling 
stakes would entail higher capital commitment and assume greater risks and responsibilities. 
Since 2012, Company F has been forming partnerships with experienced industry specialists 
in host countries and multinational wealth fund consortium to mitigate risks and overcome 
shortfalls in new areas of investments. Unlike the other three case companies that preferred to 
acquire majority stakes or full ownership, Company F shared financing and management roles 
with business partners. Company F was able to develop trust for partners (Inkpen & Currall, 
2004). The CEO of Company F’s Australian subsidiary testified that all the partner companies 
were constantly communicating and collaborated well. Company F has integrated meat 
processing businesses in Australia and the US, and showed confidence of growing its 
international assets steadily. Company F’s profits from OFDI (in both developing and advanced 
economies) contributed to more than 10 percent of the group’s profits.  
 
 The founder of Company F shared his global vision with the media. The plan was to 
leverage and coordinate acquisitions in different regions, such as processing and marketing 
with research technology, packaging and distribution in the Asia Pacific and Americas. 
Company F formulated a clear and open market strategy of not to limiting its markets to China 
and the producing host countries. Instead, it would continue to rely on traditional affluent 
markets of US, Japan and South Korea, while growing its presence in Asia to tap the 
burgeoning middle class. According to the CEO of Company F’s Australian subsidiary,  
 
“Australia is a good location rich in resources, but we need to diversify the markets. US processing 
business would require experience and higher standards for branding, labelling. The next distribution 
layout would require balancing US, Australia, Korea, Japan markets. The high cost of doing business 
in Australia discouraged us from investing in an earlier opportunity. Retail price is suppressed by 
Woolies and Coles. This would not be a good business model to expect reasonable returns to farming. 
Farm production cost is high.” - F1 (2015) 
 
Company F acknowledged that high quality Australian grass-fed beef should be aimed 
at the niche high end global markets because it could not compete on price and quantity which 
South American producers command. China is the fourth-largest market and Australia's beef 
exports to China were worth more than $600 million in 2016. Fine dining would not be 
affordable on a regular basis to the majority of Chinese middle class yet. Chinese authorities’ 
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clamp down on ostentatious spending billed by officials would likely delay the growth of 
premium wine and meat sectors in the domestic markets. The CEO of Company F’s Australian 
subsidiary understood that it could not count on the China market in the short term as the market 
takes time to grow. Company F was also vulnerable to policy changes in China when a partial 
temporary ban was imposed on some of the largest Australian meat processors in 2016 to 2017. 
Chinese ownership did not exempt Company F’s factory from the ban.  
 
“Chinese consumers are not very discerning because good chefs can make poorer quality beef taste good. 
China would want to spread risks and won't be overly dependent on Australian beef …  Exporting live 
cattle is going to be tough because Chinese consumers really want a clean and green source. Once the 
cattle go on board the ship, it is no longer Australian. They won’t trust the processing system in China. 
We have to provide industry training for importers and distributors in China. There was no infrastructure 
for chilled beef market in China previously. Our company had to take the initiative to develop these 
systems.” - F2 (2016) 
 
Company F’s continuous OFDI expansion has been facilitated by carefully crafted 
public relations exercise. Its executives participated in high-profile business events associated 
with distinguished businessmen in the host countries. Unlike the other companies, Company F 
wanted to be in the limelight and tried to build its image as a benign investor that has 
contributed much-needed capital and employment to the host country.  
 
6.6.3 Company G: Plans hindered by host country politics and slow integration  
  
The largest and earliest to internationalize, Company G has more cumulative OFDI 
value than most Chinese agrifood companies. From earlier developmental aid to developing 
countries and modest commercial projects in the 1990s, Company G is the leader of China’s 
agrifood sector, and was one of the first to explore opportunities in advanced economies. It 
took minority stakes in North American meat processors but did not participate actively in the 
running of the business and gave up its shares within five years. Company G also invested in 
South American grains and beans cropping and processing but was constrained by nationalist 
backlash.  
 
Company G’s international expansion was largely hastened by the global food crises 
(2007 – 2008), the GFC and domestic market demand. Company G managers claimed to be 
avid at monitoring world markets for investment opportunities. Like Company A, it was 
involved in the distribution of a wide range agrifood products. However, owing to the scale of 
its operations, Company G was also involved in processing and production facilities in Europe 
and South America. Company G had acquired crop processing plants in Australia due to 
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chronic shortages, high cost and inefficient production in China. The Vice President for a 
commodities unit G1 was proud that the parent company capitalized on the economic downturn 
to acquire established businesses at reduced prices in Australia and Europe. That agrifood 
businesses in advanced economies needed more capital and markets presented opportunities to 
Chinese investors in the post-GFC period.  
 
Departing from its early exploratory strategy, Company G was more confident and 
aimed at gaining full ownership of global companies. After studying the market, Company G 
engaged renowned international consultants to study potential OFDI targets. However, 
subsequent politicking by Australian suppliers and high operating costs of global trading 
houses depreciated the original calculations. This led to the reassessment of expansion plans. 
Though an SOE, Company G had followed the example of POE Company F by forming 
multinational consortia with financial backers and experienced agrifood companies to manage 
large projects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, unlike Company F which is mainly a 
consumer of commodities and distributor, Company G’s large-scale global trading business 
and combination of scattered portfolio carried higher risks.    
 
Initially G1 boasted about its acquisition of an inexpensive and well-managed 
Australian crop processing business, even though further millions of dollars were spent to 
replace old machinery, upgrade plant equipment and improve facilities and infrastructure. 
Company G justified its Australian subsidiary as a good investment. Since investing in 
Australian crop processing business, G1 claimed that the corporate unit extended its influence 
to cover “half of the global commodity market”, thereby boosting its “voice and bargaining 
position” considerably. According to G1, the Australian subsidiary was generating good profits 
within the first two years, and management expected to fully recover its capital in less than 10 
years, an excellent prognosis by agricultural sector benchmark. However, Company G could 
not fully exploit synergies due to the gaps between home and host country technical and 
management expertise. 
 
“Some machines used in Australia are not compatible with Chinese-made turbines. Shortage of technical 
expertise was also a challenge. Steel bars and parts can be imported from China, but we cannot transfer 
the whole suite.” - G1 (2015) 
 
Moreover, politicking in the host country negated most of the gains from a supposedly 
good investment. Minority politicians agitated vested farming interest groups to change 
regulations governing processing choices and pricing. Company G spent much time and 
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resources to get legal advice to break the impasse and negotiate for a favorable outcome. G1 
spoke candidly about thinking carefully whether or not to invest in problematic host countries 
in the future which contrasted to the company’s more amenable corporate press statements. 
 
“We are concerned that even a minority party that has few seats in the state is able to whip up strong 
opposition in the industry. Farmers want the power to choose their processors. Who should determine the 
price and quality of the commodity?” - G1 (2015)  
  
For large global operations, asymmetry of information between the vendor and buyer 
of businesses unfairly biased the acquirer’s calculations of the value and potential earnings. 
Company G was eager to complete the purchase of global trading firms promptly without full 
knowledge of the severity of financial difficulties the previous owners faced. According to a 
manager in Company G’s overseas subsidiary (G3), the parent company lacked specialist 
knowledge on global operations and the detailed earnings of its most recent acquisitions of 
second-tier global traders.  
 
“One of the vendors was only willing to sell 51% at first and hoped to sell the rest when the share price 
increased, but this was not happening, and the financial situation was getting worse. Company G must 
have regretted. Accounts of trading transactions are not as transparent and easily understood as financial 
equities because of multiple trading. Grain sellers face intense competition and negative margins! For 
instance, in one deal the trader could lose $30,000 but had to continue trading, hoping to make some 
profits in future through arbitrage. This business is not based on speculation, but requires more skills 
and patience. One must be good in psychology. I think the parent company realizes this now.” - G3 
(2016) 
 
 
As the negative picture unfolded, Company G responded with tough actions. Despite 
having a wealth of assets and state support, Company G had to restructure, streamline and cut 
costs. Integration of its global commodities trading businesses has been slow. Contrary to light 
touch integration of German high technology companies and brand names (Liu & Woywode, 
2013) in previous takeover deals by Chinese niche technology investors, Company G 
implemented massive retrenchments similar to typical American takeovers. Not only was the 
top management of two large acquired trading firms restructured every year, drastic cuts were 
implemented across middle level managers and staff.  
 
“Half of my team was cut. Now the rest of the team is probably leaving … The other subsidiary had a 
huge staff retention problem in its European hub. Every year, the management changed.” - G3 (2017) 
 
As post-acquisition integration gained traction, it became apparent to Company G that 
the integration and consolidation of global assets were fraught with difficulties. Company G 
even considered divesting peripheral parts of its acquired assets that did not match its main 
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objectives barely three years after the takeover. Company G was steadfast in focusing on 
essential basic food commodities of grain and soy, which may compete with biofuels for 
resources, but was prepared to let go of niche products to the private sector. As a national SOE, 
Company G was more concerned with meeting food security objectives when it had to choose 
between different units in the streamlining exercise.  
 
6.6.4 Company H: Costs and shortages prompted de-commitment  
 
Though new to internationalization, Company H was initially poised for successful 
investments in Australia to coordinate and integrate with the company’s global value chain. 
Being a well-integrated pastoral, meat processing and distribution group in China, the founder 
H1 was confident to source for high quality beef to supply China and the regional markets to 
complement its range of fresh Chinese lamb produce and frozen South American beef for the 
mass market. The pre-investment due diligence and approval process in the home and host 
countries proceeded smoothly. The owner claimed that fees for consultants and service 
providers came up to a million Australian dollars, but it was worthwhile. Unlike the experience 
of Company G, Company H felt that the host country regulatory environment was supportive 
and favorable.  
 
“We received (Australian) FIRB approval within three days for one of the projects. Our company 
provides employment for locals and promote beef exports. Australian farmers are cooperative. Our 
company applied for visas and did not encounter any problems.” - H1 (2016) 
 
Backed by a leading Chinese asset management firm and private equity investors, 
Company H was initially upbeat and self-assured after acquiring full ownership of profitable 
meat processing businesses in a region known for producing high quality beef.  
 
“We are in for the long term and won’t sell off quickly unlike some equity funds and partnerships. Others 
had invested in US beef, but we would not, because of import tariffs in China. A managed fund can have 
small stake in the investment, but for direct investment in our case, we must have 100 percent controlling 
stake. Even 1 percent of other shareholders can disrupt the plan.” - H1 (2016) 
 
Company H made efforts to localize its management and factory floor staff. H1 
understood that foreign investors would have to adapt to the host country regulations and 
practices in Australia and South America. In China, Company H had built up a reputation for 
its involvement in charity events. Internationally, the company balanced local with expatriate 
managers.  
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“At cattle auctions, local companies are welcomed and receive more support than foreign-owned ones.  
 
In South America, we only need two mainland Chinese staff to be based overseas. They shuttle, 
coordinate and oversee projects. The stock buyer is a Chinese, so he knows the Chinese market well. It 
is inevitable to employ some local staff, so we need to build trust. How many relatives does the owner 
have that he could employ in the company? Not many.  
 
Australia functions on rule of law and good governance. Chinese executives make decisions, it does not 
matter what nationality the manager is.” - H1 (2016)  
 
However, Company H encountered serious challenges one year after operating the 
acquired business became apparent. Even though H1 cautioned that Chinese investors should 
only invest in profitable businesses managed by retiring entrepreneurs, the post-acquisition 
problems it encountered were unexpected. Cost overruns stemmed from shortages, resulting in 
high price paid to cattle stock suppliers and operating expenses. Industry reports said that 
Company H’s Australian subsidiaries grappled to make outstanding payments. However, the 
management put up a brave and reassuring front when interviewed. From hindsight, it became 
clearer what the CEO of its Australian subsidiaries (H2) meant when he said that high beef 
prices may not necessarily benefit the company. Industry experts noted that while beef 
processing could be highly profitable, businesses must have abundant resources to survive 
transitional tight cash flow. However, few businesses have strong staying power to live through 
price fluctuation. Though the parent company transferred funds to pay overdue bills in its 
overseas subsidiaries, it was forced to divest some of its loss-making assets.  
 
At one time, H1 had even considered buying Australian pastoral farms to relieve supply 
shortages for processing despite his aversion to land-based investment. The challenge of 
marketing premium Australian beef to Chinese consumers was heightened when China lifted 
the ban on cheaper South American beef in 2015 and US beef in 2016. Nevertheless, Company 
H took advantage of relaxation of foreign investment regulations in South American countries 
to expand its operations in emerging markets and focus on medium quality beef for the Chinese 
market.  
 
Sharing lessons from his experience investing in Australia, Company H’s owners had 
earlier cautioned potential investors to be prudent, watchful and thoughtful because conditions 
might not be as optimistic as it seemed. Despite Company H’s cautious approach, due diligence, 
localization of staff, cultivation of good relations with host country networks, it was not 
financially viable due mainly to market shortages and price spikes. Company H’s three year 
venture of processing beef cattle in Australian was among the minority of unsuccessful 
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investment in downstream agrifood ventures in advanced economies. This experience served 
as a lesson to moderate Chinese investors’ rush for high value assets that require specialized 
skills to manage and are susceptible to market volatility tied to upstream supplies.  
 
“It would be good if potential Chinese investors are better informed and avoid rushing in. Many are 
inexperienced and believed in intermediaries who present a rosy picture. We try to caution the other 
Chinese investors, but most people misunderstood our good intentions. One investor came back to us 
after a year and regretted he had not listened.” - H1 (2016) 
 
 
6.7   Discussion 
 
The study started with a conceptual model using learning process frame to offer 
alternative explanations to conventional focus and assumptions on institutional support, rapid 
internationalization of EMNEs, entry modes and land-based resource-seeking OFDI. The 
inquiry has generated insights on the objectives, learning, challenges and adaptation to 
internationalization. SOEs and POEs specializing in agrifood business are inclined towards 
downstream value chain targets in advanced economies. Individual firms have different 
priorities on food security and profitability. However, plans, aspirations and implementation 
may diverge. Though leading Chinese agrifood firms are vertically and horizontally integrated 
in the domestic market, large corporate groups have yet to achieve global integration and 
develop into full-fledged MNEs. Chinese firms combined the economic benefits of higher 
value chain targets and political considerations to defuse tensions in the overall strategy. The 
case studies highlight the importance of learning in established Chinese firms when expanding 
to advanced economies and the need for sensitivities to host country context (Child & Marinova, 
2014). 
 
6.7.1 Rationale  
 
To address the question ‘why’, the necessary conditions for firms to embark on OFDI 
in downstream agrifood business were analyzed. As OFDI in downstream agrifood business 
involves higher level of commitment than land purchases, it attracted mostly large enterprises 
with financial resources, industry knowledge and management capabilities (Liang et al., 2012). 
Case participants shared the common assessment that downstream investment was more 
profitable, had greater potential value and could meet long-term food security and food safety 
needs.  
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As with earlier OFDI, Chinese investors hoped to acquire management skills in 
managing global value chain quickly in conjunction with resource-seeking objectives. All the 
participants resolved not to invest in land-based agrifood businesses to avoid nationalist 
backlash in host countries. They shared commonalities in adopting pre-emptive measures to 
sidestep controversies associated with land purchases. They are confident of accessing 
resources indirectly through processing and distribution. POEs and Chinese officials referred 
to unfavorable consequences of farmland acquisitions from the experience of earlier agrifood 
SOEs. Though the POEs (F and H) claimed to have independently decided to avoid farmland, 
their internationalization strategies are congruent with the state’s encouragement of 
downstream OFDI targets. The official position was explicit in reversing negative perception 
of Chinese OFDI as “neo-colonialist”, to promote a better image and gain acceptance by host 
countries. 
 
     Table 6.5 Why certain firms targeted downstream agrifood business in advanced economies 
Home Country Effects 
and Prior Learning 
 
Why: Professed Objectives Operationalization – Alternative Explanation 
Pre-requisite:  
Domestic Integration 
Industry knowledge   
Financing 
 
Acquire management skills 
quickly 
Commercial viability, potential, 
profitability and risk 
- Rapid acquisitions and presence over Europe 
and Oceania. Majority controlling stake but not 
full ownership. (A)  
 
- Evaluation of potential assets, due diligence, 
capitalize on business cycles (F, G) 
 
Internationalization 
experience or vicarious 
learning  
Preempt negative reactions to 
foreign land ownership.  
 
Access resources indirectly   
(processing & distribution)  
 
- Deliberately avoided land purchase (A, F)  
- Provided employment and capital to hosts 
- Low profile (A, G, H) 
- Proactive reputational promotion (F)  
Chinese government 
advisory and 
encouragement 
 
Influence global supply of 
commodities and prices 
 
Access resources indirectly 
through downstream value chain  
 
Improve the image of Chinese 
investors 
 
- Invest in key traders and processors to develop 
clout in commodities price setting (G) 
 
- Downstream investors either consciously 
followed directives (A, G) or inadvertently 
implemented similar strategies (F, H).  
 
- Uneven results of financial and reputational 
value creation within and across firms. 
 
 
 
The professed and underlying objectives of targeting downstream value chain agrifood 
businesses in advanced economies through different types of learning addressed the ‘why’ 
question (Table 6.5). The arguments comprise creating commercial and reputational value to 
ensure sustainable access to quality and quantity of food supply that match home market 
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demand. Some companies were able to boost its image by hiring local managers with local 
knowledge and gained public acceptance as well.  
 
6.7.2 Process of investing in downstream targets  
 
The case studies showed the uneven internationalization paths taken by each of the 
companies. The common trait shared by the case companies was their cautious approach to 
OFDI through pre-emptive strategy of avoiding farmland investment based on prior learning. 
Regardless of ownership structures, agrifood business leaders in China have tailored the pursuit 
of downstream targets in advanced countries to avoid controversies. The downstream investors 
adopted amicable negotiations rather than hostile takeover. SOEs consciously followed 
directives while POEs inadvertently implemented similar strategies. Improving Chinese 
investors’ image is important for commercial and long term strategic goals. This could mitigate 
some degree of liability of origin in the host countries (Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). 
Disruptions by supplier campaigns reversed the fortunes of Company G’s profitable processing 
plants in Australia. Company H’s relations with suppliers and employees were dented due to 
overdue payments and stock shortages rather than bias against foreign investors. Nevertheless, 
episodic disagreements post-acquisition may reinforce mutual apprehension of future Chinese 
investments in these host countries.    
 
While Company A had only trading experience, it embarked on incessant acquisitions 
to gain majority controlling stakes in a wide range of businesses located in Oceania and Europe 
However the strategy was not sustainable. Despite taking precautions, tough negotiations and 
due diligence, some of its acquired overseas assets resulted in value destruction. It had hoped 
to leverage foreign assets as securitization for further international expansion, moderate credit 
risk and earn capital gains by offering shares to the public. Encouraged by positive experience 
from early success of acquiring valuable second-tier distributors, Company A management 
invested in higher value assets in Europe. This is consistent with theorizing that boards with 
prior premium experience continue to pay higher premiums (Zhu, 2013). Two main factors 
contributed to the divestment of some acquired assets. One difficulty is popularizing unfamiliar 
and cold food in the China market. The hype of burgeoning middleclass demand for western 
food should not be a blanket application without considering hardcore dietary habits and 
choices available to consumers. Secondly, international expansion halted following tighter 
government scrutiny of unfavorable deals and anti-corruption investigations. Like MNEs from 
advanced economies that streamlined and decommitted after years of expansion 
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(Anastassopoulos & Rama, 2004), Company A had a similar experience except within a 
compressed timeframe of rapid expansion followed by rationalization. 
 
Company F could be considered exemplar and outlier of steady international expansion. 
The corporate group was at ease with establishing its global footprint through partnerships in 
China, multinational equity management funds and host country industry specialists and 
business leaders. This enabled Company F to overcome its lack of special management skills 
and experience in more complex dairy and beef processing. Company F gained significant 
reputational value through engaging in flexible modes of business alliance. In addition to 
partnering with well-regarded businesses (Stevens, Makarius, & Mukherjee, 2015) Chinese 
investors have been urged by business consultants to engage with and gain acceptance by the 
local communities in order to earn a “social license” (Nicholas & Yang, 2017) . Trust and 
common interests (Inkpen & Currall, 2004) exist because partners see advantages (Stahl et al., 
2016) in financing, synergy of diverse management expertise and access to emerging markets. 
Table 6.6 provides a summary of the internationalization processes of the four case companies, 
addressing how Chinese firms target downstream targets.   
 
The case studies also showed that experience in home country industry may not be 
sufficiently translated into competencies in coordinating and integrating international assets. 
In contrast, geographically dispersed organizations could harness different sources of learning 
from their network of experts in the local environment to complement experiential and 
organized learning (Erkelens, Hooff, Huysman, & Vlaar, 2015). Managing overseas 
subsidiaries especially in modernized dairy and meat sectors can be challenging, requiring 
specialized skills to coordinate complex networks of overseas subsidiaries with domestic 
operations. While acquisition mode is often favored by Chinese investors, partnership could be 
explored as a way to allay concerns of foreign dominance, build legitimacy and gain acceptance 
by host countries (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). SOEs were receptive to forming consortia practiced 
by large POEs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Estrin et al., 2016) to mitigate risks.  
 
Value chain integration has been a rhetorical ideal that many Chinese agrifood 
companies hope to achieve. However, the path may be gradual and slow, or even challenging 
as seen in the examples of Companies A and G. They had to resort to streamlining and cutting 
less profitable assets. Chinese investors realized from hindsight that the high cost of operating 
overseas businesses and integrating units with the parent company. Internationalization is 
fraught with uncertainty. Firms with the advantages of industry knowledge, networks, 
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institutional influence and past learning experience would be able to invest in downstream value 
chain, but are not guaranteed of smooth transition due to contingent conditions in the home and 
host countries.  
 
Table 6.6 Summary of Internationalization process of case companies 
   Company A (SOE)  
Initial ventures late 1990s to mid-2000s Higher commitments early 2000s Slow down, scale back from 2016 
- Geographical proximity host countries 
- Harness core competencies in dairy 
- Tap high demand for European wine 
 
- Single deals over billion USD 
- Expanded range of dairy products 
- Expanded to western gourmet food 
- Lengthy negotiations 
- Differences with foreign managers 
- Anti-corruption investigations 
- Slow demand for foreign cold 
foods 
 
- IPO of key subsidiaries delayed 
- Divested assets that fell short 
 
   Company F 
Domestic and regional markets Partnership inroads to Oceania 2010 - 2015 Expansion to US & Europe 2014 -  
-  Registered private company 
- Set up factories in neighboring 
developing countries 
 
- Meat processing 
- Dairy production, processing, distribution 
- Fortune Top 500 Chinese company  
- E-commerce 
 
- Minority stakes in US meat 
processing, animal feed and 
distribution 
 
- R&D 
 
 
   Company G (SOE)  
 
Exploratory after food crises 2007 – 2009 Market driven investment Global value chain integration aims   
- Minority stakes in US meat processing 
- Bid to invest in land for cropping blocked 
by nationalist policies in South America 
 
- Wineries in advanced and 
emerging markets 
 
- Crop processing in Australia and 
South America 
 
- Acquisitions of tier 2 global traders 
 
- Cropping and infrastructure 
development in South America 
 
- Infrastructure in Central Asia 
- Consolidation and streamlining 
 
 
   Company H 
Access premium quality products Diversify sources to satisfy mass market Reduced commitment 
- Low returns and cash flow squeeze 
from paying suppliers as price of beef 
cattle rose after takeover of Australian 
meat processors.   
 
 
- Concurrently bought processing businesses in 
South American countries.  
 
- Expanded access to quality beef  
 
- Invested and improved logistics and supply chain 
facilities in South America  
 
- Sold one of the meat 
processing assets in Australia 
 
6.8   Why did internationalization happen the way they did? 
  
 To deepen the analysis, I explored unexpected events and challenges during OFDI and 
post-acquisition that could lead to change of plans, further expansion or de-commitment. There 
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are four main dimensions of asymmetry in the findings: (1) knowledge of the acquirer and 
target (2) industry management of home and host countries (3) perceptions of home and host 
countries (4) expectations and achievable markets. 
 
Company G was unaware of the risks of arbitrage in global trading and huge losses in 
some transactions. The vendors were willing to sell after sustaining prolonged losses and 
volatile global prices. Due diligence may not uncover information that the vendor was 
deliberately conceal from the buyer and investment consultants. Given its status as a leading 
SOE in the industry, Company G tried to achieve food security and food safety needs through 
acquisition of high value targets for the long haul. Industry experts interviewed did not believe 
that Company G would divest grains that directly addressed China’s food security needs, even 
as it trimmed non-core niche units. While firms could gain competitive advantages by targeting 
complementary rather than identical resources, synergy between the acquirer and the target is 
necessary (Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2006). Integration could be slowed or impeded, with 
Company G resorting to drastic restructuring and cost cutting.  
 
Chinese investors new to different host country conditions were negatively impacted 
by fluctuations in the prices of agricultural products due to business cycles and weather 
conditions. Though Company H was a fully integrated pastoral, meat processing and global 
distributor for red meat in China, it endured serious challenges managing a similar business in 
the host country. Cost overrun and tight cash flow due to shortages and high prices of stock for 
processing proved to be a heavy burden. Failure to understand the complete suite of costs and 
responsibilities that the investment commitment entails could result in surprises and costly 
outcomes.  
 
Despite taking pre-emptive action to avoid land purchases, politicization may diminish 
some of the positive effects of home country support and astute investment calculations. 
Downstream investors learned after entry that longstanding cognitive biases could not be easily 
alleviated. Chinese MNEs suffering from drawbacks associated with their country of origin 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) and 
asymmetry (Shenkar, 2001) of psychic distance perceptions by host countries (Håkanson, 
Ambos, Schuster, & Leicht-Deobald, 2016). EMNEs tend to face liability of origin related to 
reputational perceptions of behavioral intent of investors, favoring those originating in the US 
and Northern Europe (Vidaver-Cohen, Gomez, & Colwell, 2015). Asymmetry of psychic 
distance perceptions between home and host countries tend to skew the international 
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reputational status (Håkanson et al., 2016) of foreign investors. Conversely, a favorable 
corporate image and reputation could help enterprises develop sustainable competitive 
advantage (Yeo, Goh, & Tso, 2011).  Reputational value creation from Chinese OFDI is a novel 
inclusion that may not be apparent initially but would be useful to improve the investor’s 
standing in the long term. At the macro-level, status elevation of representative firms and 
industry leaders would improve the image of investors of the same home country. Chinese 
investors were keen to construct favorable corporate image and reputation that could help 
Chinese enterprises to develop sustainable competitive advantage (Yeo et al., 2011).    
 
There is a gap between high expectations of a growing Chinese home market and 
achievable goals. The downstream investors studied were globally oriented to serve the host 
and international markets, and are taking time to grow in the China market. Premium quality 
agrifood products are aimed at the niche high end consumer segment. In the case of Company 
A, some risks and failures may be difficult to avoid if the evaluation of potential targets was 
clouded by management’s priorities and expectations (Ghauri & Hassan, 2014) to achieve set 
performance objectives. Furthermore, not all agrifood products imported from advanced 
economies would be well received in the home market. Investors would have to be patient to 
grow new lines, or take drastic actions to prune underperforming assets.  
 
Figure 7.2 shows the disparities between knowledge of the acquirer and target; the 
industry practice, development and management in home and host country; the home and host 
country perceptions of each other; and investors’ expectations and achievable plans to grow 
their markets. Investors may deal with challenges in a number of ways. They could learn, 
recalibrate goals to match realities and restructure accordingly. Post-acquisition modification 
of original plans could lead to diversification or divestment (Berry et al., 2010) and de-
commitment, to focus on promising investments.  
 
Figure 6.2 Dimensions of Asymmetry and Effects on Investors 
   
 
 
 
Acquirer  - - - Target Home - - - Host Industry
Home - - - Host Perceptions Expectations -- Achievable Markets
Asymmetry
       Learn - - Recalibrate goals - - Restructure - -  Diversify sources -- Divest 
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6.9   Conclusion  
 
This study addressed the rationale for downstream agrifood targets in advanced 
economies. In-depth within-case and cross-case comparisons provide insights on how firms 
internationalize, the commonalities and unique characteristics of their strategies. I further 
explained why the internationalization process experienced could vary across firms over time 
and space. The study provided nuanced narratives and rich insights on the depth of investors’ 
perceptive experience. Industry leadership and scale of operations have stronger effects on 
Chinese firms’ target of downstream overseas investments rather than ownership differences. 
The process frame has been augmented to embrace complexities among the actors in 
internationalization from pre-acquisition, negotiations, transactions and post-acquisition 
challenges. This study provides a more persuasive discourse and expands on existing direct 
causal linkages to firm ownership advantages and firm level motivations.   
 
The main theoretical contributions of this chapter are four-fold. Boundaries to 
theorizing (Meyer, 2015a; Whetten, 2009) have been set at the home country, managerial and 
interactive dynamics. First, the study enriches the process frame by including multiple factors 
of learning and industry examples that shape managerial investment decisions. This goes 
beyond conventional process models by elucidating the responsive and proactive engagements 
of protagonists. Second, I shift mainstream IB conversation from entry modes to acquisition of 
certain value chain targets as this is relevant to the agrifood sector and the current home country 
consumption led growth. Third, multinational partnership model could be explored as a 
workable alternative to mitigate risks than serial acquisitions commonly adopted by emerging 
market players. Despite pre-emptive and precautionary measures to ensure commercial 
viability and acceptance in the host country, unexpected operational costs, bad weather, 
unfavorable political developments and regulatory changes could alter plans and hinder smooth 
progression. Fourth, the study showed firms experienced non-linear and irregular 
internationalization paths. Growth spurts were subsequently paused or constrained by home 
country tightening against overleveraging, financial stress and host country developments 
specific to the industry and locations. Internationalization need not be incremental (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977) nor springboard in nature (Luo & Tung, 2007) for individual firms, but can 
be irregular and intermingled by operational and contextual factors.  
 
Finally, I provided a four-dimensional asymmetry model to show the knowledge gaps 
and explicate the need for continuous learning and adaptation after acquisitions. Agrifood 
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investors would benefit from gaining more specialized industry knowledge, testing the ground 
and cultivating host networks and business partners before making substantive commitments. 
The hype over the China market needs to be moderated and nuanced to distinguish areas of 
slow growth and inflexible consumption habits. The rhetoric of achieving value chain 
integration may be a difficult and lengthy process in practice before Chinese investors could 
rise to the level of heavyweights in global trading.   
 
There are limitations to this study which has set boundary conditions on sizeable and 
experienced agrifood companies. Chinese grain growers that combined greenfield development, 
land purchases and leasing in Western Australia and Central Asia have focused grain 
production rather than downstream agrifood sections and value chain integration. Access two 
of these companies but did not agree to participating in interviews. Excluded in the study are 
non-agrifood ventures that involve leasing of land rather than downstream targets which will 
be covered in the next chapter.  Another limitation of this study is the primary attention paid to 
business and government actors rather than macro-level analysis. This study is not intended to 
be generalizable across the industry as different owners and managers assess and response to 
specific and evolving situations. Single case studies could be conducted for more in-depth 
analysis.  Longitudinal studies tracking the impact of learning on firms’ performance would 
provide valuable knowledge and contribute further to the dynamic framework of analysis. 
Future research may benefit from the exploration of alternative assumptions to test existing 
conceptual frameworks. This approach could be expanded to the study to non-agricultural 
sectors during China’s rebalancing phase.  
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7  Chapter Seven: Concurrent Sectoral Diversification and 
Internationalization: Land-based Upstream Business Targets 
 
“Diversification is protection against ignorance … Wide diversification is only required 
when investors do not understand what they are doing.” - - Warren Buffett 
 
 “Buy land, they're not making it anymore.” - - Mark Twain 
 
 
7.1   Introduction 
 
Chinese privately-owned corporate groups undertaking dual commitments of 
diversifying into non-core agrifood business and internationalization is a recent phenomenon. 
The concurrent ‘diversifier-internationalizer’ has emerged among wealthy family-based 
Chinese conglomerates that have accumulated capital and resources from earlier home country 
economic boom in real estate, services sector and manufacturing export industries. These POEs 
are spreading their wings into non-core (Montgomery, 1994; Wan, 2005) agrifood businesses 
to fulfil the rising demand for premium food in China by the burgeoning middleclass. The focus 
of this chapter will be on why and how these investors target upstream agrifood business and 
land-based acquisitions. (In contrast, the next chapter studies established and integrated 
agrifood companies targeting downstream value chain businesses). Using the learning aspect 
of the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), I aim to uncover the facilitators, 
uncertainties and challenges of achieving the objectives set out by Chinese upstream investors. 
Because of their limited experience, the diversifier-internationalizer reflects retrospectively 
and learn as they progress (Weick, 1995a). There is a time lag in recognition for firms to draw 
lessons from experience and subsequently adjust their internationalization strategies. 
 
Extant IB literature has focused on determinants of the most efficient entry modes (Cui 
& Jiang, 2009) and how decisions shape investment commitment and performance (Dikova & 
Brouthers, 2016). Decisions are based on assessment of different host countries and potential 
opportunities. Rarely do studies address value chain targets when firms enter host countries 
except in the context of improving efficiency, profitability and governance (Alam & Bagchi, 
2011; Luo, 2008; Wang & Shi, 2013). Classical theories assume that firms that have 
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competitive advantage in the home markets are more likely to internationalize, but transaction 
costs may moderate expansion of overseas investment (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Conversely, it 
has been argued that EMNEs internationalize despite their competitive disadvantage in the 
home country (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). The effects of home country impetus and contingent 
factors in conjunction with reflection on the external environment have not be addressed 
holistically and adequately.  
 
This study examines the phenomenon of the diversifier-internationalizer that has 
neither core competencies (Very, 1993) nor competitive advantages in the agrifood sector nor 
international experience. The aim is to enhance IB knowledge on the increasing role and 
importance of the private sector in the Chinese economy (Lardy, 2014a) expanding to non-core 
sectors and global markets. While public perception commonly associates Chinese state 
orchestration of resource-seeking acquisitions with land purchases, the study of four POEs 
investing in upstream agrifood business offers fresh perspectives to the conversation. Unlike 
large central / national level SOEs that are tasked to meet food security needs and influence 
global supply and pricing, POEs conceive their strategies and portfolios individually, driven 
by the niche and profitable Chinese market segments and long-term growth.  
 
The four Chinese corporate groups selected for this study diversified into agrifood 
business and bought farmland in advanced economies from 2010 to 2017. The global food 
crises and spate of food scandals from 2008, and more global investment opportunities 
following the GFC paved the way for more players and deals transacted in the agrifood sector. 
However, farmland investments by Chinese non-agrifood companies started at least two years 
later than established agrifood firms that had invested in downstream segments overseas. The 
destinations of ‘diversifiers-internationalizers’ in agrifood OFDI are mainly Australia and New 
Zealand due to geographical proximity and sharing of the same time zone. Case studies drawn 
from interviews of business owners and senior managers show that less experienced Chinese 
firms prefer to adopt the conventional approach of resource-seeking by owning and having 
direct access to supplies of clean and green food sources. Gaining first mover advantages, legal 
protection of ownership rights (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) and potential capital appreciation are 
the main rationale cited. 
 
Chinese investors in this study are not merely expanding their product range and 
seeking new markets; they are concurrently investing in vastly different non-core sectors which 
they had limited, different or no prior industry and international experience. Many Chinese 
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POEs started as small family businesses and have grown into prominent business groups by 
riding on freer markets and trade since the late 1990s. However, Chinese POEs increasingly 
face higher costs, slower growth, global competition and market saturation in their original 
core businesses in manufacturing and services. These Chinese POEs hope to diversify into 
agrifood sector to take advantage of the consumption-led growth economy and hedge their bets 
by incorporating more stable and sustainable long-term growth.  
 
However, there are multiple challenges and risks for firms undertaking globalization 
strategies (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Luo & Peng, 1999). Firms lacking in industry 
knowledge calibrate the level and type of investment and expectations of returns (Galkina & 
Chetty, 2015; Sarasvathy, 2001). Despite the advantages enumerated by Chinese investors of 
overseas farmland, the process did not pan out as expected due to high operating costs, belated 
discovery of industry knowledge and resistance in host countries (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). Newcomers to agrifood business and OFDI need to contend 
with additional risks due to their lack of knowledge and experience in non-core business sectors 
and operating in advanced host countries.  
 
The structure of this chapter begins by drawing on relevant theories from literature on 
international acquisitions and agrifood sector integration. I problematize and critique the 
conventional focus of extant literature on macro-level motivations and the scant attention paid 
to analyzing the rationale and experience of different management strategies and 
internationalization process. I adopt a basic process model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) as the 
initial framework and create space for new findings. From interviews and secondary data, I 
will construct the perceptions and reasoning for Chinese OFDI targeting upstream agrifood 
business in Australia and New Zealand beef and dairy. In the second stage of casing (Ragin, 
2009), I discussed how knowledge inadequacy in the internationalization process resulted in 
misreading of host country politics and incurring higher than expected operating costs despite 
precautions to ensure due diligence. Retrospective sensemaking (Weick, 2006) would help to 
fill the analytical and explanatory void of the cumulative learning model. In the final part of 
casing, I will be discussing the challenges to growth and value chain integration by agrifood 
upstream investors. Learning how POEs seize opportunities and respond to emergent context 
and unforeseen challenges at different stages of internationalization provides deeper insights 
than common perceptions of resource-seeking foreign land ownership. The findings help to 
explain complex interactions among actors and changing environment that slow down 
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subsequent acquisitions and integration. The main contribution of this study is the enrichment 
and extension of existing diversification literature by offering deeper explanation of the 
original intentions, irregular and exploratory paths and disparities in performance.  
 
7.2    Review of Literature  
 
Leading IB publications on emerging market firms have been devoting to determinants 
of location choices (Buckley et al., 2007) and entry modes in horizontal industries (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1992; Canabal & White, 2008; Cui & Jiang, 2009; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & 
Peng, 2009). Scant attention has been paid to value chain targets (upstream or downstream 
business) and much less in the agrifood sector. As with mining, the agrifood sector is seen 
primarily as driven by resource-seeking motivations (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Dunning & 
Narula, 2004a). From the resource-based view, firms are heterogeneous and possess a variety 
of resources, some of which may not be perfectly transferrable (Barney, 1991). However, to 
achieve sustained competitive advantage, resources must be rare, valuable and imperfectly 
imitable (Barney, 1991). Review of IB literature noted a focus on pre-entry determinants, but 
not what happens once entry mode choice has been made (Canabal & White, 2008). In the past 
three decades, scholars have used macro-level and cross-sectional analysis to explain mode 
choices but did not address firms’ multiple entries over time and industry specific differences 
(Dikova & Brouthers, 2016). 
 
The current cluster of POEs heading for advanced economies are different to early 
phases of internationalization dominated by SOEs and POEs that receive support and subsidies 
for domestic production to meet self-sufficiency. The four POEs in this study did not enjoy 
home country specific advantages (Rugman et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2017). The argument that 
emerging market firms gain ownership advantages (Dunning, 2001; Sun et al., 2010) with 
home country support (Ramamurti, 2001) is less relevant to study this particular phenomenon. 
Firms with surplus funding are able and willing to diversify and expand to new domains to reap 
higher returns. The Chinese home country context has been saddled with longstanding food 
security concerns and heightened food safety issues since 2008. POEs that diversify and 
internationalize to agrifood sectors have different calculations and objectives that suit their 
corporate expansion. Their original firm-specific advantages and capabilities in non-agrifood 
sectors are therefore not universally useful and transferrable across institutional contexts 
(Meyer et al., 2009). IB literature has been reticent in explaining instances where firms focus 
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on specific segments of the value chain and internationalize in non-core business sectors. This 
chapter aims to enhance understanding of seemingly unconventional behavior of ‘diversifier-
internationalizers’ through the conversations between primary empirical material and 
conceptual framing.  
 
7.2.1 Product and Market Diversification 
 
Firms pursue diversification by tapping existing core competencies (Very, 1993) or 
harnessing dynamic core competencies (Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996). Firms that diversify their 
corporate portfolio may be driven by survival when earnings of their core businesses are 
declining (Very, 1993). Companies could respond to changing trends (Ansoff, 1958) and 
capitalize new opportunities by diversifying into other more profitable areas (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999). Diversification may reduce the firm’s exposure to risks of continued 
dependency on narrowly focused core businesses (Van Mieghem, 2007). Diversification could 
also be a means to create more value for the firm (Teece, 1982). However, agency theorists 
posit that managers tap excess cash flow for expansion with little consideration for profitability 
(Jensen, 1986). A study of Japanese keiretsu found that powerful member firms placed more 
emphasis on growth in the pursuit of product and international diversification, whereas less 
powerful member firms were subject to strong monitoring and emphasized profitability (Kim, 
Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004). Extant literature recognizes that business groups with private 
ownership structure have more robust internal governance and strategies to create long term 
value (Gaur & Delios, 2015).  
 
Positive performance has been linked to “relatedness” of firms’ diversification strategy. 
Firms could strengthen their competitive advantage by exploiting operational and managerial 
relatedness (Very, 1993). Related product diversification is found to have positive effects on 
the performance of MNEs while unrelated product diversification negatively moderates the 
international diversification-performance relationship (Chang & Wang, 2007). Related-group 
diversification strategy would lead to higher profits for emerging markets firms (Mishra & 
Akbar, 2007). When the liability of foreignness is high, the acquirer is motivated to pursue 
related targets that would create value (Galavotti, Depperu, & Cerrato, 2017). 
 
There is no guarantee that diversification would improve firm performance, market 
power and profitability. Diversification strategy alone, does not lead to advantages for the firm, 
but requires supplementary synergies from economies of scope, multi-market management and 
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efficiencies from market structuration (Li & Greenwood, 2004). MNEs emanating from 
advanced economies and emerging markets are dependent on host country environment for 
higher level of performance in their diversification strategy. Overseas subsidiaries performed 
better when they engaged in within-country product diversity and in host countries where 
institutions are weak (Delios, Xu, & Beamish, 2008). Another empirical study of business 
groups from emerging economies found that international diversification motives vary by host 
country development level; firms enter developed economies for exploration of new resources 
and capabilities, and enter emerging economies to exploit existing resources and capabilities 
(Hoskisson, Kim, White, & Tihanyi, 2004).    
 
Diversification of product and geographical locations are perceived as trade-offs in 
extant literature. This is consistent with the resource-based view (RBV) on the allocation of 
firm’s resources for different undertakings (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959). Industry 
globalization, foreign competition and firm product diversification may influence a firm's 
choice of the degree and scope of its international diversification strategy (Wiersema & Bowen, 
2008). Due to market imperfections and weak institutions, product diversification by emerging 
market business groups constrains international expansion (Kumar et al., 2012). A study of 
Latin American firms showed that product-diversified firms have been deterred by transaction 
costs to pursue geographically diverse and rapid internationalization (Batsakis & Mohr, 2017). 
Nevertheless, learning from prior international experience are moderators that would enable 
firms to pursue both product diversification and international expansion the effects of 
internationalization (Batsakis & Mohr, 2017; Kumar et al., 2012). However, the determinants 
of substitute (trade-off) or complement (relatedness) in diversification strategy could be 
challenged by considering a combination of evolving endogenous and exogenous factors 
(Bowen & Sleuwaegen, 2017). The strategy for international and product diversification are 
interdependent, and choices evolve depending on changes in the firm’s resources, capabilities 
and market opportunities (Bowen & Sleuwaegen, 2017). However, firms that have good 
standing in the home country in original core businesses may not be recognized and accepted 
with the same level of reputational value in other sectors and advanced host countries 
(Mukherjee, Makarius, & Stevens, 2018).  
 
Extant IB literature shows mixed evidence of diversification outcomes. Majority of 
published work focuses on financial performance measures (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 
2006). To find an optimal value and manage uncertainties, firms may adopt an under-
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diversification strategy (Hashai & Delios, 2012). A modest diversification strategy would focus 
on expanding the product line within the industry and core business. Moderate product 
diversification, speed of market expansion and geographic scope could increase EMNEs’ 
capacities to exploit different market opportunities but will turn negative if EMNEs expand 
their product range and geographic scope to higher levels (Chang, 2007). Another longitudinal 
study of Indian firms finds international diversification to be negatively related to firm 
performance at both low and high levels of internationalization (Gaur & Delios, 2015), contrary 
to U-shape observed in earlier studies. Firms may benefit from intra-industry product diversity, 
but contingent factors may decrease within-industry performance of inexperienced firms in 
technology-intensive industries (Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). Initial increase in product diversity 
could undermine the firm’s performance because of negative transfer effects, but performance 
may improve subsequently from economies of scope (Zahavi & Lavie, 2013). Hashai (2015) 
found an S-curve in the performance of firms engaged in within-industry or within-country 
diversification. The results are attributed to the balance between costs of adjustment and 
coordination compared to synergy derived from diversification (Hashai, 2015). However, 
group affiliation positively may moderate the severity of the negative relationship between 
internationalization and performance (Gaur & Delios, 2015).  
 
Diversification is neither smooth nor cumulative, as the processes exhibit irregular 
patterns and uncertainties (Montgomery, 1994). Extensive diversification could peak, followed 
by reversal of diversification strategy and even de-commitment. Firms in developed economies 
have de-diversified to refocus on core businesses to improve profitability (Markides, 1995). 
American corporations shifted from specialization to diversification, but subsequently divested 
and refocused on primary businesses (Knecht, 2014). Similar trends have been observed in 
agrifood businesses. Majority of the western food and beverage MNEs showed slower grow 
and lower profits in the 1990s, and divested from non-core areas to refocus on core business 
and related technological diversification (Anastassopoulos & Rama, 2004). Firms often 
incorporate change when implementing a diversification strategy. Managers would consider 
changes in the firm’s internal resources and capabilities and the external business environment 
when deciding on international and product market expansion (Bowen & Sleuwaegen, 2017). 
 
 To address the phenomenal emergence of Chinese firms that are new to managing 
agrifood business in both the home and host countries would require the search for a framework 
that incorporates simultaneous diversification and internationalization in the study. The rise in 
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demand for premium meat, dairy, wine, fruit and gourmet food in China have enticed firms to 
shift away from their main preoccupations with manufacturing to tap the growing high-end 
market perceived to be more profitable in the long run (Delios & Beamish, 1999). Most studies 
focus on antecedents and outcomes but neglect the justification and mechanisms in the 
decision-making process. The explanation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ are rarely addressed in depth.  
 
Current trends show that successful Chinese private business groups are diversifying 
across industries and internationally. This challenges longstanding assumptions that firms must 
possess core competencies, competitive advantage and ownership advantages (Sun et al., 2010) 
before expanding overseas. While most studies focus on related product diversification, home 
country resources and capabilities of these firms have not been studied extensively. It is 
arguable that the performance of firms’ diversification strategies are likely to be shaped by 
dissimilar home country environments (Wan & Hoskisson, 2017b). In emerging markets, 
political ties and international experience of owners and senior executives may help firms to 
access resources and exploit new market opportunities for diversification (Sun, Peng, & Tan, 
2017). Chinese firms that diversify into agrifood sector and internationalize concurrently face 
dual demands and pressure. These investors are expected to be disadvantaged by the lack of 
industry knowledge, limited time for learning and inexperience in the international 
environment (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003).   
 
7.3   Alternative Assumption Positions   
 
As this is a phenomenon-based study, some longstanding assumptions and conventional 
wisdom (Davis, 1971) in IB studies may not hold, and need to be problematized (Alvesson & 
Sandberg, 2011). Having discussed different streams of literature on diversification and 
internationalization, I would propose four alternative positions. By posing questions and 
offering alternative assumptions, I could formulate pertinent inquiry to iterate emerging data 
with theories to develop relevant theoretical constructs. I also refer to the seminal behavioral 
theory on organizational decision-making (Cyert & March, 2011) in the construction of 
alternative assumption positions. 
 
I have identified five alternative assumptions that deviate from assumptions and 
propositions in extant literature:  
 
(1) Shifting the attention from entry modes determinants to value chain targeting  
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(non-agricultural firms target land purchases) 
(2) Diversification of agricultural firms to non-agricultural areas for higher profits  
(3) Domestic product diversification and internationalization may not be a trade off 
(4) Disparity and changes between motivations and realizable objectives  
 
Firstly, I reposition the assumption from focusing on entry modes strategy to value 
chain targeting. IB literature is predominantly focused on the determinants of entry modes 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Canabal & White, 2008; Cui & Jiang, 2009; Xie & Li, 2017) 
studied using the OLI lens and home country advantages. Rather than adopting a deterministic 
approach to entry decisions, I assume that firms decide on which value chain segment to invest 
by assessing opportunities and risks in relation to their objectives. While there is a vast body 
of knowledge on entry modes, the recent surge in acquisitions of farmland by private investors 
that are relatively new to the agrifood industry have not been addressed. The trend I identified 
from emerging data that distinguishes upstream and downstream investors is interesting and 
warrants deeper investigation. I argue that a study that focuses on value chain targeting would 
generate interesting findings for theorizing. A summary comparing conventional and 
alternative assumptions is provided in Table 7.1. 
 
Secondly, it has been assumed that diversification is motivated mainly by higher profit 
margins (Mishra & Akbar, 2007; Very, 1993). Diversification among rural communities in 
advanced economies provided another stream of farm-based income to supplement the existing 
sources and this would eventually replace the original core business (Medhurst & Segrave, 
2007; Piras, 2011). Chinese farmers who earn low margins from a limited range of food crops 
have been diversifying into mixed farming and wider product range. Hundreds of publicly-
listed Chinese agricultural firms have moved into non-agricultural ventures in the Chinese 
domestic market to improve overall financial performance (Wei et al., 2017). While this may 
be true for agricultural firms diversifying into non-agricultural areas, the motivations of non-
agricultural firms making inroads to the agrifood sector is not as clear. This study examines the 
phenomenon of profitable non-agricultural POEs investing in agrifood sector and 
internationalizing with prior understanding that returns would be low, gradual and even risky 
but may be potentially rewarding in the long term.  
 
Thirdly, extant literature posited that diversification pursued along the lines of product 
relatedness (Chang & Wang, 2007) and related technology (Anastassopoulos & Rama, 2004) 
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have positive effects on performance. Diversifying firms could gain from exploiting 
operational and managerial relatedness (Very, 1993) and related target acquisition in unfamiliar 
host countries (Galavotti, Depperu, & Cerrato, 2017). The alternative assumption position I put 
forward is guided by the phenomenon of Chinese corporate groups diversifying into agrifood 
business that are vastly different from their original core business. It is possible that firms may 
diversify into products and markets that are unrelated to their existing core business activities 
within a short time. 
 
Fourthly, empirical findings show that product diversification in domestic markets 
lessen internationalization (Kumar et al., 2012). Diversification in product and market is 
portrayed as sequential; firms would consider international expansion only after it has grown 
domestically through product diversification (Batsakis & Mohr, 2017). The underlying 
arguments of these studies is that firms are cautious and would avoid overstretching their 
resources and incurring high costs. However, the recent phenomenon of Chinese POEs 
concurrently diversifying and internationalizing into agrifood sector calls for a questioning of 
this assumption. Enabled by wealth accumulated from the period of high growth in 
manufacturing and services from the late 1990s to 2000s more POEs are engaging in agrifood 
OFDI in the past decade. Unlike previous studies on international diversification focusing on 
sources, products and markets (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006), this study will shift to an assumption 
position of multiple-prong strategy of pursuing product and geographic diversification 
simultaneously. 
 
Fifthly, I question the direct causality between motivations and internationalization 
commitment. Planning based on initial objectives may not necessarily lead to intended 
consequences and managers may be set back by exogenous factors (Cyert & March, 2011) in 
the home and host environment. Diversification is fraught with uncertainties and may not turn 
out to be profitable. Concurrent diversification and internationalization would increase risks 
borne by businesses (Kucuk Yilmaz & Flouris, 2017; Liesch et al., 2011). Moreover, 
diversification into non-core sectors may encounter coordination difficulties and compound the 
types and degree of risks and diminish gains from synergy. Instead of following a pre-
deterministic causal linkage to entry modes, this study will adopt a processual path to find out 
different factors and idiosyncrasies that shape Chinese firms’ strategy of diversifying and 
internationalizing concurrently. Table 7.1 summarizes the steps in problematizing conventional 
assumptions and presenting alternative assumptions. 
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Table 7.1 Problematizing Mainstream IB Literature 
Conventional Assumptions Alternative Assumptions 
− Factors that determine firm entry modes. 
 
− Diversification is motivated by profits 
and hedging.   
 
− Related product diversification is linked 
to synergy and positive performance. 
 
Trade-off between product 
diversification in domestic market and 
internationalization. Geographical 
diversification to expand markets. 
 
− Linkage of intentions, actions, outcomes. 
  
o Choices of value chain target, balancing opportunities and risks.   
 
o Diversification into non-core sectors may be motivated by long-
term plans.  
 
o Sectoral diversification pursued by firms could be vastly 
different from core business.  
 
Diversification and internationalization can happen 
simultaneously. Internationalization is pursued to satisfy 
resource-seeking objectives to serve the home market. 
 
o Disparity between motivations and realization of objectives.  
 
 
 
7.3.1 Research Questions 
 
The question I will be addressing in this chapter is: “Why and how do some Chinese 
firms choose to diversify and internationalize concurrently?” The firms studied in this chapter 
target upstream or land based overseas assets in advanced economies. To explore this theme, I 
begin with a broad process frame. From preliminary data analysis before fieldwork, institutions 
do not appear to have a direct influence on three of the four POEs. Extant literature provides 
justification for why investors need to identify relevant international knowledge, and how and 
where to find it. This study goes further to find the reasoning behind investment decision on 
value chain target selection for business groups that lack core competencies in agrifood 
business and internationalization.  
 
Table 7.2   Research Questions  
Why – Motivations?  How?  Why did this happen?  
Prior given rationale Process   Prior understanding   
Advantages Learning and Preparation  Adaptation and responsiveness 
Market potential  Choices available Post-acquisition re-assessment 
Constraints Implementation  Selection of available options 
Long-term strategy Adaptation to environment The most feasible decision 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows the three areas for investigation. First, the why question will be 
explored to consider the balance of firm advantages and constraints as well as multiple 
objectives beyond short-term commercial gains. In the next section, I would explore the 
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process undertaken by different actors. Finally, I address why decisions and developments 
happened the way they did.  
 
7.3.2 A Preliminary Theoretical Framework   
 
A conceptual construct grounded on alternative assumptions would focus on interactive 
and implementation processes of diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990) and 
internationalization. Within the overarching dynamic home country model, this chapter will 
emphasize the markets and industry components. This includes domestic market driven 
demand, resources in overseas markets and the industry position of POEs that seek upstream 
investments in advanced economies. As these investors are non-agrifood POEs, institutional 
support plays a less significant role, in comparison with SOEs and agrifood POEs that 
traditionally received more state support for their domestic business.  
 
These private corporate groups harness their strengths in accumulated wealth to 
overcome constraints of inexperience. Diversifying POEs utilized their accumulated resources 
and management experience (Penrose, 1959) built up in non-core business areas and 
internationalized despite limited support rendered by home country institutions. Their lack of 
knowledge and experience could be compensated to a certain degree by recruiting professionals 
with industry and international experience (Huber, 1991; Pellegrino & McNaughton, 2015).  
 
However, the lack of industry knowledge and experiential learning faced by diversifier-
internationalizer may constrain their choices, performance and attainable goals. Due to their 
newness to the agrifood industry, these firms have limited engagement with industry networks 
in both home and host countries, thus limiting their ability to learn vicariously (Jiménez & de 
la Fuente, 2016). Unlike earlier SOEs, the diversifier-internationalizer are POEs that do not 
enjoy privileges of institutional support when internationalizing (Deng, 2009). Firms that are 
diversifying and internationalizing concurrently face additional disadvantages. 
Internationalization process is often irregular and filled with complexities and uncertainties, 
requiring firms to constantly adapt and change tack (Cohen & Axelrod, 1984; Garnsey & 
McGlade, 2006). Diversifier-internationalizers face uncertainties in the host environment and 
a steeper learning curve to gain industry knowledge and management skills.  
 
I examine the influences of company resources, industry knowledge, experience, home 
market position, learning and backgrounds of managers. Resource-seeking motivation alone 
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does not go sufficiently deep into the reasoning behind land purchases since the objectives 
could be achieved through the acquisition of either upstream or downstream agrifood 
businesses. This study shifts the focus to value chain target rather than the conventional 
preoccupation with motivations and entry mode decisions. Applying the appropriateness logic 
rather than consequences, implementation of internationalization strategy may lead to the 
evolution of multiple suboptimal equilibria instead of a rational and stable model (Cyert & 
March, 2011). Even with good planning and due diligence, managers may encounter 
unexpected challenges that hinder the realization of objectives. Coordination difficulties and 
unexpected high costs may reduce synergy gains from diversification (Hashai, 2015; Zhou, 
2011).  
 
To break the vicious cycle, I investigate the common traits and differences using cross-
case study of their rationale for upstream targets. I then examine the companies’ aims and 
capabilities given their strengths and weaknesses and how decisions operate against the 
backdrop of changing home and host environments. From empirical material, I integrate a 
evolutionary interrelationship model (Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; Koza et al., 2011) with a 
learning process framework (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003) as firms proceed with 
internationalization. The how question would be explored using within-case analyses as 
internationalization process varies across firms and the path is irregular and multidimensional. 
The framework could be modified and expanded after iteration of data with theories.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Initial Conceptual Framework 
              Moderators       Chinese Context 
 
           Diversify and Internationalize  
  Trade off?         Limited International Experience 
           Home Country Demand 
           Host Country Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diversification 
Internationalization 
Relatedness 
Experience 
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7.4   Multiple Case Study 
 
The case selection is purposeful. It is guided by companies that diversified into agrifood 
businesses and invested in overseas land-based / upstream / production targets. The four 
companies are POEs that started out as non-agricultural enterprises but subsequently 
diversified into agrifood business. The 13 direct participants are selected from four POEs (B, 
C, D and E).  Companies C, D and E originate from Zhejiang province that is well-known for 
entrepreneurship and historically did not have SOEs due to the geographical proximity to 
Taiwan. Company B was founded in the cosmopolitan city of Shanghai. After identifying 
several companies which had either realized or planned investment interest in agrifood OFDI 
in Australia and New Zealand and European countries, I proceeded to study their backgrounds. 
All the business groups started as family businesses in the 1990s to early 2000s.  All are listed 
holding companies and own assets well above US$1 billion. 
 
Companies B and E have prior investments in developing and emerging economies and 
would serve well for comparative analysis. The companies have invested in beef cattle 
(Companies C, D, E), dairy (B) and winery/vineyards (C). Company B had prior investments 
in grains and cropping in developing countries. Its most recent plans to expand into beef cattle 
in Australia and New Zealand did not materialize.  
 
Cross-case analysis would address ‘why’ and within-case analysis would demonstrate 
‘how’ Chinese firms target downstream agrifood business in advanced economies. I 
interviewed participants of Companies C, D and E at least twice or more times in 2015 and 
2016 and maintained email communications with some of the executives. Follow up with 
informal channels allowed me to clarify and update my empirical research. Company B 
underwent restructuring and did not accede to a second round of interviews. However, I spoke 
managed to fill in the gaps from a former manager B4, who was involved in overseas 
investment projects and provided insights into recent developments.  
 
Following each conversation with participants,  business consultants, brokers, industry 
practitioners and Chinese scholars, I constructed patterns and interconnections of multiple 
levels of analyzing units (Yin, 2014). Besides exemplars, I included outliers in this study 
(Aharoni, 2011; Buckley, 2016; Ragin, 1999). The first abductive landmark was noting that 
firms’ industry experience and networks were obvious points of difference that shaped 
cost/benefit calculations and decisions. Broad topics and detailed questions were asked in the 
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initial face-to-face meetings in the form of semi-structured interviews as discussed in the 
methodology chapter. I was able to clarify facts and inquire about the latest events and thoughts 
through informal contacts, email and telephone calls. The second phase of analysis involved 
reflection on their lack of understanding of host country regulations, industry knowledge and 
connections. Finally, after the second round of field work, I learned that majority of the firms 
were not optimistic about future plans for expansion and integration. Table 7.3 summarizes the 
coding of main themes in this study.  
 
7.5   Why: Rationale 
 
Chinese investors in overseas agrifood businesses share similar objectives of seeking 
assets and resources. Unlike most studies that focus on host country conditions that determine 
motivations, this study begin with the home country as the firms are newcomers to the agrifood 
industry and internationalization. There is a strong connection between the growing Chinese 
market for high quality food as motivations for internationalization in agrifood sectors. The 
agrifood sector in China suffers from endowment constraints due to the lack of arable land and 
resources to meet rising demand. Access to clean and green agrifood sources was cited as the 
main motivation to purchase land overseas.7 It would be challenging to diversify (Knecht, 2014) 
in both the domestic and international markets. After deliberating on the different ways of 
organizing the rich data, I revisited the literature and incorporated learning (Casillas & Moreno-
Menéndez, 2014; Johanson & Vahlne, 2003; Lyles et al., 2014) and effectuation (Sarasvathy, 
2001) to analyze why and how these diverse actors target the upstream businesses. Each of the 
diversifying companies possessed different levels and types of capabilities and limitations. 
These attributes steered them to seek land-based options to bring resources to the China market 
and learn management skills as well. Advanced economies are considered to be stable and low 
risk destinations for Chinese investors setting their sights for long-term investment projects.  
 
I examined specific and common factors among Chinese investors of rural land and 
upstream agrifood business in Australia and New Zealand to draw on the deeper meanings 
behind these decisions. The selection of cases show preference for beef and dairy largely 
because the availability of large clean rural holdings in advanced economies to exploit 
economies of scale. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand are geographically closer to the 
China market and in the same time zones in contrast to European resource bases. It was only 
                                                          
7 In contrast, companies with extensive industry and internationalization experience were inclined to invest in 
downstream segments, as discussed in Chapter 6 
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in April 2017 that the Chinese government lifted its 14-year ban on US beef and the selective 
permit to import French and Irish beef 15 years ago due to BSE (mad cow disease). Hence, 
most Chinese investors shunned American beef and dairy sources due to trade restrictions, in 
addition to the physical distance for transporting fresh food and perishables to China.  
 
Companies B and E have also invested in related agrifood businesses in emerging 
economies, for instance, Company B’s cropping in Africa, and Company E’s cattle farming in 
South America. In view of their lack of experience in agrifood business, Chinese business 
groups used diversification into agrifood business overseas to access global assets and 
resources that have good potential for appreciation. Each of the actors made their fortunes in 
non-agricultural sector in China and has the financial resources to invest in agricultural sector 
which required long gestation for returns on capital. Slow learning and the challenging climb 
up the value chain ladder from upstream to downstream should be taken into consideration. 
This section will explore the rationale of upstream investors in four areas:  
 
(1) gain direct control of safe food sources from resource rich countries  
(2) match firm capabilities and experience with targets   
(3) capital appreciation and asset building   
(4) opportunities and regulatory protection in advanced economies  
 
Table 7.3 shows different levels and phases in the manual coding and analytical process. It is 
noteworthy that some of the original reasons offered changed when Chinese investors learned 
from their international experience.   
 
 
Table 7.3 Coding Themes of Diversification-Internationalization 
Key Points Turning Points Analysis of the Phenomenon 
Home country demand: safe food Growing supply and market Slow road for returns to investment 
Countries that are rich in resources 
Opportunities for acquisitions 
Political stability, asset protection 
Not all localities are the same 
Long term value of assets 
Uncertainties and knowledge gaps 
Increasingly unfriendly environment 
Search for suitable targets 
From upstream to downstream 
Challenges of farmland 
management and production  
Difference between intention and result  
Wealth of business group 
Due diligence 
Tolerable short-term losses 
Realization of shortcomings 
Wait and see  
Relevance to make up for competencies 
 
 
 Chapter Seven: Concurrent Sectoral Diversification and Internationalization 
202 
 
7.5.1 Direct Control of Safe Food Sources 
 
Farmland purchase is the direct and fastest way to access and own resources. These 
companies want reassurance of owning tangible physical assets of rural land and related 
farming operations. Securing consistent supply of high quality resources is the main priority of 
Companies B, C, D and E as they are targeting the growing middle class and niche high end 
market. While the World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2009) found that most MNEs are not 
involved in direct farming but in processing and distribution streams, newcomers to agrifood 
sector are more comfortable to start with upstream production segment of the value chain. 
Interviewees justified land-based investment as a necessity to make up for China’s inherent 
disadvantages for large-scale farming with natural endowment constraints and increasingly 
stretched resources in clean water, arable land and rural labor. Longstanding and intractable 
issues of soil depletion, overuse of fertilizer, pollution and insufficient water could not be 
resolved in a short time. As urban development and non-agricultural land use are more lucrative 
than agriculture (Huang, 2008), a senior economics academic (X6) confirmed that imposing 
the redline minimum of arable land is insufficient to ensure food security. Local officials 
usually reserve land that is less valuable and less fertile to meet the stipulated threshold. 8  
 
Importing though less risky, would not be a good option because the participants 
coveted assurance of reliable and consistent supplies at reasonable prices. The Chinese 
government has encouraged firms to invest than to respond to higher demand for food by 
importing. Companies D and E have started farming business in China for two years before 
acquiring farmland overseas. However, like Companies B and D, Company E found that farm 
productivity for cattle was low in China due to the lack of good pastures, harsh terrain, limited 
water sources and high cost of animal feed. The Vice President of Company B noted that cattle 
in China did not have the luxury of space while in New Zealand, one dairy cow grazed on 0.4 
hectares of land. Company E appreciated the rich natural resources and competitive advantages 
of Australia, in stark contrast to the natural endowment deficit in China. 
 
“China has limited natural resources, but consumers are getting more affluent and could afford better 
food. Beef cattle farms in Xinjiang are free roaming and not intensive farming. China’s land conversion 
policy has impacted productivity and land for beef cattle is scarce. The climate is too dry for grass to 
grow well. Similarly, Mongolia is also unsuitable. Only in Shandong, the weather is better and animal 
feed is also cheaper. The northern regions are suitable for breeding dairy cows but not optimal for beef 
cattle. Land resources in China is limited because of urbanization, industrialization and competition for 
different uses.” – E1, HQ (2015) 
                                                          
8 Prime land that commands the highest prices are usually in the river deltas around the cities on the east 
coast of China.  
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Food safety was a common objective shared by all participants interviewed. As these 
upstream investors not SOEs, they did not have additional responsibilities to accomplish food 
security objectives. Companies B and D clearly stated their aspiration to build a brand name of 
safe and tasty food that emphasized traceability of all its products and provide assurance to 
consumers. Company D was headed by a team of technical and professional experts to direct 
resources into research and sourcing of high quality fruit, vegetables, poultry, fish and red meat 
in China and overseas subsidiaries. An agricultural economics scholar (X7) said that milk 
sourced from New Zealand and the Netherlands were the most highly regarded by Chinese 
consumers, followed by Australia, Ireland, France and some west European countries. Frequent 
travel created new opportunities (Crick & Spence, 2005; Klag & Langley, 2013; Meyer & Skak, 
2002) for potential Chinese investors to invest beyond traditional destinations of Southeast 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. The owners of Companies C and D were said to 
have been impressed by the favorable environment in Australia when they toured the country 
some years ago. Following up, they kept a close watch for investment opportunities in Australia. 
Drawing on literature from psychology, people develop liking and perceive as attractive, 
objects that are more familiar, having been exposed to them over time (Zajonc, 2001). 
 
7.5.2 Matching capabilities with international targets 
 
Diversification can be employed as a corporate strategy in dynamic environments 
(Knecht, 2014). Home market demand played an important role in the surge of agrifood OFDI 
to Australia and New Zealand since 2008. Prior to the latest series of investment, the 
internationalization track records of all except Company B have been mostly confined to 
trading, exporting manufactured goods and services. More Chinese POEs are shifting from 
core businesses to hedge against risk exposure (Van Mieghem, 2007) and exploit potential 
benefits and profitability (Very, 1993) of consumption-led new normal economy.  
 
Though the case companies are award winners in manufacturing and have good 
industry and political connections (Chapter 5), they are new to agrifood business. Two Chinese 
economists I spoke to said that while Chinese agricultural firms diversified to seek higher 
profits, successful non-agricultural firms are more interested in expanding to agrifood business 
for long term stability. Though profit margins in the agricultural sector are typically low, non-
agricultural POEs are keen to tap the next wave of growth with the burgeoning middle class in 
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emerging economies. Wealthy private corporate groups have built up resources to diversify 
into agrifood business quickly to gain the first mover advantage of providing clean and safe 
food. All the four companies articulated that they were “investing for the future”.   
 
“Agriculture though less profitable and takes a long time to build up, it is less speculative, not a bubble. 
Vegetables cost $5 a kg now; copper prices are also approximately that. It’s better to invest in agrifood 
than mining.” – C1, HQ (2015) 
 
 
Concurrent and prior to their foray into agrifood business, three companies had already 
expanded into an array of services (financial, education, recreation, tourism). Companies B, D 
and E had developed domestic agricultural subsidiaries before investing in Australia and New 
Zealand (Table 7.5). The financial reports of Companies C and E indicated lower profits earned 
in the last three years prior to internationalization. Companies B and C had earlier benefited 
from high growth and infrastructural projects in the post-GFC stimulus policies but anticipated 
gradual slowdown. Company E also faced competition from cheaper producers of machinery 
for markets in developing economies. Table 7.4 shows the diversification of portfolios which 
Chinese companies and government officials termed as “transformation” and “remodeling”.  
 
Table 7.4   Background of Case Companies and Diversification of Business Groups 
Firms  Core Businesses   Diversification in China Overseas targets 
 
B Real Estate, 
Construction  
Technology, Utilities, Investment, Mining, Metals  
Cropping: soy, corn, sorghum.  
Sheep breeding, live pigs, dairy, meat processing   
 
Africa (mining; crops) 
South America (grain) 
New Zealand (dairy) 
C Metal tools and parts 
 
Scoping and negotiating to distribute premium food Australia  
(winery; cattle) 
 
D   
 
Metal processing    
  
Education, Finance, Real Estate, Hotels, Environment 
Sustainable farming and health food 
 
Australia 
(real estate; cattle) 
E   
 
Machinery  
  
Real estate, Hotels, Recreation, Equity Investment. 
Sheep breeding 
 
Australia (cattle) 
Central Asia (meat)  
Europe, US, NZ  
(recreation) 
  
 
 
Unlike agrifood industry heavyweights that have a strong research base and access to a 
wide range of funding avenues, most upstream investors have yet to establish agrifood industry 
connections in the home and host country. An economic director of the provincial government 
(Q3) said that Chinese overseas consulates usually try to match newcomers with more 
experienced businesses as mentors but since there are few prior Chinese investment in 
advanced economies, there are limitations to tapping ethnic networks. During the first round 
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of interviews in 2015, all the four companies had yet to develop databases of domestic and 
global product markets and distribution systems of the agrifood products in their portfolios. 
They did not have the necessary resources and skills to manage downstream business and 
integrate value chain segments It will take time to build up industry knowledge, unlike agrifood 
leaders that have timely market database and integrated value chains in domestic and regional 
markets.   
 
The companies studied in this chapter justified investing in lower cost upstream 
businesses as a safe investment. Due to their limited agrifood and international experience, they 
were convinced that physical assets are sound investment as the value appreciate over time. 
Moreover, land prices were less prohibitive in contrast to costly and limited number of higher 
value downstream business. On average, a processing business project could cost 10 to 20 times 
more than a dairy farm or cattle station. Competition for processing business is typically keener, 
are likely to be cornered by the bigger and more experienced players.  
 
A senior executive (E2) noted the scarcity of good processing businesses available for 
sale and were therefore more “precious”. Land purchases were relatively more affordable and 
appeared easier for those lacking in industry experience to manage. The Chairman of an 
overseas subsidiary (D3) noted that their investments must be profitable in the long term. 
Commitment to downstream industries would put additional strain on monetary and human 
resources for firms that are new to agrifood business. The two companies also noted that 
downstream businesses could be double-edged, and face coordination and cost management 
risks despite the promise of higher profits. The Vice President D1 pointed out that downstream 
business would not be at the mercy of weather conditions. However, D1 also recognized that 
it would be more difficult to manage downstream business: 
 
“Downstream requires higher level and different types of skills because of more stringent regulatory 
demands for sanitation, logistics, recycling and liaison with government.” – D1, HQ (2016) 
 
 
Despite their interest to look out for downstream opportunities, the management in 
Companies D and E stressed that they were “not ready” for downstream business, and the 
timing was not right yet, given the uncertain market conditions. Investment in downstream 
agrifood business must be well-planned and could not be easily executed if they lack relevant 
experience. E2 said that the company currently did not have the requisite skills to manage the 
processing and marketing specialized product range. While Chinese investors wanted to keep 
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the options open, screening the market for the right opportunities to acquire assets at reasonable 
prices, they want to ensure smooth transition and integration with their current upstream assets.   
 
7.5.3 Capital appreciation and asset building  
 
Chinese investors were optimistic that rural land values will appreciate. Following the 
experience of China’s growth history, those businesses and individuals who have witnessed or 
benefited from the property boom in China have strong faith in real estate. For Company B, 
real estate has been the bedrock and growth engine, while Companies D and E diversified into 
real estate development several years before entering agrifood industry (Table 7.4). Some 
industry experts I interviewed have criticized land purchases as myopic, applying China’s 
narrow window of property boom experience to OFDI which is very different. Yet upstream 
investors were undeterred and placed much hope for capital appreciation. Though the owner 
(C1) admitted that he might have overpaid for one of the properties, he was unperturbed and 
believed that the value of land would appreciate over time.  
   
Asset accumulation is a strong driver for Companies B and E to pursue acquisitions of 
large scale rural land in advanced economies. Ownership of more physical assets would serve 
as good collateral to secure credit needed for expansion. Industry sources said that management 
of cattle requires large-scale and long-term commitments. It would not be profitable to invest 
in small holdings with a few thousand heads of cattle. Company B’s solid foundation in real 
estate and infrastructural development reinforced its bid for prized land parcels. An academic 
(X7) inferred from Company B’s activities in the Chinese stock market that it was using 
internationalization as a way of boosting the company’s reputation and share value.   
 
Company E’s overseas subsidiary bought several more cattle stations in the vicinity and 
consolidated more than 10 properties in Southeast Australia to improve efficiency and 
economies of scale. Manager E2 disclosed the company’s plan to acquire more assets as a way 
of getting competitive financing overseas to enable the company to expand to an optimal level. 
E2 recently confided that the company’s aim was to expand its land bank and eventually make 
agricultural business almost half of the conglomerate’s total revenue in the coming years.   
 
“Currently our financing for overseas investment is sourced mainly in China, with a small amount from 
overseas. Creditors evaluate the company’s current assets. As we acquire more assets overseas, we will 
be able to borrow more from overseas, maybe at good rates. It’s the bank’s assessment of risk.”  -- E2, 
HQ (2016) 
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7.5.4 Opportunities and Regulatory Protection 
 
Protection of ownership rights was a main enticement for Chinese investors who 
invested in farmland overseas. Coming from a state-controlled system where land was 
collectively owned or leased to entrepreneurs, private ownership of property was attractive to 
Chinese investors. The key participants of the four companies viewed political stability and 
rule of law in advanced economies as appealing consideration (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Luo & 
Tung, 2007).  
 
Company B stood out from the rest by strongly affirming the trust that legal protection 
of proprietary rights, established regulations and strong institutions in advanced economies 
would work in their favor. As one of China’s first mover to invest in dairy farms overseas in 
New Zealand, early success in land acquisitions bolstered Company B’s confidence to acquire 
more farmland in Australia and branch out to the nascent beef cattle industry. Then Vice 
President B1 was nonchalant that the nationalistic backlash seen in previous Chinese 
investment in developing countries; he doubted this would happen in advanced economies. 
Though an émigré with extensive international and agricultural industry experience in Africa 
and South America, B1 dismissed suggestions that local sensitivities to land purchases would 
hinder the company’s overseas expansion. Senior executives in Company B were self-assured 
that the host country should logically welcome foreign investors who would bring much-
needed capital to revitalize the agrifood sector, providing employment and infrastructure to 
improve the local economy. The company had hoped to learn, adopt and capitalize modern 
Western legal systems to protect its acquired overseas assets.    
 
“Using a soft influence approach, we learn more, and adapt to local Western laws which would in turn 
protect our interests, and effectively apply the law to secure and advance our interests.” – B1, HQ (2015) 
 
 
The founder of Company C also highlighted the importance of legal protection in 
countries like Australia due to the political stability. As a smaller player among the diversifiers 
into the agrifood sector, it has chosen to invest only in Australia. Company E also indicated 
that Australia was a more stable investment destination than Southeast Asian countries.   
 
Another perspective that is often overlooked concerns the nostalgia from investors’ 
agricultural occupations in the past. Opportunities for overseas land purchases helped to satisfy 
personal aspirations of wealthy businessmen. Most POEs emerged in the 1990s after collective 
agricultural land was increasingly expropriated for urbanization. According to a business 
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broker and consultant (X4), buyers of Australian rural properties were mostly farmers in their 
younger days. Companies C and D confirmed that the owners’ families had been farmers for 
many generations. Some may have participated in earlier 1980s household TVEs in restricted 
free market experimentation. POEs that ventured into non-agricultural business still held strong 
emotional attachment to land. The household collective farming system and continuing 
urbanization meant that farmers only had small plots of land to work on. While Chinese 
companies could lease amalgamated plots for economically efficient farming, this could not 
match the farm size in Australia and New Zealand. Chinese academics X6 and X7 said that 
mechanization has helped Chinese farmers to improve yields but the lack of natural endowment 
(poor quality of soil, pollution and limited water resources) has constrained China’s agricultural 
productivity. Large agricultural economies offer opportunities for Chinese agribusiness 
investors to acquire large tracts of good quality rural land from retiring farmers who wanted to 
divest but struggled to find suitable successors or local buyers. Despite the Chinese 
government’s encouragement to invest in downstream agrifood businesses (Ye, 2016), 
diversifiers-internationalizers were convinced of the advantages of owning farmland in 
advanced economies.  
 
7.6   Casing: Addressing How Questions   
 
The four Chinese corporate groups studied exhibited irregular development, phases of 
confidence, expansion, reconsideration and temporary inactivity. Concurrent diversification 
and internationalization that is anomalous in IB can be more challenging than investors had 
envisaged. Within-case study is appropriate to analyze different internationalization experience. 
Companies B, C and D had similar experience with initial expansion, scale back and refocus. 
In contrast, Company E was able to expand steadily. 
 
7.6.1 Company B: Overconfidence deflates international expansion   
 
 A corporate group with a real estate and services portfolio, Company B diversified into 
agrifood internationally before it had established a domestic agrifood business unit. Investment 
in Africa cropping was incidental, mainly to build goodwill in the host country where it had 
mining interests. Following the scandals over melamine tainted milk in China, Company B 
sourced for pristine resources by acquiring dairy farms in New Zealand. The holding company 
subsequently acquired a Chinese agrifood company into its corporate group and used this as 
the platform to its further agrifood diversification and internationalization. Since implanting 
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the domestic agrifood arm, Company B was beset by integration and public image issues 
related to a history of corporate fraud carried over from the acquired Chinese agrifood company.  
 
Company B thought that it had made the correct moves, recruiting western executives 
and localizing management staff in its parent company and foreign subsidiaries. However, 
communications problems have hindered integration and smooth operations. Three years on, 
senior managers in its New Zealand subsidiary were replaced by bilingual professionals.  
 
“We have 50-50 management, Chinese and locals, in New Zealand … We have legal assurance by using 
a holding company’s investment fund. We do not interfere with original local production of milk. Our 
success boils down to having good resource and good business partners.” – B1 (2015)   
 
 
Manager B4 confided that the CEO of the parent company’s agricultural unit who was a 
“foreigner” had difficulty communicating with senior and middle management in China. This 
slowed down workflow and impeded understanding and decision-making. Though this may 
not be a central cause of Company B’s subsequent failure in international expansion, internal 
problems hampered corporate coordination and effectiveness of growing market outlets in 
China.  
 
“The CEO resigned because he realized that China is a difficult market to develop. He does not know the 
Chinese language; he could neither read nor speak. It was time consuming having to translate financial 
reports and explain to him the business operations - that affected productivity and was costly. His 
experience in the New Zealand market was not relevant. That’s a developed and mature market, unlike 
in China. We need to put in a lot of work to build up the distribution because dairy is not yet fully 
developed in the China market.” - - B4 (2016) 
 
 
Encouraged by the initial smooth implementation of cropping and dairy, Company B’s 
senior executives overseeing agrifood business, decided to expand into pastoral farming. Host 
government approval of its first entry to advanced economies (New Zealand) convinced the 
management team that mature economies with established institutions were more reliable and 
stable than developing economies. However, Company B embarked on expansion into cattle 
farming overseas before it had time to develop its dairy distribution in the China market.   
  
Its most recent overseas bids for substantial blocks of cattle stations in New Zealand 
and Australia were rejected by the host governments. Though the two top executives had 
agrifood industry knowledge and international experience, their skills were not directly 
relevant to the specialized pastoral sector. Seemingly good diplomatic relations between China 
and Oceanian countries beguiled the management to dismiss the looming undercurrents and 
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shift in host countries’ political climate. Lowy Institute polled in 2014 showing 60 per cent of 
the public were against “the Australian government allowing foreign companies to invest in 
agriculture” (Fullilove, 2014). The timing of the Australian elections heightened the 
politicization of foreign land ownership by minority parties and populist campaigns. Despite 
being a POE and transparent in its activities, Company B’s expansion to the pastoral sector was 
blocked on rare application of “national interest” grounds by the Australian Foreign Investment 
Review Board.  
 
B4 who was well-informed of the company’s overseas expansion later disclosed that 
the management realized too late the intensity of nationalistic opposition. Subsequent efforts 
to explain and put positive spins by hiring public relations consultants proved futile. the CEO 
had international experience misread the evolving situation. Earlier success and preconceived 
optimism (March & Shapira, 1987) clouded managers’ assessment of the costs (Ghauri & 
Hassan, 2014) involved in acquiring competitive targets. Considering the fluidity of the 
political and regulatory environment, firms need more than basic knowledge of 
internationalization, and have to be flexible and innovative in order to  create value and improve 
performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
 
To boost shareholder confidence after its failed bids in Australia and New Zealand, 
Company B undertook radical internal changes in the agricultural unit and redesigned its 
internationalization plans. Company B executives tried to put up a brave front publicly while 
extensive corporate regrouping was taking place. According to a cattle industry source, the 
interim chief executive who replaced the Westerner was “not disappointed” that the deal was 
rejected because it was “free advertisement” for the company while causing damage to the host 
country’s reputation. However, three Chinese investors / industry experts I spoke to thought 
that Company B was chasing overpriced and “hollow” trophy targets which required additional 
capital to make the farms viable.   
 
Recovering from the debacle of aggressive expansion, Company B promptly ceased 
pursuing pastoral farming and expanded into more familiar grains trading business in South 
America. The newly elected Managing Director of the agrifood management was known for 
his experience in agrifood business and internationalization. He also had a track record of 
avoiding farmland purchases and targeting downstream agrifood investments in his previous 
appointments. Under the new leadership, Company B focused on consolidating its existing 
dairy assets. Over the past five years Company B has opened a thousand stores in several 
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Chinese provinces by collaborating with supermarkets and used online and TV channels to 
promote B2C sales. However, it had not made much headway in importing higher quantities 
of fresh milk due to the stringent regulations imposed by the Chinese authorities. Rather than 
diversifying further into a wide range of subsectors and products, Company B would 
concentrate on building up its dairy and grains supply chain.    
 
7.6.2 Company C: initial success, expansion, and freeze in unsuccessful areas  
 
The sequence of Company C’s activities defied the conventional conception of building 
competitive domestic business and diversify before internationalizing. In 2013, Company C 
was scouting for international investment opportunities before having a clear idea of the type 
of industry and extent of diversification. The owner C1 stumbled upon a reputable Australian 
vineyard/winery facing cash flow difficulties through a business associate and decided to 
contribute some capital. Encouraged by the success of its first attempts to market Australian 
wine in the affluent Yangzi regional cities, C1 took up majority stake and planned to acquire 
more diverse overseas businesses. Unlike many Chinese vineyard acquisitions for hobby and 
recreation, the positive experience of Company C was attributed to both quality and quantity. 
C1 emphasized that he owned profitable large-scale wine “factories” not “small wineries”. The 
successful run of the vineyard/winery business was better than what Company C had 
anticipated. In 2015, half of the output was exported to China, the remaining wine was sold in 
in Australia, Europe and Southeast Asia. 
 
“Our markets for wine spans the whole of China. We are committed to marketing. These can be 
considered normal returns. Opportunities for development in Yangzi region are slightly better. We 
chose to follow the branding strategy. Until now, development can be considered good, and have met 
our expectations.”  -- C2 (2017) 
 
 
Company C recognized that the demand for beef in China was rising and would match 
pork and chicken consumption in the future. Believing that premium beef would complement 
fine wine, Company C went on to acquire multiple pastoral land to boost its overseas asset 
stock. Though its foray into cattle farms cost over $70 million, double that invested in wineries, 
cattle beef was less profitable.    
 
Unlike the other Chinese POEs that also started as family businesses but had introduced 
professionalism into the management team, Company C’s decisions were made solely by the 
founder and owner. C1 took it upon himself to research, scout and decide on investment targets. 
Local Australians were hired as farm managers and workers supplemented by seasonal 
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farmhands. The owner C1 declared that he did not engage consultants, brokers or agricultural 
experts because he only trusted his own assessment. He took personal responsibility for all the 
decisions. Nevertheless, C1 accepted that he might have overpaid for the most recent 
investment in a cattle station. Managing Director C3 clarified that previous opportunities 
recommended by agents were unsuccessful in contrast to Company C’s direct contact with 
vendors.  
 
The Managing Director C3 tried to justify the limited scope of its Australian cattle farm 
operations. While acknowledging weather and complex management challenges, high costs 
and difficulty of producing good quality beef were implied. C3 claimed he was not concerned 
that his Australian farms did not directly supply beef to China. Their cattle stations engaged in 
less costly and easier calf-raising activities for a short period of time, giving some semblance 
of working farms. The management of cattle stations has been left entirely to Australian 
managers who reported to subsidiary offices in Australian cities and headquarters in China.   
 
“The main activity in two of our cattle stations is raising young calves up to 25 kg and selling to the 
commodity market. Fattening is also not our business. We don’t deal with distributors or retail in 
Australia. Acquiring abattoir business is not on the cards. Currently, there is no need to enter 
processing because our calves are sold at an early stage.”  -- C3 (2016) 
 
 
Company C was contented to act as a distributor rather than producer at the source as 
it was not producing efficiently and sufficiently to supply the China market. C3 organized meat 
purchases at auctions to export to China. Unlike some Chinese industry associates who boasted 
traceability of its products, C3 argued that consumers trusted food originating from Australia 
as the country itself was a brand name with an immaculate tracking system. C3 dismissed 
traceability as irrelevant because it is already built into the Australian system.  
 
“Australian law requires transparent tracking. Australian regulators and safety standards are well 
known.  There is nothing special about one company from another. It’s the same whether beef are for 
exports or are sold in Australia. We could check the source and track the entire supply chain if we 
wanted to. But that is of no interest and unimportant to us. We won’t know if the meat from our farms 
are sold to restaurants or households and to which countries. Our beef products distributed in the 
China market are not sourced directly from our own cattle stations.”  -- C3 (2016) 
 
 
In subsequent conversations, Manager C2 disclosed that the company’s Australian beef 
exports did not meet customer demand in China, in terms of pricing and quality. Company C 
tried to purchase acceptable quality beef at prices that Chinese consumers were willing to pay. 
However, Australian beef was not price competitive compared to US and South American 
imports, and Chinese consumers who paid a premium had very high expectations.  
 Chapter Seven: Concurrent Sectoral Diversification and Internationalization 
213 
 
 
“We can’t attribute [not meeting expectations] to the commercial model, or a problem with raw 
material / resources. Australian grass-fed cattle cannot compete in China’s lower end market. Higher 
end products marketing channels remain very good but faced pressure from US grain-fed resources, 
and Chinese government policies. [Trade] is not smooth. Prices of grass-fed cow could easily be 
depressed by competition from even cheaper South American sources. I believe that Australian 
abattoirs and meat processors still command a favorable marketing situation in China because sales 
do not involve large quantities and could utilize trade fairs to achieve precision marketing. However, 
faced with vast market challenges, Australian beef is more expensive and does not enjoy competitive 
advantages. Yes, the main customers are concentrated in Shanghai Yangzi area.” – C2 (2017) 
 
 
 Despite worse than expected results with its recent cattle farm acquisitions, Company 
C claimed it had gained first mover advantage. Company C was fortunate that the timing of its 
acquisition did not encounter resistance in the host country, but he was wary about the negative 
climate towards foreign investors in the host country.   
 
 “FIRB revision of Chinese land investment threshold was a passive reaction on the part of politicians. 
It had not affected us because our acquisitions have already been approved. However, in future we 
will likely hit the threshold of foreign ownership and this will be known to the public.” - C3 (2016) 
 
 “I feel satisfied with our correct assessment of the market, achieving acquisition targets and the 
approval. But I’m not so satisfied with management of relationships in the host country. Another issue 
is understanding Australian culture and gaining public acceptance.” - C3 (2016) 
 
 
Company C was the only firm that did not have agrifood production base in the home 
country when it invested in Australia. It incurred much higher risks than the other diversifiers-
internationalizers. Company C’s serendipitous overseas acquisition of non-core businesses 
meant it was not well equipped to manage uncertainties in agrifood business. MD C3 who was 
slated to take over the family business affirmed that agrifood business would comprise less 
than 10 per cent of the corporate group’s assets and revenue. Earlier suggestions by the owner 
C1 to expand agrifood OFDI to Asian countries have apparently been put on hold. C2 recently 
confirmed that there was no intention to acquire abattoirs or South American resources.  
 
7.6.3 Company D: challenges and interruption in overseas expansion  
 
Diversification and internationalization are carefully designed by this corporate group 
reputed for metal exports. Its founder was a billionaire and ranked in the top 100 of China’s 
rich list according to Forbes in 2016. Company D has been diversifying into real estate, hotels, 
education and financial services earlier. Its subsequent diversification into agrifood business 
was spurred by demands of its education subsidiary. Company D started importing food for 
school boarders from wealthy families under its education services business. In 2011, Company 
D launched sustainable horticulture and free-range poultry farming in China.  
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Company D expanded its nascent agrifood business through internationalization to 
fulfil its objective of providing safe and healthy food to the Chinese population. While domestic 
horticulture, fisheries and poultry enjoyed some success, trial cattle farming in South China 
proved unsatisfactory, prompting the company to seek overseas resources. Company D was 
initially looking for opportunities in vineyards in the US and cattle stations in Australia but 
decided to settle for the latter in 2014. They did not consider cattle opportunities in the US 
because the ban on American beef was still in force until August 2017.  
 
Company D faced challenges managing its overseas agrifood assets due to the lack of 
relevant industry expertise and different business environment. The recruitment of scientific 
professionals and agricultural specialists contributed to the growth of its domestic agrifood 
business but proved less useful for internationalization. Though D1 was an accomplished US 
trained scientist, he admitted to “gaps” between professional knowledge and actual business. 
D3 and D4 had careers in finance and business consultancy before managing their overseas 
subsidiaries, but they lacked knowledge in agrifood business. Both lamented that 
comprehensive guidelines on “cattle industry best practices” were not easily available to help 
Australian farm owners. Subsequently, D4 engaged agro-specialist consultants to provide 
relevant farm management advice.   
 
Despite intensive pre-acquisition research, hiring top consultants and examining more 
than 30 potential projects in Australia, Company D was not proud of its OFDI. When I first 
met D1 in 2015, he was confident the Company had not paid the so-called “China premium” 
(Phillips, 2012). A year later, D1 realized that consultants only looked superficially at the 
positive aspects based on information provided by the vendor and neglected to consider 
negative scenarios when conducting due diligence. Only those who have specialist knowledge 
and experience in Australian farming and are familiar with local regulations, and able to make 
accurate assessment of the value of these farm assets. Water shortage had been a serious 
challenge especially with the prolonged drought since taking over the cattle station. However, 
D1 realized belatedly that investing in water titles would not alleviate shortage under drought 
conditions.   
 
“It is important to learn and understand water titles. Only the experts know the specifics. When the 
water level falls, holding a water title does not permit us to use any more water. When there is plenty 
of water, farmers with water entitlement can draw more water. Water right is useless when water is 
needed most. We spent A$7 million to acquire water rights.  
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Now I understand why the previous owner did not invest more on the farm. Initially I thought it was 
because the previous owner had no money, which was partly true, but more importantly, it was a 
difficult business to manage [because of dry weather]. The former owner stayed on as a consultant 
for 6 months after the transaction. But he moved further south and purchased another farm. [He did 
not retire]” - D1 (2016)   
 
D1 admitted he had learned much about the Australian cattle industry from post-
acquisition conversations with agricultural, trade and investment officials. He believed that 
Company D would have made better investment choices and gained higher returns and lower 
operating costs if they had consulted Australian officials before investing. Due to their limited 
networks in Australia, Company D did not have access to specialized cattle industry knowledge 
and regulations. Company D’s main Australian subsidiary contact was their Australian meat 
processor. It did not receive support from Australian officials (prior to drought relief support 
in 2018), other Chinese investors and the rural community around their cattle stations.    
 
“We have contact with Austrade to convey the strain of land tax on foreign investors. It is a 
disadvantage for foreign investors because during down times, we still employ Australians and pay 
their salaries. Because there are few Chinese owning farmland, we don’t have much of a voice. Just 
to give feedback but nothing has been done.  
 
We don’t have to keep track of developments of other Chinese investors. We are not close to 
Australian industry associates. Everyone has the same costs, facilities, activities. There is no direct 
competition, as we are doing the same things.” -  D4 (2017) 
 
  Company D attributed the poor performance mainly to “weather conditions beyond 
human control”. Prolonged drought led to stocks declining to half the cattle herd size when 
they started with more than 5000 heads. Bogged down by multiple challenges of knowledge 
gap, high operating costs (labor and animal feed) and poor weather, Company D was 
constrained from expanding horizontally and integrating vertically with other parts of the value 
chain. Initially Company D made arrangement with its Australian meat processor to export 
beef from their Australian farms to Company D’s own marketing networks in China. Two 
shipments of Angus beef produced by its Australian farms were delivered to China in late 2015 
and January 2016. At that time, the CEO of its Australian subsidiary D2 estimated that 30% of 
the output from their cattle stations were destined for the China market while the rest were sold 
mostly in Australia, US, Japan and Korea, as decided by their processor. However, a year later, 
Company D halted supplies from their farms to the China market due to shortages. Another 
smaller pastoral farming project had leased surplus equipment to mining companies during this 
period of inactivity. 
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Company D, like Company C, was discouraged from further international expansion 
but would hold existing agrifood investments in the hope of turnaround. Company D 
considered purchasing an abattoir in 2016 but walked away from the opportunity because the 
price was high, and the vendor refused to guarantee earnings and make allowance for an 
impending downturn. In contrast, Company D’s domestic agrifood business continues to grow 
steadily. As a small part of the corporate group business, the poor performance of its overseas 
agrifood component hardly affected the group’s overall performance. It planned to gradually 
expand to reach 50 specialty food retail stores beyond big cities to residential districts. It has 
established a coherent and connected ecosystem in China for efficient tracking from self- 
managed production, processing, cold systems, transport and retail with the help of a US-based 
multinational IT solutions consultant.  
 
Company D could afford and was prepared to wait for years to get return on capital 
from its overseas investment. However, the timeframe had been extended in view of 
uncertainties. In the worst-case scenario, D3 has not ruled out divesting its agrifood business 
in Australia, in the unlikely event that they received a good offer. 
  
“Returns will take a long time: two to three years to be operationally manageable, and longer about 5 
to 10 years for positive returns. Only in the medium to longer term can the investor expect the value of 
agricultural assets to appreciate. This is not a fantastic financial investment. It is more for longer term 
strategic interest. If we were only interested in financial returns, it’s better to invest in residential real 
estate.” - D3 (2016) 
 
 
7.6.4 Company E: steady expansion 
 
With its wealth accumulated earned from manufacturing machinery, Company E 
diversified into real estate, recreation and financial services. In 2012, Company E began sheep 
breeding jointly with an SOE with industry knowledge and was familiar with northern China. 
Company E initially imported live breeding stock from Australia for its sheep farms in China. 
In less than two years, Company E expanded to beef cattle farming in Australia, and 
subsequently to South America and Central Asia because of natural disadvantages for beef 
cattle farming in China. The diversification of sources enabled Company E to tap the mass 
market for medium grade beef from developing countries and the high end premium beef from 
Australia.  
 
Company E sought crucial advice from its team of industry professionals recruited in 
Australia because it did not trust brokers and consultants. Initially, the intention was to cultivate 
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canola and wheat. It changed to breeding sheep and cows and grew different types of grass. 
However, local farmers and the previous owners advised them to move from mixed farming to 
concentrate on beef cattle. Company E was able to incrementally acquire family-sized holdings 
and the neighboring blocks over the years and consolidated them into sizeable blocks to achieve 
efficiency. Company E’s total assets in Australia approximately double that of the investments 
made by Companies C or D individually.  
 
“Cross border investment is full of uncertainties. We need good recommendations for projects. 
Though the Chinese Commerce Ministry has representative offices in many countries, the locals will 
understand how to manage public relations better. Professional bankers and accountants are available, 
but Company E won’t delegate advice because the interest of consultants is in brokering deals. We 
are more interested in quality and profitability.” – E1 (2015) 
 
“We rarely relied on intermediaries, maybe less than 40% of the time. Mostly, we deal directly with 
the vendors.” - E2 (2016) 
 
 
Company E had a parallel structure of Australian and Chinese managers in its overseas 
subsidiary. Company E hired an Australian with experience in rural property management to 
head the Australian office before acquiring overseas assets. The public face of Company E in 
Australia is of Anglo-Saxon heritage. Bilingual Chinese émigrés served as the interface 
between head office and subsidiaries and interactions of management, professional and farming 
staff.  
 
 “We employ local Australians and that cost the company A$2 to 3 million a year … The Australian 
CEO is adept at communicating with Austrade and DFAT.” - - E1 (2015)    
 
“He [the Australian CEO] is knowledgeable and experienced, has many channels and is good at dealing 
with different parties.” – E2 (2016)  
 
 
 The strategy of Company E was to maintain a low profile so that vested interests in the 
host country did not have a chance to protest. Only when Company E had acquired substantial 
landholdings was it confident to raise its profile and engaged the public and media. Company 
E’s spokesman shared industry knowledge in the media, informing and reassuring the 
Australian public and politicians of the challenges of managing agrifood business and the 
contributions made by foreign investors to the economy. 
 
The pace of expansion depends on local environment. We tried to keep a low profile, not to leak any 
information prematurely. We only announce after the transaction. Foremost, we must have a good 
strategy. Then public relations and operations. 
 
We do not chase assets blindly. Decisions must be scientific and reasonable. Use overseas advantage to 
make up for domestic shortcomings. Accelerate only when the company has more bargaining power.  
Developing home market and e-commerce will follow.”  - -  E2 (2016) 
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Company E was more fortunate than C and D in that its farm assets were not hit by 
drought. Australian processors were instructed to export small quantities of Angus beef 
produced in farms owned by Company E to test the China market in urban stores and e-
commerce platforms. Company E learned through using others’ distribution systems in China 
before developing their own. US and Japan are still the largest markets. Company E would be 
in a better position than C and D to expand its overseas assets. According to E2, the plan was 
to eventually make its agriculture business comprise half of the corporate group’s core business. 
However, it acknowledged that margins from agrifood business were slim and returns on 
capital would be slow. E2 emphasized the need to balance investment objectives and spread 
risks. Though keen to expand into downstream agrifood value chain, Company E conceded 
that downstream business was more sophisticated and potential targets must satisfy many 
conditions for success before proceeding – business cycle, specialized skills, smooth transition 
and market channels.     
    
“Opportunities for acquiring meat processing are coming up because conditions have changed since the 
third quarter of 2015. Abattoirs were doing a thriving business in the past 2.5 years, earning huge profits. 
Company XYZ bought at the peak, had to pay a premium based on prior market price. This sector is cyclical. 
We are waiting for opportunities and the right price as conditions have changed.  
 
Taking over processing business is challenging because this is a highly skilled area. Most Chinese 
businesses do not have enough experience with processing. While workers usually remain in the factories, 
the managers, usually the former owners, may not want to stay. This abattoir we were interested in had two 
generations of owners working on the business, but they wanted to get out totally. Most family businesses 
hold extreme propositions: either the previous owner insists on keeping a majority stake and stay on to 
manage [and control] or they would totally wash their hands. In the interim after takeover, we need 
managers who are experienced in the same business. You can’t just recruit someone from another company 
in the same industry because they won’t know the exclusive products of that abattoir well. Acquiring 
processing business can be quite tricky and risky in this respect.”  -- E2, HQ (2016) 
 
 
The degree of commitment and how investors envisioned the internationalization 
process are closely correlated with their evolving OFDI performance. While simultaneous 
diversification and internationalization could be challenging, Company E was the most 
optimistic, expecting agrifood business to grow to 50 per cent the size of the corporate group. 
Company D had the resources to endure setbacks managing its overseas assets and would 
continue to expand its domestic agrifood business. Different outcomes of agrifood OFDI and 
divestment had not adversely affected the corporate groups’ overall performance and 
profitability. Company C was the least ambitious, as it did not have any firm plans to diversify 
and internationalize at the beginning and would focus on its successful wine business and its 
core metals manufacturing. Company B regrouped after failing to acquire cattle businesses and 
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indicated that it would return to invest in Australia and consolidate its existing dairy supply 
chain. Table 7.5 shows the varying degrees of commitment by each of the firms studied and 
their vision of the importance of the agrifood sector in the corporate group’s portfolio.  
 
Table 7.5 Varying Degrees of Commitment and Future Prognosis 
E D B C 
Consolidate land bank 
Develop China market 
Owns more than 10 
properties worth over $100 
million. 
 
Waiting for downstream 
opportunities and smooth 
transition of management 
 
Agrifood arm to grow to 
50% of group business. 
 
Focus on breeding, feeding. 
 
Industry learning.    
Build networks with host 
 
Develop niche markets in 
China. 
 
Agrifood currently 
comprises a small portion 
but is growing. 
 
Not ready to enter 
downstream business.   
 
Regroup internally 
 
Reconfigure OFDI after 
exit from Australia 
 
Diversify to South 
America grains (animal 
feed) 
 
Focus on dairy and 
withdraw from meat. 
 
Plans to re-enter 
Australia later 
 
Success in wine distribution 
in home provinces. 
 
Cattle stations engage in 
disjointed activities.  
 
Priority in cost saving 
expediency rather than 
expansion.  
 
Agrifood will be under 10% 
of group business 
 
 
             High          Level of Commitment                   Low 
 
 
7.7 Discussion 
 
7.7.1 Gap between Intentions and Achievements 
 
Chinese diversifiers faced additional difficulties expanding to non-core sectors beyond 
related product range and new markets. When they embarked on internationalization 
concurrently or soon after diversification, their options are constrained by limited capabilities 
and skills despite their wealth and recruitment of industry experts.    Resource-seeking 
motivations arise from the lack of resource endowment and rising demand in the home country. 
Implementation may not proceed according to plan because practical circumstances may either 
enhance or impede progress. Due to the uncertainties of diversifying across sectors and borders 
(Hashai & Delios, 2012), the paths are irregular and non-linear. Firms need to balance the cost 
and benefits to gain from synergies and value creation of acquisitions (Zhou, 2011). Moreover, 
the liability of foreignness (Galavotti et al., 2017; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) increases in the 
agrifood sector due to sensitivities attached to foreign land ownership. Table 7.6 shows the 
internationalization process of individual firms. Chinese investors halted overseas investment 
after encountering challenges or have acquired substantial rural land (Company E).  
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Table 7.6 Internationalization Process of Case Companies (2010-2017) 
Company B 
Core and peripheral   Dairy resource seeking Expansion to red meat deterred Focus on existing resources 
Metals and cropping 
in Africa  
Cumulative acquisitions of 
New Zealand dairy farms.   
Failed bid for sheep and beef 
station in New Zealand. 
 
Failed bid for pastoral farmland 
in Australia.  
 
Grains trading in South 
America. 
 
Build up dairy value chain 
integration. 
 
 
Company C 
Exploration through networks   Beef cattle – new area Prioritize the successful, neglect the difficult 
Vineyards and winery. 
Small followed by higher stake 
 
Acquisition of parcels of 
farmland in succession.   
Focus on wine distribution.  
Stocks for China market from trading rather than 
own pastoral. Detach overseas assets from the 
home market. 
 
 
Company D 
Meat processing Wait and see 
Two beef cattle projects. 
More efficient than producing in China. 
 
Low stock due to prolonged drought. Temporary halt in supplies to the China 
market. Unable to link up with growing domestic agrifood networks.  
 
Services to mining companies during inactivity.  
 
 
Company E 
Pastoral: medium grade  Premium grade meat Further expansion and integration plans 
Central Asia  
South America 
 
Acquisition of small holdings from 
retiring Australian farmers and 
amalgamate  
 
Look out for meat processing opportunities.   
Continue to build land bank 
Develop distribution in China 
 
 
7.7.2 Lessons from the Case Studies 
 
 Each case has different experience due to varying objectives, managerial preferences, 
timing of investment, market size and regulations. These diversifier-internationalizers did not 
have the time and opportunity to cultivate extensive business networks (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2003; Mattsson et al., 2006), and could only do so gradually. Besides their inexperience in both 
agrifood industry and internationalization, these firms also did not learn vicariously from 
relevant industry experts (Posen & Chen, 2013). Chinese firms interested in investing in 
Australia and New Zealand that have small though growing ethnic Chinese migrant community 
have limited leverage in tapping diaspora connections (Mukherjee et al., 2018) to prepare for 
entry and facilitate transition. There is little room to escape from the higher and compounded 
risks of concurrent diversification and internationalization. When adopting simultaneous 
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diversification-internationalization strategy, even well-resourced firms led by technically 
competent managers but without relevant and specialized expertise, have learned gradually 
from hindsight. In some cases, adjustments to goals enabled firms to ride through current 
challenges for long-term gains from investment. However, some erroneous turns have resulted 
in exit from target markets.  
 
High profile failure 
 
Country B’s moves were largely influenced by the previous experience of its key 
executives and directors and opportunities for investment. Company B diversified into 
greenfield farms in developing countries and acquired dairy farms in New Zealand before 
setting up an agricultural unit in the parent company through acquisition of a domestic firm. 
(This was different from Companies D and E which had set up agrifood food business in the 
domestic market before venturing overseas.) The consolidation and integration of Company 
B’s international assets was slow due to communication problems between senior executives 
of different backgrounds. Substantive reshuffle was indicative of the weakness of its domestic 
agrifood business, the need to boost shareholder confidence, and reconsider its expansion plans. 
Company B’s failed bids to acquire pastoral farmland in New Zealand and Australia surprised 
its managers. The tremendous trust Company B executives placed on institutions of advanced 
economies led to complacence and failure to recognize signs of mounting resistance. The two 
failures taught Company B to redesign their international strategy and to concentrate on those 
two areas which have potential for success – dairy (New Zealand) and grains (South America).   
 
Opportunistic moves 
  
Company C was a case of serendipity and opportunism when it first invested in 
Australian vineyard and winery even though it had always been a metals manufacturer in China 
and had not invested overseas. Even as the owner and founder C1 admitted to overpaying for 
subsequent pastoral farmland, he rationalized that it was a good investment because land value 
would appreciate over time. The low activity of pastoral farming activity did not appear to be 
efficient use of its assets and diminished chances of Company C becoming the supplier of beef 
to the China market. Though Company B also did not have an agricultural arm in place before 
investing in overseas agrifood business, unlike C, its senior management had prior agrifood 
industry and international experience. Company C did not trust intermediaries to advise and 
broker deals despite its lack of experience in agrifood business and OFDI, unlike the others 
who engaged consultants and professional agricultural experts.  
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Exemplar of Long-term Strategy 
 
Company E had a well-conceived plan to recruit an Australian CEO who knew the 
cattle industry and rural investments well. It played its cards well not to announce acquisition 
plans too early to avoid anti-foreign opposition in the host country. Company E aspired to grow 
its agrifood business to a significant share of the corporate group’s business and worked 
steadily to achieve the goals. It had set aside funds for overseas subsidiary managers to 
purchase and gradually consolidate farmland under its ownership. It was better positioned than 
the rest of the investors to acquire downstream agrifood business. 
 
Unexpected scale back 
 
Company D blamed bad weather, undisclosed information by the vendor and optimistic 
projections by consultants for the underperformance of in its pastoral farming acquisitions in 
Australia. Lack of knowledge in specialized cattle farming disadvantaged the new owners even 
though the farm managers remained after the takeover. Though its directors had agricultural 
science and financial backgrounds, the skills were not directly relevant in making investment 
decisions and suited to cattle industry. Asymmetry of information between buyer and seller has 
worked against the investor’s interest. They retrospectively learned that they might have 
overpaid for the farmland despite performing due diligence prior to acquisition.  
 
Cross-case comparison and impact on industry 
The other companies that invested in upstream businesses and industry sources were 
surprised and disappointed with Company B’s unfortunate experience. C3 and E3 felt that 
Company B had overbid to acquire huge pastoral holdings that contained some poor-quality 
land and needed a lot more work and investment. C3 cautioned that future acquisitions in 
Australia must be underpinned by rationality, hinting at less than friendly treatment of foreign 
investors by the host country and the high prices Chinese investors had to pay. D1 criticized 
the host government for not matching its “words” (of promoting foreign investment) with 
“actions”. While some believed that opposition to Chinese investment might fizzle out as had 
happened with Japanese investment in the 1970s, the value of Chinese OFDI has grown 
multiple fold within a compressed timeframe, and the chorus of political rhetoric against 
Chinese nationals has worsened. Nevertheless, Company B’s failed bids were not 
representative, as approvals were granted to majority of foreign investment applications 
submitted to the Australian and New Zealand authorities.  
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Australian officials later conceded that Company B’s experience was a “one-off” 
exception as applications would rarely be rejected (a total of five among hundreds were turned 
down from 2012 to 2017). Moreover, the host government was anxious to reassure foreign 
investors in the aftermath of a high-profile rejection that Australia still welcomed foreign 
capital. Ironically, Company B’s failure to enter the Australian cattle sector had benefited 
industry competitors as subsequent applications were approved. Chinese investors have learned 
to be more discreet and tactful when pursuing land purchases. Rather than incremental 
development from trade, partnership, acquisition to greenfield, Chinese investors who had 
acquired land were more open to partnerships with locals in the host countries or take minority 
stakes in land ownership to temper nationalistic reactions and boost their reputation and 
credibility (Stevens et al., 2015).   
 
7.7.3 Why did things happen the way they did?    
 
Being newcomers to the agrifood industry, the four companies were eyeing overseas 
investments that would be “relatively easier” to manage than complex downstream businesses. 
Knowledge is essential to internationalization (Casillas et al., 2009) and this is especially 
crucial for specialized areas of agrifood business such as dairy and cattle. The resource-based 
view (Barney, 1991) addresses the means aspect but is thin on exploring the willingness and 
calculations of firms with limited industry experience. Though most of the POEs were founded 
in the 1990s, with 20 years of manufacturing and services experience, they had limited 
agricultural experience and needed to learn and adapt to organizational restructuring and 
external environmental changes. Farmland ownership is more easily achievable than taking 
over processing plant and distribution which employ hundreds of workers and require 
sophisticated coordination.  
 
To catch up quickly in the new area of agrifood business, the owners of companies B, 
D and E grafted foreign and local industry talents (Huber, 1991) to acquire new knowledge and 
transition to newly created agricultural sections of the corporate group. Farm management was 
delegated to Australians and seasonal farmhands and supervised from offices located in the 
cities. In hindsight, Companies C and D discovered the asymmetry between buyer and seller 
knowledge. They did not expect persistent drought, high operating costs, supply shortage and 
uncompetitive pricing, which hampered plans to tap the China market.  
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7.7.4 Theorizing: Realization from Hindsight 
 
I gained deeper insights by reflecting on participants’ assessment of how their 
investments progressed. Though the empirical material supports the view inexperienced firms 
could benefit from recruiting industry professionals, it did not sufficiently equip investors to 
overcome a multitude of challenges in an unfamiliar sector and host country conditions. As 
events unfolded, participants also had a clearer vision and reflection of their experience. 
Sensemaking is realization when people make retrospective sense of the situations to enact and 
construct from clues, plausible, reasonable and coherent explanations of experience and 
expectations (Weick, 1995a). Sensemaking revolves around the analysis of “meaningful lived 
experience” and the fact that the “perceived world is in reality a past world” (1995: 24). The 
past is reconstructed from the knowledge of the outcome, as actors would remember the events 
that have led to this result (Langenberg & Wesseling, 2016). There is a time lag (Luoma, Ruutu, 
King, & Tikkanen, 2017) between awareness, acknowledgement and evaluating what is the 
value gained from the experience. Hence, developing knowledge from experiential learning 
(Casillas & Moreno-Menéndez, 2014; Johanson & Vahlne, 2003) takes time and absorption of 
relevant experience to be applied to another context.  
  
  The casing (Ragin, 2009) of Companies B and D showed that insufficient knowledge 
could hamper internationalization and that gradual learning (Forsgren, 2015; Pellegrino & 
McNaughton, 2015) was painful but unavoidable. Though initially upbeat about their 
investment and plans, the same investors subsequently changed the narrative and realized the 
complexity and intensity of practical problems in negotiations and post-acquisition stages. 
Managers later admitted to errors due to insufficient knowledge. The assumption that emerging 
market firms could expand rapidly needs to be moderated to take into consideration the 
challenges of achieving multiplicity of objectives. An industry expert criticized Chinese 
investors’ over confidence and optimism, believing that throwing money would help them to 
become better managers. This reinforces my argument that relevant ground information and 
specialist knowledge (Welch et al., 2016) are crucial in facilitating the internationalization 
process. Knowledge should not be limited to markets, technology and host countries (Fletcher, 
Harris, & Richey, 2013) but requires sensitivity to different investment destinations.  
 
The four companies have endeavored to recruit skilled professional, technical and 
management staff to transition into agrifood and internationalization. However, it was 
insufficient to possess merely general industry experience. In the case of Company B and D, 
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grafting of experts did not translate into quick learning (Huber, 1991) as their specialization 
was not transferable and applicable to a different context. Chinese POE business group 
founders/owners have considerable influence on key strategic decisions but delegate 
operational decisions to professional managers. The initial losses and slow growth of returns 
from OFDI were tolerated as diversification commitment did not adversely and materially 
affect the corporate groups’ overall performance and may yield long-term capital appreciation.  
 
Overconfidence proved detrimental to Chinese investors bent on acquiring high profile 
trophy assets. Company B misread the evolving situation as it relied on basic information that 
gave a false sense of security and trust in strong institutions of advanced economies. Earlier 
success and preconceived optimism (March & Shapira, 1987) clouded the professional 
managers’ and negotiators’ assessment of the real costs (Ghauri & Hassan, 2014) involved in 
acquiring coveted overseas assets. Considering the fluidity of the political and regulatory 
environment, firms need more than basic knowledge of internationalization, and have to be 
flexible and innovate in order to  create value and improve performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990).   
 
The agrifood sector is a sensitive industry that is susceptible to resistance even in host 
countries with more developed institutions (Zhang et al., 2011). The main difference between 
firms that have industry experience and newcomers is earlier awareness, learning and proactive 
response when internationalizing. MNEs face a range of obstacles in trying to establish and 
maintain legitimacy and acceptance across different countries (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). There 
is inherent cognitive bias against the country of origin even though Chinese farmland investors 
are POEs with heterogeneous commercial objectives. Extant literature did not address the 
puzzle of POE acquirers having to deal with shifting political and regulatory environment in 
host countries. Even though the Chinese government did not own or give direct support to 
internationalizing POEs, liability of country of origin (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) and anti-foreign rhetoric and politicking could 
derail the proposed project and slow expansion plans.   
 
While previous studies focus on home institutional constraints for EMNEs, Chinese 
investors faced increasing challenges to manage shifting regulatory regimes and political 
climate in host countries (Hillman & Wan, 2005). In the early stages of the phenomenal surge 
in agrifood OFDI to advanced economies from 2010 – 2015, Chinese businesses and local 
officials conveyed their perception of host country opposition to foreign investment in a 
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simplistic nutshell, blaming opposition parties for disrupting foreign investment but trusted that 
the government would act rationally and not dismiss inflow of foreign capital. However, the 
political situation in Australia has shifted with public campaigns and media scrutiny, and 
emotions could not be easily defused. Despite signing a Free Trade Agreement with Australia, 
Chinese cumulative purchases of farmland worth more than $15 million must apply for FIRB 
approval while the threshold for investors from US and UK was $1 billion (FIRB, 2017).  
 
MNEs that are more proactive (Child & Tsai, 2005) could preempt detrimental effects 
from committing to businesses with low potential and high costs. Company E did not rule out 
forming alliances (Cui & Jiang, 2012) with Australian partners to buy farmland in the future to 
ease concerns, a retreat from acquisitions and full ownership in their earlier entries. Rather than 
incremental internationalization and de-internationalization, Chinese POEs indicated their 
receptiveness to joint ownership. Learning from an industry competitor’s failed experience 
(Forsgren, 2015; Madsen & Desai, 2010), Chinese investors maintained a low profile prior to 
expansion (Company E), or reduced visibility when the investment environment became less 
welcoming (Company C). Some like Company E realized they could compensate for the lack 
of industry knowledge and host environment by proactively learning from official sources 
(Fletcher & Harris, 2011; Kostova et al., 2008). In some instances, industry associates 
gradually learned from their own and others’ failures and adapted to changes by conforming to 
acceptable norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
 
As the four companies have built up a largesse from their earlier successful core 
businesses in heavy industries (C, D, E), real estate (B, D), and more recently hospitality and 
financial services (D, E), are prepared to tolerate short term affordable losses (Deligianni, 
Voudouris, & Lioukas, 2017; Sarasvathy, 2001). Chinese investors new to the agrifood 
industry and internationalization had to focus on the controllable aspects (Sarasvathy, 2001) of 
future developments of their businesses. Internationalizing firms have to try to “make do” 
(Weick, 1999) by working within constraints and find alternatives to overcome practical 
problems. However, eventually, they were bogged down by problems and could not run away 
from dual challenges of diversification and internationalization.  
 
Accepting that low returns and long gestation are expected of land-based agrifood 
investments, POEs soldiered on with the understanding that the home country government 
would not bail out failed ventures. Unlike SOEs with both economic and social responsibilities 
to fulfil, the primary consideration of POEs targeting upstream agrifood business are market 
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dynamics and good management. Achieving strategic objectives meant ensuring stability in the 
future of the company, which would include diversifying, integrating and growing the group 
businesses. For POEs, the meaning of “strategic” investment differs from the SOEs’ task of 
achieving national objectives. Though the participants were patient and realistic not to expect 
quick returns from land-based and upstream agrifood investment, this is not incompatible with 
profit-making. The longevity of agrifood MNEs is known for their diversification and steady 
growth strategies. However, non-agricultural firms diversifying into agrifood business face a 
host of natural and regulatory challenges.  
 
 This study shows that diversification and internationalization would compound the 
risks for Chinese investors (Montgomery, 1994). Unlike most MNEs that diversify in products 
within-industry (Li & Greenwood, 2004; Zahavi & Lavie, 2013) or within-country (Delios et 
al., 2008; Hashai, 2015), the four Chinese corporate groups studied simultaneously diversified 
across sectors in the domestic and new host destinations. The findings challenge the assumption 
that benefits derived from diversification would reduce corporate exposure to risks and 
dependency on core businesses (Van Mieghem, 2007). Though the Chinese corporate groups 
face slowdown from manufacturing and infrastructure, its choice of agrifood business was to 
achieve long-term stable growth rather than for survival reasons (Very, 1993). As seen in the 
experience of Company B, its failed foray into beef cattle livestock farming prompted it to 
abandon these plans and refocus on dairy and grains (Knecht, 2014) in the hope of improving 
profitability (Markides, 1995). The case study shows that diversification into agrifood business 
is a decision for long haul commitment and perseverance due to low margins and slow returns 
to capital.  
 
 Chinese investors in farmland are locked into the upstream segment of farming due to 
challenges of managing current businesses and the prohibitive costs of processing business and 
the lack of specialized management skills to take over higher value chain targets (Welch et al., 
2016).  Faced with slow growth and their bottom line affected by poor weather and high costs, 
upstream investors’ appetite and capacity for expensive downstream investments have been 
dampened. The high cost of coordination and managing interdependencies of different business 
lines posed significant challenge to achieving synergy and spread risks through diversification. 
The firm's likelihood of diversifying into a new business decreases in keeping with the firm's 
existing business lines (Zhou, 2011). Successful innovation in agrifood chains requires 
collaborative, coordinated and complementary dynamics (Verena & Jos, 2015). 
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China is not a ‘ready-made market’ waiting for Chinese investors to import resources 
back home to meet the enormous demand as envisaged. Impediments such as tightening of 
Chinese import regulations, temporary ban imposed on dairy and beef that did not meet the 
procedural formalities, or retaliation against host government policies could undermine 
Chinese investors’ bid to grow their market share in China. It takes a long time to develop 
distribution networks. None of the companies have established a stable distribution channel 
between the home and advanced host countries three to five years after investing in overseas 
dairy and beef resources. Companies C and D disrupted export of beef produced in their farms 
due to shortages, a move that diverged from plans to access resources directly to supply the 
China market. Investors of Australian beef and New Zealand dairy aimed at the high end 
Chinese market. Premium quality products commanded a higher price tag than other emerging 
market producers. However, the Chinese middle class could only afford to purchase Australian 
beef occasionally. The growth of the Chinese market for Australian beef (C, D, E) and New 
Zealand dairy (B) have been impeded by an inability to convince more consumers to switch to 
premium quality red meat, dairy products and Western diet. Participants acknowledged that it 
would take several years before foreign products gained wider acceptance. Traditionally, most 
Chinese get meat protein from pork and chicken. As noted by the founder of Company C, it 
will take time to build up the China market for beef because the present generation of Chinese 
consumers prefer to eat pork, except ethnic minorities who buy fresh beef and lamb locally. 
Chinese consumers who are unfamiliar with the method of preparing western style steak and 
may not appreciate the high price it commands.    
 
Figure 7.2 shows how diversification and internationalization evolved, focusing on the 
position of POEs. Rising demand in the China market and inherent natural disadvantage in the 
home country pushed POEs without agrifood base and experience to target resource rich 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand. They were encouraged by the prospect of capital 
appreciation, clean and green image, and long-term stability of agrifood business. POEs exhibit 
heterogenous strategies to diversify and internationalize -- relying on the founders’ business 
assessment, recruitment of professionals internationally, hiring host country local managers 
and outsourcing to consultants. The outcomes vary across firms, with Company E 
accumulating more assets and poised for integration when downstream opportunities arise. 
Since acquiring farmland for livestock production, Chinese investors’ objectives to access 
resources to ship to the China market had not materialize. Australian beef was in short supply 
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and limited to trial distribution or have halted altogether while it remains to be seen for 
Companies B and C to expand dairy and wine distribution outside their regional strongholds.   
 
 
Figure 7.2 Dynamic home industry and market effects on diversification and internationalization 
 Home Country  International Context 
China Market Demand            
 
     Domestic Farms 
D: poultry, fisheries, horticulture 
E: animal husbandry with help from local SOE  
B: acquire local agricultural firm 
 
 
     Natural endowment shortfall  
     Small landholdings and low productivity 
 
    Lack of industry knowledge  
    Owner or firm research 
   Trading 
 
 
Grafting professionals / industry experts 
from Australia, NZ, North & South America  
 
C: Serendipity  
 
 Investment Opportunities  
 Capital appreciation  
 Long term ‘strategic’ objectives 
 Politically stable host countries 
 Products are traceable and not banned  
 
   Lack of OFDI experience 
   and Networks 
  
 
  Intermediaries  
 
Recruitment of local farm managers 
Government, industry, communities 
        
 
 
7.8   Contribution  
 
This chapter makes multiple theoretical contributions. Firstly, the study combines 
cross-sectoral diversification and internationalization based on a current phenomenon. This 
expands research parameters of extant IB knowledge in related diversification and trade-off 
between product and market diversification. Wealthy diversifier-internationalizers can tolerate 
longer gestation for returns on capital. Secondly, the study enriches process theory by 
integrating learning and sensemaking approaches of analysis. Using rich field data helps to 
focus the attention on firms’ difficulties due to knowledge gaps, information disclosure and 
vested interests of intermediaries that could impede achievement of investor objectives and 
cause operational surprises. Thirdly, I have shown that negative political environment in the 
host country may hinder rural land purchases even though the Chinese investors are POEs. The 
liability of the country of origin is as important a consideration, not limited to concerns over 
state ownership in gaining acceptance and legitimacy in the host country. Fourthly, the study 
shows that value chain integration is not easily achievable as Chinese farmland investors are 
trapped in upstream segment, because of the high cost of acquiring processing plants, expertise 
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required and difficulties in developing distribution linkage with the China market. In this study 
the country-of-origin liability need not stem from historical conflicts, and that bilateral relations 
may deteriorate from nationalist rhetoric, political campaigns and diplomatic posturing. 
  
The study contributes valuable lessons in management strategy for firms that are 
diversifying and internationalizing into new products and markets. This chapter has two main 
managerial implications. First, in making diversification choices, a firm needs to evaluate the 
double challenges of managing new sectors and markets. The question is whether investors 
could balance the potential synergy with the associated coordination costs. Failure to be 
informed of specialized industry knowledge and sensitivities in host country prior to 
commitment could result in surprises during and after takeover. Firms might get locked into 
challenges of upstream business management due to weather, regulatory changes and obstacles 
to expansion. Second, businesses should be conscious that the host country environment and 
development of home markets may constrain expansion. POEs should not take for granted that 
they will gain legitimacy owing to their autonomy from the home country government. Hiring 
local managers to improve the firm’s public image and seeking local partners in the host 
country may mitigate risks of negative backlash to foreign land ownership, instead of holding 
on to the longstanding preferred acquisition mode.  
 
Companies that are resource-seeking would benefit from testing the ground and 
cultivating host country networks and business partners early before making substantive 
commitments. Chinese investors have tried to build a positive image and are prepared to accept 
short-term losses in their bid to gain direct access to resources in advanced economies for a 
growing Chinese market. Alternative channels to access resources, such as downstream targets, 
could be considered for those with strong finances. Investment in agrifood business requires 
patience and endurance in contrast to fast moving manufacturing and high technology sectors. 
The limitation is that the case study focused on high protein premium food sectors and excluded 
POEs that had invested in smaller scale horticulture (such as nuts and vegetables). Their 
narrative was not a tough struggle, being located closer to the coast than the drought-stricken 
outback, showed lower costs and higher profit margins as they are aimed at niche local and 
regional markets. Nevertheless, this study is generalizable within the boundary conditions 
experienced by diversifiers-internationalizers.   
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8 Chapter Eight: Coevolution of Home Country Actors’ Risk 
Mitigation Mechanisms for Internationalization: Integrating 
“Come Back” with “Go Out” 
 
 
“Risk comes from not knowing what you are doing.” -- Warren Buffett   
 
“Life is short, art long, opportunity fleeting, experience misleading, judgment difficult.”                        
-- Hippocrates 
 
 
8.1   Introduction  
 
The notion of risk mitigation in the internationalization of Chinese firms has rarely been 
addressed in extant IB literature. Conversations in the emerging market stream of IB literature 
have been dominated by globalization supported by home country institutions that enable firms 
to overcome competitive disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Rugman & Li, 2007). 
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) prior to China’s accession to WTO in 2001 was 
associated with high political risk destinations (Buckley et al., 2007) due in part to scarce 
opportunities of acquiring higher value targets in advanced economies. The internationalization 
of latecomer Chinese firms was characterized as springboard of serial, recursive and aggressive 
acquisitions (Luo & Tung, 2007) facilitated by home country advantages against the backdrop 
of pro-market reforms and deregulation (Luo et al., 2010). Despite institutional support to boost 
firm capabilities, there was an absence of robust and coherent mechanisms of how Chinese 
businesses navigate risks in the international environment. The preoccupation has been the 
reliance on ownership advantages afforded by the home country (Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman 
et al., 2011) and networks (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2015; Johanson & Mattsson, 1988) 
which would help inexperienced firms to enter new markets.  
 
Growing references in Chinese official and business platforms linking “come back” 
(returns and commercial viability) with “go out” (globalization) warrant further investigation. 
Risk mitigation mechanisms were weak when China’s “Go Global” policy was proposed in 
1999. Moreover, internationalization is a two-way path; internationalization plans are 
continuously formulated in response to previous results and feedback. Informal references to 
“come back” broadened to official expectation of firm’s responsibility amidst deregulation and 
the recent escalation of direct government intervention to limit overleveraging by companies. 
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The recognition of risk has prompted moves to improve management, governance and 
profitability. Instead of a top down and unidirectional formula, business actors and stakeholders 
evolve in the context of growing perceptibility of business risks, shifting priorities and 
balancing multi-prong internationalization strategy. This study examines the dynamics of risk 
management in Chinese OFDI with a focus on agrifood sector from the home country 
perspective and addresses the disparity between practice and theorizing.  
  
This chapter traces the coevolution of home country actors in managing risks as 
response to feedback from the internationalization process and experience. First, it is pertinent 
to define the meaning of the term “come back”. While “go out” is a widely used by Chinese 
with reference to China’s globalization strategy, “come back” emerged less than a decade ago. 
Scant references to “come back” could be traced to Chinese academic opinions and private 
narratives by business actors and local officials. Prompted by this emergent metaphorical 
phrasal verb (McMillan, 2017) and personification of globalization process used by home 
country actors, I began to investigate increasing concerns over the lack of risk control 
mechanisms to ensure the commercial viability and sustainability of Chinese OFDI. The study 
frames “come back” as the enhancement of risk management mechanisms against the backdrop 
of consumption-driven growth and economic rebalancing.  
 
The choice of studying diverse enterprises with a wide range of core competencies 
engaging in OFDI in agrifood sector could be justified by the growing demand for safe food. 
The period under study, 2008 to 2017, saw a surge of Chinese OFDI in agrifood businesses of 
advanced economies post-GFC. Though OFDI in agrifood sector inherently carries high risks 
and has not been classified as either a pillar or strategic industry, it continues to receive 
government encouragement in contrast to unproductive sectors such as real estate. This is 
attributed to the importance of achieving food security and food security needs through 
internationalization to complement domestic self-sufficiency policies. Using multiple cross-
case studies of eight companies and perspectives of officials, consultants and industry, this 
study enhances our understanding of perspectives from heterogeneous actors from official, 
business, industry in the management of risk in internationalization. Perceptions of risks vary 
and may change and overlap with business practices, regulatory shift and reflections on 
internationalization experience over time. To enhance contextualization, the study includes 
media analysis, recent developments and ripples of risk mitigation for some high-profile cases. 
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The paper begins with a review of the assumptions on risks of internationalization in 
extant IB literature. Risk of globalization is interpreted to be tolerable and affordable given the 
strong home country institutional support, unlike most industrialized MNEs (Ramamurti, 2012; 
Sun et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2010). A preliminary conceptual model integrates institutional 
(Peng, 2003) and process (Cantwell et al., 2010; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Van de Ven & 
Poole, 2005) frameworks with risk perception. Drawing on interdisciplinary literature from 
strategic management and political economy (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008a; Kostova et al., 2008; Witt & Redding, 2013), I will examine the dynamic interactions 
of multilevel and heterogenous actors. The research question is: How home country actors 
perceive and manage risks?    
 
There are two main findings in this study. First, businesses and institutions employed 
and adapted through self-help, outsourcing, delegation of responsibility and intervention. 
However, actors adjusted and intensified efforts to improve knowledge, feasibility, protection 
and image when these measures fell short of expectations. Despite efforts to mitigate risks and 
improve feasibility, unfolding awareness of specialized knowledge deficiency, host country 
regulatory changes and unknown risks continue to pose challenges to Chinese investors. 
Another finding is the irregularity and non-linear internationalization process that includes 
divestment and draw down of commitments, a departure from conventional focus on speedy 
serial acquisitions facilitated by deregulation, institutional support and (Luo & Tung, 2007) 
firm learning (Mathews, 2002a). The interactions of evolving policies, private narratives, 
formalization and wider acceptance of risk mitigation increasingly reinforce the message for 
firms to ensure viability of their international commitments. From the findings, I developed a 
dynamic ‘confluence and reinforcement’ of risk management model involving Chinese 
political and business stakeholders.  
 
This study contributes to elucidating the nuances, relationships and dynamics of risk 
perception and management over time. I address the complexities of multiple levels and 
temporal dimensions of home country effects on the internationalization of Chinese firms. The 
contributions are three-fold. First, reconceptualization using a dynamic approach offers 
alternative explanations and nuanced characterization to shed light on high risk acquisitions 
undertaken by Chinese firms. Second, a coevolutionary lens enriches the process frame by 
elucidating the interdependencies and growing sophistication of firms in managing risks. 
Learning and responses may spur firms to adjust the levels and types of investment targets 
 Chapter Eight: Coevolution of Risk Mitigation Mechanisms  
234 
 
instead of the widely assumed and accepted cumulative progression. Third, metaphors serve as 
a stepping stone to provide deeper insights and enable theorizing on the practice of risk 
awareness and mitigation in the Chinese context.  
 
8.2   Risk Perception and Management     
 
There is a lack of consensus on the perceptions, effects and mitigation of risks in IB 
and management scholarship. Risk has been portrayed as inevitable in business decisions as 
well as a liability to performance. Neo-classical microeconomic theory assumes that higher 
risks are rewarded with higher returns, differentiating measurable risk from elusive uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). Businesses operating in uncertainties have to confront unavoidable risks 
operating in unfamiliar environments (Vahlne et al., 2017). Risk seeking is viewed as one of 
the defining characteristics of international entrepreneurship (Shrader, Oviatt, & McDougall, 
2000). Knowledge is portrayed as inversely related to risk within the firm working towards 
additional value creation (Buckley & Carter, 2004). This is consistent with experiential 
learning in the process model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). A bottom-up approach examines 
risk propensity and experience of individual managers that could be incorporated into 
organizational strategic decision-making (Buckley, Chen, Clegg, & Voss, 2016). Individual 
managers may not always perceive or handle risk in the conventional conception of rational 
decision-making (McDougall et al., 1994). More likely, managers would look for alternatives 
to improve the odds for expected values of return on capital (March & Shapira, 1987). Extant 
literature lays the foundation for contingent and situational conditions for managerial risk 
management.  
 
At one end of the spectrum, doing nothing or installing overcontrolling risk avoidance 
measures (Smart & Creelman, 2013) would minimize risk. However, firms will miss business 
opportunities and may have to catch up and maintain competitive advantage in the longer term. 
Managers routinely respond, plan and anticipate, but specific content of strategies are gleaned 
from phased learning (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). The process stream of IB literature 
associates risk moderation with lower commitments such as trading and licensing to (Figueira-
de-Lemos et al., 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Mature MNEs would arguably be better 
equipped to assess risks, exercise caution and undertake mitigation measures.  
 
Delays are inevitable due to the time taken to formulate counter-strategies and ensuing 
market responses (Luoma et al., 2017). The time lag between recognition and response 
 Chapter Eight: Coevolution of Risk Mitigation Mechanisms  
235 
 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) to risk, mitigation and outcomes, should be taken into 
consideration. It could be argued that centralized decision-making authority is able to respond 
more quickly (Scheffer et al., 2003). However, the counterargument from political economy 
literature recognizes that decentralization allows local officials and businesses to respond 
flexibly and improvise mechanisms to make up for weak institutions (Ang, 2016).  
 
Managerial decisions are history dependent and are not made in isolation based on 
current conditions (Levitt & March, 1988). Learning extends to gaining insights from others’ 
experience or vicarious learning (Jiang et al., 2014; Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016). It would 
be difficult to pinpoint the start and end of learning as it is continuous and responsive.  Investors 
could turn liability of newness (Zou & Ghauri, 2010) to advantage by learning from incumbents 
and predecessors (Posen & Chen, 2013) within and outside their organizations.    
 
Knowledge gaps would increase with the expansion in scale, to different product sectors 
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Williamson & Raman, 2013), distant locations, industries and markets 
(Petersen et al., 2008; Shenkar, 2012). Conversely, improved knowledge would help to 
overcome challenges of internationalization. However, it is possible that management practice 
may misalign risk exposure with risk appetite due to the lack of awareness and ineffective 
communication of risk assessment in the organizational culture (Smart & Creelman, 2013). 
The awakening process may heighten consciousness of the risk and how to manage risks 
(Liesch et al., 2011).  
 
While conventional risk assessment focuses on firm-specific credit risk assessment 
using accounting or market data, relational and environmental risks could be moderated by 
networks performance and experiential learning (Eriksson et al., 2014; Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009; Vahlne et al., 2017; Vahlne & Johanson, 2013). Managers in shared networks may seek 
positive models in the hope of replicating model firms’ success (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Forsgren, 2002; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988). It is also possible to acquire deep learning 
from failures (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Williamson & Raman, 2011; Yang et al., 2015). 
Learning and adaptation may reduce insensitivity and biases, and help managers to uncover 
regretful decisions on hindsight reflection (Cox, 2015).  
 
8.2.1 Risk in Chinese OFDI 
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In the early phases of internationalization, risk did not appear to be a major concern for 
Chinese firms. A seminal work by UK scholars found linkage between vigorous OFDI to 
politically risky destinations (Buckley et al., 2007). Chinese MNEs differed from counterparts 
in most industrialized economies due to market imperfections, special ownership advantages 
and institutional factors (Buckley et al., 2007). Institutional support may help emerging market 
MNEs to overcome competitive disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). SOEs have greater 
latitude owing to soft budget constraints and national support for acquiring strategic assets 
(Kornai et al., 2003). The latecomer perspective shares the view that risk is tolerated and 
downplayed. Home government support helps to overcome latecomer disadvantage through 
aggressive acquisitions which often involve risk-taking in the pursuit of strategic assets in 
advanced economies (Luo & Tung, 2007). Home government support and well-established 
host country institutions may exempt firms from having prior entry experience and enhance 
organizational capabilities to manage risks (Lu, Liu, Wright & Filatotchev, 2014). Moreover, 
it is assumed that EMNEs learn, leverage and harness cumulative capabilities and resources, 
would be able to moderate their competitive disadvantage (Mathews, 2002a). However, having 
initial ownership advantages (Ramamurti, 2012) would not sufficiently equip firms with 
capabilities to address uncertainties in internationalization. 
 
Early OFDI undertaken by SOEs are shielded to some degree by the delegation of 
authority. SOEs relegated risk as a secondary concern compared to national priorities of 
accessing overseas resources, technology and strategic assets (Wang et al., 2012). In a risk 
sharing relationship, the principal (state owner) could not verify that the agent (manager) has 
behaved appropriately and shared common perceptions towards risk and course of actions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). National champions identified by the Chinese government for 
internationalization (Landau et al., 2016; Li et al., 2014; Thun, 2004a) did not much pay 
attention to the means and processes as long as the primary goals of internationalization in 
scale, speed and scope are accomplished.  
 
On the other hand, private entrepreneurs may risk affordable loss rather than expect 
returns by keeping uncertainty at an acceptable level in less optimistic situations (Vahlne et al., 
2017). This concept draws on effectuation strategy where entrepreneurs “make do” with given 
knowledge and available resources, and accept a certain level of affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 
2001). Serious challenges faced by Chinese firms are the lack of professional knowledge of 
international accounting, taxation, branding, auditing, finance, transfer pricing, cash flow and 
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risk management, as well as in the host country's business law, judicial system, and commercial 
arbitration (Luo & Tung, 2007). Acquirers run the risk of overpaying, in part due to 
inexperience and willingness to pay higher prices for coveted businesses (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005). The picture is complicated by the growing prominence of POEs pursuing 
internationalization autonomous of state guidance. By 2016, half of the value of China’s 
US$226.5 billion worth of OFDI were transacted by private companies, a significant rise from 
less than five per cent in 2010 and 35 per cent in 2015 (Barber, 2016).   
 
Inexperienced firms with limited relevant industry knowledge may be oblivious to risk 
(Liesch et al., 2011) and neglect to manage risk. Higher risk appetite and risk tolerance may be 
attributed to low cost of capital for internationalizing SOEs (Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu, 
2014; Ramamurti, 2012; Rugman et al., 2011). Managers become more aware of potential 
problems when they have developed the ability and affordability to take action and follow up 
to resolve hazardous issues (Weick, 2006). Firms could manage uncertainties and the 
unknowable by calibrating business decisions to what they could make sense of and understand 
the nature of the problems.  
 
Recent findings show inconsistencies in risk associated with ownership types. SOE 
managers notably adopt a “defender strategy” and are less likely to engage in riskier OFDI, in 
contrast to POEs that are inclined towards prospecting (Peng, Tan, & Tong, 2004). The 
explanation for a less aggressive SOE strategy is that SOEs perceive their environment to be 
more hostile, dynamic and complex. In another study, prior knowledge and absorptive capacity 
of firms are offered as explanations for the level of risk taking: half of the Chinese firms studied 
have selected experimental risk taking while the others followed cautious and gradual 
internationalization (Lyles et al., 2014). The transferability of risk management skills from 
previous experience to different environments is nebulous, and therefore should not be taken 
for granted (Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Oh & Oetzel, 2017).  
 
Political risk is not limited to instability from major political upheavals and regime 
change, but extends to less conspicuous policy uncertainty in relatively stable political 
environment that may undermine firms’ business strategy (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Henisz & Delios, 
2004). Easier access to global opportunities, South-South cooperation and resource-seeking 
motivations probably entice Chinese firms to engage with politically unstable but friendly host 
countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu, 2014). Entry to developing economies that are 
politically unstable could be facilitated through network relationships (Menkhoff & Gerke, 
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2002; Tung & Chung, 2010). However, risk assessment may not be meticulously calculated 
and deliberated upon. Managers often rely on subjective feel, in the absence of formal and 
rigorous and systematic assessment of the political environment (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; 
Kobrin, 1979). Advanced economies may appear to be low risk destinations owing to strong 
institutions and stability (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Henisz & Delios, 2004) but Chinese OFDI have 
encountered liability of country of origin (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 
2010). Faced with nationalist responses and regulatory changes, firms may adjust the level of 
commitments and future managerial decisions (Kobrin, 1979).   
 
8.3   Conceptual Framework 
 
The study of internationalization process of Chinese firms deserves a holistic approach 
to examine informal, cognitive and interactive relationships (Scott, 2001) beyond formal 
institutions, rules and regulations (North, 1990) operating in fairly stable environments. A non-
deterministic process framework is appropriate to explain change, complexities, learning and 
variation in commitments (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 2006, 2009). 
This chapter examines the refinement of strategies in managing risks through business 
initiatives, government intervention and adaptive responses. The objective is not to map direct 
causality suited to the variance approach, but to provide insights as a step towards theorizing 
(Van de Ven, 2007). China is considered a developmental state with centralized political 
control and decentralized economic management to achieve economic growth but the path is 
filled with uncertainties (Knight, 2014). Pro-market reforms had significant impact on the 
liberalization of SOEs (Dau, 2012; Liebman & Milhaupt, 2015). Deregulation has altered the 
political-economic landscape to enable previously constrained POEs to expand overseas (Luo 
et al., 2010). The research problem addresses a concern over the lack of relevant controls that 
match the risks faced by Chinese investors rather than overcontrol within the spectrum of risk 
management.  
 
To enrich the process frame, I include multilevel interactions and temporal dimensions 
as a complex moving picture rather than a snapshot (Ang, 2016; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; 
Krug & Hendrischke, 2015; Lewin et al., 1999). An initial conceptual model is developed to 
identify the types, degree and combinations of risks and mitigation measures to improve 
viability and sustainability. At the early phases of internationalization, Chinese firms received 
more direct government support (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007) and may accept 
“affordable loss” and postpone expected returns (Sarasvathy, 2001) to access resources, skills 
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and strategic assets. More recently, business consultants based in Australia have observed that 
Chinese firms are more inclined to conduct due diligence to manage investment risk.   
 
Metaphors are powerful literary devices that provide strong foundation and useful 
channel to theorizing (Bacharach, 1989). The advantage of metaphors is their ability to develop 
new ideas and guide analysis in novel ways to develop a reflexive mechanism to deepen 
understanding (Alvesson, 2003). The emergent metaphors of including “come back” with “go 
out” are context specific to Chinese internationalization. Chinese institutions encompass 
multiple levels of central directives and local implementation, balancing facilitation with 
individual firm responsibilities. Concurrently, responses and initiatives by business actors, 
reflection on past internationalization experience, would support the formalization and 
reinforcement of risk mitigation mechanisms. As managers become more experienced or 
forced by accountability and expectations to deliver better performance, they are inclined to 
pay more attention to previously neglected risks and work towards cautious risk management 
strategy (March & Shapira, 1987).  
 
The research questions of the study in this chapter explore is: How home country actors 
perceive and manage risks? In relation to this theme, this chapter examines the development 
process of risk migration in the Chinese context. A dynamic model (Cantwell et al., 2010; Chen 
& Naughton, 2017; Child et al., 2012; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Garnsey & McGlade, 2006; 
Krug & Hendrischke, 2015; Lundan, 2011) would capture the concurrent evolution of diverse 
interactions and feedback among the main actors in the home country involved in 
internationalization. Firstly, different types of risks identified from literature and news sources 
could be broadly categorized as acceptable, unavoidable and manageable risks studied in the 
process frame (Johanson & Vahlne, 2006; Vahlne et al., 2017). Secondly, field data is studied 
with the context, industry and secondary sources to uncover different perspectives and 
adjustment to mitigate risks. Problematization of conventional and accepted assumptions 
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) based on early internationalization of Chinese firms exhibiting 
high risk and high premium transactions would advance alternative assumptions to suit an 
evolving environment. Iteration of emergent data with theory helps to reconceptualize the 
notion of risks and internationalization objectives. Boundaries to theorizing (Meyer, 2015a; 
Whetten, 2009) are set within the home country to include local official, managerial and market 
dynamics over the last decade.    
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Figure 8.1 Weakness of Risk Mitigation Mechanisms 
  
Firms with Institutional support                         
             Profitable  
         
Firms that venture on their own        
                                  Fail and cannot come back 
         Loss of capital, debts  
    
                                 ---  Weak Risk Mitigation Mechanisms --- 
 
 
 
8.4   Multiple Cases   
 
Two SOEs and six POEs have been selected for cross-case analyses of the 
commonalities and unique characteristics. Multiple levels of analyzing units (Yin, 2009) can 
be constructed from corporate entities, management, public policy and private positions and 
industry opinions. The casing approach (Ragin, 2009) is adopted to explain and give substance 
to the main themes and changes in risk mitigation. The shifts and intensification of  risk 
perception and management will be examined by studying the interactions of different levels 
and perspectives from policy, business, response, feedback and fine-tuning over time (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002). The participants included senior managers of Chinese firms and local officials 
of overseeing economic and international portfolios (Chapter 4). To contextualize the research 
subjects, I complemented primary sources with published company, media reports and archival 
materials. Additionally, I consulted industry expert opinion (brokers, consultants, scholars) to 
strengthen reflexivity and iteration with conceptual frameworks.  
 
8.5   Context: Meanings of the terms 
 
The expression of “come back” was non-existent when China embarked on “go out” 
policy in 1999. The term “go out” is a literal translation from the slogan for globalization 
zouchuqu that was officially adopted and encouraged from 1999 to 2001 prior to China’s 
accession to the WTO (Li, 2006; Zhu, 2001). While the term “go out” is widely known as the 
informal term for China’s globalization policy, the expression of “come back” emerged as an 
afterthought and caught the Chinese stakeholders’ attention only in recent years. A business 
strategy that incorporates varying degrees of risk management would impact on the success or 
Go Out 
Come Back 
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failure of overseas ventures. Pro-market reforms and the priority to “go out” downplayed or 
neglected how firms could “come back”, zouhuilai or huidelai. The term “come back” has 
gained prominence with the increasing recognition that “go out” should generate positive return 
on assets and profits to repatriate to the parent firm in the home country. Hence, Chinese 
investors who incurred huge losses overseas would not be able to return to the home country. 
 
The term “come back” also evokes connotations of social acceptance and recognition 
of successful business by society. An individual’s social standing and position in society is 
important. While losing “face” is seen as a discredit in Chinese society, Chinese management 
could motivated by the need for social acceptance to strive for success (Lockett, 1988). The 
concept of face or mianzi is embedded in Chinese culture and management (Buckley, Clegg, 
& Tan, 2006). To maintain, preserve or upgrade one’s stature are ways to gain acceptance in 
Chinese industry and society. For the new breed of nouveau riche entrepreneurs, sustainable 
performance would be vital to keeping their newly earned position.    
 
Government support focused on funding the initial foray helped to improve firm 
capabilities and provided basic information on host countries (Q3). However, underdeveloped 
risk mitigation mechanisms and controls could reduce the likelihood of firms “coming back” 
with profits or capabilities that would benefit the parent company and in turn the home country. 
Deregulation has given Chinese investors greater freedom and quicker approvals to venture 
abroad, but the onus was on them to manage risks. While some cautious managers of large 
corporations initiated formal processes such as due diligence checks, individual Chinese 
businesses did not apply risk mechanisms consistently. As it became apparent that the 
performance of some OFDI projects were unsatisfactory, official and business actors reflected 
on how to improve their globalization strategy and optimize results. Bad loans from domestic 
post-GFC stimulus and internationalization risks prompted the central government to be more 
circumspect and reassess risky ventures.   
 
8.6   Dynamics of international risk perception 
 
8.6.1 Official Acknowledgement 
 
The dominant discourse of “go out” policy has grown and remained on an even keel, 
but it has undergone refinement to balance multiple objectives of globalization. Though review 
and approval requirements overseen by MOFCOM and NDRC have been relaxed further in 
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2014, Chinese firms were urged to be responsible for economic and technical feasibility of an 
overseas investment (Ma, 2014). Procedural simplification and relaxation reduced the costs 
and time for Chinese enterprises to file reports or obtain approval for investing overseas. 
However, it was uncertain how official expectations of holding firms accountable for 
commercial viability of overseas projects could be effectively monitored and enforced.  
 
Delays and policy adjustments (Luoma et al., 2017) are to be expected given the 
experimental nature of Chinese policies. These would have indirect and mixed effects given 
the flexible interpretation and implementation by local governments and leveraging by 
businesses. Concerns over the high-risk nature of some OFDI projects took time to be translated 
and implemented as formal policy outcomes. In the absence of prepared preventive and 
proactive risk mitigation mechanisms, firms would be left to fend for themselves and counter 
the after effects from risks. Responsive remedies may not be timely and effective in resolving 
problems arising from risk.   
 
The “come back” metaphorical phrase was initiated by academic and professional 
consultancy services before officials and businesses recognized these concerns. Initially, few 
commentaries in the Chinese media narrowly focused on foreign exchange issues related to 
funds repatriation. Prior to 2014, references to “come back” were at best found in official 
acknowledgement of others’ opinions without any comments. The Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFOCM) did not have a policy on “come back” nor was it the originator of ideas 
on “come back”. The earliest mention of “come back” could be traced to an academic article 
selected from a scholarly newspaper republished on MOFCOM webpage in 2012, urging firms 
to learn and strengthen their capabilities to prepare for uncertainties in the competitive 
international environment “before going out” (Xu, 2012). Soon after China joined WTO, 
MOFCOM was focused on international expansion but did not pay much attention to 
sustainability of foreign investments. In 2015, MOFCOM webpage carried a legal 
consultancy’s advice that for public-private partnership (PPP) to “come back safely”, there is 
a need to establish good relations with host countries and reasonable conflict resolution 
mechanisms (Jianwei, 2015). However, the legal experts were quoted as recommending that 
“come back” would be desirable if Chinese MNEs could create value from OFDI. However, 
firms should not exploit the “brand” of foreign assets to incur more debt through bank credit 
and IPO in the home country (Jianwei, 2015).  
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Though it has been brought to their attention that businesses engaged in risky leveraging, 
official comments were scarce initially and there was no followup of concrete measures to 
mitigate risks. Table 8.1 shows two rare references to “come back” published on the Ministry 
of Commerce webpages. The official position merely noted the views expressed by academics 
and consultants. The notion of risk was highlighted in the conceptual and normative space, but 
this was limited to persuasive arguments and proposals for improvement. The process of 
recognition being translated into active risk mitigation policy was gradual and overlapped with 
developments in the academic and business discussions. Discussions of related measures are 
referred to in Section 8.7.2 in tis chapter.  
 
 
Table 8.1 Selective References of "Come Back" in the Public Domain 
 Time Source / Context Proposals 
Dec 2012 
 
 
 
Academic commentary from Learning Times 
commented firms should follow “go out, go in, 
settle down, come back, restart” strategy.    
 
Be well prepared before “going out”. 
Investors must adapt to host country opportunities 
and threats. 
Nov 2015 
  
 
A legal consultancy article suggested ways to 
develop private-public partnership (PPP) model for 
OFDI, establish good relations with host and 
resolution mechanism. 
 
Businesses must create value from funds that 
“come back” and not to incur more debts. 
 
      
    Collated by author from MOFCOM webpages    
 
 
 
The years 2014 to 2015 are the likely turning points of rising concern over whether 
Chinese firms could survive unscathed from internationalization. Regulation and compliance 
were considered impediments to internationalization, especially by POEs who bore the burden 
of proving their projects would be successful in their application for approval. Previously, 
control on the number, scale and pace of internationalization was a blunt and restrictive way to 
minimize risk of Chinese firms that lack international experience. From gradual relaxation of 
foreign exchange since 2003, laws governing Chinese firms investing overseas had been 
simplified and streamlined from 2005 to facilitate OFDI. Chinese OFDI is regulated by 
multiple compliance agencies in the central government. Deregulation opened opportunities 
for more Chinese firms especially POEs to internationalize. Since 2015, MOFCOM has put the 
onus on businesses to ensure profitability. Less than a year after the passage of significant 
deregulation to facilitate OFDI, the Vice Minister of Commerce Zhang Xiangchen clarified 
and highlighted at a State Council press briefing that firms must be responsible for evaluating 
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and ensuring risk is minimized so that OFDI projects would be viable  (Xinhuanet, 2015). 
However, it was uncertain how firms could be entrusted to mitigate risks. 
 
“Enterprises are the principal subject of OFDI, it should be responsible for the risk, profit and loss. If they 
want to invest, the capital is theirs, so they themselves must be responsible. Of course, OFDI is also 
related to some national government policies on banking and credit support. For instance, we have some 
preferential buyer’s credit, it’s the host government’s borrowing from China, to operate some project 
development. Chinese enterprises contribute part of the capital funds. The Chinese government and banks 
would of course want to assess the risk of projects, to ensure that the money could be returned. We also 
want to ensure that the project could continue to be viable.” - Vice Minister of Commerce Zhang 
Xiangchen press briefing (17 September 2015)   
 
Typical to Chinese economic history, policy pronouncements were gathered from 
assessments that prompted the need to change, but implementation entailed garnering support 
from different levels of government. Local officials encouraged inexperienced firms to discuss 
their business plans so that some high risk overseas investment could be avoided. A provincial 
bureau manager in the Yangzi delta region Q4 (2015) said that businesses were obliged and 
encouraged to keep the government informed. Officials were concerned that businesses 
focused on opportunities for making profits but neglected the accompanied risks. However, Q4 
justified that if certain OFDI projects were unsuccessful, the government was absolved of the 
blame if firms did not consult the government prior to venturing overseas. A director in a 
southern municipality Q2 (2014) disclosed that more than half of Chinese businesses that 
invested overseas did not file reports of OFDI activities and tapped illicit channels of funding. 
Government officials acknowledged that smaller POEs who did not receive government 
support and were unable to get loans resorted to underground funding for OFDI. The risks are 
higher as these borrowers were not assessed on resource backing, credit rating and repayment 
ability and are likely to incur higher costs of borrowing.  
 
The articulation of how firms could “come back” in the public domain foreshadowed 
stronger controls to mitigate risks which were absent or glossed over in the early stages of 
internationalization. In 2016, Chinese overseas acquisition deals topped US$225 billion, 
prompting the government to consider closer scrutiny and impose restraints. The frequency, 
intensity and seriousness in the treatment of risk from internationalization has amplified since 
late 2016. In January 2017, SASAC adopted a negative list to regulate SOEs OFDI to prevent 
loss of asset values, strengthen disciplinary inspection of finance and operations, and 
accountability system (State-Council, 2017). Controls were expanded to capital outflows to 
over-leveraged, irrational and unproductive areas such as real estate, hotels, entertainment and 
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sports undertaken by POEs (Zhong, 2017a). In August 2017, the MoF formally called for the 
implementation of professional financial accountability system by SOEs for their foreign 
investments which included pursuing SOE executives for liability in relation to any losses 
incurred as a result of “unscientific decision-making and lack of necessary procedures” and 
failure to undertake adequate financial risk and feasibility assessments prior to commitment 
(CNB, 2017).  
 
8.6.2 Private Narratives 
 
Undercurrents concerning risky ventures were picked up in private conversations with 
businesses and officials during fieldwork in the latter part of 2015. Interview participants from 
SOEs and POEs expressed apprehension over “mistakes made” in earlier OFDI experience. 
Even hybrid SOEs were increasingly concerned with commercial viability and accountability 
to shareholders that resemble the characteristics of POEs and conventional MNEs. There is a 
growing sense of awareness among Chinese investors that internationalization is only a means 
to an end and there is no guarantee of success unless firms are vigilant and ensure sustainability. 
The Vice President of a regional state-owned publicly-listed agrifood conglomerate said: 
 
“Firms that go out (internationalize) and invest in agriculture must ensure they could come back. Do 
not simply go out and find out later that it would be impossible to return. The priority of investors must 
be to address whether they could come back after going out. Investment decisions must demonstrate 
relevance and reflection.” – A2, HQ (2015) 
 
 The founder and owner of Company C, a diversified POE in metal manufacturing and 
agrifood distribution, claimed that he adopted a cautious approach. C1 justified his strategy of 
balancing risk and profitability. Reflecting on judgement errors of Chinese mining companies 
in earlier resource-seeking ventures, C1 urged current investors to be careful and conceive a 
long-term vision of market dynamics. OFDI based on optimistic projections of huge demand 
for resources tended to overshoot and failed to take into consideration possible slowdown in 
demand and oversupply. C1 believed that diversifying into agrifood business would be 
potentially more stable and rewarding than investing in mining.  
 
“Many mining companies have gone out but could not return. Agriculture though less profitable and 
takes a long time to build up, is less speculative; it’s not a bubble. Vegetables cost $5 a kg now; copper 
prices have fallen and are comparable to the price of vegetables.” - C1, HQ (2015)  
   
 Besides businesses, risk was also acknowledged by local officials in private discussions. 
Local officials in cities based in the Yangzi delta echoed concerns over risks expressed by 
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enterprises and urged firms to ensure that OFDI was sustainable. The deputy director of a 
municipality who was responsible for agriculture division was concerned that capital invested 
overseas should generate positive earnings.  
 
“Every year, many enterprises Go Out. They seek support. Previously they went to Third World 
countries. It was like throwing [investment] into the ocean but you can’t see, the waves are strong ... 
Nowadays, we must ensure good returns for investment.” – Q3 (2015) 
 
 
POE directors of Companies D and F believed that they are responsible for the success 
of OFDI because unlike SOEs, they could not depend on the Chinese government to bail out 
failed businesses. Calls for business to “come back” contributed to policy inputs from business 
interest. In his policy recommendations to the CPPCC, the chairman of a private corporate 
group (not in the case studies) suggested that SOEs and hybrids could take the lead to “go out” 
and “attract investment back” to the home country. He said that regardless of individual or 
state-encouraged infrastructural projects, the objective of globalization is for the firms to make 
improvements and return to the home country (Liu, Xiao, & 2015).  
 
8.7   Shift in Risk Perceptions and Management 
 
Risks previously regarded as tolerable or unknown could be reconceptualized as 
avoidable and manageable risks in tandem with further deregulation and growth in OFDI. The 
Chinese government has put the onus on firms to ensure commercial viability after 2014. While 
many listed POEs and SOEs were already conducting due diligence prior to OFDI, official 
statement served as a reminder that risk mitigation would be expected. Business interviewees 
identified knowledge, financial and technical feasibility and positive image as essential 
advantages while officials proposed insurance protection. There is a time lag between 
recognition, identification and formulation of risk mitigation measures. Initially, risk 
perception and risk mitigation did not feature as a priority in Chinese firms’ globalization 
strategy. When business owners and managers recognized the types of risks and became more 
aware of the measures available to reduce avoidable risks, they sought to develop risk 
mitigation mechanisms.  
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Table 8.2 Evolving Priorities, Risk Perception and Risk Management in OFDI 
 Evolution  Affordable Risk 
 
Unknown Risk Manageable Risk 
 
1990s - Pre-WTO  
National Priorities  
SOEs champions 
− Priority to support 
firms to gain 
ownership and 
competitive 
advantage 
 
− SOE are main 
players 
 
 Lack of knowledge 
 
 Political instability in 
developing economies. 
 
 Limited opportunities 
 
• Proximity: geographical, 
cultural, political, 
informal networks  
 
 
Post GFC 
Balancing 
Deregulation  
 
Feasibility / Viability 
Awareness / Learning   
 
− Higher value 
businesses available 
in advanced 
economies 
 
− More opportunities 
for strategic asset 
seeking 
 
 Learning in new areas 
 
 Lack of specialized 
skills and knowledge   
 
 Managerial biases may 
underestimate risk 
level 
 
• Advanced economies are 
more stable and 
regulated  
 
• Requisite knowledge, 
due diligence, good 
relations with host 
countries 
 
Rebalancing   
Recentralization  
 
− Rationality in 
investment decisions 
 
− Key sectors are 
exempted 
 
 Weather, markets 
 Host country biases 
 Lack of specialized 
skills and knowledge   
• Curbs of over-leveraging 
in unproductive sectors.  
 
• Apply rationality and 
risk mitigation measures 
 
Table 8.2 tracks the changing perceptions and mitigation of different categories of risks. 
In the early part of internationalization, Chinese firms that backed by financial resources were 
inclined to pitch a higher threshold of tolerance for ‘affordable risk’ as the primary objective 
was to expand the scale of operations rapidly. Although home country institutional support and 
informal networks helped firms to gain ownership advantages and background information, 
these were inadequate to help firms gain deeper knowledge of the target business and host 
environment. Inexperience may have resulted in not knowing some of the possible risks that 
firms may encounter in internationalization. In subsequent phases, OFDI expanded to advanced 
economies which may be culturally and institutionally distant but politically more stable 
compared to developing economies. Some of the negative consequences included 
accumulation of debts from overleveraging, new business areas, high risk commitments and 
challenges of managing uncertainties. Nevertheless, prior due diligence and stability of host 
countries could not be taken for granted. As officials and businesses became increasingly aware 
of previously unknown risks and knowledge gaps, interventionist measures were considered 
and adopted to constrain different sources of risks. The misalignment between risk exposure 
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and risk management needs to be addressed with further strengthening and distribution of risk 
mitigation mechanisms.  
 
8.7.1 Knowledge   
 
The rapid growth in the scale, coverage and speed of internationalization has prompted 
calls for deeper and richer host country knowledge, business intelligence and understanding of 
specialized industry and context. Since China opened its doors for trade and encouraged firms 
to venture overseas, MOFCOM and overseas commercial consuls provided basic and general 
information of host countries and introduced overseas ethnic Chinese networks to potential 
investors. Business interviewees spoke frankly about the inadequacy and generic irrelevance 
of the government’s information services. Established firms prefer to seek paid professional 
advice than to rely mainly on the government. A survey showed a third of Chinese firms 
requested for information from the Chinese government, while 40 percent received consultancy 
services and training from networks such as industrial and commercial associations (Garnaut 
et al., 2012). Leveraging relevant knowledge is more useful than accumulating information of 
different contexts that may not be related and applicable to other situations.  
 
Large SOEs such as Companies A and G have in-house research units. POEs such as 
Companies B, D, E and F recruited Chinese emigres with professional, industry and 
international knowledge and hired senior executives in the host countries to manage overseas 
subsidiaries. Other publicly-listed POEs that still retained a principally family management 
style such as Companies C and H conducted their own research rather than outsourcing to 
consultants and intermediaries. Company B valued having a good grasp of detailed information 
and was willing to pay well for good quality reports. The Vice President (B1) lamented that 
currently the Chinese government researchers could not meet businesses’ requirements for 
knowledge of high risk host countries. He urged government researchers to bridge the 
information gaps and appealed for help in providing big data and deep analyses. 
 
“Since POEs are taking risks, the [Chinese] government should give preferential treatment to show 
encouragement and appreciation ... Firstly, information on local tax, laws and resources would be useful. 
Chinese embassies and consuls offer very basic and brief data that do not meet professional standard. 
Secondly, technical details like water resources, facilities, weather, fair price for M&A are important. Even 
if researchers charge fees, we are willing to pay for these services. Enterprises spend too much time 
researching and should outsource … but we want authoritative, professional, consultancy grade business 
intelligence. Macro & mid-range reports from government researchers should be provided free. We are 
willing to pay for micro analysis, that are tailored to our needs. For instance, high risk countries. We 
welcome collaboration and recommendations from researchers.” - B1 (2015) 
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In a similar vein, Company E appreciated more timely and detailed data on markets and 
host countries to enable MNEs to strategize and make critical investment decisions. Timing is 
crucial for resources and commodities-based investments because of market volatility and 
difficulties in projecting future market outlook. The General Manager of the parent company 
was disappointed with the lack of comprehensive data in China to help potential investors.   
 
“We lack time to research for information. Foreign investment cannot be delayed because things are 
changing rapidly. We are really in need of timely industry data. The government publishes data more than 
a year late (the latest issue had data till 2013) and it’s not detailed enough. Only US databases are 
complete.” – E1 (2015) 
 
Local officials claimed they are flexible and adaptive and would try to meet the needs of 
internationalizing firms that satisfy commercial criteria. According to a director in charge of 
foreign economic portfolios Q2, there has been a shift from regional and functional 
categorizations of information resources towards specific customized needs such as relevant 
project-based assistance to serve businesses better. Government researchers expected to charge 
businesses fees for providing analysis of business opportunities in target host countries. Semi-
official business networks based in Shanghai provide taxation, legal, markets and host country 
information on the internet and training schedule publicized on social media such as WeChat. 
However, there remains a gap with business needs for bespoke research that are industry and 
location specific. In the post-acquisition stages, interviewees also blamed the lack of relevant 
industry and host country regulatory data to enable businesses to make informed and prudent 
decisions. 
 
8.7.2 Financial and technical feasibility 
  
Awareness and recognition of risk is the first step towards moderation and precaution. 
Some IB scholars have observed that Chinese investors may be prone to overpaying for assets, 
especially well-known and coveted international companies (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). 
Though widely discussed among business communities and consultants, the “China premium” 
has scarcely been addressed and conceived as risk in IB research. KPMG and EY consultancies 
based in China found about a third of investors admitting to overpaying for overseas assets 
(Fung & To, 2010) and failure of OFDI in meeting expectations (EY, 2014). Financial 
commitment well above the market valuation of acquired assets poses additional challenge for 
investors as it would take longer to get returns on capital. Energy and branded assets are more 
costly and attracted multiple bidders than agrifood business transaction deals (Scissors, 2017).   
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POEs are becoming important players in OFDI following years of pro-market reforms 
and deregulation (Chen, 2016). POE managers claimed to be prudent and conducted due 
diligence, exercise self-discipline and proactively research on potential targets. Large POEs 
and hybrid SOEs are taking the lead in imparting industry best practice. Awareness of risk is 
the first step to hasten risk management and put systems and controls in place. Participants in 
the case studies confirmed that they consulted top notch legal and financial professionals for 
advice prior to acquisition. Besides engaging the services of multiple intermediaries, POEs 
recruited professionals and specialists to improve the managerial team’s competencies. 
However, directors of Companies F and H and a business consultant X4 commented that 
Chinese investors erroneously believed that having money could solve all their problems. 
 
Pro-market reforms since the 1990s resulted in the reorganization and restructuring of 
SOEs. Though about half of SOE boards are political appointees, the rest are professionals, and 
publicly-listed subsidiaries in the corporate group are accountable to shareholders (Brødsgaard, 
Hubbard, Cai, & Zhang, 2017). The expectations of SOE performance and accountability has 
also been raised. SOEs learned vicariously from earlier internationalizing SOEs to adopt a more 
cautious approach to internationalization. According to General Manager A1, the Company 
targeted overseas businesses that were profitable or at least breaking even. Company A was 
cautious in selecting its investment targets. Managers wanted to avoid squandering its financial 
resources and damage the image of the model enterprise with a good credit standing. Manager 
A1 rationalized that it “may not buy the cheapest but the price must be reasonable for the same 
type of investment assets”. Company A “avoided risks by choosing host countries that were 
politically stable” such as advanced economies or “friendly countries”. They also recruited 
experienced negotiators in the private sector to search for potential businesses and bargain for 
reasonable terms and did not hesitate to walk away from less attractive offers. A senior director 
of a central SOE (G1) boasted that they waited for the right opportunities and market cycle to 
acquire businesses at a discounted price.   
 
From my discussions with Australian trade and investment officials, business brokers 
and economists, I gathered that Chinese SOEs are becoming “more sophisticated”. SOE 
interviewees engage services of the Big Four, reputable legal firms and market intermediaries 
in recent years. SOEs adopted due diligence measures through intermediaries like their POE 
counterparts. According to a senior academic of a Southeast Asian research institute (X8), 
SOEs were pressured and enticed to learn and compete with POEs. Company G followed the 
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example of large private conglomerates to form multinational consortium funding to spread 
risks among experienced industry and financial partners when it acquired high value 
international assets. Institutions responded and followed suit by encouraging private-public-
partnership (PPP) in domestic infrastructure, and assessed which firms deserved support. 
SASAC overseeing SOEs mandated in January 2017 that SOEs should attract third-party 
investors when investing abroad as part of a push to integrate capital, following earlier 
restrictions issued under Document 43 to constrain borrowing by local governments and 
control the escalation of debts. I learned from discussions with Chinese academics in 
management and agricultural economics that the government encouraged broad collaboration 
as SOEs could benefit from other market players, mitigate risks and reach higher levels of 
development. Restructuring of SOEs has been accomplished and the next wave to improve the 
skills and acumen of managers. Scholars interviewed believed that the rationale behind PPP 
was to enable reformed hybrid SOEs to obtain more capital, improve management and 
governance by learning from private sector partners. On the other hand, there are some 
academics who are critical of PPP as a way for the Chinese government to pass the buck and 
debts to the private sector. Though private corporations may have less to gain economically, 
there are benefits to gain political connections as in the previous phases of economic reforms. 
 
While more SOEs are following the guidebook to conduct due diligence, the central 
government has stepped up measures to offset excessive and ill-disciplined investors. Anti-
corruption drive under the Xi leadership has put high spending SOEs under closer scrutiny 
since 2014. A former senior executive of Company A had been charged with corruption and 
was eventually sentenced to 18 years jail for bribery and embezzlement. On hindsight, some 
of the overseas assets acquired during a period of rapid expansion under his watch were 
divested with some losses. Industry source X10 disclosed that Company A negotiators were 
also questioned for agreeing to unfavorable deals in recent years. Subsequently, Company A 
slowed down its acquisition spree and did not achieve the scores of acquisitions slated on its 
five-year plan.  
 
8.7.3 The Learning Process of Risk Management 
 
Despite risk mitigation measures, POEs may still unwittingly overbid due to the lack 
of expert knowledge of the potential target, industry specialization and applications of host 
country regulations. Moreover, when international expansion gained momentum, managers 
tend to be lulled into overconfidence. Industry and host government sources are concerned with 
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firms targeting trophy assets such as large landholdings and critical infrastructure as that may 
trigger nationalist backlash in host countries. Company B was complacent, believing that 
political stability of advanced economies and strong regulatory regimes would award prized 
assets to the highest bidder. Being a POE, Company B did not expect the hostility towards its 
bid for large landholdings in Australia and New Zealand. Company B was surprised and 
learned a costly lesson that despite being a POE, growing public concerns could steer the host 
government to reject its investment application.  
 
The experience of Company D also highlights the challenges of unknown and 
unavoidable risks. Despite investing time and resources to research potential targets and host 
countries, investors would not find out critical details about the potential business if the seller 
withheld information. Company D realized how challenging it was after taking over and 
operating the business for a year. Bad weather, climate change and market dynamics are often 
left out in upbeat projections modelled by financial consultants who were enthusiastic to close 
the deals. As the assessors were external parties outsourced by Chinese investors, they did not 
have to bear the consequences if certain risks had been overlooked. Participants of Company 
D were initially confident that they did all that was necessary to ensure checks and due 
diligence and paid a reasonable price for three rural properties in Australia. However, it 
gradually emerged that these measures were inadequate. In the beginning, the Vice President 
D1 at the parent headquarter office was confident that he had secured a good deal and 
subsequent narratives revealed inexperience in handling crises unseen in the home country.    
 
“M&A requires specialization in knowledge about the legal aspects and supply chain, local expertise, 
human resources, and how to ensure getting a reasonable price. The popular talk about “China premium” 
was that Chinese purchase at high prices but sell cheap. We are very cautious about investment and must 
debunk the myth of China premium. Foreigners find it hilarious and mind boggling why Chinese investors 
are willing to pay double the asking price.”  - D1, HQ (2015) 
 
The narrative turned more depressing as operational realities set in. The parent company 
management was certain that it had not paid a premium, but a manager of the overseas 
subsidiary admitted a year later that “hopefully they had only paid a small premium”. In the 
following year, D1 admitted there was a gap between his professional knowledge and business 
investment.  Overseas subsidiary manager D4 later acknowledged in 2017 that it would be 
difficult to resell the assets at the price they bought for. Another business owner C1 also 
admitted to overpaying for subsequent cattle farmland acquisitions after a successful spate of 
investments in wineries. Moreover, Companies B, C, D, E which were non-agricultural firms 
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in China diversifying into agrifood sector and internationalizing concurrently. Their 
international experience was limited to trading, exporting non-agrifood manufactured products 
and services. Compared to investors whose core-businesses were in the same sector as 
international acquisitions, the cluster of diversifiers-internationalizers studied had to confront 
and manage additional risks. Though they recruited professional managers and locals, all 
except Company E were not well-equipped with some training, management skills and 
experience to operate overseas ventures. 
 
8.7.4 Industry specific risks: Agrifood sector 
 
Chinese SOEs have been encouraged by the government to target higher value added 
and entire supply chain as a measure of risk mitigation. Agriculture production bears higher 
risks due to vulnerability to natural conditions and are unlikely to yield profit margins in the 
short-term. According to a recent research conducted by the NDRC, Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Agriculture, only two central/national SOEs and few provincial SOEs have invest 
in the global processing and supply chain, whereas most agrifood OFDI are concentrated in 
ventures that bear high risk and low returns (Jiang, 2017). POEs complaints difficult to get 
loans, lack of support, slow processing. Senior government researchers and advisers 
highlighted the need to be more tolerant of slow returns from agricultural OFDI in contrast to 
conventional corporate performance evaluation (Cheng & Zhang, 2014). In the latest 
government directives, OFDI in agrifood sector has been identified as one of the encouraged 
sectors along with resources and technology because of the importance of food security and 
food safety in contrast to real estate, sports and entertainment which are considered 
unproductive sectors. Upstream agrifood investors are vulnerable to unavoidable risks which 
include bad weather and global price fluctuations. Though downstream segments are more 
profitable, investors must contend with high cattle prices, cash flow problems and dealings 
with host country industry networks and managing local staff.  
 
 The Chinese domestic agricultural sector enjoys high levels of support for production, 
mainly relying on price support for risk reduction (also implemented in Korea and Japan) and 
rate payment or subsidies (practised in EU and US) (Antón, 2009). Though the Chinese 
government subsidizes domestic agriculture, subsidies and insurance was not available to 
Chinese agrifood businesses investment overseas. Most of these proposals remain on paper due 
to difficulties in implementing support for Chinese investors. The Chinese government only 
provides general personal accident insurance subsidies for Chinese expatriates working abroad 
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(Luo et al., 2010). The idea of providing support for agrifood OFDI to mitigate risks remains 
an elusive plan that has not been implemented.  
 
Listening to the meetings with businesses, government researchers who worked closely 
with FAO and the World Bank suggested support for insurance protection against inherent risks 
in the vulnerable agricultural sector. Insurance is a form of risk management by transferring 
and outsourcing the risk to another party. Though the idea of insurance coverage for 
international agrifood investment was novel and important, some managers questioned its 
adequacy and affordability due to the high cost and uncertainty of insurance coverage.   
 
 “We need some insurance coverage to protect against risks. Paying a premium for the short-term is not an 
issue but for long-term investors (in the agrifood business) covering 30 years would mean paying a higher 
premium. It would be disadvantageous for companies going in for the long haul, like fishing with a long 
line. Government support would not be sufficient.”  - A1 (2015) 
   
 
A POE executive based in Australia was more candid in his criticisms, raising doubts 
about the feasibility of overseas insurance proposal. D4 reasoned that Chinese insurers would 
not understand diverse international host environments to cater to the specific needs of clients. 
 
“There is no such transnational insurance product (modelled from domestic practice). It would be difficult 
to offer insurance and support claims because Chinese insurers do not understand the farming business 
overseas. It would be too costly and unsuitable to the insured. Within China, there are many types of 
professional insurance products and specific services. For instance, natural calamities and extreme weather 
conditions in Xinjiang that cover loss of herd. In Australia, we take up general insurance for workers 
compensation, floods, fire, loss of property coverage.” – D4 (2017)  
 
 Some Australian agrifood commodities companies and industry consultants advocated 
lower insurance payments by farmers during an agricultural symposium held in Sydney in 
September 2017. However, these proposals are preliminary and have limited influence on 
insurers. It is aimed at alleviating problems from natural calamities and climate change. In 
another follow-up interview, D4 complained that insurance for farm assets in Australia will be 
increased as conditions worsened for farming.   
 
“We are paying too much premium. The insurance broker recently pushed for increasing the scope of 
coverage. This will really a big burden for us.” - D4 (2017) 
  
Due to the gaps between business expectations and government delivery of knowledge, 
proposals for insurance coverage for Chinese overseas investors failed to take off. Despite 
additional risks shouldered by agrifood investors and long-term gestation of return on capital, 
home country institutions professed to support certain OFDI which meet vital domestic needs 
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such as food security. Though some degree of risks could be mitigated by pre-investment 
exercise of due diligence procedures, Chinese investors continue to contend with unknown and 
unavoidable risks such as harsh weather, inadequate industry knowledge and relevant 
management skills that match their overseas acquisitions.   
 
8.7.5 Political Risks 
 
Chinese investors may suffer from negativity attributed to the liability of country of 
origin (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010). A survey of local officials 
indicated that political instability, economic and regulatory changes in host countries are 
among the top risks borne by Chinese agrifood investors overseas (Jiang, 2017). It is 
acknowledged in semi-official and consultancy online social media platforms that the US is 
not a friendly destination given the geopolitical background and the tedious approval processes 
supervised by CFIUS. However, most investors hold superficial and subjective assessments of 
the host country political environment (Kobrin, 1979). In the earlier years of phenomenal surge 
in agrifood OFDI to advanced economies, Chinese businesses and local officials blamed the 
“opposition parties” in advanced economies for disrupting foreign investment for political 
gains but trusted that the government in power would act rationally and not dismiss inflow of 
foreign capital. However, public campaigns and media scrutiny may lead to deterioration of 
the operating environment and negativity that could not be defused easily. Opposition and 
vested interests could pressure the government to tighten regulations especially in situations 
where the government holds a slim majority.  
 
SOEs tended to favor Europe over the US as the region is seen as less politicized and 
offered differentiated regimes on OFDI (Le Corre & Sepulchre, 2016). The Vice President of 
Company A identified European countries as more sympathetic host destinations.  
 
“In terms of resources, Australia is the closest distance to China. Europe offers great potential. International 
relations will determine [what happens]. Europeans empathize with Chinese investors because they too had 
been “tricked” by the US in the past. East European countries are very interested in our investment. They 
have a good resource base.”  - A2 (2015) 
 
However, even Germany has recently imposed restrictions on Chinese acquisition of 
high technology firms (Gilchrist, 2017; Liu & Woywode, 2013). Though advanced economies 
are politically stable, Chinese investors are exposed to populist, nationalist and protectionist 
backlash in host country politics. SOEs and POEs care about the image and reputation of 
Chinese investors and are sensitive to developments that may hinder future OFDI. SOEs and 
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POEs concur that the government could do more in terms of diplomacy to project a more 
positive image of their home country.   
 
The Chinese government could influence the direction of OFDI by showing support. I think it would be 
sufficient if the government could educate the young well and improve the country's image in foreign 
relations.” - F1 (2015) 
 
  The asymmetry between Chinese investors’ home country and host countries that 
belong to the developed world became more apparent to managers from hindsight. Despite 
cautious efforts to avoid buying land, the firms studied realized that cognitive bias persisted. 
Hence certain industries such as agrifood business are more susceptible to challenges in host 
countries than manufacturing and services. Chinese scholars claimed that MNEs pursued both 
economic and social objectives to gain goodwill in the host countries. However, national 
factors and cognitive processes interact to form asymmetric distance perceptions (Håkanson et 
al., 2016).  
 
Some owners and senior executives interviewed considered the option of wait and see, 
preferring to halt overseas investment expansion in unfriendly host countries and seek 
alternative target destinations. These Chinese firms, regardless of size and ownership, either 
had unsatisfactory experience or assessed that the host governments were biased. For instance, 
Companies C and G which had earlier invested in Australia, hinted that they might consider 
investing in other regional countries after witnessing the erratic application of regulations on 
signatories of Free Trade Agreements and lowering the threshold for scrutiny towards Chinese 
investors. Even though both companies have yet to commit to suitable targets in Southeast Asia, 
further investment in Australia has been put on hold as the management hinted that Chinese 
capital was not appreciated by certain political and vested interests and that could undermine 
their profitability. Additionally, concerns over domestic debt and the Chinese government’s 
pressure against overleveraging, managers would have to make careful and discerning choices 
in investment decisions.  
 
Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was introduced in 2013, the central 
government has been promoting investments towards preferred destinations and projects. 
According to local official Q1 (2017), the BRI platform encourages investments with friendly 
countries and allows the government some leeway to monitor and shape the course of large-
scale overseas projects. BRI framework has been encouraged by the Chinese leadership to 
extend its domestic achievements towards growing and integrating regional economies 
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sympathetic to its interests. Despite other inherent risks of BRI, the latest platform helps to 
address one of the sources of risks emanating from a more protective global investment climate 
spearheaded by US and followed by its close allies.  
 
Agribusiness has recently been included in the predominantly infrastructure-focused 
BRI. This was aimed at integrating supply chain logistics support to ensure security of food 
supplies. In 2017, the Ministry of Commerce confirmed that 30 of the 64 countries in the BRI 
have signed bilateral agricultural agreements with China (Jiang, 2017). A longstanding 
difficulty for smaller POEs to get cheap capital could be addressed by taking advantage of Silk 
Road Fund. However, academic and industry sources cautioned that Chinese investors used the 
BRI label to gain official approval and support for their projects. Financiers are concerned 
about the economic and financial risks and uncertain returns of investing in BRI as some 
partner countries are economically undeveloped, politically unstable and rife with security 
problems (Cai, 2017). Consequently, some high risk and costly infrastructural projects running 
through the northern corridor have been delayed or called off due to political instability, 
incompatible Chinese construction equipment and difficulties in securing credit. 
 
8.8   Tightening of OFDI criteria 
 
Consistent with the experimental nature of Chinese economic policy management, 
different levers had been utilized to selectively focus on certain risk mitigation mechanisms. 
There is room for improving the effectiveness of existing controls and instating mechanisms in 
areas that are lacking in risk mitigation. As discussed, the main trade-off of deregulation was 
that more firms could take advantage of relaxed approval process and tended to overleverage. 
References to unsatisfactory outcomes from soft budget constraints, cannibalizing, overbidding 
and inexperience of early internationalizing firms were confined to private narratives until the 
last two years. Despite official suggestions to make firms accountable for risk taking and 
performance of OFDI, it was difficult to monitor and enforce uniformly. The state media has 
often projected a balanced prognosis, citing business consultancy studies that showed a third 
of OFDI were profitable, a third broke even and the rest incurred losses (Pheonix, 2015).  
 
According to Q1, “face” is very important to the Chinese, hence the government tried to 
put up a brave front and would not dwell on the details of failed cases. Local officials Q2 and 
Q4 admitted that more than half of Chinese businesses that invested overseas did not file reports 
of OFDI activities and had utilized illicit channels of funding. After decades of decentralization 
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to local authorities that propelled domestic growth and internationalization, the central 
government intervened to curb excessive commitments and soaring debts. Since 2014, re-
regulation and recentralization encompassed corrective reactions to excessive deregulation and 
debts. Local officials confirmed that the central government has employed state-owned 
financial institutions to rein in those capital outflows deemed as unwarranted and wasteful 
investment.   
 
8.8.1 Rational investment decisions 
 
To strengthen the justification for the shift towards central monitoring and restraints over 
unfavored types of OFDI, the government called for rational investment decisions. The 
rationality argument is couched as reasonable and scientific to convince and gain public support 
for tougher regulations and enforcement. The objective is to persuade and present Chinese 
investors as sensible and savvy, not inexperienced and desperate to acquire overvalued assets. 
High profile trophy acquisitions are discouraged under the new regulations except in sectors 
that are deemed crucial and beneficial to the home country. Reducing the volume of Chinese 
OFDI and focusing on key sectors may also limit saliency bias and negative response towards 
Chinese investors. Local official (Q3) and POE manager (F1) have criticized those who 
indiscriminately chased overseas for undermining the reputation of other Chinese investors. 
These comments foreshadow the gradual formalization of risk controls of excessive and 
imprudent OFDI.   
 
In August 2017, the State Council stated that "profound changes are taking place in 
international and domestic situations, and Chinese enterprises face not just relatively good 
opportunities but also various risks and challenges in overseas investments” (Bloomberg, 18 
August 2017). Risk mitigation was considered to redress overleveraging of overseas 
investment. The Director General of the International Cooperation Center of NDRC Cao 
Wenlian publicly stated (as reported by CNBC) that  
 
" [The government] is not discouraging overseas investment; it's just that the government has started 
regulating overseas investment … what the Chinese government has done is to control or fend off the 
risks … We should rein in the belts of companies and remind them that their investments need to be wiser." 
(Yan, 2017) 
 
 Financiers have already been exacting more stringent terms on businesses to ensure that 
OFDI would be financially viable through years of pro-market reforms. According to a 
manager of a private commercial bank X5 (2015), the procedure to approve loans is guided by 
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commercial assessment of credit worthiness and repayment capability of investing firms. 
Commercial assessment was the primary principle applied, though personal networks may help 
in some instances after commercial tests have been met. Even for government-supported BRI 
initiative, bankers are increasingly demanding  tougher terms to ensure viability and longer 
term sustainability of these projects (Cai, 2017). 
 
8.8.2 Business affirmation of risk control policy 
 
Chinese POEs weighed in to express support for national policies. Prominent billionaires 
defended their past and present OFDI strategies to claim adherence to government objectives 
of low risk, viable and sustainable overseas investment. The Chinese media recently featured 
the Chairman of Fosun Guo Guangchang reassuring his employees that the company’s high-
profile acquisition of French dairy jointly with a Chinese SOE was to gradually consolidate 
global resources, reduce debt, improve financial strength and development in China. Guo 
differentiated his strategy from some Chinese enterprises that tried to outbid each other (Li, 
Zhang, Zhang, Peng, & Feng, 2017; Yan, 2017). Another prominent businessman Cao Dewang 
exhorted Chinese firms not to blindly “go out”, but to be clear about the objectives and 
shortcomings. He claimed to have done extensive research before investing and used every 
cent of his own money. Cao claimed that “if you fly out, you must return on a plane and not 
walk home because you do not have money to pay the airfare” (He, 2017).  
 
Model POEs continuously negotiate with the Chinese authorities to moderate policies 
that inadvertently hurt Chinese overseas investment interests. Company F’s founder capitalized 
on the government’s general tightening and selective encouragement of agricultural OFDI to 
justify requests for more substantive support of Chinese enterprises that fulfilled China’s 
growing demand for fresh food and premium quality food by investing in resource-rich 
advanced economies. Company F had invested in meat processing and distribution in Australia 
and the US but faced subsequent import restrictions imposed intermittently by customs on meat 
imports. For several months in 2017, Chinese authorities imposed a temporary ban on some 
foreign meat distributors, including those invested by Chinese companies, from selling meat to 
Chinese consumers. Products from overseas subsidiaries of Company F also faced intense 
competition from cheaper substitutes from emerging markets entering the China market. 
Ironically, post-acquisition challenges which stem from home country regulations has become 
an area of concern for some POEs.  
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The concept of risk continues to be co-constructed by Chinese official and business actors. 
Even investors who are not overleveraged with borrowings in overseas commitments could be 
urged to support the home country. Company D has been advised to divest some of its overseas 
assets to boost domestic liquidity as China braces for the looming trade war with the US. It was 
less than a year ago during my follow-up meetings that D4 confirmed that the Chinese 
government supported its OFDI in agrifood business as seen in the quick approval process. D4 
vindicated that the company had healthy cash flow and used its own accumulated resources 
and did not have to service loans. Being a publicly-listed company, Company D’s financial 
results were strong, despite some setbacks encountered when diversifying into agrifood OFDI. 
However, recent developments  
 
8.9   Discussion 
 
A dynamic approach adopted in this study explicates how multi-level interactions of 
heterogeneous business and official actors in the home country take place and responses to 
domestic markets and feedback from internationalization experience. The growing awareness 
of the types and levels of risks reinforced risk mitigation mechanisms initiated by business and 
government actors. Considering the experimental and exploratory character of Chinese 
political economy, learning and adaptation could sensitize actors to the environment and reduce 
biases and uncover regretful decisions from hindsight (Cox, 2015). The metaphor “come back” 
gradually mingled with the predominant narrative of “go out” in Chinese globalization strategy. 
The growing acknowledgement of “come back” as a resonance to “go out” showed increasing 
concern over viability and sustainability of internationalization. This study has identified risk 
mitigation mechanisms as the missing link for firms to “come back”. This awakening and 
recognition by Chinese institutions and businesses constituted a learning process from previous 
investments that did not transpire smoothly as envisaged. Chinese agrifood OFDI to advanced 
economies learned from losses in the mining sector and were determined to avoid the pitfalls. 
Changing priorities called for moderation of some aggressive OFDI which did not meet 
expectations of returns on capital and long-term sustainability goals. 
 
From the findings of this multiple case study, public statements and economic reforms, 
I developed ‘gradual confluence and reinforcement’ model consistent with internationalization 
process. Previous studies tend to portray static and stable conditions. Linear path dependency 
assumes that internationalization will expand unabated. A study found Chinese POEs found 
the risk of entry modes are associated with firms’ resource endowment and organizing 
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capability (Liang et al., 2012). However, the assumption is contradicted by examples of firms 
endowed with resources and internationalization experience undertaking precautionary 
measures to minimize risks. This study shows that scholars, businesses and government 
reflected on the course of rapid serial acquisitions and put in brakes and controls to ensure more 
sustainable overseas investment. The perception and management of risks have changed over 
time. 
 
I identified diverse sources and levels of risks that have been overlooked. In the initial 
years of internationalization, owners and managers relegated risks as secondary and affordable 
rapid expansion (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007) being the primary focus. Motivated 
by resources and strategic seeking objectives, Chinese firms geared towards gaining 
competitive advantages. Firms embarked on serial acquisitions which are riskier than other 
modes. Some degree of risks was tolerated (Luo & Tung, 2007; Lyles et al., 2014; Ramamurti, 
2012) if the expected returns outweighed the costs. Studies on rapid internationalization and 
high-risk ventures were assumed to be affordable risks underwritten by home country support 
which in turn supports firm specific advantages (Rugman et al., 2011).  Having found the 
nuanced explanations of home country support in Chapter 5, I am inclined to rely on the process 
framework which offers scope for building the narrative of risk management. MNEs may treat 
initial losses as part of learning (Vahlne et al., 2017) and “make do” with available resources 
and accept affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 2001). Consequently, underdeveloped risk mitigation 
mechanisms were not applied consistently by different actors.  
 
Inexperienced Chinese firms still have much to learn in evaluating different types and 
levels of risks and dealing with the unknown. Businesses new to an industry or OFDI may have 
to endure unavoidable risks (Vahlne et al., 2017) given their limited knowledge in industry and 
host country. The nuanced treatment of risks helps to explain the apparent paradox of Chinese 
risk aversion in earlier OFDI. Early Chinese OFDI showed acceptance of high risk destinations 
in developing countries. Initially risk management was not incorporated in the firm’s 
internationalization strategy owing to lack of awareness or recognition of risk. Firms learned 
and accepted that some risks are considered avoidable and manageable as firms exercised due 
diligence and spread their portfolios to hedge the bets.   
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8.9.1 Turning Points 
 
A significant milestone is deregulation of OFDI from 2014. This encouraged more 
firms to “go out” but the government made it the investors’ responsibility to mitigate risks.  
Privately, government researchers sounded out businesses with the proposal of support for 
insurance to help Chinese agrifood businesses overseas. However, implementing ill-defined 
measures would be challenging in different regulatory regimes. Under pressure to be more 
accountable for their commercial performance, large SOEs raised awareness of different 
dimensions of risks and improved management through learning and due diligence. Model 
hybrid SOEs have selectively followed industry standards set by successful POEs (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) in evaluating targets and mitigating risks. For instance, Company F was part 
of a multinational consortium fund and formed joint ventures with industry leaders in the host 
countries. Pro-market reforms resulted in Chinse hybrid SOEs behaving more like POEs and 
the characteristics of companies with links to the state have been observed in other countries 
(Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2016). Experience from unsuccessful bids or unexpected 
difficulties (Madsen & Desai, 2010) served as lessons for Chinese managers to halt expansion 
in unfavorable host countries or consider alternative destinations. Only in the last two years did 
the Chinese government intervene to reduce overleveraging to cool both domestic and overseas 
investment. Table 8.3 shows the evolution of risk perception between regulations with 
enterprises, from light consideration for risk mitigation to gradual evolution and confluence 
and reinforcement of support for Chinese international investors to “come back”. 
 
Publicly-listed SOEs and POEs in this study display willingness to engage 
professionals to conduct due diligence prior to OFDI. Senior executives of one corporate group 
initially thought that they clinched a good deal and had avoided paying the “China premium” 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Despite conscious efforts by Chinese businesses and officials to 
improve knowledge, recruit industry professionals and assess the feasibility of projects, there 
exist disparities over expectations and delivery of knowledge, precautionary measures and high 
cost of insurance coverage. Basic awareness may not always translate into effective measures 
to deal with consequences of risks and unknown risks in the future. In hindsight, some 
managers gained a better understanding of knowledge gaps and ineffective mechanisms of 
tackling risks. Recognition has led to subsequent recalibration of risk perception and 
management (Liesch et al., 2011). Nevertheless, there would be inevitable time lag (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977; Luoma et al., 2017) between awareness, response, planning and 
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implementation. The ineffectiveness of past persuasion on firms and ineffective controls 
prompted the home country institutions to exert tighter regulations to limit irrational investment 
decisions and deleveraging. 
 
Table 8.3 Changing Perspectives on Risk Mitigation 
 Time Regulations and Official Statements Narratives of Enterprises 
2014   Deregulation: NDRC Order 9 and MOFCOM 
Measures. 
 
(Pre-interview)  
2015 Sep 
Government 
Vice Minister of Commerce clarified at a press 
briefing on deregulation measures, that enterprises 
must be responsible for OFDI risk evaluation, 
management, decisions, profit and loss and ensure 
that money can be returned.  
 
Government facilitates Go Out procedures.  
Businesses must be responsible for ensuring 
viability.  
 
 
 
 
Recentralization and closer scrutiny of rapid 
expansion and overpayment for overseas assets. 
 
 
 
 
Firms target good value assets and conduct prior 
investment due diligence. 
 
SOE A VP said its OFDI must come back unlike 
earlier mining OFDI.  
 
POE C owners urged “come back” and avoid 
examples of failed mining OFDI. 
 
Former SOE senior executive was jailed for 
corruption.  
 
Aug 2017 
Re-
Regulation 
Deleveraging 
high risk 
ventures 
 
SASAC adopted a negative list to regulate SOEs. 
 
Encourage agriculture, resources, energy and 
technology sectors. Restrict real estate, hotel and 
sports. 
 
Direct crackdown on SOEs and indirect pressure 
on highly leveraged POEs.  
 
State Council statement on balancing risk and 
opportunities in overseas investments.  
 
NDRC criticized "irrational" overseas investment 
in some sectors, while encouraging projects linked 
to the Belt and Road initiative. 
 
MoF proposed that SOEs implement professional 
financial accountability system. SOE executives 
are liable for losses incurred due to irrational 
decisions and failure to undertake adequate 
financial risk and feasibility assessments. 
 
 
 
Privately, Company D overseas manager affirmed 
that agriculture was exempted. He defended their 
low leverage and cautious approach. 
 
Company F capitalized on government 
encouragement of agrifood sector to request for 
support and facilitation of customs processing. 
 
Public affirmation of support for government 
policy. Two billionaires claimed their 
longstanding alignment with national objectives.  
 
 
 Collated by author from Chinese newspapers and webpages of Mofcom and business commentaries 
 
 
Recentralization accompanied by anti-corruption investigations have strengthened 
monitoring systems of SOE deals. Successive tightening on overleveraged OFDI in 
unproductive sectors through the financial system have been extended to POEs as well. The 
central government justified intervention and tough policies as necessary measures to promote 
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rational and responsible business decisions. The formalization of regulations on encouraged 
and discouraged sectors received strong public affirmation by Chinese businesses. The 
effectiveness of risk controls would be boosted with the convergence of policy and business 
interests. Private businesses openly claim alignment with government policies to ensure 
prudence, value creation and sustainable internationalization. This in turn strengthen the 
bargaining strength of businesses targeting agrifood OFDI and other favored sectors.  
 
Figure 8.2 is a graphic representation of the evolution of risk and mitigation as 
perceived by different actors in the home country. Risk management and mitigation are more 
likely to result in firms that “go out” to “come back”.  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Evolutionary Diffusion and Reinforcement of Risk 
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8.9.2 Failed cases 
 
There are probably riskier ventures that were unprofitable and could not “come back” 
than is widely publicized. Chinese officials and businesses are embarrassed and reluctant to 
acknowledge failures. However, remedial actions were undertaken to address concerns and 
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guard against similar mistakes in future. The wealth of the eight agrifood business groups in 
this study enabled these firms to overcome unexpected challenges and stay afloat. Despite 
paying premium prices for some assets and incurring operational losses after takeover, 
divestment and de-internationalization have been moderate and limited to assets that showed 
limited potential of turnaround.  
 
Even experienced agrifood companies are not shielded from high risks despite taking 
pre-emptive and precautionary measures prior to OFDI commitment. Companies A and G had 
to divest some of its foreign assets to align with the parent companies’ core objectives and cut 
loss making operations. Nevertheless, because these assets are at least second-tier reputable 
companies, there were ready buyers albeit incurring some capital losses. Company H was 
dogged by cash flow issues and decided to sell most of their meat processing assets to an 
established Australian business after repaying their debts.  
 
Churning and recycling of assets have been seen in previous failed cases of Japanese 
and Chinese investments in real estate and dairy sectors. A freeze in international expansion 
and selected divestment did not amount to large scale de-commitment by Chinese firms in this 
study. As Companies A, D, E and F have strong financials and diversified domestic businesses, 
it could buffer against shocks and risks from localized suppliers and markets. The overall 
profitability of business groups was not affected as the conglomerates’ investments included 
diverse portfolios of high returns, long-term, stable and risky investments. The eight case 
companies are content to cut costs and postpone integration of existing businesses in the short 
term. Selective streamlining, divestment and de-commitment were carried out by Companies 
A, B, H and G to refocus on developing core businesses.  
   
The cluster of diversifier-internationalizers (Companies B, C, D and E) who ventured 
into non-core agrifood businesses and internationalization faced multiple risks. Not only did 
they lack international investment experience, they were unfamiliar with the agrifood sector, 
and therefore had to shoulder immense risk. Despite their previous success and profitability in 
non-agricultural core business in the home country market, diversifying and internationalizing 
firms such as B, C and D could not meet performance targets. Though they understood that 
agrifood OFDI entails long gestation, low returns, slow growth and high risks, they thought it 
would be rewarding in the long term and decided to stay for the long haul. Diversification is 
fraught with uncertainties and may not always lead to improvement of profitability 
(Montgomery, 1994) especially in unrelated product and industry (Mishra & Akbar, 2007) and 
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may even increase risks (Kucuk Yilmaz & Flouris, 2017; Liesch et al., 2011) for the investor. 
Moreover, diversification into non-core sectors may encounter coordination difficulties, dilute 
synergies (Hashai, 2015; Zhou, 2011) and compound the types and degree of risks. Companies 
C and D persisted despite adverse weather conditions (Vahlne et al., 2017) which could be 
deemed affordable losses (Sarasvathy, 2001). Company D executives continue to hope for 
improvement of weather and a turnaround. Poor performance of acquired overseas assets 
discouraged Companies C and D from expansion and they were locked in the current upstream 
value chain.  
 
Apart from mitigating financial risks, Chinese investors contend with risks arising from 
knowledge gaps of host country industry practice and policy uncertainties in advanced 
economies when formulating business strategy (Fitzpatrick, 1983; Henisz & Delios, 2004). 
This study extends and enriches the process framework by finding different levels and types of 
risk management the level and types of risks in the discovery, response and mitigation process. 
In hindsight, investors learned that due diligence could not be fully outsourced as consultants 
are hired to achieve predetermined ends based on information provided by the vendors. To 
understand the risks of their potential ventures, managers should possess comprehensive 
knowledge of potential investment targets, industry and the host country environment. 
Challenges from lack of specialized industry knowledge, bad weather and market dynamics 
impact agrifood sector more than other industries. Though advanced economies are politically 
stable, there are unavoidable risks (Vahlne et al., 2017) from uncertainties of regulatory 
changes that would be difficult to anticipate and manage.  
 
The participants in this study tried to build a positive image or avoid negative publicity 
and had urged the government to step up diplomatic efforts to build a more conducive and 
friendlier environment. This supports the argument that businesses with a favorable corporate 
image and reputation would be able to develop sustainable competitive advantage (Yeo et al., 
2011). Though earlier studies highlighted the challenges of host countries nationalism towards 
sensitive security related state-owned targets (Zhang & He, 2014), POEs too face difficulties 
when acquiring sales by private family businesses in the light of dynamic host country posture 
towards Chinese investors. The study shows that not only the SOEs but POEs too face risks 
from negative biases in the international environment and this may be difficult to alleviate. 
Hence, there is a growing agreement among officials and businesses to focus on the key sectors 
and friendly host countries.  
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8.10  Conclusion 
 
This study captures multiple perspectives and temporal dimensions of the dynamic 
political economy. Motivated by the emergent metaphor used by participants of incorporating 
“come back” as a rejoinder to the dominant Go Out policy narrative, the study is framed as the 
process of strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms. Extant literature focuses on high risk and 
aggressive acquisitions in earlier internationalization of Chinese firms supported by ownership 
advantages and institutional factors. Departing from conventional IB scholarship which 
focuses on ownership advantages that support persistent OFDI, I address the increasing 
concerns over the viability and sustainability of the internationalization of Chinese firms. 
Conventional assumptions are problematized to expand the scope for findings and theorizing 
to capture the dynamic perception and management of risk. This study offers an alternative 
perspective and explanation using an evolutionary approach. This enables me to develop a 
“gradual confluence and reinforcement model” to explain the notion of risk in the 
internationalization process of Chinese agrifood business. Pro-market reforms, deregulation 
and recentralization shape the perception and management of risks in internationalization. 
Addressing financial related risks is only the first step as firms need to pay attention to 
knowledge deficiency and political risks.  
 
The contributions of this chapter are three-fold. First, the dynamic reconceptualization 
of risk perception and management offers alternative explanations to existing perspectives of 
high risk acquisitions. As Chinese firms continue to internationalize against the backdrop of a 
consumption driven home economy and recentralization, risk mitigation has taken on different 
overtones. Second, the evolutionary approach enriches the process frame by showing the non-
linear, interdependencies and growing sophistication of Chinese firms and home government 
in mitigating risks and ensuring sustainability. The transitional nature and key turning points 
of risk perceptions and mitigation efforts have not been well recognized and appreciated in the 
existing body of literature. Third, metaphors provide insights and a means to encapsulate 
evolving risk perception and risk management as part of firms’ international investment 
strategy.  
 
There are significant ramifications of risk management for managerial and policy 
decisions. Businesses should note that it is insufficient to focus on performing costly due 
diligence procedures. Further risk mitigation can be achieved through professionalization of 
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management, strengthening the risk management mechanisms and deepen their understanding 
of the host country. Public policy should take into consideration that the China political 
economy continues to evolve: rebalancing growth, internationalization, consumption driven 
growth, more supervision and risk controls. Emphasis on one aspect may result in 
compromising other objectives. Recentralization has dampened vibrant growth but may be 
necessary to curb overexpansion. Emerging market investors could take a leaf from policy 
transitions and roles of businesses. The lesson for host country policy decision is not to take 
for granted the high level of enthusiasm seen in past Chinese OFDI. Rising concern by the 
home country government and failed business ventures would inevitably raise apprehension 
and call for more controls to restrict overleveraging of assets.  
 
This study is bounded by context specific country, agrifood sector and the timeframe 
of study in the past decade. Due recognition is paid to seminal IB studies on the earlier phases 
of internationalization. One proposition for the research agenda is to conduct empirical testing 
of the insights and findings. Future research could examine and explore deeper into the 
treatment of different types of risks and other growth sectors. At the other end of the spectrum, 
research agenda may examine single case study to elucidate different levels of managerial 
perceptions that result in the firm’s risk management strategies.  
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9 Conclusion  
 
     “To finish the moment, to find the journey’s end in every step of the road,  
     to live the greatest number of good hours, is wisdom.”  - - Ralph Waldo Emerson 
  
9.1   Research Objectives 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of the findings and contributions. My 
research focused on how home country actors and relationships impact on internationalization. 
In the course of this research, I have gained understanding of the rationale behind investment 
choices, types of targets and levels of commitments. This study responds to the call for more 
vibrant and stimulating IB research on phenomena, and focus on the energetic, creative and 
risk-taking managers (Delios, 2017). To make up for the macro-level focus on the country and 
firm levels, I adopted multi-level, behavioral and non-linear approach to study 
internationalization process. The main aim of this thesis is to uncover the temporal and multiple 
dimensions of home country effects. The choice of a current research setting of agrifood OFDI 
to advanced economies during China’s economic rebalancing towards a consumption driven 
economy is appropriate and opportune for investigation. The study captures historic changes 
in institutions and relationships in a holistic way. Rather than a conventional macroeconomic 
equilibrium, I adopted a bottom-up approach and incorporate changes. The study applied an 
integrative and interdisciplinary frame combining IB knowledge with political economy and 
economic sociology on home country dynamics as the foundation. The emergent framework 
has enriched existing IB theories on process and institutions in the study of internationalization 
of Chinese and emerging market firms.   
  
While extant literature on process, institutions and latecomer perspectives enhanced our 
knowledge in the early stages of internationalization by Chinese firms, each model individually 
does not adequately explain the experience of Chinese firms investing in unique agrifood OFDI 
in advanced economies since 2008. The importance of achieving food security and food safety 
goals at the macro-level as motivations for internationalization have been recognized but 
implementation has not been smooth. This is due in part to the snapshot and abstraction of 
complexities that make up home country effects. The emergent framework from this study 
incorporates central policies and local government implementation, business actors, firms’ 
position in the industry, and market developments. I argued that an integration of evolutionary 
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model, institutional and relational perspectives and continuous learning of process would aptly 
serve as useful constructs to study home country effects on internationalization. This is 
consistent with abductive approach to research that creates space for innovation. Multiple 
stakeholders rationalize, leverage and advance their respective interests in collaborative and 
competitive modes under different circumstances. This study offers fresh and alternative 
explanations of the complexities and changes in the Chinese home country context. 
 
9.2   Findings 
 
Rich data generated from field work used in multiple case analyses are developed and 
presented in chapters five to eight to provide the context and content of this research. I 
addressed the broad research question of how home country effects shape internationalization 
and the context specific thematic questions through reflexivity and iteration of data with 
theories. This is consistent with the philosophical assumptions of pragmatism, using abductive 
logic, and applying a practical approach to theorizing phenomena. The thematic chapters are 
interrelated and linked to form a coherent monograph on the dynamic relationships in the home 
country effects on the internationalization of Chinese firms. There are seven key findings in 
this thesis.  
 
9.2.1 Nuances of Institutional Support 
 
The key finding in Chapter 5 is that home country institutional support has different 
meanings to different stakeholders in internationalization at various times. The study 
challenges the assumption in extant literature of dichotomous support versus constraint based 
on static ownership types and connections. While the central government support 
internationalization of key industries, local officials are increasingly adhering to market criteria 
and that support for SOEs should not be taken for granted. Integrating previous work in 
economics (Garnaut et al., 2012) with IB would be useful to understand the effects of pro-
market reforms have prompted officials and organizations to evaluate firms on a similar basis 
as the banks in advanced economies would. Commercial banks assess the firm’s credit 
worthiness, repayment capabilities and business viability. Drawing on political economy 
literature, institutional and industry actors respond, coevolve and reinforce each other to 
changing expectations and objectives (Ang, 2016). Local officials implementing policy 
directives from the central government interpret and match the needs of internationalizing firms. 
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Concurrently, businesses respond to and leverage institutional actors to elicit different forms 
and levels of appropriate support for their global strategy.  
 
The study also produced a more nuanced representation than the popular perception 
that SOEs are favored in institutional support for internationalization. SOEs not limited to 
central organizations are under increasing pressure to perform (Li et al., 2014) and even 
compete with POEs for funding. SOEs are expected to demonstrate accountability and conduct 
due diligence as they contend with recentralization, monitoring and anti-corruption 
investigation. Though SOEs’ wealth of resources could be attributed to the history of 
government support and ownership, a growing proportion of funding for their OFDI come from 
discretionary funds, loans from the free market and post-acquisition IPO. The study also dispels 
common impressions of home country advantages in the form of subsidies for 
internationalization. In this study, managers confirmed that subsidies have been limited to 
support domestic agricultural production.  
 
While scholarship concentrated on early part of internationalization of emerging market 
firms, this study provides insights into the growing prominence of large POEs in the latest 
phase of internationalization. Previous findings portray POEs as constrained by discriminatory 
home country treatment and were forced to escape overseas. However, most POEs studied are 
not keen on receiving home country institutional support for internationalization or are very 
selective on how support would be beneficial to the firms. Large POEs prefer to utilize their 
savings and source for capital from the markets to maintain autonomous decision making on 
internationalization. Some POEs seek underground channels of funding or industry support to 
invest overseas. This research shifts the conversation from binary conception of support and 
the linkage between firm advantages and country support (Rugman & Li, 2007). An emergent 
‘discretionary’ model that captures the changing character of home country support and how 
actors leverage for their own advantage would be useful for future research.   
 
9.2.2 Preemptive and visionary strategy of experienced firms 
 
The paradox of agrifood OFDI that eschewed land purchases is explained in Chapter 6. 
The behavior of experienced Chinese agrifood firms that invested in processing and supply 
chain businesses can be justified by resources and management skills could be gained more 
effectively by acquiring downstream targets of advanced economies. Established Chinese 
agrifood firms and officials rationalized that Chinese firms should avoid controversies 
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associated with farmland acquisitions, alluding to literature and media portrayal of Chinese 
land grabbing (Bräutigam & Zhang, 2013; Kaag & Zoomers, 2014; Myers & Guo, 2015). 
However, the cautious approach of avoiding nationalist backlash and promoting China’s 
influence in global agrifood supply chain was insufficient to ensure smooth post-acquisition 
integration. 
 
Chinese agrifood corporations displayed different pace and scale and collaboration with 
foreign partners and even divestment in the internationalization process. Industry experience 
in the home country may not translate into management competencies for coordinating and 
integrating international assets. Relentless acquisitions undertaken by Company A were abated 
by obstacles of converting home market consumers to accept new products from advanced 
countries and increased government investigation of SOEs. Company F managed to overcome 
lack of specialized knowledge, expanded to different regions through consortium funding and 
integrated dairy and beef processing acquisitions by forming alliances with host country 
industry leaders. As an important national SOE, Company G had to achieve multiple goals of 
food security, food safety and profitability, but was hampered by politicking in Australia, costly 
operations and integration problems of two global trading firms. Although Company H is a 
leading meat producer, processor and distributor in China, its meat processing acquisition in 
Australia faced supply shortages, resource price spikes and cashflow problems, forcing it to 
diversify to other resource locations in South America and divest most of its underperforming 
assets in Australia. Despite their achievements in the home country and some prior 
internationalization experience, Chinese firms faced daunting challenges due mainly to 
knowledge gaps in management of specialized agrifood businesses in advanced economies.  
  
9.2.3 Double Burden of Concurrent Internationalization and Diversification   
 
Unlike most MNEs that diversify across products within-industry, within-country or in 
complementary products and markets, the four Chinese corporate groups studied diversified 
across sectors and pursued internationalization concurrently. The internationalizer-diversifiers 
shoulder compounded risks of simultaneous challenges and uncertainties. The behavior of this 
cluster of Chinese investors seem at odds with findings in extant literature on core 
competencies, competitive advantage and balancing resource allocation as prerequisites for 
internationalization. Previous studies show a trade-off between product and market 
diversification. With their largesse from successful non-agricultural businesses in the home 
country, the internationalizer-diversifiers targeted land-based upstream agrifood OFDI of 
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advanced economies. Despite home country encouragement to invest in downstream assets, 
being newcomers to the agrifood sector, this cluster of firms preferred investments that 
involved less capital and delegation to local farm managers. Resource seeking motivations to 
address natural endowment deficiencies and rising demand in the home country have been the 
main motivations. Unlike established agrifood firms, these investors count on the potential for 
capital appreciation by owning land in advanced economies that offer property rights protection 
and stability of political environment.   
 
Because of the uncertainties of diversification across sectors and borders (Hashai & 
Delios, 2012), the experience and performance of each firm differs widely. Managers need to 
balance the costs and benefits to gain from synergies of diversification and value creation 
(Zhou, 2011). Moreover, the liability of foreignness (Galavotti et al., 2017; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977) increases in agrifood sector due to sensitivities attached to foreign land ownership. 
Insufficient relevant knowledge of non-core industries, shifting host country regulations and 
lack of local networks have hindered the smooth operations and cost controls after takeover. 
Despite conducting due diligence prior to commitment, two case companies halted further 
expansion (Welch et al., 2016) and were constrained from exporting their farm produce to the 
China market due to high costs and supply issues and were locked in upstream segment. Only 
Company E which hired relevant host country managerial talent to undertake farmland 
purchases steadily consolidated its farmland purchases.  
 
The study provides an alternative perspective to political stability and regulations of 
advanced economies host countries portrayed in extant literature. I have addressed how shifting 
political and regulatory environment that impact subsequent entries and internationalization 
expansion. Investors’ liability of country of origin (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) is not limited to SOEs. Even POEs could be 
hindered by contingent factors such as nationalistic public campaigns may exacerbate 
opposition. Hence, POEs are ill-prepared to manage impediments to gain acceptance and 
legitimacy in host countries which are politically stable, with well-established institutions. 
Other than keeping a low profile, there was little Chinese investors could respond when caught 
in midst of politicking in the host countries and at the low points in bilateral relations.   
 
Nevertheless, setbacks of investment bids and recent losses incurred in Australia and 
New Zealand did not adversely affect large Chinese corporate groups’ overall performance in 
the parent companies. This is because of their domestic asset wealth and continued reliance on 
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non-agricultural core businesses. Aware of the low margins and long gestation for returns on 
capital in the agrifood sector, the upstream investors hedged on long-term stable growth instead 
of diversifying for survival and profitability (Very, 1993). Moreover, upstream investors took 
comfort in potential capital appreciation of assets in resource rich advanced economies.  
  
9.2.4 Challenges of selling to the China market 
 
Another key finding is that China is not a “ready-made market” waiting for Chinese 
investors to import agrifood products back home to meet the enormous demand. This has 
challenged even large and experienced agrifood investors. Company A had to divest its 
nutritional food acquisition in the UK due to the slow sales performance of its highly priced 
products in China. Chinese consumers are not convinced to switch to certain unfamiliar 
products such as cold dairy products. Just because infant milk formula, fruits, olive oil and 
wine met consumers’ food safety concerns and lifestyle aspirations, did not mean that most 
imported agrifood products would gain popularity. The China market could be tough to win 
over in areas where habits of eating warm food persist. Australian beef is exported to affluent 
markets in US, Japan and South Korea, and the high-end market in China, because it competes 
on quality rather than price. The Chinese middle class could only afford to purchase premium 
Australian beef occasionally. Traditionally, the majority of Chinese consumer obtain meat 
protein from pork and chicken. Chinese agrifood investors acknowledge that it will take time 
to convert Chinese consumers’ taste and build up the distribution network in China. 
Impediments such as the tightening of Chinese import regulations, temporary ban imposed on 
dairy and beef that did not meet the procedural formalities, could undermine Chinese investors’ 
margins.     
 
9.2.5 Gradual development of risk mitigation mechanisms 
  
Chapter 8 tracks the evolving perception, priorities and management of risks in 
internationalization from the home country actors’ perspectives. Risk mitigation mechanisms 
that were previously weak or overlooked in the home country are gaining attention in the era 
of recentralization and deleveraging. Extant literature tends to associate internationalization of 
Chinese firms with high risk destinations (Buckley et al., 2007). Insensitivity to risks and 
inability to manage risks are gradually addressed with greater awareness and emergent 
mechanisms. MNEs may treat initial losses as part of learning (Vahlne et al., 2017) and accept 
affordable loss (Sarasvathy, 2001). In the early days of internationalization, Chinese used the 
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term “go out” to refer to globalization. Since 2014, the rejoinder metaphorical verbal phrase of 
“come back” emerged from private business narratives. Concurrently, the Chinese government 
expects investors to be responsible for risk management in a deregulated regime that is more 
conducive to internationalization. Learning from losses incurred by earlier investors in the 
mining sector, current agrifood investors were determined to avoid the pitfalls.  
 
The publicly-listed SOEs and POEs in this study followed set procedures to conduct 
due diligence and spread their portfolios to hedge the bets. However, this may not guarantee 
success due to the unforeseen gaps in information on business targets, uncertainties in host 
country, the lack of specialized industry knowledge and unfavorable weather conditions. 
Despite some measures taken to reduce risks, there are some unknown and unavoidable risks 
that result in investors paying the “China premium” as managers realized in hindsight. The 
policy priorities favored moderation of aggressive OFDI that did not meet expectations of 
returns on capital. From early 2017, businesses publicly supported the government’s call for 
rationality and deleveraging in internationalization. Risk mechanisms are gradually 
emphasized and strengthened by risk awareness, persuasion for firms to be responsible, and 
subsequent intensification of controls. The findings support an emergent framework of 
‘confluence and reinforcement’ of risk mitigation mechanisms shared by official and business 
stakeholders in internationalization.     
 
9.2.6 Knowledge Gaps 
 
Chinese investors had to contend with the lack of knowledge in specialized businesses 
and industries that are outside their core competencies or prior experience. Having the financial 
resources and hiring professional managers and consultants with general expertise may not 
fully protect firms from the challenges of managing its overseas acquisitions. For Companies 
B and D, grafting of experts did not translate into quick and relevant learning as their skills 
were not transferable and applicable to the industry-specific context and host country 
regulatory environment. Other factors include high operating costs, poor weather and 
unfavorable political developments altered Chinese investors’ plans for cumulative 
internationalization and integration. Even agrifood giants such as Companies A and G were 
unaware of the less than transparent trading accounts of major assets acquired within the last 
five years. Both companies streamlined their overseas assets to tailor the needs of the China 
market, and divested those non-core units that had lost value post-acquisition.     
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9.2.7 Success and unsatisfactory outcomes 
 
The exemplars in the case studies are POEs that have invested in upstream (Company 
E) or downstream (Company F) agrifood businesses in Australia, New Zealand and America. 
The model cases were able to harness home country state support during the initial 
development of their domestic agrifood business. They also found suitable foreign partners and 
recruited local managers who were well-versed with specialized industry knowledge to execute 
their global strategies at critical points in time. Not only did they overcome competitive 
disadvantages, the two companies also avoided political controversies that some of their 
competitors and industry associates encountered. While Company E kept a low profile in the 
host countries initially, the owner of Company F was proud to publicize the company’s 
contribution to capital and employment in the host country economy and maintained a celebrity 
status in the home country.  
 
Another finding is that success and failure are not absolute definitions but a balance of 
mixed results. Even Company A which is a model SOE did not make accurate assessment of 
the home market demand for certain foreign food products and was said to have overpaid for 
some assets in Europe. Companies A, F and G had to divest parts of their international assets 
that did not meet their expectations of sales, costs and parent company objectives respectively. 
De-commitment has been low and selective, but the overall strategy of investing for the long 
haul remains on course. Though beleaguered by high costs and drought, Companies C and D 
persevered with existing operations, but freeze further investment in Australia, their only host 
country destination. Company B had encountered a huge setback in failure to get approval to 
invest in trophy farmland in Australia and New Zealand. Company B shifted its focus to 
diversifying OFDI to emerging markets and developing grains, oilseeds and existing dairy 
supply chain.  
 
9.3   Contributions 
 
This study has enriched and moved beyond process and institutional theoretical frames 
in extant literature grounded on longstanding assumptions of stable, progressive and distinct 
boundaries in internationalization. Existing studies that exclude time and complexities impose 
restrictions on explaining change and interdependencies among actors in the home country 
context and how these would impact internationalization.  
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9.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
  
Firstly, dynamic and coevolutionary models in this study deepens the institutional 
frame. I reconceptualized conventional models of support versus constraint duality linked to 
ownership types. This study offers nuanced explanations of players’ perceptions and responses 
to policy shifts. I also offered explanations for the paradoxes in agrifood resource-seeking 
decisions and the effects of pro-market reform, deregulation and recentralization on 
internationalization. Institutional focus studies tend to take a snapshot instead of incorporating 
evolution, continuity and transition. Literature on varieties of capitalism and business systems 
are correct in their own right, but are incomplete in explaining diversity and exceptional 
examples.  
 
Drawing on political economy literature helps to strengthen existing institutional 
constructs. A coevolutionary approach used in this thesis captures change as well as complexity 
(Garnsey & McGlade, 2006). The findings also temper the predominantly positive aspects of 
home country support. The difficulties encountered in tapping the huge Chinese market 
included temporary bans on fresh food imports, and tightening of import regulations, in 
addition to existing trade barriers. These have hurt some Chinese investors importing products 
from their overseas subsidiaries to China. This study has moved beyond existing studies and 
conceptual exploration of stable government institutional support for Chinese firms to develop 
international competitiveness (Ramamurti, 2012; Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014).  
 
Secondly, this study extends and enriches the process frame. A dynamic home country 
model elucidates the non-linear, interdependencies and growing sophistication of the 
internationalization experience. Rather than the progressive path suggested by the Uppsala 
model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), this study sheds light on the uneven development of the 
internationalization experience. Surge in OFDI may be followed by halt in expansion, selective 
divestment and de-commitment. Learning is not limited to experiential knowledge building 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2003). The study augmented the sources of learning by incorporating 
vicarious learning, learning from previous experience, grafting of professionals and 
outsourcing to consultants. However, increased learning may not be sufficient to ensure better 
management outcomes. The knowledge acquired from grafting talents, experiential and 
vicarious learning, should be timely and relevant to specialized industry requirements of their 
investment targets and portfolios. Moreover, the study showed that learning is a continuous 
adaptation process. Post-acquisition discovery of asymmetry of industry knowledge, vendors 
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disclosure, operational realities and politically driven regulatory changes in host countries, 
could impose burden firms, preventing them from expanding and integrating assets across the 
value chain. 
 
Thirdly, this study of institutional change challenges conventional conceptualization of 
home country support versus constraint dichotomy (Voss et al., 2010). Extant literature 
associates institutional support with state ownership while firms that do not have good 
connections are constrained and have to escape overseas (Witt & Lewin, 2007) . Incorporating 
multiple perspectives overcomes limitations of unidirectional causality commonly adopted by 
studies of home country effects. While CSA and FSA dilute the liability of foreignness 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009) the liability of country of origin (Ramachandran & Pant, 
2010) remains strong and disadvantaged Chinese investors in advanced economies. Even 
successful model SOEs are under increasing pressure to be accountable for its international 
investment and compete for government support. Institutional support is increasingly merit-
based, shifting in tandem with pro-market reforms, deregulation and refinement of policies 
with the recent recentralization and deleveraging agenda. Subsidies received by established 
Chinese agrifood firms are to support domestic agrifood production but rarely for 
internationalization. Contrary to the narrative of constraints on POEs which may be relevant in 
the early stages of China’s globalization, large POEs declined government assistance and value 
autonomous decision-making to pursue their respective international business strategies.  
  
Fourthly, I shifted mainstream IB conversation from commonly studied entry mode 
strategies to value chain targets. Agrifood OFDI need not be land-based investment. 
Experienced Chinese agrifood companies took preemptive and precautionary measures to 
avoid controversial land purchases and target higher value downstream businesses in advanced 
economies to influence global supply chains. The study also contributed to IB literature on 
diversification and business groups. In Chapter 7, the study goes beyond typical product and 
market diversification to cross-sectoral expansion outside the core businesses. The emergence 
of diversifier-internationalizers have not been studied in IB. Non-agrifood POEs had the 
capital but lacked knowledge, home and host government support and networks before 
internationalizing due to their lack of core competencies and experience in the agrifood sector. 
While partially conscious of lower margins and returns from agrifood investment, investors are 
motivated by the growth of the middleclass market and potential capital appreciation. 
Commitments by wealthy first movers did not drastically affect the group’s overall 
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performance. However, the rarity of achieving scale economies and breaking even during the 
long gestation of agrifood business have discouraged existing investors from expanding. 
Companies A, G and H had to divest some of its overseas assets to focus on core businesses or 
diversify to other host countries. The rhetoric of achieving value chain integration may be a 
difficult and lengthy process in practice. In fact, two of the upstream investors in this study 
were locked into their existing farmland commitments and hesitated to acquire downstream 
segments of agrifood business. 
 
Fifthly, the study explored alternative strategies of Chinese investors. Successful and 
satisfactory internationalization experience are outliers. Companies F and G and to a certain 
extent E, showed that adopting a flexible approach to reconfigure business alliances instead of 
full ownership of acquired assets would be advantageous to mitigate risks and gain acceptance. 
The study substantiated isomorphism of industry standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) when 
peers follow leaders to form multinational consortium funding to raise more capital and tap 
diverse management expertise, thereby reducing risks of embarking on large scale projects. 
Company F went further to form partnerships with host country industry leaders to ensure 
smooth transition and sustainability, and shielded itself from politicking in host countries that 
afflicted some Chinese investors. Embracing exemplars and outliers contributed to holistic 
analysis of the agrifood players, in contrast to commonly used variant studies that exclude 
outliers as statistically non-significant. The study incorporates the important roles played by 
heterogenous actors such as different types of SOEs and POEs.  
 
Sixthly, I extended the notion of risk in the internationalization of Chinese firms. The 
process of recognizing different forms of risks and realizing that inadequate mechanisms of 
managing uncertainties in internationalization was gradual and interactive. The notion of 
“come back” has recently made its way into the vocabulary of Chinese globalization commonly 
known as “go out’”. By following the narratives of how Chinese home country players perceive 
and mitigate risks, the study provided deeper understanding and explanation of Chinese OFDI 
directed at high risk destinations and high premium paid to resources and strategic assets. A 
coevolutionary model sheds light on change and the dilemmas of concurrent pro-market 
reforms, deregulation, recentralization and deleveraging.  
 
Seventhly, the thesis contributed to clarifying the latecomer perspective (Luo & Tung, 
2007; Mathews, 2002a) and CSA-FSA (Rugman & Li, 2007). I qualified that advantages could 
be offset by liability of foreignness due to gaps in trust and knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 
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2009). Rapid and relentless acquisitions may not be sustainable if learning and risks did not 
catch up with the pace of absorption (Petersen et al., 2008). Internationalization would peak, 
encounter challenges, slow down expansion and even result in de-commitment of some 
investments that incurred unsustainable losses, with little potential for turnaround. Earlier 
success and preconceived optimism (March & Shapira, 1987) may cloud professional 
managers and negotiators’ assessment of the costs (Ghauri & Hassan, 2014) involved in 
acquiring potential targets that are highly regarded. Despite political stability, the politics and 
regulatory environment of some advanced economies, Chinese firms that are overconfident 
may underestimate the challenges, miscalculate the costs and opposition that could derail their 
investment plans.  
 
Firms need more than basic knowledge on internationalization, and have to be flexible 
and innovative in order to  create value and improve performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
Company A found that some of its investments did not retain its value and failed to grow the 
China and global markets. Company H was saddled with cash flow and debt repayment issues 
soon after it took over a chain of meat processors in Australia. Though its intention was to 
endure the challenges and commit for the long-term, the owners reluctantly divested some of 
its Australian assets and focused on lower cost South American supply chain. The study goes 
further than financial value and explored reputational value gains of OFDI. Chinese businesses 
and the home government are increasingly concerned with how negative perceptions of the 
country of origin (Ramachandran & Pant, 2010) would impede internationalization plans. 
Prominent business leaders are supportive of moderating irrational investment decisions such 
as paying high premiums for high profile trophy overseas assets that may result in nationalist 
backlash against Chinese investors. Image and trust building are important to safeguard 
sustainability of investors’ internationalization strategy.  
 
9.3.2 Contribution to Methodology  
  
This study produces relevant insights through investigative, observational and reflexive 
methods (Klag & Langley, 2013). Engaging directly with the main actors has improved our 
understanding of evolving real world phenomena as a lived experience and contribute to social 
construction and theorizing (Elkjaer & Simpson, 2011). Employing qualitative case study 
methodology to look into the black box has been underutilized in IB. Case studies in extant 
literature have been dominated by positivist qualitative case study methodology (Piekkari et 
al., 2011). New knowledge could be constructed without the constraints imposed by deductive 
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experiments and exploratory observations. My research shows that abduction could be an 
alternative to induction and deduction in explaining puzzling phenomena (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2011; Brinkmann, 2014). Though abduction has rarely been used in case studies, it 
provides insights and explanatory power that commonly adopted positivist methods lack. 
Induction which is better known for case study research is constrained from generating new 
theories (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Instead of reduction and abstraction, I optimized 
abductive logic to push the boundaries to create space and enhance conceptual innovation. 
Multiple channels of communications from diverse primary sources, industry experts and 
published materials are useful to investigate the meanings of conventional notions. Manual 
coding and inference from empirical material helped to guide the exploration of relevant topics 
to the field of study rather than determine beforehand what needs to be studied. Drawing 
meanings from empirical material and the language of participants, I construct deeper insights 
to develop models such as ‘autonomy’ of POE perspective on support.  
 
Another methodological contribution is extending the criteria of qualitative research in 
IB scholarship. I demonstrated that using the “third generation” pluralistic and contextual 
approach without adhering closely to rigid application of set procedures could produce robust 
and good quality research (Welch & Piekkari, 2017). Departing from conventional studies 
confining either to the microlevel firm or macrolevel country, this study digs deeper into the 
multi-level and multi-dimensional mechanics. I adopted a holistic and processual approach by 
including the contextual and temporal dimensions. This contrasts with mainstream controlled 
and decontextualized studies which are safer, tried, tested and accepted practice, but 
constrained by stringent conventions.  
 
The discovery of exceptional cases transcends the standard classification of categories. 
The “casing” of time, levels (Ragin 1992) and multiple sites (Barton 2006) provides a holistic 
view of different dimensions of analysis. Combining multiple cross-case and within-case 
studies has increased explanatory power for encapsulating relationships among multilevel, 
heterogenous actors in different circumstances. Two rounds of formal interviews and followup 
communications with some participants enabled my research to track evolving non-linear 
processes and reassessment of managerial rationale over time. I showed that trustworthiness 
and rigor (Ballinger, 2004; Finlay, 2002b) could be implemented in qualitative case studies by 
cross-checking, presenting and constructing narratives from different perspectives, and 
  Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
282 
 
evaluating field data with multiple home and host countries and industry sources and iteration 
with existing conceptual frameworks.   
 
 This study embraced the exemplars, outliers and surprises as part of the discovery 
process. Unlike conventional case studies that emphasize on exemplars and positive cases, I 
presented a complex amalgamation of strengths and weaknesses of actors operating in 
changing environmental conditions. The study of outliers adds depth to existing theories and 
helps to develop persuasive arguments and theoretical constructs (Aharoni, 2011). Falsification 
would generate new discoveries (Popper, 2002), novel theoretical insights (Weick, 1995b) and 
reframing of findings (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012).   
 
The use of metaphors provided interesting and richer insights of the protagonists’ 
interpretation and justification for decisions (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009). Metaphorical 
(Alvesson, 2011) phrasal verbs of “go out” and “come back” emerging from the participants 
prompted deeper investigation into the notion of risk from the home country perspective. 
Narratives of businesses and officials in the private and public domains have enabled 
connections to be established between coevolution of different actors in the construction of risk 
perception and risk mitigation mechanisms. Textual and media analysis also strengthens the 
narrative and helps to explain and extend existing findings on high risk and overpriced 
transactions that have long characterized internationalization of Chinese firms. Including 
evolving literary terms in the narrative is consistent with the aims of mapping change and 
complexities. 
 
9.3.3 Management Practice 
 
A practical contribution for managers is the need to be sensitive to economic, political 
and social conditions in the operating environment. This study shows that besides having 
capital and established due diligence procedures, investors need to gain specialized knowledge 
of target businesses and understand host country regulatory and political climate. Paying 
premium prices to acquire coveted prized assets may not guarantee success in clinching the 
deal, nor does it help in value retention, value creation and viability of the operations post-
acquisition. Experienced industry leaders and recruitment of professionals would be helpful to 
investment outcomes only if they match the specific and specialized needs of the targeted 
business and investment objectives. 
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Potential investors who had success in acquisitions should be open to opportunities for 
collaboration with host country and multinational partners. It is never too late to learn and 
benefit from specialized knowledge and management skills of host country businesses. In 
contrast to Chinese investors’ preference for rapid international expansion through acquisitions 
and wholly owned subsidiaries, the option of joint ownership with different expertise would 
help to spread and mitigate risks in an increasingly challenging international environment. 
Investors would gain by testing the ground and cultivating host networks and business partners 
before making substantive commitments. Unlike previous conception of joint ventures to 
mitigate risks, more than two partners could be involved in consortium funding and 
management drawn from different countries, not limited to the host country. As some of the 
cases with POE investors showed, outsourcing to consultants and delegation of farm 
management to local managers may not fully mitigate risks. Managers themselves need to 
acquire the expertise required to understand specific businesses, host country regulations and 
the industry well.  
 
The hype and optimism of the ready and huge China market needs to be moderated. 
Companies would benefit by distinguishing areas of high potential growth from those that are 
difficult to penetrate due to persistent consumption habits, uncompetitive pricing and 
availability of substitutes. Investors should make allowance for growing the import and 
distribution channels in China gradually as existing trade barriers and ad hoc temporary bans 
may be imposed on certain foreign products, notwithstanding Chinese ownership of these 
overseas based companies.   
 
9.3.4 Policy Implications 
 
Home country policy makers should be mindful that rebalancing economic growth, 
redistribution of benefits, recentralization, anti-corruption and risk management would 
persuade businesses to be more cautious about undertaking more large-scale projects and slow 
down internationalization. Institutional support is wide ranging, and not confined to direct 
financial assistance to potential investors. The value of support depends on its usefulness to 
individual investors. Participants in this study have urged the Chinese government to offer 
more detailed and up-to-date industry and host country data, and to promote better diplomatic 
relations. Most POEs are reluctant to exchange autonomous internationalization strategy with 
direct government support unless their specific needs can be met. 
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A key implication for host countries is that SOEs are becoming more commercially 
oriented and competitive. Home country financial support for SOEs could not be taken for 
granted as firms have to demonstrate their capabilities and compete for funding that is open to 
a wider base of companies. Hence it would be timely to adjust the perceptions and expectations 
of advantages accorded to SOEs in general. The enthusiasm of Chinese investors in the past 
may not continue due to rising concerns in the home country of irrational investment decisions, 
rising debt and overleveraging especially into unproductive sectors.    
 
9.4   Research Boundaries 
 
9.4.1 Assumptions   
 
This was a qualitative research that aimed at opening the black box to examine change 
and interactions of home country effects on internationalization. The study was conducted 
using a bottom-up approach to capture interdependencies and change. Instead of the commonly 
used variant approach which connects causal deterministic factors to results, the boundary 
conditions have been relaxed to the specified timeframe and contingencies. The home country 
focus on the agrifood sector was critical to understanding institutional support and domestic 
demand especially during China’s transition to a consumption-led economic growth and 
continual refinement of pro-market policies. This study was framed to expand the scope, 
meaning and changes of home country effects to incorporate various levels of government, 
managers, industry and markets as well as the temporal dimension. The study has shifted the 
conversation from dualistic conception of home country support, entry mode strategy, high risk 
acquisitions and land-based investment to alternative assumptions. I assumed that the 
internationalization process would not necessarily be incremental and cumulative but could be 
non-linear and irregular and may even lead to de-commitment and de-internationalization. 
Home country support could take various forms and need not be dependent on ownership 
structures of the recipient companies. Home country actors are heterogenous and come from 
multiple perspectives: managerial, industry, local official, central policy directives and markets. 
Managers justified the selection of different sources of capital, value chain targets and risk 
mitigation measures which may not be in line with conventional wisdom. Relationships in the 
home country are assumed to be complex, ambivalent, interactive, overlapping and mutually 
influencing. 
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9.4.2 Limitations and Future Research  
 
My research is pitched at multi-level institutions, managerial behavior, firms’ position 
in the industry and markets. Though the study has taken a holistic and temporal approach, it 
does not claim generalizability for all Chinese investment, but provides insights into realities 
that would support theorizing under similar home country conditions. Replication and 
generalizable objectives are not entirely in line with the study of human behavior and social 
sciences (Dubois & Gadde, 2014). This is a context specific study of agrifood OFDI, and 
concurrent pro-market reforms, deregulation, recentralization and deleveraging. The 
expectation and objective of qualitative studies are not to develop abstraction for universal 
applications. Instead, the thesis has provided analytical generalizability for casing rather than 
statistical generalizability. A dynamic home country model would be relevant if similar 
conditions, managerial behavior, policies and powerplay are found in other industries and 
emerging markets.   
 
The study was bounded by the timeframe of study in the past decade when the 
phenomenon of internationalization in agrifood business took place. The study is focused on 
changes from high growth manufacturing to consumption driven rebalancing in the home 
country political economy.  Hence, these findings should be interpreted carefully given that the 
current study was necessarily confined to certain personalities, conditions, time and place. Due 
to the constraints of time and space, I have focused on home country factors and incorporated 
feedback from host countries, but this is in no way indicative of the lesser importance of host 
country context and the feedback for subsequent home country initiatives.   
 
Despite having access to interviews to company sources, follow-up communications, 
official views, industry sources and substantial published data, not all the companies provided 
the same degree of rich information. Some interviewees were more articulate, and willing to 
share details, and provided their analyses up to the latest developments. On the other hand, 
SOEs required formal application and accompaniment by home country official researchers 
working on a similar topic but different duration for the project. Counter-checking with other 
industry experts, annual reports and business commentaries was needed to corroborate the 
details and provide deeper and alternative insights. Two companies that had experienced board 
reshuffles and encountered difficulties in their internationalization strategy declined to be 
interviewed again subsequently.  
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The emergent frameworks constructed in the study include ‘discretionary meanings of 
support’, ‘preemptive downstream target strategy’, ‘diversification-internationalization 
challenges’ and ‘confluence and reinforcement’. These models provide opportunities and 
agendas for further theoretical development. Future studies could be expanded by increasing 
the sample to test different companies and other emerging markets. A larger-scale research 
would need to be conducted to verify if this framework could be applied at the national level, 
different regions and cross-country comparisons. Another research potential is to examine 
different types of risks and other growth sectors. Longitudinal studies could be conducted to 
continue where this study has left off to generate findings on the development of these 
companies in their future internationalization processes. Studies of Chinese MNE behavior 
could be deepened by focusing on single case studies. Micro-level analysis will improve our 
understanding of managerial interactions within each company and relationships with external 
parties and stakeholders. Incorporating diverse host government perspectives in the study 
would be helpful for investigating various challenges faced by emerging market MNEs.   
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